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
EUROPE SINCE 1870

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LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN

TO
MY BROTHER
JAMES FLYNN TURNER
WITH
GRATITUDE AND AFFECTION
MCMXXI

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P R E F A C E

THE author has attempted an outline of the history of Europe in the last fifty years, an era which began with the victories of the Germans in 1870 and ended with the destruction of their empire.

No period can be more interesting to the present student of events. The history of Europe during this half century was, indeed, the larger part of the history of all of the world, for most of the world's population was controlled by European powers or else associated with them and directly affected by their fate. The events of this time have touched the lives and the fortunes of most men and women now living. Successive years were thronged with vast developments and crowded with a multitude of persons and events, the story moving like some drama on to its tragic end.

Whether we wish it or not, the present and the future must be filled with great problems arising from this era, to be understood only in connection with it. Into consideration of these problems we here in the United States are destined to be ever more nearly drawn.

Much of the writing was done in connection with the author's *Europe, 1789-1920*; but considerable additions have been made and some portions are entirely new. If, in spite of the larger space available here, he can be reproached with having left out a great many things, the answer must be that he has tried very hard to do this. In his own studies and reading he has never had any lasting impression from a mere collection of details. He has,



PREFACE

therefore, striven to eliminate non-essential things wherever he could, and elsewhere subordinate the less important matters to consideration of principal tendencies and dominant ideas. It is his highest ambition that in his pages may be had a glimpse of the reality of departed years and something of the spirit that was in them. In respect of this he hopes that some of the quotations at the chapter heads may seem of more worth than ten times their space filled with data and statistics; and that here and there a student reading them may feel the mysterious call to seek out the great books himself.

The author is indebted to the courtesy of Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons for permission to quote at the beginning of the seventeenth chapter lines written by the late Lieutenant-Colonel John McCrae.

EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER.

Ann Arbor, Michigan

May 1, 1921

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE ERA OF 1870	7
II. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND AFTER	17
III. NEW INVENTIONS AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION	40
IV. CERTAIN INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES	67
V. THE EUROPEAN STATES IN 1870	94
VI. THE MILITARY TRIUMPHS OF GERMANY, 1864-1871	122
VII. THE GROWTH OF THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE	143
VIII. THE LEADERSHIP OF GERMANY—THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE	173
IX. THE RECOVERY OF FRANCE—THE DUAL ALLIANCE	210
X. DEMOCRATIC BRITAIN	240
XI. RUSSIA	269
XII. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, TURKEY, AND THE BALKANS	304
XIII. ITALY, SPAIN, AND THE LESSER STATES	344
XIV. COLONIES AND IMPERIAL EXPANSION	369
XV. TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE ENTENTES	398
XVI. THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR	421
XVII. THE GREAT WAR	450
XVIII. THE SETTLEMENT OF 1920	498
XIX. SOCIALISM, SYNDICALISM, AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION	529
APPENDIX	551
INDEX	557

MAPS

NO.		PAGE
1.	RELIEF MAP OF EUROPE	<i>Following</i> 20
2.	RACIAL MAP OF EUROPE	" 36
3.	THE COAL, IRON, AND OIL RESOURCES OF EUROPE	<i>Following</i> 52
4.	EUROPE: SHOWING RAILROADS, CANALS, AND PRINCIPAL RIVERS	<i>Following</i> 68
5.	EUROPE IN 1870 (<i>In colors</i>)	" 100
6.	ALSACE-LORRAINE	140
7.	THE GERMAN EMPIRE IN 1914	<i>Following</i> 164
8.	THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO	177
9.	FRANCE IN 1920	216
10.	THE BRITISH ISLES	244
11.	IRELAND: SHOWING THE SINK FEIN AREAS IN 1918, AND THE UNIONIST AREAS IN ULMSTER.	262
12.	MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE HISTORY OF POLAND	275
13.	RACIAL MAP OF RUSSIA	277
14.	THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN 1914	<i>Following</i> 292
15.	THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR	295
16.	RACIAL MAP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY	309
17.	THE BALKANS IN 1878	322
18.	THE OTTOMAN DOMINIONS: GREATEST EX- TENT, SUCCESSIVE LOSSES, PRESENT EX- TENT	<i>Following</i> 324
19.	THE BALKANS IN 1913	330
20.	ASIA IN 1800	<i>Following</i> 356
21.	AFRICA IN 1800	" 372
22.	ASIA IN 1914	" 388
23.	AFRICA IN 1914	" 404

MAPS

NO.		PAGE
24.	THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1914 . . .	<i>Following</i>
25.	SUPPOSED PAN-GERMAN PLAN . . .	“
26.	THE WESTERN FRONT IN THE GREAT WAR . . .	465
27.	THE EASTERN FRONT IN THE GREAT WAR. . .	466
28.	THE OCEANS OF THE WORLD—MERCATOR'S PROJECTION: SHOWING THE PRINCIPAL SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE GREAT WAR.	<i>Following</i>
29.	GALLIPOLI	468
30.	THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONTIER.	471
31.	AFRICA IN 1920	<i>Following</i>
32.	CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.	483
33.	THE BALKANS IN 1920	500
34.	JUGO-SLAVIA	507
35.	THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1920 . . .	<i>Following</i>
36.	EUROPE IN 1920 (<i>In colors</i>) . . .	516
		532

EUROPE SINCE 1870

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CHAPTER I

THE ERA OF 1870 AND EUROPE

Europe is the smallest in extent of the four great continents, and yet we may pronounce it the most important of all the divisions of the globe. Asia, indeed, was the cradle of civilization and knowledge; but her empires soon became, and have ever since continued, stationary; while Europe has carried the sciences, arts, and refinements, with almost uninterrupted progress, to the comparatively elevated state at which they have now arrived. All the branches of industry are conducted with a skill and to an extent unattained in any other part of the earth.

HUGH MURRAY, and others, *The Encyclopædia of Geography* (1855), i. 288, 289.

THE beginning of this period of European history, far away as it seems now, is not remote through number of years. Some can still remember 1870, and many fathers and mothers of the generation now living were of the generation then in its prime. But passing years have brought about mighty changes. The men of that time, so be-whiskered, as they peer from out of the engravings, with tall hats, loose trousers, long coats; the women, with wide skirts, crinoline, and shawls; the artisans, the laborers, the women workers, the peasants, seen in the prints or cruder pictures of then; all of these people of the era of our fathers or grandfathers lived amidst changes which have since made their life and surroundings appear strange and old-fashioned to us.

Yet, compared with what had been a century précédent, before 1789, in the Old Régime, these men and women lived in the midst of conditions much like our own. A hundred years before, in the eighteenth century, almost all the people in Europe had made their living by working the

Two genera-tions ago

The Old
Régime very
different
from the
period about
1870

Lowly condition of the people in the eighteenth century

Religion

land. A much smaller number sought their livelihood in manufacturing, commerce, and trade. They worked long hours with simple tools, and with much labor of muscle and hands. Few of them could read and write. Most of them made up a lower class, without political power or rights, ruled by a small upper class and sovereigns, whom they obeyed and supported. The great mass of men and women were serfs, partly unfree. Between the throng of laborers, peasants, and serfs on the one hand, and the great men of the nobility or the Church on the other, was a middle class, the *bourgeoisie*, rising in importance, but in most countries still with small part in controlling affairs. Generally government was in the hands of sovereigns, who had power complete and despotic, ruling of themselves and through officials whom they appointed or removed at their pleasure. In no great country then did an important representative assembly exist, save in Great Britain; and the British parliament, though it was representative and endowed with real power, represented only the upper classes and very often worked in their interests. Nowhere, except among the followers of such men as Rousseau, was there any idea that all men, not to speak of women, should vote and be represented in parliaments, which should make the laws and grant taxes. There was much unbelief and religious decadence, but this had been confined mostly to the upper intellectual class. The great body of the people everywhere followed the teaching of their priests without question. Enlightened sceptics might deride the dogmas of the Church, but the masses, simple and pious, accepted the Scriptures, with the story of creation and the fall of man, with the derivative conceptions of heaven, earth, purgatory, and hell, literally, with no reservation. In most of the countries of Europe national feeling was dormant or weak.

At this time most people travelled seldom and little. By land they must go on foot, on horseback, or in cumber-

THE ERA OF 1870 AND EUROPE 9

some coaches, over poor roads, ill made and ill kept. On the rivers they might go down with the current toward the coast. On the sea they would voyage slowly in small sailing ships driven forward by the wind. Not many letters could be sent; they went slow and might not be delivered. Newspapers were few and small and contained little news. There was no way of getting news from other places quickly. Most houses were not well heated, and there was no way for most people to get enough inexpensive fuel. Artificial lighting was scanty and poor; and after sundown there was such darkness as is not known to most people now. There was not much machinery. Manufacturing was mostly carried on in the laborers' homes. The work was done largely by hand, with simple tools and devices. The steam engine was only just beginning to be used. There were not yet any railroads, no steamboats, no telegraphs, no telephones, and no electrical apparatus. Only a little had the forces of nature been reduced to the service of man.

By 1870 an immense transformation had come. Divine right of kings and their absolute power had been overthrown in western Europe. In many countries constitutions had appeared, and governments had come to be limited and responsible to representatives elected. Most people still did not accept any idea of complete democracy or universal suffrage, and would have laughed to scorn the suggestion that women should have any control over the governments which ruled them. None the less the condition of women was slowly but constantly improving, and in one country after another the electorate was being widened and democracy enhanced and extended. By this time nationalism had come to be one of the strongest political forces in the world. In western Europe the power of nobles and great churchmen had been broken, and an aristocracy of blood no longer lorded over the mass of the people. The place of the old nobility now was largely

Material
conditions
in the time
of the Old
Régime

Conditions
about 1870

Industry
and capi-
talism

held by an industrial aristocracy, the great manufacturers, capitalists, and traders, much increased in numbers, in wealth, and in power. They were masters of men employed in factories and working at the machines of employers for wages. More and more they dominated the conduct of affairs. But the workers, so helpless and oppressed in the early days of the Industrial Revolution, were slowly gathering power to win better conditions. Already they were beginning to form industrial trade unions, while the socialist doctrines of St. Simon and Marx proclaimed new hopes for the masses of mankind. At the same time, immense and brilliant scientific investigation was establishing new ideas which conflicted with the older teachings of the Church. Men were beginning to believe that the world was very old, and that things always had developed by slow change or evolution.

Material
conditions in
1870

During the period just preceding, the advance in discovery and mechanical invention had been far greater than in any epoch before. In 1870, it is true, in Europe as elsewhere, there were no airplanes, no submarines, no automobiles, no combustion gas engines, and no tram cars in the cities. The phonograph, the cinema, and wireless telegraphy had not yet appeared. But some of the greatest things which we have now men were possessed of then. The immense liners and huge freight ships which cross every ocean in our day had not yet appeared, but steamships had revolutionized sea-borne traffic. The passage over the Atlantic, which had formerly taken a month or six or seven weeks, now sometimes took less than a fortnight. Maritime facilities were being extended, and vast changes and improvements made. The Isthmus of Panama was still the narrow but insuperable obstacle between the Atlantic and the Pacific that it was in the days when Balboa toiled slowly from one shore to the other. But a still greater obstacle to the world's trade had just been removed. In 1869 the Suez Canal was opened amidst

THE ERA OF 1870 AND EUROPE 11

magnificent festivities, memorable for the first performance of Verdi's *Aïda*. The splendid railroad systems of Europe, which before the Great War linked all its important cities together, and formed a network of highways in the more advanced countries of the west, were far less developed fifty years before; but railways had long been increasingly important. Already the Prussians were arranging their railways for war, in "strategic systems."

Partly in consequence of better transportation, partly because of certain great mechanical inventions, an industrial system had been rising, which made it easy to produce more necessaries and luxuries than had ever been possible before in the history of mankind. The telegraph was everywhere bringing rapid communication on land, while telegraphs carried in submarine cables were being laid beneath various seas. In 1866 such a cable had been stretched across the bottom of the Atlantic. It was now possible for news to be got quickly from a distance, and with the development of the power printing-press, large newspapers containing much fresh news were circulated widely without delay. Illiteracy was still prevalent in eastern and southern Europe, and much of it remained in all countries except Prussia and a few smaller states. Yet, it had much diminished since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and there were constantly more readers of newspapers, periodicals, and books.

The lands of these people, the mountains, the rivers, the seas round about—all were very much as they had been for a hundred past generations. In mass and in area Europe seemed small enough, for it was least among the continents, less than either of the Americas, only an extension of Asia, to the east, and small beside the giant Africa southward. From Asia Europe was marked off on the east by the low-lying Ural Mountains; southward by the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, and by the Caucasus Mountains between them. At two points, the

Machinery
and com-
munication

The Con-
tinent of
Europe

Bosporus and the Dardanelles, where Constantinople stood and where ancient Troy once had been, Asia and Europe were separated by less than the breadth of a river. Between Europe and Africa lay the Mediterranean, highway of commerce and once the very cradle of European culture. Past the sunlit shores of Greece and Italy and France, this sea stretched on resplendent and broad, until narrowing down by the Spanish coast it ended at the Strait of Gibraltar.

The Euro-
pean plain

Of this Europe the greater part was a vast and extensive low plain, which embraced all the eastern half of the continent. From the sunken stretches by the Caspian and the great wheat lands above the Black Sea, up across the steppes, the forests, the marshes of Russia, to the barren tundras of the north, and eastward from the Urals to the Carpathian Mountains, stretched the mighty expanses of this plain, which was here the home of the Russian people and mother of the races of the Slavs. Huge, monotonous, unbroken, it was traversed by broad, slowly moving rivers, Ural, Volga, Dnieper, and Don, flowing to the south, and by others less known and less used flowing northward. Stretching west, to the north of the Carpathians and lesser mountains, a narrower part of this plain extended, across the Prussian and northern German lands, over Belgium and Holland, across the northern part of France and the western part, down to the Pyrenees Mountains. And farther north and westward, beyond the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, beyond lands long since sunken and drowned, portions of this plain ended in Sweden and England. Across parts of this western extension ran the most renowned rivers of Europe, Vistula, Oder, Elbe, Weser, Rhine, Seine, Loire, Garonne, and Thames. In this great plain, from the Russian mountains to the Bay of Biscay and Ireland, lived most of Europe's inhabitants, and there now were assembled most of her wealth and grandeur and power.

THE ERA OF 1870 AND EUROPE 13

Elsewhere mountain and upland held sway over lowland and plain. Most of Norway, most of Switzerland, all the north half of Scotland, most of Wales, and much of the Balkan country, were mountainous, and parts of them backward, sparsely peopled, and poor. Between Italians, Germans, and Frenchmen the heights of the Alps rose like a towering rampart, distinctly separating nations. All the eastern coast of the Adriatic and all the west side of Norway were a succession of deep fiords and landlocked bays between lofty and precipitous mountains. In 1870 the inhabitants of Albania were in the midst of the savage, tribal conditions in which Lord Byron had known them sixty years earlier, like the Scottish Highlanders two centuries before. Spain, with plateau lands traversed by parallel ranges, was definitely marked off from France by the Pyrenees Mountains. In central Europe the Carpathians lay like a bulwark reared against Russia.

Mountain
and upland

The principal arteries of communication and commerce continued to be the rivers and the seas. The more important rivers of north Russia and those of eastern Germany drained to the Baltic, whence the commerce of these regions went outward in between the Scandinavian countries to the North Sea and the oceans of the world. The rivers of west Germany, the Low Countries, and north France, flowed to the North Sea and the English Channel, whence their commerce was carried to the Atlantic. Beyond the Continent lay England, just where she commanded all of this commerce. Her favorable position had brought her great wealth and power. To London, on the estuary of the Thames, came the shipping of the world, while Liverpool, on the western side of England, threw on the growing American trade. Eastern Russia drained down to the land-locked Caspian through the mighty length of the Volga. All central and southern Russia looked toward the Black Sea, while Austria, Hungary, and

Rivers and
seas

the Balkan countries were nourished by the Danube which sought this sea also. The commerce of the Black Sea went in a steady stream past Constantinople and Gallipoli to the Mediterranean, where it was mostly borne westward past southern Europe out by Gibraltar to the Atlantic Ocean. On the Mediterranean, brought thither by road or river, went the commerce of Greece, of Italy, of southern France, and of most of Spain.

The land routes

The great land routes sought the valleys and the plains, or, if necessary, climbed uplands and the mountain passes. Through the Pyrenees went the overland routes between France and Spain. Through the several Alpine passes armies and merchants had gone from the time of Hannibal to the time of Napoleon, and under the Alps long tunnels for railways were soon to be built. Between the French and the German peoples, between Paris and Berlin, the old roads, the modern trunk line, the principal highway, traversed the plain across Belgium and Holland, and across these small countries, especially Belgium, from one to the other of the mightier neighbors, merchants and their wares had gone for ages, and armies had often met there in mortal combat.

Memorials,
traditions,
associations

This Europe was a land very rich in its past, enshrined in old deeds and traditions. Some ancient crosses and round towers still existed in Ireland. Up and down England, from Canterbury to Durham, were the cathedrals, with their majesty, beauty, and repose. In Portugal were the vast, deserted palaces built in former times. In Spain the *Escurial* watched over its gray, wide plain, while the sublime quietude of the cathedral at Toledo witnessed the devotion of days elsewhere gone. All through the southern parts of France were relics of Greeks, of Romans, of medieval culture, from the aqueduct near Nîmes and the amphitheatre at Arles to the fortress towers and the keep of Carcassonne. Northward were the cathedrals, at Bourges, at Chartres, at Amiens,

THE ERA OF 1870 AND EUROPE 15

at Rheims, and *Notre-Dame de Paris*; and farther on the abbeys and churches of the Normans. In Belgium the Cloth Hall at Ypres, the towers and old bridges of Bruges. At Cologne the cathedral spires threw their shadows down by the Rhine. All across western Germany, along the Baltic, down through Austria and its provinces, were memorials of an older German culture, at Augsburg, at Nürnberg, at Innsbruck, at Salzburg, at Rothenburg, and Aachen. In Italy were the palaces and churches of Milan and Florence, the canals and the marbles of Venice, the tombs of Ravenna, the tower of Pisa, the Coliseum at Rome and St. Peter's, and near Naples the older ruins of Pompeii were even then being uncovered. By the Danube at Vienna stood the houses of the proudest aristocracy in Europe. At Constantinople bulked, as if for ever, the dome of *Santa Sophia*; before it rose in slender height the newer minarets of the Turk. Across the stretches of the Russian plain were Moscow and Novgorod, in their aspect half oriental; and farther still, at Samara on the Volga, the market place, with riot of colors and babel of voices, its throngs come from Europe and Asia.

The mountains of southern Spain had looked down when the Moors gained their victories and afterward made their last stand. The Pillars of Hercules had watched the Phœnician galleys go by. The fogs and the rain blew in Ireland as in the time of Saint Patrick. The Channel and the Rhine had long before been observed and described by Cæsar. Older by far than the Catacombs of Rome or the ruined temple at Pæstum, Vesuvius poured forth its smoke, while Stromboli glared in the night as when Carthaginians came sailing north. The Alpine passes had seen the ages go by, with the barbarians, the conquerors, the merchants, the pilgrims, who had toiled to their heights, then gone downward. More ancient than Homer or Sappho was the beauty of the isles of the Greeks. A few years before the Carpathians had been pierced

Cities of
an older
time

The past
and the
present

by Russian armies, as long since they had been traversed by Hungarians and Huns. The endless reaches of Russia stretched on in remoteness and sadness. The Rhine flowed down, past medieval castles and new industrial cities, by ancient vineyards, by the memories of Roman bridges. The stars of the night, which had glittered for Galileo and Dante, watched now the nineteenth century slowly draw toward its close. Beside these things the state-craft of rulers, wars, treaties, arrangements, the toil and the lives of people, man's doings and man's aspirations, here as elsewhere seemed fleeting, small, unimportant.

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CHAPTER II

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND AFTER

The power of kings and magistrates is nothing else, but what is only derivative, transferred and committed to them in trust from the people to the common good of them all, in whom the power yet remains fundamentally. . . .

JOHN MILTON, *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (1649).

Les représentants du peuple français constitués en assemblée nationale . . . déclarent

Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits. . . .

Le but de toute association politique est la conservation des droits naturels . . . la liberté, la propriété, la sûreté et la résistance à l'oppression

Declaration of the Rights of Man, September 14, 1791, *Archives Parlementaires*, 1st series, xxxii. 525.

Universal suffrage *fera le tour du monde*. It is now the last court of appeal on all questions, international, among the rest.

Conversation of MONTALEMBERT with NASSAU SENIOR (1863).

DOWN to 1870, perhaps it still seemed that the most important cause of changes in the hundred years preceding had been the French Revolution, and that Europe in the nineteenth century had been adjusting herself to what had begun in the latter part of the eighteenth century in France. In the days of the Old Régime the great mass of men and women almost everywhere had been debased, ignorant, laborious peasants, toiling on the land to produce with a rude agriculture the subsistence for themselves and their masters. For the most part, as in Russia, the German countries, Hungary, and Poland, they were serfs, partly unfree, bound to the soil, under obligation to work for their lord several days in the week, and make to him

Europe before the French Revolution

Condition
of the
masses

payments in produce or kind. In some places, like Ireland, where serfdom did not prevail, the peasants were bowed down in as lowly position through heavy rents which they paid to landlords. Nowhere, save in some of the Swiss Cantons, did the mass of the people control their governments or have any voice in the conduct of affairs. Almost everywhere they were excluded from all participation in government, substantially debarred from the holding of office, not allowed to vote for the members of legislative or conciliar assemblies, where such assemblies existed. Most of them were entirely subject to the rule of absolute sovereigns or powerful nobles. The mighty Roman Catholic Church had for ages insisted that within its ranks there should be opportunity for the humblest to rise, though actually the great places had almost always been monopolized by members of the upper classes. In

Ideas about
government

the seventeenth century Calvinists, asserting that all men were equal in the sight of God, transferred this idea to the realm of politics, and declared that church members, at any rate, should have part in the government under which they lived, and some right to control their rulers. Generally, however, there was no idea that most men and women should have any part in the governance of states, through representatives consenting to taxes or making the laws of the land. It was almost universally held that they should merely obey without question. Kings and nobles then tried to govern their realms to best advantage, and sometimes endeavored to better the condition of the people. None the less, for the most part government was managed in the interests of the sovereigns and the upper classes, taxes were imposed without respect to the wish of the payers, and statecraft and foreign policy were carried on at the discretion of rulers.

In Great Britain then conditions, though very different from what they are now, were nevertheless better than anywhere else in Europe. The power of the king had long

been limited by a parliament composed partly of representatives of the upper and middle classes, and it was not possible to take from British subjects a shilling of taxes which their parliament had not freely granted. Serfdom had completely passed away. The great majority of the people had, indeed, no voice in the government, but they had the protection of the English common law and certain great statutes, like *Habeas Corpus*; and the great men of the upper classes, while ruling in their own interests, yet had much consideration for the people beneath them. The government of Britain in the latter part of the eighteenth century was regarded as a model by the great French political theorists and writers, who hoped that their own might be reconstructed some day so as to be more like it.

Conditions
in Great
Britain

In France conditions then were less good, but more favorable than in any other large state excepting Great Britain. The government was entirely in the hands of a king with unlimited power, assisted by officials whom he appointed. Whereas parliamentary institutions had developed in England, so that in course of time the power of the king was limited and checked, in France they had declined, and the French representative assembly, the *États Généraux*, had not been summoned since 1614. Serfdom had mostly disappeared, but some old manorial obligations, payments to the *seigneur* and working upon his land, remained to vex a great number of peasants. Taxes were high, and were paid very largely by the impoverished lower classes. Notwithstanding all this, most Frenchmen probably realized that for the past hundred years their government had been more successful than that of any other great state on the Continent, that the soil of France had almost never in that time been trodden by invaders, that France was great and respected, and that French culture, in its favorable surroundings, had developed more finely than any other then in existence.


In France

Conditions
relatively
good


It was partly because conditions were relatively good, and because civilization and prosperity were high, that so much enlightened discontent was developed. Writers like Montesquieu and Voltaire proclaimed the superior excellence of English institutions; Voltaire and Diderot criticized traditional beliefs with remarkable clearness and merciless wit; Rousseau and his disciples spread abroad a strange new philosophy that men were equal, that they should control their government, that existing things should be overthrown so that men might return to a blessed "state of nature." These teachings were allowed by a society long established and now grown careless, so strongly established, as it seemed, that it need not fear for the future. But year by year, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the *bourgeoisie* were rising in importance and less content with their status, national finances grew more hopelessly involved, and the condition of the lowest class seemed harder to bear. At last bankruptcy was at hand, and as a final recourse the king, Louis XVI, summoned the *États Généraux*, the old assembly of estates.

First stage
of the
French
Revolution,
1789-1792

Few, perhaps, expected the mighty results which followed. Almost immediately, the Third Estate, representatives of the middle and lower classes, got control of the body. They proclaimed themselves a National Assembly, and proceeded to draw up a constitution for France. The ideas long spread about were now seen to have taken deep root, and there was abundant evidence that reform would at once be attempted. Presently, in 1791, a constitution was proclaimed which made France a limited monarchy, like Great Britain, with principal power in a legislative assembly; but going beyond what had yet been accomplished in England, the franchise was given to three fourths of the men of the state. Nowhere up to that time had so great an extension of the electorate been made. The National Assembly had abolished serfdom and



1. RELIEF



RELIEF MAP OF EUROPE

manorial burdens, and then confiscated the vast possessions of the Church, a fifth of the land in the kingdom. Hunger and misery had already caused outbreaks of the poor and the desperate, who rose up against their lords, seized their property, and drove them away.

In the course of the two years, 1789-91, the French reformers seemed to have accomplished all that had been brought to pass in Britain during ages, and more. But the momentum of so rapid a change is seldom to be stayed until it has gone much farther in more rapid and violent course. Radicals now demanded more fundamental and thorough-going reforms, declaring that what had been done so far benefited the lower classes very little. Ideas of complete democracy were put forward, and other ideas like the socialism preached fifty years later. Amid discontent from existing abuses and the confusion attending reforms it was not difficult for resolute radicals to seize control of affairs, especially when reactionaries and foreign powers tried to restore what had just been abolished. Accordingly, in 1792, the Revolution entered upon a new and more radical phase, when the new constitutional government was overthrown, a republic proclaimed, and a National Convention, chosen by manhood suffrage, assembled to draw up another constitution. Next year the king was put to death, and the nobles banished for ever. Sweeping changes were made or begun in the interests of the mass of the people. The property of the nobles was confiscated by the state and sold; and presently bought by small proprietors, so that afterward France came to be more largely divided among small owners than any other great state in the world. Simplification and codifying of the law were begun, and a better educational system was planned, work completed afterward under Napoleon Bonaparte. But this excellent work was wrought in the midst of a period of excessively radical change. Some of the reformers tried to sweep away

The second
stage, 1792-5

The Con-
vention

all old things. They called 1792 the Year I. Some wished to divide all property among all of the people. Christianity was suppressed and the worship of Reason proclaimed.

The Reign
of Terror
and the en-
suing reac-
tion

There was, consequently, inevitable reaction. Many Frenchmen loved the old order. They had not sought its overthrow, and longed to restore it. A great many earnestly wanted the reforms made by the National Assembly, but not the extremer changes offered now by the Convention. Moreover, the measures against church property, and especially against the Church, profoundly alienated great bodies of men and women whose strongest attachment was to their Church. And finally, while the great mass of the people had formerly been peasants, poor and discontented, now that manorial obligations had been abolished, their condition was bettered. As they began to purchase the confiscated lands and become property-owners themselves, they became conservative and no longer willing to follow radical leaders. Accordingly, while in 1792-3 a great outburst of patriotism and rising of the people enabled the Convention to repel foreign enemies who tried to enter France, soon the leaders in the Convention, like Marat, Danton, and Robespierre, could maintain their power only through a reign of Terror, as did the *Bolsheviks* in Russia more than a century later.

The middle
class
assumes
control

By massacre, by judicial murder, by ruthless force, they suppressed all uprisings and got space to continue their work. But the tide now flowed steadily back away from them, and presently the Convention came again under the power of the *bourgeoisie*. In 1795 the so-called Constitution of the Year III established the Directory, and made the government a middle-class republic, in which the franchise was limited by property qualifications. When this government had lost esteem from inefficiency and from corruption it was overthrown by Napoleon Bonaparte, a soldier of fortune but also a statesman and genius of unrivalled abilities and daring.

Bonaparte, in effect, saved from further reaction and, perhaps, from overthrow, such of the work of the Revolution as had solid basis in the wishes of most of the people. As first consul, under the Constitution of the Year VIII (1800), and afterward as emperor (1802–1814), he seized upon all real power in the state, and was actually more powerful than Louis XVI ever had been. But the work of the National Assembly, 1789–91, was preserved, and some of the work of the Convention brought to completion. Thus under Napoleon, as under the Constitution of 1791, serfdom and manorial obligations remained abolished; and the land taken from the monasteries and the Church, and now getting more and more into the possession of peasant proprietors, laid the foundations of a new, stronger France. Under his direction the old confused laws were reduced to the simple *Code Napoléon*, which embodied, moreover, some of the best ideas of the Revolution. A great reform of education was carried forward. On the other hand, the excesses of the Jacobins and the Terror were rejected; and peace was made with the Church in the compromise embodied in the *Concordat* of 1801. Accordingly, the all-important, but comparatively moderate, reforms of the first part of the Revolution were preserved.

From France the reforms of the Revolution were spread out over western, southern, and central Europe during a long series of wars, which began during the Revolution, continued under Napoleon, and were finally ended with the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. In 1792 the Revolutionists had seen themselves threatened not only by conservatives and reactionaries in France, but by opposition from all the old divine right monarchies of Europe. Taking the offensive themselves they soon proclaimed that they would carry the blessings of their revolution to all the oppressed peoples of Europe. Then by propaganda and force of arms they sought to set up their system in

The less radical part of the Revolution saved by Napoleon Bonaparte

The Revolutionary ideas spread to other countries

Radicals
and con-
servatives
in Europe

all of the lands near by. They had much success, and soon occupied the districts adjoining their frontiers. Presently, indeed, Europe was divided between the innovators, supported and urged forward by a militant French Republic, and all those who clung to the old order, whose instincts were conservative, who were appalled at the execution of the French king and his queen, and at the excesses of the Reign of Terror. Napoleon was, indeed, ambitious and filled with consciousness of his ability as a soldier, but he was also confronted with an opposition in Europe, which was to a large extent opposition to the French Revolution. In the long wars of his time, which lasted with little intermission from 1797 to 1815, he crushed his enemies, and erected the mightiest despotism and military empire which Europe had seen for ages, but he also defended and preserved the better parts of the Revolution. When at last his enemies finally prevailed and his power was broken, through mere passage of time the best reforms of the Revolution had got firm root in France, and in the neighboring countries where Frenchmen had brought them.

Reaction
1814-1855

With the restoration of the Bourbons in 1814 a period of reaction began in France, but the best reforms were not disturbed, and presently the work of 1789 was extended by the Revolution of 1830. After the downfall of Napoleon very naturally reaction at once commenced in all the principal countries of Europe. After the long period of wars and confusion one of the principal objects of the great men who assembled at the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) was to restore what had been overthrown and make further revolution impossible. During the period of the domination of Metternich, the Austrian statesman (1814-48), and of Tsar Nicholas I of Russia (1825-55), reaction held full sway over parts of the Continent. But even so, none of the great things which had been achieved in 1789 was destroyed. The Revolution of 1830 began

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 25

a new, more liberal era in France and in Belgium; while the revolutions in various countries in 1848 not only carried forward the work in France but broke the power and the system of Metternich in central Europe. As yet the spirit of the French Revolution had scarcely crossed the borders of the realm of the tsars, but after the disasters of the Crimean War (1854–6), a new era began also in Russia. During all this time and afterward the ideas proclaimed in France in 1789 were being spread farther and farther, and more and more made good and accepted.

In 1789 serfdom had been the condition of most of the people of Europe. In that year the remnants of it were abolished in France. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods it was brought to an end by French conquerors in the German lands along the Rhine, in Italy, and in Spain. In 1807, when Prussia, striving to regenerate herself and then escape from Napoleon's overlordship, was carrying through great reforms, serfdom was abolished in her dominions. It was now at an end in western and southern Europe, and in most of the German countries; but it lingered on among the millions of subjects of Austria and Russia. Then, during the Revolution of 1848 serfdom was abolished in Austria and in Hungary. Meanwhile, there had been some idea of freeing the serfs in Russia; but this was not attempted in earnest until the reign of Alexander II, who brought it to an end in the years from 1859–66. By this time slavery, a more complete form of servitude, had been abolished in the Southern States of the American Union, so that by 1870, except in Brazil, civil freedom was universal in every country ruled by white men in the world.

Meanwhile, constitutional progress had gone on apace. In 1789 no important country had a constitution defining the powers of the government, except the new United States with their written constitution just established, and Great Britain with the custom, laws, and court decisions,

Later revolutions,
1830, 1848

Disappearance of
serfdom

Constitu-
tional prog-
ress

which practically made an unwritten constitution. Almost everywhere, in states great or little, the power of the sovereign was not limited, save to some extent by general custom and obvious propriety. Generally that which pleased the prince was law.

Constitu-
tional
government
in France

In 1791 the French National Assembly drew up the first constitution ever given to a great state on the continent of Europe, and this was followed by others, in 1795 and 1800, all of them defining exactly the functions of the government and limiting its power. There was now in France above the rulers a great law which they must observe; and while in effect such a thing had long existed in England, there it was unwritten and defined only by the custom and constitutional development of the English people. When Louis XVIII was restored in 1814 he granted a Charter, or constitution, which, although it embodied the doctrine of Divine Right, limited the authority of the king and provided a definite scheme for the government of the realm. In 1830 this Charter was revised, and the doctrine of Divine Right omitted. After the Revolution of 1848 a constituent assembly drafted a new arrangement, and although Louis Napoleon seized large power for himself, yet even when he reigned as the Emperor Napoleon III he ruled the country under a constitution.

In Spain

Meanwhile, constitutionalism had gone forward in countries near by. The people of Great Britain continued, in accordance with their peculiar and admirable political genius, to preserve their constitution large and unwritten; but as changes took place in other countries constitutions were written out explicitly after the manner of the French and the American peoples. In 1812 the Spanish revolutionists had proclaimed a liberal constitution, embodying the best ideas recently developed in France, and though this constitution was speedily overthrown, it was proclaimed again in Spain during the revolution there in

1820, and for some time served as a model for liberals in the southern lands. In 1830, when the Belgians declared their independence of Holland, they adopted a constitution, for some time the most liberal in Europe. The Revolution of 1848 brought constitutions in Austria and in Hungary, though in the following reaction they were speedily overthrown. In the next year, however, a new constitution was proclaimed for all of the Austrian dominions. Meanwhile, a general assembly, known as the Frankfort Parliament, had convened to draw up a scheme for uniting Germany. This assembly tried also to make a liberal constitution, but in the reaction soon under way in central Europe the rulers of the principal states found it easy to reject its work. In Prussia in 1848 the people had risen in revolution, and a constituent assembly was called. The king was soon able to dismiss the members; but in 1850 a constitution was granted by the grace of the sovereign himself. Forty years before the Prussian king had promised to grant a "suitably organized representation both provincial and national," but this promise, twice repeated at intervals of five years, had remained unfulfilled. When at last, in 1867, German unity was substantially accomplished, the new North German Confederation was organized under a constitution, which was the basis of that of the German Empire established soon after. When the age-long troubles of the Austrians and Magyars were arranged in 1867, the settlement was embodied in the constitutional Compromise or *Ausgleich*. Farther east and south, in the dominions of Russia and of Turkey, there continued to be no semblance of government by any constitution.

Meanwhile, the other great ideas of the French Revolution were spreading through Europe and changing the relations of men. *Liberté*, *Égalité*, *Fraternité* were the magnificent watchwords of Revolutionary leaders, and far as the deeds of these men and their successors often fell,

In central Europe

Liberty and equality

Impulse of
the French
Revolution

short, yet it was the ideal of the best men to bring them to pass. Liberty and equality were more and more made good by the work of the Revolution and Napoleon, and as the result of a spirit increasingly enlightened and humane. Rousseau's idea, that man was born free, was embodied in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1791), that all men are free and equal in rights. As serfdom was abolished and civil equality made good in France, and as these reforms were gradually extended beyond the French borders, a great amelioration in the condition of the masses took place. By the end of the eighteenth century these things had been wrought in France; during the first half of the nineteenth they were accomplished in central Europe; during the second half they were being worked out in the eastern part.

Democracy
in earlier
times

But while the idea of civil equality was spreading across Europe, political equality made much slower progress. Nowhere except among a few radical reformers was it believed that all of the people or most of them should have part in the government of the state. "I do not know," said Bishop Horsley in the British House of Lords, "what the mass of the people in any country have to do with the laws but to obey them." Democracy and political equality had scarcely yet been conceived of. In ancient times there had been in the most highly developed communities, especially in some of the city states of Greece, flourishing democracies, in which political power was actually in the hands of the *demos* or people. But this *demos* was only a part of the community, the free male citizens of the state, living beside other men who had no share in political privileges and supported by a far more numerous body of slaves. In the seventeenth century the Calvinistic religious doctrines applied to politics presently developed the idea of the political equality of the citizens in the government of their country, and for a while in England (1649-60) monarchy was abolished, a republic established,

and political power given to the citizens of the state. But neither in England, where the experiment endured only for a brief space, nor in Calvinist Geneva and the Puritan communities across the Atlantic in New England, where the idea endured, was there any complete notion of democracy, for always the franchise was rigidly restricted to "God-fearing" men, the members of the Church in power. Furthermore, the Greek democratic assemblies of all the citizens, making their laws and deciding upon the administration of government, could never operate successfully for a large area. Hence self-government could not be developed by the people in a widely extended jurisdiction like the Roman Empire.

During the Middle Ages, in Europe an immense forward step was taken in the gradual development of representative government, in which a few went from a locality to stand for their many fellows who could not go. Usually the representatives were wanted merely to grant money to the king, but in course of time they gained greater power, and attended to other things also. This was the origin of the medieval estates of the realm. In England, where they had their farthest development, they gradually made the parliament of England. But generally the idea was not that people, or all people, should be represented, and hence should choose the representatives who went to the assembly for them, but that the members should represent property or classes of people. As late as 1793 a British judge gravely declared: "A government in every country should be just like a corporation; and in this country it is made up of the landed interest, which alone has a right to be represented; as for the rabble who have nothing but personal property, what hold has the nation upon them?"

During the Age of Reason and while old ideas were breaking up in the second half of the eighteenth century, a new, bold conception came forth. Rousseau, developing

Develop-
ment of the
system of
representa-
tion

Representa-
tion of peo-
ple

Rousseau

ideas once put forward by others who attracted little attention, now proclaimed that according to nature all men were equal, and that the wickedness of man and the misfortunes of time had made the inequalities existing. His ideas concerning this "state of nature," to which he urged all men to return, had no historical foundation, and probably no basis in fact, but through the wondrous eloquence and passion of his writing he got universal attention. The American Declaration of Independence in 1776 specifically embodied this doctrine, and it was presently asserted for a greater number of people in the French Constitution of 1791. But actually it was difficult to realize. In the American communities there was no thought whatever of including negro slaves or even free negroes; and when the Constitution of the United States was adopted the regulation of the franchise was left to the several states, in which for a while only a small minority of the people might vote. Great Britain had long had the most liberal government in Europe, but the franchise for electing members of the House of Commons had been fixed long before, and not one man out of ten had the suffrage. The new French constitution immensely extended the franchise—to three fourths of all the men; but this franchise was based upon property, being restricted to those who paid a certain amount of taxes.

Representa-
tion of all
the people

During the confusion of 1792 Rousseau's conception of equality was partly realized in politics, when a National Assembly was chosen by manhood suffrage. Among certain English radicals also the doctrine was already growing. "Personality is the sole foundation of the right of being represented," said John Cartwright in his pamphlet *Take Your Choice* (1776), "property has, in reality, nothing to do in the case." And he and others advocated extension of the suffrage to all men. But actually such ideas were contrary to a vast amount of prejudice and olden custom, and in days when communication was poor,

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 31

with no wide circulation of newspapers, no rapid dissemination of news, and when most people could not read, they could probably not have succeeded. In Britain the agitation made no headway; in France reaction soon came. In the French Constitution of the Year III (1795) the franchise was again restricted by property qualifications, and while in the Constitution of the Year VIII (1800) manhood suffrage was for the first time really established, these voters were merely to choose others who would then choose five thousand "National Notables" from whom the executive would choose the members of the legislative assembly, so that the power of the ballot was not really entrusted to the people.

Even after the Restoration and the Congress of Vienna there was gradual and continued political progress, and the franchise was slowly extended. In France the Charter restricted the franchise to men of thirty years or more with high property qualification, thus allowing the vote to 100,000 voters out of a population of 29,000,000. In 1831 an electoral law reduced the qualification and so increased the electorate to 200,000 out of 32,000,000. After the Revolution of 1848 a new constitution again established manhood suffrage.

In the British Isles progress seemed slower, but more was really being achieved. Religious disabilities were first removed from Protestant Dissenters and from Roman Catholics, and then after a memorable agitation the franchise was extended in 1832. By no means was the principle of manhood or universal suffrage admitted. "The higher and middling orders are the natural representatives of the human race," Macaulay had said three years before; and the suffrage was still restricted to certain classes, and limited by property qualifications. Indeed, the principal effect of a change which seemed revolutionary then was to transfer control from the upper class to the middle class, probably more conservative and more

Extension of
the fran-
chise in
France

In the
United
Kingdom

In the North
German
Confedera-
tion

tenacious of its rights. None the less, the electorate was increased from 500,000 to 1,000,000. A generation later, in 1867, after much unrest and repeated demands, a second electoral reform law was passed, and the franchise, still limited by particular qualifications, was extended so that 2,500,000 men could vote out of a population of about 30,000,000. This seemed but a grudging concession in comparison with the manhood suffrage established in France since 1848, and the manhood suffrage granted by the constitution of the North German Confederation (1867); but in the France of the Second Empire, as in the *Norddeutsches Bund* of Bismarck, and in the German Empire afterward established, choosing of the members of the national legislature was of less importance because other constitutional provisions left to these legislatures little substantial power. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, while only a portion of the men might vote for their representatives in the House of Commons, yet the Commons really controlled the government.

In other
countries

In other countries where constitutional government was erected the franchise was usually restricted by property qualifications. By the constitution of 1831 only those Belgians might vote who paid a considerable tax; and the electorate was but slightly extended in 1848. In Holland, where, as in England, there had long before been relatively large constitutional progress, the electorate was small and was only slightly extended in 1848. In Spain universal suffrage had been prematurely established in 1812, but the constitution was overthrown, reestablished by a revolution, then abrogated again. In 1848 Piedmont received from her king a constitution according to which the electorate was restricted to property-holders, and on the establishment of Italian unity (1861) this constitution with some changes was given to the Kingdom of Italy. During the Revolution of 1848 universal manhood suffrage was proclaimed in Austria. In Hungary, the same

year, by the March Laws the antiquated Diet, formerly controlled entirely by the nobility, was so reformed that its members were to be elected by citizens owning a certain amount of property. The reaction which soon followed swept all this away, and for a while after 1851 the Hapsburg dominions, like the Russian, were ruled entirely according to the will of the sovereign. In 1867, when the *Ausgleich* was agreed on, a narrow electorate was established in the two parts of the Dual Monarchy. Switzerland in earlier times had been one of the principal strongholds of constitutional, even democratic, government in the world. In 1848, when the Swiss Republic was established, a constitution was adopted by which the members of the National Council, the lower house of the national legislature, were to be elected by the votes of all adult males. In 1814 a constitution was established in Norway by which the representatives in the national legislature were elected by a large electorate limited by low property qualifications. In Sweden and also in Denmark the process was very much slower.

It is interesting to note that while in the American colonies, as in England during the same period, the franchise had been restricted to a small number of the inhabitants by various qualifications, and that this restriction continued for some time after independence had been won, the limitations were removed in the early part of the nineteenth century, and by 1830, substantially, there was manhood suffrage for the free, white, adult males of the United States.

Fraternity, perhaps the noblest idea of the Revolution, an old ideal of the Christian Church, proclaimed by the gentlest and wisest souls for a thousand years, was realized much less well. True, it was carried forward by the enlightenment and humanitarianism increasingly characteristic of the nineteenth century, by the great body of the socialists, and by a noble company of men and women who

In the
Hapsburg
dominions

In the
United
States

Fraternity

wished to bring war to an end, make humanity better, and do as they would be done by. But the conception of fraternity ran counter to the spirit of nationalism, which found new birth in Revolutionary times, and which, becoming constantly stronger, marked men off in national divisions ever more sharply.

Develop-
ment of na-
tionalism

"Nations"

Nationalism, which may be understood as the consciousness of a body of people that they are closely bound together by certain ties, and that they are in some manner separate and distinct from others, is to a great extent a development of the period since 1789. Of old people were held together, for the most part, in small groups by family ties and blood relationship, and sometimes brought together in larger groups by interest, despotism, or force. Athenians were keenly conscious of their solidarity as citizens of Athens, and the Dorians of Sparta or the inhabitants of Corinth had similar feeling, but never were the Hellenes able to coalesce into one Greek nation. The inhabitants of the broad Roman Empire were so long united under good laws and admirable political organization that they could not but be conscious of some community in one Roman state. During the Middle Ages, however, much of Europe was for a while broken up in small parts, under the "feudal system." Much of it long remained so divided; and it was impossible to make either a united Italy or a united Germany until long after the middle of the nineteenth century. "Nation" had not yet the meaning afterward given it. In ancient times it had denoted a group of people connected by blood-relation-ship (*nati*, born), and in medieval times it was used at the great universities to denote a body of students who had come from the same country. After a while strong nation states well organized were built up in England, in France, and presently in Spain. Within these states there gradually developed among many people strong feeling of nationality. But how incomplete the work

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 35

often remained is evident in that all through the Middle Ages the north of England was loosely bound to the other portions, and that Catalonia has not yet been really united in national consciousness with the rest of Spain. The ideals cherished by many of the great leaders in the Middle Ages had been contrary to the development of nationalism, and had tended toward establishing a common citizenship in one great European Empire or one great Church; and it should be noted that even in the eighteenth century there was among the rulers and enlightened classes, who were relatively more important then than now, considerable feeling of internationalism and consciousness of common European civilization.

Slow progress

Nationalism entered upon a new, a splendid, and a terrible development in connection with the French Revolution. In 1793 a great European coalition was formed to overthrow the new system in France. The people already had a strong feeling of nationality, based on their language, their civilization, and traditions, and they had on memorable occasions before come forward to save the *patrie* when pressing danger threatened. Now to all the old feeling of oneness as a French nation were added an ardor and an enthusiasm sprung from belief that among them a glorious new era of the rights of man and his greater happiness had come. Accordingly, Frenchmen rushed forward to save the Revolution which seemed to have brought such great gifts. France was defended, and soon after French nationalism and Revolutionary ardor, guided by the supreme military ability of Napoleon, conquered a large part of Europe.

Nationalism in France

The success of Napoleon and the French came in no small part from the ardent spirit of French nationality opposed to peoples among whom this feeling was not yet so strong. But the conquests and oppressions of the French awakened stronger nationalism in other countries also. This spirit flaming forth in 1808 made Spaniards

In other countries


willing to give up all that Spain might be free again. Such feeling was roused among the Slavs when Napoleon entered Russia in 1812. Prussia had been humbled to the dust, but the strong feeling of nationality rising there and spreading thence to other German countries prepared the way for the War of Liberation and Napoleon's final downfall.

Nationalism
during the
nineteenth
century


During the nineteenth century nationalism developed ever more strongly. To the impulse of the French Revolution succeeded the effects of the Industrial Revolution, improved communication, and general systems of education. People were brought together in cities and towns more than previously, and there they could be more quickly and easily reached by a common feeling. As the railroads, steamships, telegraphs, and newspapers did their work, it is true that all the parts of Europe and indeed of the world were bound in union as never before; but the effects of this unification were felt more strongly within the boundaries of a country than through an entire continent, and tended more toward the development of nationalism than any international spirit. Especially did the spread of education make it possible for the old literature and language and the national character and consciousness embodied in them to affect more strongly large bodies of people and bind them closely together. Early in the nineteenth century renewed study of the Greek classics in Greece prepared the way for revival of nationality there and for winning independence. During the first half of the century growing national consciousness prepared the way for a united Italy and a united Germany at last. By 1870 almost all Italy except Rome had been brought together in a strong nation state, and by 1866 most of the German people had been assembled in two great groups which would shortly be united in a German Empire.

Revival and
larger
growth

If nationality was bringing together groups of people



2. RACIAL



OFFICIAL MAP OF EUROPE

in strong unions for their happiness and advantage, it was also dividing European society more sharply, and threatening to break to pieces states not well united. Under the impulse of their national feeling and interests Frenchmen and Germans were preparing to fight out their differences in a mortal struggle. In 1848 in the Hapsburg dominions Germans were hoping to Teutonize the subject races so as to make one stronger nation; but in Hungary the Magyars planned to Magyarize the Slavic peoples, while the Slavs in both Austria and Hungary—Bohemians, Serbs, Croats, as well as the Rumans of Transylvania—yearned to keep their own language and culture and even to attain independence. In 1867 the Germans of Austria had been forced to concede equality to the Magyars, but the two then arranged to hold down the other peoples, who remained as unwilling subjects. Even in Ireland, where British conquest, apparently, had at last been succeeded by assimilation, and where by 1850 the Celtic language began to seem doomed to extinction, the Young Ireland movement, a precursor of the present *Sinn Fein*, was striving to preserve the old spirit and language, and waken Irish nationality again.

National
feeling also
a disintegrat-
ing force

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CHAPTER III

NEW INVENTIONS AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Nam instrumenta navigandi possunt fieri sine hominibus remigantibus, ut naves maximae, fluviales et marinæ, ferantur unico homine regente, majori velocitate quam si plene essent hominibus. Item currus possunt fieri ut sine animali moveantur cum impetu inæstimabili. . . . Item instrumentum, parvum in quantitate, ad elevandum et deprimendum pondera quasi infinita, quo nihil utilius est in casu.

ROGER BACON, *De Secretis Operibus Artis et Naturæ*, c. iv.
(c. 1249).

Les conditions du travail subissaient la plus profonde modification qu'elles aient éprouvée depuis l'origine des sociétés. Deux machines, désormais immortelles, la machine à vapeur et la machine à filer, bouleversaient le vieux système commercial et faisaient naître presque au même moment des produits matériels et des questions sociales, inconnus à nos pères.

ADOLPHE BLANQUI, *Histoire de l'Économie Politique en Europe*
ii. 207, 208 (1837).

The essence of the Industrial Revolution is the substitution of competition for the medieval regulations which had previously controlled the production and distribution of wealth. On this account it is not only one of the most important facts of English history, but Europe owes to it the growth of two great systems of thought—Economic Science, and its antithesis, Socialism.

ARNOLD TOYNBEE, *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution*, p. 85
(1884).

Older conditions

DIFFERENT as conditions now are from what they were fifty years ago, the difference between 1870 and 1750 or 1789 is much more striking. In many respects conditions in the second half of the eighteenth century were nearer to what they had been five hundred or a thousand years before than to what they were a hundred years later.

INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 41

There were no railroads then, no steamboats, no telegraphs, no telephones. It was difficult for most people to get light after the sun went down or heat when the weather was cold. Refrigeration or preserving of food was scarcely employed yet. All sorts of inventions and mechanical appliances, which later on were to make life so much easier and more pleasant, had not yet appeared. And above all, the machines which were to revolutionize industry and transportation and make it possible for the first time in the history of the world for a great surplus of necessities and luxuries to be produced, had not yet appeared, except to some extent in England, and even there were only at the beginning of their service.

By 1870 steam and electricity were the servants of man and for him were performing countless tasks, though many of the devices employed then seem very crude compared with what came later. By that time in every important country in western Europe machines in factories were performing vastly more work than men unaided could have accomplished, and were producing immense store of manufactured things. By that time, through application of machinery, means of transportation had been so revolutionized that it was possible for travellers to move quickly and freight to be transported more easily than ever before. It was now possible for many people in western Europe to get coal for heating their houses, and artificial lighting was being generally used. News was now collected quickly, and immediately disseminated in great numbers of newspapers printed by machinery. Such large alterations were then going on that the changes in the nineteenth century have seemed greater and more important than in all of the centuries preceding. These alterations were most of all due to numerous scientific inventions, and to the machines which brought about the Industrial Revolution.

Rude steam engines, invented at least as early as the

Important
things lack-
ing there

Conditions
in 1870

Transpor-
tation

end of the seventeenth century, were first used for pumping water from mines. Many since forgotten probably contributed to the development, but the invention is now associated especially with the name of Thomas Newcomen (1705) and above all with that of James Watt (1769). Many were the industrial uses to which these engines were put in England. At the beginning of the nineteenth century efforts were made to apply them to moving vehicles on land and ships on the sea. Along with several other inventors Robert Fulton, an American, devoted himself to the making of a "steamboat," and fully succeeded by 1807. In the next year Richard Trevithick ran the first steam engine along a railway in London. In 1825 George Stephenson made a far more powerful locomotive, and presently railway systems connected all the principal cities of Europe. In 1838 the steamship *Great Western* crossed the Atlantic in two weeks.

Interchange
of commodi-
ties and
materials

The result of this revolution in transportation was that food could be moved from districts where it was produced to other places far away, with a speed never possible before. In like manner the materials for building and construction were carried from the forests and the quarries and the mines, making more easily possible the construction of great edifices, gigantic bridges, and public improvements, on a scale scarcely dreamed of before, as well as a multitude of dwelling houses. And because of improvements in mining and the revolution in transportation, coal was easily procured to be used in factories for manufacturing and to heat the houses in which people lived.

Conveni-
ences in
dwelling
houses

The habitations of people were presently furnished with more conveniences than had ever been the case in the past. Not since the time when the great Roman cities were provided with water brought through stone pipes had men and women had plentiful supply. In the Middle Ages and for some time after, even in the prosperous

cities and towns, people generally got their water from wells and cisterns. There was seldom a sufficient supply of water in the houses themselves. Such was the inconvenience of getting it that most people washed themselves seldom. Baths were apt to be taken in rivers when warm weather came; and a London apprentice of the eighteenth century declared that sometimes for six weeks he never washed his face. It was convenient to be dirty; and in the Middle Ages some had regarded filth as a sign of goodness. The result was the numerous skin diseases, with which people were once tortured much more than now, and the many epidemics and plagues which came from dirt and unsanitary living. In the latter part of the eighteenth century and especially during the nineteenth, the great cities and even the more prosperous towns brought plentiful supplies of water from some undefiled source at a distance, and distributed it through small pipes of iron into houses. The better heating now made it possible to get supplies of hot water in dwellings, something not easily done since hypocausts were used by the Romans. This again led to greater cleanliness in winter, and presently bathtubs of wood lined with tin appeared in increasing numbers, and many people now bathed as often as once in a week.

During this same time a marvellous change was made in artificial lighting. In the absence of sunlight, always man's principal, and often his sole, reliance, torches, braziers, candles, and lamps had been used at night by those who were able to afford them. But down to the beginning of the nineteenth century it was not even easy to get fire or a light in the first place, since this was usually done by flint and tinder or else keeping a coal alive. Moreover, oil and tallow were expensive for most people and not to be obtained in large amounts. About the end of the eighteenth century gas made from coal was used to illuminate factories and homes; during the next fifty

Supply of
water

Artificial
lighting

year its use was widely extended; and poor and ghastly as such light often seemed to a later generation, it furnished good artificial illumination for more people than anything before it. In 1782, Argand, a Swiss inventor working in England, perfected a lamp better than any previously used. Oil for such lamps now began to be obtained in ever greater quantities, first from whales, then petroleum from the earth, until more and more people without gas supply could have what even now seems a fairly good light. Then about 1827 certain Englishmen invented matches, slender splints of wood dipped in some material easily rubbed and ignited: an invention simple enough, but affording as much convenience as almost anything in the nineteenth century.

Machinery

While these changes, one after another, were effecting so great a revolution in the life of Europe, and affording to unnumbered common people conveniences previously in the reach of the wealthy alone and often not to be obtained at any price, another series of changes was transforming life even more profoundly. These changes came in consequence of the introduction of labor-saving machines, which made it possible to produce greater quantities of goods more quickly and more easily than ever before, and which presently effected an immense alteration in industry and in social relations.

The Industrial Revolution

The Industrial Revolution, as this movement has long been called, began in Great Britain. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there had been in all the principal countries of western Europe much progress in science and invention. In the eighteenth century, for particular reasons, this progress entered on a new stage in England and Scotland. The position of Great Britain made her safe from foreign invaders, and there was already very great wealth accumulated from business and trade. A strong, well-organized government afforded security and order, at the same time that the inhabitants enjoyed

protection of the law and had much individual freedom. The old guild restrictions, by which industry had first been regulated and then retarded, had passed away in Britain much more than in neighboring Continental countries, giving much freedom and opportunity for the adventurous and those capable of embarking in new enterprises. Moreover, the genius of the British people tended particularly toward the practical application of science and the making of things which would work for some purpose. Above all, though before that time men had paid little attention to it, Britain possessed huge stores of coal and iron, and, what was equally important, they lay in such close proximity that they could easily be used together.

The Industrial Revolution began in England with a series of inventions which revolutionized the textile industry. In medieval times good clothing was difficult to make and expensive to buy. Notwithstanding that princes and great men were splendidly appareled and had abundance of fine raiment, the process of making clothes was so difficult and lengthy that the multitude of mankind could not have many garments, and wore such as they had as long as they could hold them together. The fibres, cotton, silk, or wool, had to be slowly arranged by hand, then patiently spun on a wheel worked by foot, then the threads woven by hand into cloth. Relatively to the number of people, not much cloth could be produced thus, save by disproportionate expenditure of time.

In 1738 an Englishman, John Kay, invented the flying shuttle with which weaving could be done more rapidly than ever before. No great change followed, however, since the thread used by the weavers was still slowly spun in the old manner. But about 1770 a spinning "jeñny" or engine was completed by James Hargreaves, in which a number of spinning wheels could be turned by revolving a crank, and a spinner could now make eight threads at

The old
textile in-
dustry

Revolution
in the
textile in-
dustry

Spinning
machines
and weaving
machines

ence. As a result of these mechanical contrivances manufacturers, that is laborers working with their hands, in the old way, could accomplish much more than before. Nine years later Samuel Crompton perfected the "spinning-mule" by which a great deal more thread could be produced. The next large step forward consisted in the operation of these machines by power. In 1769 Richard Arkwright began to run his spinning engines by water power. In 1785 Edmund Cartwright applied water power to a weaving machine, so that one boy with the machine could make more cloth than three skilled weavers without it. During all this time the steam engine had been developing; it was soon used in the new factories to drive an increasing number of new machines, which were invented for many different kinds of work.

Immense
conse-
quences

These machines, especially the power machines, soon brought enormous changes. In 1837 a French writer, looking back over the progress which by that time had become much clearer, declared that while his countrymen had been passing through such great experiences in the French Revolution, the English had begun their revolution in the domain of industry. "Conditions of work," he said, "underwent the profoundest modification which had been known since society began." Not only could immensely greater quantities of goods be produced, but there arose a new controlling class, the capitalists who owned the machines, and the position of the artisans was soon greatly altered.

The old in-
dustrial
system

In medieval times manufacturing had been rudely carried on in people's houses, or under the guild system, in which masters, or small proprietors, worked themselves along with apprentices in small establishments. In course of time the guilds decayed, and by the eighteenth century in England had largely disappeared. But manufacturing continued to be done in small establishments, mainly in the houses of the workmen them-

selves. The man of the house wove his cloth or made his knives or his shoes, assisted by his wife and his children; or, where the guild system survived, the master worked in the midst of the apprentices who under him were learning the trade. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this arrangement was being partly superseded, especially in England, by small factories and capitalism; nevertheless, most of the manufacturing continued to be done by the domestic system, in the houses of the workers, many of whom were their own masters, toiling for themselves. Where the master worked with apprentices or hired workingmen the relations which existed between them were necessarily personal, intimate, and close. The father might be a little tyrant over children and wife; a bad master might abuse or overwork his apprentices; but there were many who looked out for the welfare of their helpers, and this they were able to do because they lived and worked in the midst of these helpers.

During the eighteenth century capitalism was playing more and more part in the organization of manufacturing, wealthy men paying house workers for their labor, supplying them with the material to be wrought, and taking from them the manufactured goods. The new machines themselves at first involved no very great change. The first machines were not very cumbersome or costly, and successful workmen could buy them. The heavy power machines, which presently appeared, however, could only be obtained by those who had considerable capital to buy them and put up large buildings in which to instal them. Accordingly, in England, and afterward wherever the large machines were brought into use, the domestic system of industry was largely crushed out. With the new machines the work could be done much more easily, and much more produced, so that workers under the old system could not long continue

Domestic
industry

The new
industrial
system

Domestic
industry
crushed out

competition. For a while they would strive desperately, working longer hours and selling their products for less than they had taken before, but generally in the end they failed. Most of them went from their cottages and spinning-wheels and hand-looms to the towns where the factories were rising, and asked for factory employment. In consequence, the large class of small manufacturers and masters dwindled away, and in their place arose a small class of powerful and wealthy capitalist owners of factories with large machines. Over against them was an army of employees working in these factories for wages. Constantly the gap between employers and employees widened, and less and less close were relations between them. Once the master had known his men and worked with them; now the capitalist employed hundreds of "hands," with whom he often had little contact and no sympathy and no acquaintance. There had always been a gap between the upper and the lower members of the industrial system; now it became a great gulf, constantly more striking to the eye, and ever more difficult to cross.

Depression
of the
workers

Under the new system the condition of the workers at the start became rapidly worse. The machines forced them out of the old way of working, but many could find no employment in the new system. It had long been understood that new inventions, whatever benefits were to come later, would deprive some workers of the chance to labor. Early in the sixteenth century in Danzig a certain one had invented a weaving machine, which made four or six pieces at once; but the mayor, so the story went, "being apprehensive that this invention might throw a large number of workmen on the streets," secretly put the inventor to death. In the seventeenth century such machines brought about riots among the weavers in Holland and in England, and using them was long forbidden in some of the German states. Now also in England it was found that with labor-saving machines not

so many workmen were required, and it was soon discovered, moreover, that women and children could do much of the work formerly done by skilled men. The artisans thus thrown out of work resisted their fate, smashing the new looms or trying to prevent other workers from using them; but this soon came to an end when the authority of the law was turned against them. The crowds of workers, larger than the number needed by the factory owners, bid against each other for employment, and were thus completely at the mercy of employers, being forced to accept such wages and terms as were offered.

Moreover, the Industrial Revolution resulted not merely from introducing machines which revolutionized work, but from a new policy with respect to industrial regulation. Formerly in England and elsewhere in Europe the general policy had been for the local authorities or the government of the state to regulate industry, and many a law had been passed to assess the amount of wages, many an ordinance to specify the conditions under which work should be done. These regulations had to some extent been made in the interests of the upper classes, but they were also intended by the state for the protection of workers. During the eighteenth century, however, the idea developed that all such outside regulation was interference and restriction, which hindered much more than it helped. A group of French thinkers taught the doctrine of *laissez-faire*, that the state should let private enterprise alone, and this teaching was taken over into England, especially by Adam Smith. Rousseau and his contemporaries were asserting that men had natural rights, which had been lessened or annulled by interference from the governments above them; and from this was developed the idea that men should have complete freedom, without any governmental regulation, to manage their business as they chose, or to work under such conditions as they agreed to themselves. Unfortunately

Women and
children in
the factories

The state
and industry

Laissez-faire

It was soon evident that "freedom of contract" and *laissez-faire*, whatever their actual and theoretical merits, and however much they were acclaimed by economists and philosophers then, soon gave more power to capitalists and employers, and put the laborers in more lowly subjection.

"Natural laws"

The government ceased intervening to regulate and protect the workers, and the new laws which were passed were made in the interests of the upper class which controlled the state. By the employing class *laissez-faire* was welcomed and praised, as was the doctrine then current that the best results in human relations would follow from each man seeking his own selfish interest. Poverty and suffering came from natural laws, it was said, which no human kindness could remove. It was proper that capitalists should take as high profits and give as low wages as possible, since all this was worked out through the "natural laws." If more than the market wages were given, it would simply result in poor people having a larger number of children, after which conditions would be as before.

Industrial evils

So, while great prosperity came to many factory owners and lenders of money, while Britain went forward with immense progress in wealth and in power, while she obtained from her factories and her ships the strength and the resources with which she held out against Napoleon to the end, horrible results affected some of her people. Workers with their families came from villages and small towns to the factory towns seeking work. Wages were driven down far below what a family could live on. Some could find no work at all. Mournful and squalid quarters rose rapidly to house the workers, and in these houses they were huddled together until the living conditions became terrible. It was soon discovered that the machines could be operated still more cheaply by getting the labor of children, and more and more were children put to

INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 51

work in the factories. At first the foundlings and miserable inmates of workhouses, who were purchased and trafficked in almost like slaves, were obtained. They were put to more toil than they could endure, often urged by the "overlooker's" lash, imprisoned at night lest they run away, and given no wages, since according to the law they were considered to be apprentices learning their trade. As a result of this competition still more men were put out of work and wages were brought even lower. Presently parents were forced to do what had previously been regarded as a great disgrace, put their children out to work in the factories. Under the old system there had been much labor by children, but most of it had been done for parents in the home. Now the conditions under which children worked became worse, and seemed still worse since they could be more readily seen. After a while many men remained idle, supported by the labor of their women and children. In the midst of dirt, heat, stench, whir of wheels, and clatter of looms, children were working long hours, when they should have been at play, or, according to our ideas now, at school. Women were working so long and so hard that they were permanently weakening themselves, unable to bear strong children, or unable to give birth at all. In the factory towns were idle men and underpaid men. The standard of living went lower and lower.

Such is the description which contemporaries have handed down. Doubtless the picture should not all be dark, and no doubt the evils have been exaggerated and dwelt on too much. It should be remembered that under the old system there were many evils, much hardship, and many bad results. The evils of the period of transition, the time between the breakdown of the old system, with the decay of state regulation, and the new period when machine industry and capitalism were thoroughly established, are not well remembered now; but those evils were

Child labor

Degeneracy

great, and were afterward lessened by the Industrial Revolution itself. Notwithstanding all this, the evil consequences of the Revolution were presently evident in the degeneracy of a portion of the people. For a long time in England there had been a sturdy agricultural population from which came the fighting men who won England's wars; now the rural population declined, and it was seen that the factory towns contained many poor, ill-nourished, overworked men, women, and children, whose health and physical strength were decreasing.

The workers
helpless


It may be that time would have brought some adjustment, and that the new conditions would presently have been made less hard; but so bad did they actually appear that some immediate remedy was sought for. After the end of the Napoleonic wars, when men had space to think of other things than defending England from foreign foes, it was evident that there was much discontent among the lower classes of the population in Britain. These were the years when socialism began to attract attention, and when the Chartist asked for reform. But the workers themselves could do little. The concentration of wealth and industrial power, which the machines and the new organization were bringing, made it hopeless for individual workers to resist their capitalist masters. Only by uniting could they hope with success to oppose them. Long before workmen had attempted to form combinations, but always such unions were forbidden by law, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century the authorities generally considered that unions of workmen were harmful to industry and dangerous to the state. In 1799 and in 1800 they had been specifically forbidden in Britain.

Gradual
ameliora-
tion

It was afterward evident that no simple remedy would avail, since so large and so profound was the alteration brought to pass that amelioration and adjustment could only come from patient effort and the working of time. In Britain, and later on elsewhere, the doctrine of *laissez-*



3. THE COAL, IRON, AN



AND THE RESOURCES OF EUROPE

faire was presently abandoned more and more. It became apparent to the best people that "enlightened self-interest" did not bring the best results. Laws were presently passed by which the government limited the hours of labor for women and children, and children under a certain age were forbidden to work. In 1824 and 1825 trade unions of workingmen were legalized, though for a long time thereafter the authorities hampered them greatly. The regulation of industry by the state, however great a change in political philosophy it involved, was at first insufficient and ill-enforced, while the first trade unions were usually too weak to win contests with employers. To some people during this period it seemed that the entire existing system was now wrong; such great changes had been made that fundamental reforms and a different social system were needed before the resultant evils could be cured. Thus arose one of the most important intellectual and social developments of the nineteenth century, the greater growth of socialist doctrines.

The Industrial Revolution was first marked and important in Great Britain. Perhaps it might quickly have spread to the Continent, but for a generation the neighboring countries were absorbed in the French Révolution and the exhausting wars which followed. By 1815 England had a long start, had amassed much wealth, and had become the workshop of the world. But the industrial changes presently took place in the other countries. In France the new methods and machines soon appeared, and along with them the factories, the slums, and the striking new social problems. A great industrial development followed with much prosperity, but the French had less coal and iron than the British, and in the end it was seen that the temperament of the people did not so easily adapt itself to large-scale production and machine work. Hence industrialism never did assume such large proportions in France as in England. During

Laissez-faire partly abandoned

Spread of the Industrial Revolution

Progress
eastward in
Europe

the same time the Revolution was beginning in Belgium. Eastward it spread across the German countries, and by 1870 the north German states were in the midst of vast industrial development. It did not come to Italy until after this time, and it did not reach Russia until the latter part of the nineteenth century. It began to affect the countries of western and central Europe in the first half of the century, and some of the countries of eastern Europe, to a less extent, in the years which followed. Generally speaking, the Industrial Revolution made greatest changes only in those countries like Britain, Belgium, and Germany, where great deposits of coal and iron were at hand. Italy, Spain, the Balkans lagged far behind, since mostly they lacked these resources.

General
results

The greater results of the Industrial Revolution in Europe were not apparent for a while, and some of them were not understood until long after 1870, when industrial growth had reached far greater proportions. Generally speaking, the consequences were an alteration in the relative importance of classes of people in particular districts, alteration of the relative importance of districts or countries themselves, the rise of socialism and schemes for a social organization entirely different from the prevailing ones, immense changes in warfare and relative military power, increasing importance of urban life, an alteration in the position and status of women, the development of democracy and the spread of the franchise, an increase in the quantity of things which serve the necessities and the pleasures of man, and a greater material development than had ever been possible before.

The new
upper class

In antiquity, during the Middle Ages, and down to the end of the eighteenth century, land was always the most important property, and the aristocracy, the upper class, was based upon the holding of landed property. Under the "feudal system" of the Middle Ages holding of land on terms of some sort of service or payment was

the very foundation of social organization. The great landholders were the nobles, the *seigneurs*, the lords of the manor, in possession of political power, local jurisdiction, and sometimes of the offices of state. In the eighteenth century, under the centralized governments of western Europe, they had long since lost all independent political power, but beneath the sovereign they made the class which had the privileges and held the property in the days of the Old Régime. The exceptions were England and Holland, where the greater members of the middle class, the bankers and the masters of commerce, shared the control of affairs in the state with the landed nobility above them.

The effects of the French Revolution, and gradually its later consequences, took away from the noble proprietors their power, special privileges, and in some places even the land on which their previous position had been based. But if the French Revolution abased one upper class, the effects of the Industrial Revolution assisted in the raising of another. Long before 1789 it was evident that in the more advanced countries of western Europe a middle class of bankers, business men, and members of professions was becoming increasingly important. As the old aristocracy went down before the new forces this *bourgeoisie* in France, and later on elsewhere, got control and reaped some of the greatest benefits from the changes. It was soon evident that the destruction of Revolutionary times had not levelled all men and made them all equal. "Aristocracy always exists," said Napoleon. "Destroy it in the nobility, it removes itself immediately to the rich and powerful houses of the middle class." And he added, what seemed more prophetic still later: "Destroy it in these, it survives and takes refuge with the leaders of the workshops and people." He, doubtless, understood little of the Industrial Revolution, but in the first half of the nineteenth century it had already created a new class of wealthy and powerful men, who more and more

The landed aristocracy

The bourgeoisie

A ruling class

Power of the
bourgeoisie

gained control of the governments of their countries, and who presently constituted an upper caste between whom and the great mass of wage-earners and employees there was in the end almost as great a gulf as once existed between lords of the manor and villeins. In the Middle Ages aristocrats and the strong and able men had gone into the Church and risen to be powerful ecclesiastics, or else had been captains in the wars, or noblemen with castles, men-at-arms, and manorial rights over their fellows; now such men went into industry or commerce, and, when they succeeded, held similar power as a result of their gold and their factories and machines. In the course of the nineteenth century in many places they supplanted the power of kings and the power of the old nobility completely. "Our epoch," said Marx and Engels in their *Communist Manifesto* (1848), is "the epoch of the *bourgeoisie*." The socialists looked upon these industrial and financial magnates as their principal opponents; and in the twentieth century the extreme socialists, the *Bolsherviki* of Russia, assailed them as the arch-enemies to be overthrown by a rising of the proletariat, the mass of the workers.

Increase of
population
in Great
Britain

In parts of western Europe a great increase of population followed the Industrial Revolution. The inhabitants of Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century have been estimated at 175,000,000; a hundred years later the population was 400,000,000. In countries like Great Britain, Belgium, and Germany this was undoubtedly due most of all to the mighty industrial expansion. In 1801 the population of Great Britain was about 10,500,000; a century later it was more than 36,000,000. During that time English agriculture diminished relatively, and it would have been impossible to feed such increasing multitudes had it not been for the manufactured goods which paid for increasing importations of food. Three fourths of the people at last were engaged in industry and

commerce. In the earlier part of the nineteenth century attempt had been made to maintain English agriculture by protection, but after the tariffs were removed with the repeal (1846) of the Corn Laws it had to endure competition with the great grain fields of America and Russia. As time went on, farming was more and more abandoned, and the island became a vast industrial hive. Increasingly was Britain less able to feed her growing population except with food-stuffs imported. For a long time she could do this easily enough, for being first in the field she found markets among other people still mostly engaged in agriculture, and she had besides a great colonial empire in which manufacturing was not yet established, and from which raw materials were easily obtained. In the first half of the twentieth century, however, it was evident that each country desired to develop its own manufactures as soon as it could; and evidently when this came to pass it would no longer be so easy for the older industrial communities, lacking local agricultural support, to make their own living.

Decline of
agriculture

Similar results followed in the German countries, especially after the founding of the German Empire (1871). In 1837 the population of the lands later on contained in this empire had been 33,000,000; by 1910 there were 65,000,000. By that time three fifths of the people were engaged in manufacturing and trade; agriculture was no longer sufficient to support the population; and many of the people really got their living by making manufactured goods to be exchanged abroad for food. But German exporters had to compete in a field already largely taken by the British, which was, moreover, slowly diminishing as other countries were establishing their industrial systems. Furthermore, the Germans had no great colonial empire in which to exchange manufactures for the raw materials needed. The difficulties which arose thence probably had something to do with bringing on the

Increase of
population
in Germany

Great War, in which Germany struck to win what she did not have. In the future, countries like Great Britain and Germany will have more difficulty in continuing to expand population and wealth, so far as such expansion is based on selling manufactures to other people for food.

Relative importance of districts changed

The Netherlands

Southern Europe

The Industrial Revolution brought about a shifting of population from one district to another, and brought more rapid growth in some countries than in others. Down to the middle of the eighteenth century the rich and important parts of England had always been the east and the south, containing the principal seaports and the best agricultural lands. After 1760 this gradually changed until the larger number of people lived near the coal and the iron, about the industrial centers of the west and the north. Scotland, poor and unimportant until she was admitted to share in England's trade (1707), became very prosperous after the middle of the eighteenth century, when industrial life developed along the Clyde. In the early Middle Ages Flanders and the western Netherlands contained rich cities and flourishing small manufactures, but when these were ruined they became less important than the northern Netherlands (Holland) with their mighty and prosperous commerce. But after the establishment of the independence of the Flemish and French Netherlands as the Kingdom of Belgium (1831), the Industrial Revolution brought great factories and huge prosperity based on the coal and iron of the valley of the Meuse, and Belgium went forward faster than Holland. During the Middle Ages southern Europe was wealthier and more important than the northern part; but later it was evident that the best deposits of coal and iron were in the north, and the Industrial Revolution was one of the principal factors in making the north so much more powerful and rich. Until the middle of the nineteenth century France continued to be as populous as Germany and stronger; but after that time, when German unity was accompanied

by mighty industrial growth, Germany went forward so much more rapidly than France that in 1914 she had half again as much wealth and nearly twice the population.

Industrial development gradually brought great changes in military strength, which were beginning to be apparent by 1870, though they were not clearly perceived until long after that time. As the Industrial Revolution progressed, machines and tools got to be so much more powerful and complicated that an alteration took place not generally understood before 1914-15. By that time the power of cannon and rapid-fire guns had become so immeasurably great that there was an enormous disparity between men supplied with modern death-dealing instruments and the very bravest soldiers not so equipped. No longer did an army of warlike savages have any chance against a few soldiers of some Great Power. A nation's military strength was no longer in any direct proportion to the number of its fighting men, but altogether to the size of its armies equipped with modern weapons and supplied with the ammunition which they needed. Only the states which possessed sufficient iron and coal, with developed industrial systems, numerous factories and machines, producing immense quantities of pig-iron, to be wrought by skilled workmen into mighty weapons and various implements, could hope to fight a great war successfully for any long time. In 1815 Russia had appeared a colossus, irresistible if her myriads were capably led; a hundred years later the German Empire crushed her with all her millions, completely. She had then, it is true, the greatest number of fighting-men to call into service, but she lacked railroads, factories, trained industrial workers, and she was unable to supply the material of war. The industrial strength of Germany was then seen to be so enormous that for a while she easily defeated all her opponents. The Great War became essentially a duel between Germany and England, the two principal in-

Industrialism and military strength

Russia and Germany

industrial powers of Europe, and was finally decided by the entrance of the United States, the greatest industrial nation in the world.

Urban and
rural life

The Revolution involved a change from rural to city life in many parts of Europe, and brought a constantly greater preponderance of town over country life. Down to the end of the eighteenth century there was no large community in Europe in which the great majority of the people did not make their living by agriculture in the fields about villages in the country. Afterward in countries like Britain, Belgium, and the German Empire, where industrialism most greatly developed, gradually most of the people were to be found in cities and manufacturing districts. In the civilized countries of antiquity city life had predominated over rural life; during the Middle Ages power based on the land was all-important, and this long continued to be so; but during the course of the nineteenth century the urban communities of western Europe acquired greater weight than the country districts. "The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns," said the *Communist Manifesto* in 1848.

City life

This change involved much progress and some retrogression. Great numbers of people were thus brought together by the Industrial Revolution, and mere association gradually gave them the quicker, more open, more radical minds, which always have come with city life, while they soon discovered the power of numbers and of acting together. Hence nothing was more potent than the Industrial Revolution in advancing democracy, self-government, education, the emancipation and advancement of women. In many of these towns, it is true, there were low wages, filthy habitations, undernourishment, and degeneracy of body and mind. But these conditions never affected all the workers, and as time went on conditions were better. On the other hand, as the cities became larger, many of their inhabitants were almost

INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 61

cut off from contact with the soil, and removed from knowledge of the country, from which their forefathers had developed character and derived their principal thoughts. Accordingly, many of the inhabitants acquired a new way of looking at things, both better and worse than the old. It was also true that the artisans and workers of the towns were soon mentally more alert, more apt to question existing conditions, better able to conceive of changes, more insistent in demanding that changes be made, and more powerful in bringing them about. It had ever been so. The most brilliant civilization of antiquity arose in the cities; in after times the great reforms in Europe began in the towns.

New en-
vironment

During the course of the nineteenth century the ideas once formulated in England, then more grandly stated in France, then worked out through the American and the French Revolutions, were gradually followed by the masses in western Europe. Especially in the towns arose demand for revision of the franchise and extension to the workers of some share in governing the state. In course of time in Great Britain, in France, in Italy, and in Belgium, and to a less extent in the German states, working-men and rural laborers were admitted to the franchise, and in time tended to secure control. They themselves and the classes above them saw that this power could not be wisely used unless they had education, which already the townspeople were more and more desiring to have. Accordingly, in the nineteenth century for the first time in the history of mankind, it became one of the great purposes to see that all men and women should be able to read and write. By no means had this been completely accomplished by 1870, nor is it yet, save in the most advanced and prosperous countries of the world. But in those lands where most of the people had gradually got some education and some political experience, more and more were they demanding reforms in the govern-

Results of
urban
growth

ment, and other reforms which would make their lives happier and better.

The position
of women

In consequence of the Industrial Revolution, probably, more than anything else, the position of women was changed profoundly. By 1870 there had already been alteration in their status in some countries, though much larger results would be more evident fifty years later. The nineteenth century was the era of great change in the history of women. The great movements of the past, the Renaissance, the Reformation, even the French Revolution, which carried many men so far forward, left women much as they had been, inferior and subordinate to men. Among savage and barbarous peoples, in primitive times, though occasionally women had possessed political power and were held in high respect, they were generally obliged to do most of the work. Among the earlier civilized peoples they had usually been the servants and chattels of men, though under the Roman Empire law and custom gradually gave them the highest position held by women before the latter part of the nineteenth century. Christianity, since it made people gentler and more kindly, affected women's lot in many ways for the better, yet it assisted in keeping them in lower position than men. Through the first woman, it was said, came sin: and, from her, death and the fall of man. The curse of Eve was on all women: they were less than men; they should be obedient to their husbands. Accordingly, the Church had given them an honorable but inferior position, though this was counterbalanced by veneration of the mother of Christ. The monks and the hermits, at one time so powerful, taught that women were sinful creatures to be avoided. Through all these ages down to recent times certain circumstances pertaining to women combined with prevailing conditions of society to influence ideas about them. They were less strong than men: they needed men's protection; this was purchased by obedience and

Christianity
and woman

submission. Down to the time of the Industrial Revolution most of women's work was always done in the home, under the control and supervision of men, whose authority was recognized by law. It was not often possible for an unmarried woman to have a business of her own, or find work outside the home; and there she worked under the direction of some male relative or some man who gave her support. Englishmen believed that their women were better off than those of any other country, but in England unmarried women had a legal position less good than men's, while married women, the great majority of the sex, had no legal existence separate from the husbands', of whom they were considered a part. The husband was responsible for the wife, and had entire authority over her. At the time of marriage the husband became owner of the wife's property, and when children were born they were legally his. Generally women were not supposed to possess any learning except what pertained to home duties. They were advised not to display such education as they had, since learning in women was thought unwomanly and improper, and apt to be disliked by the men. Generally families were larger then than now, and a great part of all the mental and physical energy of most women was given to the bearing and raising of children.

Subordina-
tion to men

From time immemorial had these things been, but now a great transformation was taking place. Many things contributed to effect this change. The grand ideas of the French Revolution were gradually considered to pertain to women as well as to men. In the nineteenth century several causes brought it about that greater sympathy and humanitarianism developed than ever before. The rapid advance of men was being shared by women. "Unless women are raised to the level of men, men will be pulled down to theirs," said John Stuart Mill in 1866. In course of time women as well as men obtained education, and from it came deepening of intellect and broadening of mind,

Betterment
of women's
position

Some
economic
independ-
ence

greater sense of dignity and worth, and inevitably larger power. Finally, as a result of the Industrial Revolution, much of the work formerly done in the home—spinning, weaving, making clothes, preserving food, and even preparing it to be eaten—was taken away to be done by factory workers. To the factories women followed this work, of which previously the larger part had always been done by themselves; and there they worked for wages, which, after a while, they kept and considered as their own. In this way came the beginning of some economic independence. Furthermore, the Industrial Revolution, as will be shown, made possible a larger amount of leisure than ever before, especially for women. The greater material prosperity and the higher standard of living in consequence often brought it about that families were smaller than before. By 1870 women were at the threshold of a new era, which in some respects would be preëminently a Woman's Age.

Greater pro-
duction and
more leisure

Finally the industrial changes of the nineteenth century created a different standard of living and a higher material civilization for a great many people. In earlier times there had often been much comfortable, even splendid, living, with a great deal of beauty and grace; but most of the population had no share in it, and never could hope to have. There were then wanting many things now taken as a matter of course. However much most people strove they could not hope to get a large amount of such things as then existed, for working alone in their homes, with hands or simple appliances, without machinery, with little coöperation and division of labor, it was not possible ever to produce much more than was needed by most people for mere subsistence. So it had been in ancient times, when only a minority enjoyed luxury and fine living through the labor of a multitude of slaves. So it was through medieval and modern times, when only the aristocracy and a few prosperous people had these

things. But with the coming of the great factories and machines of the Industrial Revolution it was possible to produce easily much greater quantities of things than had ever been obtained before, so that more people might have them; and this increased production had to do also with many new articles which were now invented. Accordingly, while at first numerous laborers were thrown out of work, and while the condition of the workers was often very bad, yet it was presently evident that the new system yielded far greater output, and that now the mass of the people might get things formerly possessed only by the wealthy. Furthermore, the machines doing the work of many men made it possible for an increasing number of people to work less for the obtaining of what they wanted, with the result that leisure, time free from the toil necessary for existence, became the possession of a larger number of people than ever before. This leisure was devoted by some of the fortunate to improving their education and still further advancing their civilization.

More necessities and many new things produced

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CHAPTER IV

CERTAIN INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES

Everybody has read Mr. Darwin's book . . . pietists . . . decry it . . . bigots denounce it with ignorant invective; old ladies of both sexes consider it a decidedly dangerous book, and even savants . . . quote antiquated writers to show that its author is no better than an ape himself. . . .

T. H. HUXLEY, "The Origin of the Species" (1860).

In England ist der Umwälzungsprozess mit Händen greifbar . . . in Deutschland, Frankreich, kurz allen Kulturstaaten des europäischen Kontinents, eine Umwandlung der bestehenden Verhältnisse von Kapital und Arbeit ebenso fühlbar und ebenso unvermeidlich ist als in England.

KARL MARX, preface to *Das Kapital* (1867).

Romanum pontificem, cum ex cathedra loquitur, id est, cum omnium christianorum pastoris et doctoris munere fungens pro supra sua apostolica auctoritate doctrinam de fide vel moribus ab universa ecclesia tenendam definit, per assistentiam divinam, ipsi in beato Petro promissam, ea infallibilitate pollere, qua divinus redemptor ecclesiam suam in definienda doctrina de fide vel moribus instrutam esse voluit.

CONCILIO VATICANUM: "De Romani pontificis infallibili magisterio" (July 18, 1870).

DURING the hundred years or more from the middle of the eighteenth century great changes took place which profoundly altered men's ideas about themselves, about the world around them, their conception of the Church, of the State, of the relations of men one with another, and of the organization of society; so that by 1870, and especially in the latter part of the nineteenth century, a vast alteration was apparent. During this time came not only the French Revolution and the Industrial Revo-

Intellectual
changes

lution, but from them socialism took its rise, while the doctrine of evolution and the spread of scientific thinking brought large change in methods of thought and in intellectual outlook.

New conditions

The new inventions and the new industrial organization were making it possible to produce more of the necessities and of the desirable things of life than in the past, with much less of human labor. Gradually a considerable part of all the population had more time to spare from work to devote to the enjoyment of life and the consideration of various things. Hence it was possible for more people than previously to be aware of intellectual changes, and by them to be more affected.

The universe


During this period came completely altered conception of mankind and the world, of their origin, their progress, and their development. For a long time before, indeed, had such a change been in progress. After the second century of the Christian Era it had generally been considered that the earth was the center of the universe. Above were the heavens, containing sun, moon, and stars, relatively small and in the firmament at no great distance above the earth. In accordance with this conception Dante in the *Divina Commedia* explained the position of heaven, purgatory, and hell, and thus even Milton during the seventeenth century, in his *Paradise Lost*, conceived the structure and parts of the universe. According to this belief the sun, the moon, and the stars were all considered relatively unimportant and subsidiary to the earth. The world and mankind therein were the center of things, the beginning and end of creation.

Changing conceptions of the cosmos

A change began when Copernicus, a Prussian, in 1543 published his book, *De orbium cœlestium revolutionibus* (concerning the movements of the heavenly bodies), in which he asserted that the sun was the center of the universe, and the earth only one of the bodies which revolved about it. At the beginning of the seventeenth



4. EUROPE: SHOWING RAILROADS



MAP OF CANALS, AND PRINCIPAL RIVERS

century his teachings were confirmed and extended by the German, Kepler, and slowly the results were accepted. When this took place it was no longer possible to attach either to men or their world such immense importance as before. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries conceptions of the universe altered still more with the progress of astronomy and other sciences. Mathematics was developed, delicate instruments were perfected, telescopes became ever more powerful, and spectrum analysis was brought into service, with the result that further discoveries were made which more completely altered ideas. At the end of the eighteenth century men thought of the sun as the center of a universe, with planets and attendant satellites revolving about it, and so vast was this universe that the outermost planet, *Neptune*, revolved at a distance of 2,800,000,000 miles. Slowly during the nineteenth century was knowledge of the heavens advanced, until this solar universe seemed small and but a little part of all things. By the beginning of the twentieth century distances had become so vast that they were measured now only by the "light year," the distance that light, travelling 186,000 miles a second, would traverse in a year. From the earth to the sun, light would go in eight minutes, but it would take four years for the passage to the nearest fixed star, and myriads or millions of years to reach another nebula like the Milky Way, of which perhaps the sun and its system are a part.

Along with this idea of the diminishing importance of the earth came another great change in thought. In early times, and especially since the rise of Christianity, it had been taught that the heavens and the earth and all the things they contained were created by God in six days; and it was believed that as they had suddenly been made in the beginning, so they had continued, essentially unchanged. Things had been designed for a purpose; that purpose continued to be. Men and women must

The earth
smaller, not
the center
of things

Creation

accept the conditions around them by which they were ruled. "In the beginning," said the *Genesis* of Scriptures, "God created the heaven and the earth . . . man in his own image. . . . Thus the heavens and the earth were finished." Literal belief in these precepts was fundamental. Many a reader of the Bible studied the chronology which it contained, laboriously estimating the years which had elapsed since Creation. About the middle of the seventeenth century Archbishop Usher, of the Anglican Church in Ireland, declared that Creation had taken place 4,004 years before the birth of Jesus Christ. Thus, according to current ideas, the life of man and of the world was but short, just as the universe was little.

Altered conception

These conceptions also were changed for many people during the course of the nineteenth century by the advance of science and the formulation of the doctrine of evolution until it became increasingly doubtful to many whether the universe and all it contained had been made suddenly and primarily with reference to man. The very idea of creation, or a sudden making of things, was slowly displaced by the belief that things had evolved out of other things slowly, through long process of time.

Evolution

The doctrine of evolution was not new, for it went back at least to the time of some of the Greek philosophers, from whom it had been taken to be grandly stated by Lucretius in his *De Natura Rerum*. In 1749 the great French naturalist, Buffon, began the publication of his *Histoire Naturelle*, in which he declared that environment altered animals, and suggested that both men and apes might have developed from a common ancestor long before. At the end of the eighteenth century James Hutton, a Scottish geologist, showed how changes in the earth's surface had been made, and declared that he could "find no traces of a beginning, no prospect of an end." About this time also the doctrine of development and slow change was advanced by the French astronomer and mathema-

tician, Laplace, who undertook in his Nebular Hypothesis to explain the development of the solar system.

It was in the first half of the nineteenth century, however, that contributions were made which caused the doctrine to revolutionize thinking. In 1830 Sir Charles Lyell began the publication of his *Principles of Geology*, in which he showed how earth features had developed and were everywhere developing still. Later on he declared that remains of primitive man were found under some of the later strata of the earth's surface, and estimated that men had lived in the world for 50,000 or 100,000 years. Later authorities believed that man might have existed for 1,000,000 years, and that the years of the age of the earth might be 200,000,000.

Geology:
Lyell

Most important of all, however, was the work of the English naturalist, Charles Darwin. Influenced by Lyell's teaching of slow development, and also by the doctrine of the English economist Malthus, that increase of living things depended on their supply of food, he made a long and careful study of animals and plants. In 1859 he published his work, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, and twelve years later his other work, *The Descent of Man*. In these writings he taught that there had been a long, slow development of things, an evolution of one type from another; that the changes in this evolution had been brought about as the result of a struggle for survival, in which some individuals or species had survived because of peculiarities which especially fitted them to succeed or survive, and that these peculiarities increasing in course of time had constituted the changes of evolution, and brought about variation of species. There had been a long descent of species in which man could be traced back through the ape families to lower forms more distant and remote in time. Meanwhile, a younger scientist, A. R. Wallace, had independently reached the same conclusions.

Darwin:
natural
science

Spread of
the doctrine
of evolution

The sober writings of Darwin, from the nature of their substance very difficult to comprehend, could have no wide circle of understanding readers, but in consequence of his work the idea of evolution attracted great attention. Among English-speaking people it was expounded by Thomas Huxley with such brilliancy and complete clearness that the educated layman understood it. Presently the doctrine became the most important new intellectual force of the time. Herbert Spencer in England undertook to explain all branches of knowledge in terms of evolution. By 1870 a bitter controversy was raging, in which clergymen and conservatives heaped upon the hypothesis their obloquy, denunciation, and ridicule. In course of time, however, it was generally accepted among educated people, and though afterward modified in important particulars, it was in the end recognized as one of the very bases of modern thought.

Evolution
and
religion

The results of all this were enormous. The conceptions of scholars and learned men were fundamentally changed, and religious ideas soon affected. The Bible had seemed to make it certain that the earth was created in six days; now geologists were teaching that the world had been slowly evolving for 100,000,000 years. Hitherto most people had believed that man had existed for about 6,000 years; now geologists asserted that he had been on the earth for more than 100,000. For ages had it been taught that "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him"; now many declared that human beings had gradually been evolved from lower animals, these from reptiles, they from fishes, and so on back to the lowest forms in primeval times. It was therefore a generation of unhappiness and stress to many pious and thoughtful people, who were yet struck by the apparent truth of the new assertions which were being taught; they felt that the basis of their faith was being shaken since they had taken all the Bible as inspired and all its

contents to be literally true. By 1870 a painful conflict was going on between science and religion, which continued long after. In this conflict evolutionists and men of science were held up as atheists and blasphemers, while they heaped scorn on the ignorance of their opponents. As the century slowly progressed many people were able to adjust their beliefs and modify their conceptions, so that religion and science were reconciled for them.

Meanwhile, innovation no less profound was taking place concerning ideas of social and economic arrangement. To the humane French philosophers of the latter part of the eighteenth century the world had seemed full of abuses, and they had stated the means by which men could be given their natural equality and the happiness which ought to be their due; these doctrines had been restated in the French Revolution, and attempt made to carry them into effect. Hence had come civil equality. But the radical reformers of the Revolution had clearly perceived that the better state which they hoped for could never be attained unless economic equality came also. Presently the effects of the Industrial Revolution were apparent, and economic inequalities appeared still more striking. To remedy these conditions old doctrines were restated so strikingly that they have never since failed of attention.

The ideas now known as socialism did not originate in the nineteenth century, but in some form can be traced back very far. Plato, who perceived the inequalities of his time, and who declared that in every city there were two great groups, the few who had, and the many who did not have, always at war with each other, described in his *Republic* an ideal state in which there should be community of goods and all fare alike. Others before him had dreamed of this, and the idea was handed on down. When Christianity was established something of communism was adopted. "If thou wilt be perfect," said Jesus to a certain

Socialism

Communist
ideas in
earlier times

In the
Church

one, "go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor." Holding of property in common for all the members came to be the rule of organization in the early Church as it was in the later monastic societies; but as time went on it was not retained in the general organization of the Catholic Church. In 1360 John Ball and others preached to English villeins that in the beginning all men were equal and that serfdom ought to be abolished. The doctrine of communism was again memorably stated in the sixteenth century by the Englishman, Sir Thomas More, who described the blessed country of *Utopia* where community of goods prevailed. During the period of the Reformation there was some attempt to realize this, especially in places where the Anabaptists were in control. During the seventeenth century in England certain Levellers arose to preach that all men should have equal position. In the eighteenth century French philosophic writers again expounded the doctrine. In 1748 Montesquieu recalled the communism of the Republic of Plato, declared that the rich obtained their wealth by taking from others, suggested that the State should divide great fortunes, and asserted that in return for their labor the State owed food, clothing, and a healthful living to all of its citizens. Rousseau, who learned much from Montesquieu, asserted in his *Discourse Concerning Inequality among Men* (1754) that in the state of nature, before the time of private property, all men were free and held the property in common.

Communism
in the
French
Revolution

In the French Revolution the disciples of Rousseau and his fellows, both Girondins and Jacobins, held similar ideas; and, though these ideas had almost no actual result, yet during the most extreme part of the Revolution some attempt was made to put them into effect. One of the Girondists asserted that equality would come only if fortunes were equally divided by law, and if laws were passed to prevent inequalities in the future. In 1792 Robespierre declared that property held in common by all

of society was indispensable. "The French Revolution," said Sylvain Maréchal in 1796, in his *Manifeste des Égaux* (Proclamation of Equals), "is but the forerunner of another revolution much greater . . . which will be the last . . . we move forward to something more sublime and just, the common weal and community of goods. No more private ownership of land, the land belongs to no one." By this time reaction was already under way, and the bourgeois Directory was in control. Against this government Babeuf, who had asserted belief in complete equality and community of property, headed a conspiracy in 1796. His scheme, which at once came to naught with his capture and execution, had been the establishment of a state in which private property should not exist, and in which the commonwealth, holding all property, should direct all the work of its citizens, dividing their tasks among them, and, if necessary, compelling men to do the work assigned. Actually, the course of the Revolution brought it about that private property in France presently came to be divided among a larger number of proprietors than before. From France communistic doctrines had spread over into England, but no substantial results were apparent.

For the most part the communistic theories of the Old Régime and the Revolution had to do with landed property, but during the first half of the nineteenth century the Industrial Revolution produced in western Europe such large results, such power and wealth in the hands of capitalists and factory owners, and made so evident the lowly dependence of a multitude of workers, that again the ideas of better arrangement of wealth and of regulation by the State were taken up. They were directed now more against the *bourgeoisie*. In France the sale on easy terms to the peasants of the lands of the nobles and the Church was bringing to the mass of the people better chance than the people of any nation ever before had had.

Economic
equality
by law

The In-
dustrial
Revolution

The *Ateliers Nationaux*

while his commission deliberated about various measures—a ten-hour working day, assistance for workmen, and better conditions for them—the government put into operation a scheme resembling what he had urged, but in character actually quite different, and something he would never have approved. National Workshops (*Ateliers Nationaux*) were set up, in which the State was to be the employer. This was, indeed, nothing more than a gigantic system of poor relief, for men were put to work, irrespective of their training, at digging and then filling up the holes, and at similar tasks, the State paying them the uniform wage of two francs a day. Many applied for this work, there was not enough to go around, and great confusion and dissatisfaction arose. The entire scheme, with which the authorities associated Blanc's name, incurred disrepute, and when the government, now controlled by the *bourgeoisie*, felt itself stronger, the National Workshops were abolished. Then the socialist and radical workingmen of Paris rose in furious revolt. After terrible street fighting they were completely crushed, and in 1848 as in 1796 the *bourgeoisie* remained completely triumphant.

Decline of
the older
socialism

Thus it is evident that ideas of socialism or communism, even more than the doctrine of evolution, had had a long development before the middle of the nineteenth century, and that many thinkers who contributed to its teachings continued to influence men after this time. But by 1848 the socialism of Owen, Fourier, Saint-Simon, and their followers was visibly sunk in decay; their efforts had failed, and it was apparent that their teachings had not produced the results they hoped for. Chartist in England was dying out. The schemes of Louis Blanc had failed in Paris. After 1840 many radical workmen had lost faith in the doctrines of these teachers, and some of them began to believe that reforms by the government, and remedies brought by philanthropists or conducted by "men of science" would help them little. The better-

ment of the condition of the proletariat, it was said, must come through the efforts of itself. The doctrines which such men held vaguely and not yet well defined had to some extent been stated by the German, Wilhelm Weitling, and by the Frenchman, Étienne Cabet who in 1840 published his *Voyage en Icarie*, a philosophic romance which described the communism of an ideal state. Presently German refugees, followers of this workingmen's movement, founded the Communist League, a secret society, with headquarters in London. It was at this point that Marx, the great expounder of modern socialist doctrines, appeared.

Karl Marx (1818–1883) was of Jewish descent, and came of a middle-class family in Rhenish Prussia. He was destined for the law, but his own inclinations carried him to philosophy and historical studies. He was at first a liberal bourgeois, in the days of political repression in Germany before the Revolution of 1848. Soon he found it expedient to leave the country. In 1843 he went to Paris. There he met Friedrich Engels, his companion and co-worker thereafter. Through study of the teachings of Robert Owen, and through acquaintance with Louis Blanc in Paris, Marx became a social reformer and an advocate of the workingman's cause. In 1847 Marx and Engels attended a meeting of the Communist League held in London. The views which they there stated made much impression, and they were asked to draw up a working programme for the League. This they did, and in 1848 appeared the *Communist Manifesto*, a small pamphlet containing in brief form their socialist doctrines. "Let the ruling classes tremble," they said. "Workmen of all lands, unite." In 1849 Marx, having returned to Prussia, was expelled from the country. Presently along with his wife he took refuge in London, and remained in England till his death. During these long years, in the midst of poverty, discouragement, and meager living, sustained by

New
teachings

Karl Marx

Communist
Manifesto

Finds refuge
in England

the devotion of his wife and the sympathy of followers and friends, haunting, as many a scholar since has done, the round room of the British Museum in quest of materials for research, writing in his rooms, often in the midst of the children whom he loved, shouting, tumbling, harnessing him as he wrote and whipping him in the midst of laughter and shouts, he composed his profound and extensive studies which constitute a landmark in the development of historical and economic writing. His chief work, *Das Kapital* (Capital), was published in 1867.

Influence
of Marx

In 1862 Marx took the lead in founding the International Working Men's Association, often known as the *Internationale*, which brought together in one organization the communist organizations of different countries. National feelings were ever growing stronger, despite the new economic teachings, and it was found impossible to hold together the workmen of all countries in one body, so that the Association soon broke down, though international meetings came together from time to time later on. By 1870 belief in communism had made considerable progress, though in the next year it received a decisive setback in the collapse of the *Commune* of Paris, which Marx had approved. But communism, or socialism, as it was called again later on, had received vast impetus and new meaning from the teachings of Engels and Marx. Everywhere the *Communist Manifesto* had attracted attention. *Das Kapital* had not directly influenced many, but the ideas of the master were being reduced to simple form, popularized and spread broadcast, as new teachings and great doctrines usually are, by numerous disciples who proclaimed them again and again. In another generation they had become mighty factors in the intellectual and economic life of the world; and when the century ended, it was seen that the teachings of Marx—like the exhortations of Luther and Calvin, like the theories of Rousseau, like the doctrine of evolution taught by Dar-

His writings

win—had profoundly affected the minds of great numbers of men.

According to Marx there had always been a few at the top ruling and exploiting the many beneath them. Between the two groups there had been a struggle from of old. In ancient times the contest was between masters and slaves; slavery had gradually disappeared, but then society was divided into the lords above and the great body of the serfs beneath them; gradually serfdom had disappeared in most places, as nobles and lords lost their power, but from the ruins of feudal society had come the modern bourgeois society, and the age-long struggle was still being fought out between capitalists and industrial workers. "Society as a whole," said the *Communist Manifesto*, "is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: *Bourgeoisie* and *Proletariat*." In the end the upper class, the workingmen's enemy and master, would be completely overthrown. Now the workers toiled for their masters in factories and were huddled together in tenements and slums, but their number was great, and if they could unite with the workers in the country they might some day get the government within their control. Capital and wealth were held by a few; they were destined to be concentrated in still fewer hands; then, finally, when the people had control, all would be taken over by the State for the people. Marx declared that upper-class capitalists largely owned as private property the wealth which had been created by the workers, and that with the destruction of the *bourgeoisie* and their organization, this would be brought to an end and capital be the common property of the people. The *Manifesto* stated in simple form some of the measures which it was hoped would be ordained: abolition of property in land, all rents to be taken for the public; a heavy progressive or graduated income tax; abolition of inheritance; centralization

Doctrines
of Marx and
Engels

Struggle of
classes

Socialist ideas

of credit in the hands of the State, the State setting up a national bank with exclusive monopoly; all means of communication and transport to be centralized, controlled by the State; State ownership of factories and instruments of production; equal liability of all to labor—establishment of “industrial armies”; free education of all children in public schools, and abolition of children’s factory labor. “In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” “The proletarians,” said the *Manifesto*, “have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.”

Their character

It was the work of these communist teachers, and especially of Marx, to take the earlier socialist speculations, and give them firmer foundation and greater distinctness. The doctrines of Marx were no mere abstractions conceived in his own mind nor brilliant speculations based upon foundations which he merely assumed. For years he carried on tireless research in the past records of industrial history and development, and whether or not his deductions were correct, he deduced from his study of the past his interpretation of the present and prophecies for the future. His conclusion that all history recorded a struggle between classes was plausible enough, however true it may be. His prediction that the mass of the people would certainly control the governments of their states later on was in accord with the splendid dreams of the democracy then developing, which since his time have developed so much further still. His conclusion that under the control of the people communism would be established for the betterment of the lot of the people had for more than two thousand years been the dream of not a few philosophers who hoped to ameliorate the lot of mankind. His idea that the proletariats of the several countries had interests in common and should live together

in amity and accord was but an aspect of the scheme which many noble spirits have cherished for the attainment of peace and things better.

The ideas of Marx and other great socialists were carried further and sometimes perverted by rasher and more ardent spirits, whose declarations filled contemporaries with aversion and horror. Socialism soon came under the stigma of intending to break up the family, abolish marriage, bring community of women, divide all property equally, and do away with the Christian religion. There was good reason to think that if those who cherished these ideals could, they would bring them to pass by force through sudden overturning and revolution. Accordingly, socialism, like the doctrine of evolution, had to encounter not merely the conservative instinct of the time in which it appeared, but also the repugnance and dread of many who were frightened at radical wildness. For not all of this was Marx responsible. It should be remembered also that, whatever his mistakes, and some of them only time will determine, his motives were of the best. He was filled with a passionate humanity and desire to make the lot of his fellowmen better. "The poor always ye have with you," was the maxim which had come down through the ages; but these socialists conceived of poverty as a disease in the State, curable, and preventable, indeed, if the State were but organized better.

By 1870 socialism had not achieved great results, and the *Commune* of Paris next year was to strike the people of Europe with horror. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, increasingly would its influence grow. Many of the socialists themselves would gradually become less extreme, and expect to bring their reforms about slowly, in consequence of perception by most people that their doctrines were best. Some of their ideas in course of time would be adopted by governments themselves and put into effect, for the most part, it would seem,

More radical
doctrines

Criticism
of socialist
doctrines

Doubt concerning socialist doctrines

for the better. Generally, however, their fundamental doctrine, that private property should be abolished and that all should be held by the State for the use of its people, would find slow acceptance. It would be possible to point out that communism had existed probably in every primitive society, and that if the history of mankind extended over 100,000 years, perhaps much the greater part of this time had known the existence of communistic society. It was certain, however, that in the development of what most people conceived to be the better civilization of the more recent centuries, always common ownership had yielded to the system of private holding. Whether, then, communism was well adapted for advanced peoples, whether it could ever be put into operation for the welfare of the majority, in 1870 as in 1920, was for most people hidden in doubt and the future.

Religion

In the midst of vast revolutions thus going on in the realm of general ideas most people continued to hold to the philosophy and beliefs that had been handed down by their Church. In the past, religion had always been the greatest of intellectual forces affecting mankind, embodying science, philosophy, explanation of the present and hope for the future. In the Middle Ages the Christian Church, gradually taking the best of the past and the present, had become the most important of all the agents of civilization and progress. It had seldom been difficult for its ministers to hold the affection and adherence of their followers, though always the bold and speculative had struck out on new paths for themselves. Especially was this so now during the strange and wondrous time of the nineteenth century. During this time the three parts of Christianity in Europe met the changes about them with varying fortune.

The Greek Catholic Church

Least affected then and for a long time after was the Greek Catholic or Orthodox Church of the East, which counted among its adherents most of the Russians, the

Greeks, and most of the South Slavs of the Balkan country. This Church, largely controlled by the Russian Government and working in obedience to the tsar, had long gone forward unwavering in its course, with ancient ritual, and ceremonies of the past, little troubled by revolts from within and scarcely touched by influence from without. The Russian people were still off on one side of the Continent, outside the great currents that were steadily changing western and central Europe. Censorship kept out the new books and prevented new teachings; police suppressed all innovators or drove them away. Almost all the people were illiterate and simple. In Russia, accordingly, socialism as yet had no footing, and evolution was scarcely known of. The Russian Church thus remote continued to be generally followed and obeyed by the people, whose great teacher it remained, whose traditions it embodied, and whose national consciousness it fostered. Most of the Russian people were, as ever, simple-minded peasants, cherishing their *ikons* or images, crossing themselves devoutly as they passed by the shrines and the churches.

The Church
of the Slavs

Since the French Revolution the Roman Catholic Church had been passing through vicissitudes much greater. In several countries it had been deprived of its property; in 1860 most of the territory of the popes had been taken from them; they still held the city of Rome and a little district about it, though twice, in 1862 and 1867, Garibaldi had tried to take this, and the papal tenure was now entirely dependent upon European political conditions. One of the popes had been carried off a prisoner by Napoleon. Furthermore, the populations of western and central Europe, in the midst of which this Church was established, were far more enlightened than those of the eastern lands. Its adherents were much in contact with the great changes in science and culture and much more affected by them, so that the western

The Roman
Catholic
Church

The French
Revolution
and Na-
poleon

Church had again and again to encounter new ideas which threatened to undermine its power.

The Roman Catholic Church had been touched by the French Revolution much more than the Protestant Churches, for the effects of the Revolution were greater and lasted longer in Catholic countries. During the Revolution the lands of the Church had been confiscated in France. A little later, during the Terror, the extreme revolutionists suppressed the Christian religion, closed the churches, and proclaimed the worship of Reason. A reaction had, indeed, soon followed, and Napoleon, understanding the sentiments of most of the people and their veneration for the faith of their fathers, had respected Christianity and given it the protection of the government. In 1801 he had made with Pius VII the famous *Concordat* or agreement; but he had soon come into conflict with this pope and cast him into prison. For a short time after 1809 Napoleon made good the ideal of the greatest medieval emperors; he considered himself to be head of the Empire and superior to the Church, with the pope subordinate and dependent. Not since the time of the Babylonian Captivity in the fourteenth century, when the popes resided at Avignon under the shadow of the power of France, had papal authority been so much lowered.

Older condi-
tions re-
stored

All this came to an end with the fall of Napoleon; and after the Congress of Vienna the Church recovered. The ecclesiastical property confiscated in France was not restored, but the gifts of pious Catholics founded a new wealth for it. During this period of restoration and reaction people remembered that the Church had been attacked at the same time that so many other venerable institutions were overthrown; and the ruling class often believed that the worst excesses of the radicals and revolutionists could not have happened had not religion and the Church been abandoned. Accordingly, it was

thought well that priests should have their old influence; education was placed in their hands; and they were supported by the government, to which in turn they gave faithful assistance.

It was presently seen, however, that it was not the violence of Hébert or Napoleon, but the continuing ideas of the French Revolution and those now brought about by the Industrial Revolution in process, the scientific advance, and the new ideas, that were dangerous to the old beliefs and to the temporal power of the Church. Civil and religious equality made people different from what they had been. Socialism was rising, and during the remainder of the century it had greater and greater effect upon the outlook of people in the lower as well as the upper classes. From the first the teachings of the socialists made men less inclined to follow without question the old doctrines of the Churches. During all this time also great discoveries, strange inventions, and bold speculations laid the foundation for an entirely different way of looking at things, which made it impossible for some to believe any longer what their fathers had accepted without question.

Among the great movements of this time none was more striking than the spread of education in the western half of Europe. Hence people were more easily brought to a knowledge of the great new doctrines and the wonderful experiments and discoveries that were taking place, and the alterations in human knowledge which followed. A different spirit had been developing since the eighteenth century and constantly spreading. More and more did people require reasons for what they were asked to believe, and demand proofs of what was submitted. Discoveries in the realms of biology, chemistry, and physics explained an immense number of things, and promised to explain many more. In course of time those who understood the writings of Lyell, Darwin, and Huxley

Conflict
with the
new ideas

Education
and scienti-
fic spirit

came to conceive of things in terms of science where before they had as a matter of faith believed what was taught. These people or their teachers began to subject even the Bible to "higher criticism," just as they would examine the texts of Shakespeare or Virgil; to investigate the history of religions just as they would search for the origins of feudalism or the rise of parliaments in the Middle Ages; and in consequence they began to doubt or reject many things which the Church had said must be believed.

Science and
religion in
Catholic
countries

All the Churches of western Europe had to encounter this spirit increasingly in the century after the French Revolution, and all of them were shaken by it. The Roman Catholic Church met the situation as it had met similar ones in the past. The doctrines it taught were to be considered divinely inspired and unalterably true. Circumstances in the world around might change and science bring revelation and discoveries, but always the teachings of the Church remained true as they had been from the first; and they were to be entirely accepted by the faithful. Accordingly, as the gap widened between what had been of old and what the effects of the French Revolution were producing, between the old industrial system and the results of the Industrial Revolution, between the teachings of the fathers and hierarchs of the Church and the new ideas taught by the socialists, between the stories contained in the Bible and the conclusions of scientific scholars, Catholic populations remained divided in two parts, as, indeed, they had been in the eighteenth century when the enlightened sceptics were doing their work: many belonging to the upper intellectual classes with better education either abandoned their religion or remained Catholics merely in name; the larger body of the poor, the humble, and the simple clung to priests and the Church as their fathers and their mothers before them, together with many of the cultured and learned, to whom the new knowledge seemed less good than the old.

Scepticism
and religious
devotion

The Roman Catholic Church was far from remaining a passive spectator of the conflict going on around it. Generally speaking, it supported the best of the old order and opposed revolutions and changes; it favored monarchies rather than the revolutionary republics which appeared; it opposed socialism and set itself sternly against "free thinking" or any attempt to compromise with the new knowledge by abandoning any part of the older faith.

The authorities of the Church condemned the new socialist teachings completely. Generally the ecclesiastics of western Europe were against the ideas of Marx, but the most formidable opposition came from the Roman Catholic Church. In 1864 Pope Pius IX denounced socialism and communism in the *Syllabus of Errors*. Churchmen, remembering the extremities of the French Revolution, and considering some of the teachings of the socialist leaders, believed that communism aimed at the overthrow of Christianity altogether. Socialists looked upon the churches, and especially the Roman Catholic Church, as great established interests, founded upon the old system and identified with its fortunes, and hence great obstacles in the way of alteration for the better.

Against all other innovations the Church spoke no less strongly. In 1864 Pius IX issued the encyclical (circular letter) *Quanta Cura* at the same time with the *Syllabus* (summary) of *Errors*. Here he rigidly upheld all the old contentions of the Church, and condemned all who tended toward free thinking, religious liberty, or any diminution of the authority of the Church by abolishing ecclesiastical courts, by making the clergy less subordinate to Rome, by establishing lay marriage, and putting education under laymen's control. Nor was this all. In 1854 the Pope had promulgated the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, Mary. In December, 1869, was assembled an ecumenical council of the Church at Rome, the first which had been brought together since the

Attitude
of the
Church

Socialism
opposed

The *Sylla-*
bus of
Errors

The Vatican
Council,
1869-70

Council of Trent concluded its sessions in 1563. At this Council of the Vatican proposals were made to affirm the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Popes. This was so counter to the tendencies of the age, in which philosophy and science were making many people increasingly doubtful about the absolute truth of anything, that many Catholics were strongly opposed to it, and at first only a minority in the Council could be brought to support it. Through skilful management, however, and largely because of pressure and persuasion from the pope, the doctrine of Papal Infallibility was affirmed; that is to say, that the pope, speaking *ex cathedra* (as pope) with respect to affairs of the Church, could not err. Even after the work of the Council was done, some Catholics refused to accept the doctrine newly proclaimed; but in so far as they remained in the Church, after a while they were forced to yield. Thus in 1870 the Church was presenting to the world a front unchanged and unchanging; but circumstances around it were altering more swiftly than ever before.

The Prot-
estant
Churches

The Protestant Churches during this period were confronted with many of these same problems, but there is less to be said about them, since no one of them presented so striking or powerful an organization as either the Greek Catholic or the Roman Catholic Church. The Protestant creeds were professed in some of the greatest countries of Europe, but the character and the organization of their Churches was such that they could not play the large part in politics and international relations taken by the Papal See. The circumstances of the Reformation had brought it about that when the Protestant Churches were established, they were put under the control of the State, and after that time the Anglican Church in England and the Lutheran Church in Prussia had remained great and wealthy, but usually passive and obedient in their established position.

During the nineteenth century they strove, like the Catholic Church, to hold to the privileges and the teachings they had long maintained. They also had to meet the changes in life and thought that arose all during this time, and their adherents also were often torn by struggle between the old beliefs and the new revelations of science. But notwithstanding that many Protestant ministers regarded Darwin and Huxley as atheists and accursed, and the doctrines of Saint-Simon and Marx as dangerous and grounded in error, and notwithstanding that the Protestant Churches also regarded their own doctrines as unquestionably true and unchanging, yet in the case of Protestants it was often less difficult to reconcile science and new social doctrine with religion; for Protestantism, in spite of itself, had always conduced toward freedom of thought. The early Protestants had had no idea whatever of permitting intellectual or religious freedom, but they had broken away from the Roman Catholic Church; and what they had done others did more easily afterward. Not only had many new Protestant sects been founded, but within these sects individuals tended more and more to the belief that each person might be his own judge. A great many Protestants, therefore, were less under the authority of the heads of their Church, and more in the habit of judging for themselves. Accordingly, after some struggle, many Protestants modified their religious beliefs so as to bring them, as they thought, into conformity with the new teachings of philosophy and science, and in course of time a considerable number of their ministers and leaders had been able to do this likewise.

Conflict
with the
new teach-
ings

Freedom of
thought

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CHAPTER V

THE EUROPEAN STATES IN 1870

The prospects with which the year terminated were those of durable peace to this country, and of a general settlement of the affairs of the continent. . . . There were, indeed, appearances which a boding mind might regard as presaging an interruption of the calm. . . .

Annual Register, For the Year 1870, p. 1 (on the state of affairs at the end of the year 1869).

Le peuple français est convoqué. . . . pour accepter ou rejeter le projet de plébiscite suivant: "Le peuple approuve les réformes libérales opérées dans la Constitution depuis 1860, par l'Empereur. . . .

Decree of Napoleon III, April 20, 1870: ÉMILE OLLIVIER: *L'Empire Libéral*, xiii. 332.

Es ist in einem anderen Lande von amtlicher Stelle aus gesagt worden: der Friede Europas beruhe auf dem Degen Frankreichs . . . aber dass . . . jeder Staat, dem seine Ehre und Unabhängigkeit lieb ist, sich bewusst sein muss, dass sein Friede und seine Sicherheit auf seinem eigenen Degen beruht,—ich glaube, meine Herren, darüber werden wir alle einig sein.

Speech of BISMARCK, May 22, 1869: Horst Kohl, *Bismarck-Regesten* (1891), i. 373.

The
United
Kingdom of
Great Brit-
ain and
Ireland

IN 1870 the most powerful European state was the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of which the important member was Great Britain, with England the principal part. Close as was the proximity of Britain to the European continent, important and constant as her relations with the rest of Europe necessarily were, her insular position continued, as during a long time in the past, to make her principal interests elsewhere. Before the period of her greatness England had been a small and unimportant country on the outskirts of Europe, though

sometimes her excellent soldiery had won great victories in France. The fundamental change in trade routes and relative geographical position made the beginning of a great alteration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, during which time the English, through good fortune, through their enterprise and skill, and because their geographical position was now one of the best in the world, laid the foundations of a great colonial empire, and became the wealthiest trading nation in the world. This position they maintained in a series of successful wars with Spain, with Holland, and with France. In 1707 England and Scotland were firmly and finally united. After the middle of the eighteenth century the Industrial Revolution, beginning in Britain, advanced there with gigantic strides, bringing much increase of wealth and power to the nation. In 1801 Ireland, previously conquered and long held in dependence and subjection, was incorporated with Great Britain in the United Kingdom. During all this time the colonial dominions were extended, and although the best of the colonies had revolted and become independent, as the United States, yet all through the first half of the nineteenth century the British Empire continued to expand in wealth, in greatness, and in power.

In the course of this development the principal interests of Britain had been outside of Europe, over the oceans, in the dominions, and along the trade routes of the world. In European affairs usually she took as little part as she could. The wars with Spain and Holland and France were fought largely about colonies and trade. In general, it was the great purpose of Britain to maintain the Balance of Power in Europe, and prevent any state from obtaining such greatness as to be a danger to its neighbors and herself. Hence she had twice taken part in great wars against France, assisting Germans and others to resist Louis XIV and Napoleon. Her greatest duel had been with France during the Revolution and under

Causes of
the great-
ness of
England

British
policy

Struggle
with
Napoleon

Napoleon; and during some years in the period of Napoleon's greatness, she alone, guarded by her navy and supported by her industry and trade, had held out against him. During those years she had assisted all of his enemies and expended vast sums in the struggle. After Waterloo the great menace of his power had been finally removed, and Britain, needing time to restore her strength and reduce the immense national debt of £840,000,000 which weighed down upon her, soon withdrew as much as possible from European affairs, into what was sometimes spoken of as "splendid isolation."

Government

The government of Britain in 1870 was the most advanced and liberal in Europe; and, except for certain years during the French Revolution when Frenchmen made such rapid reforms, it had been so for many generations. Practically this government was vested in a parliament, the more important part of which, the House of Commons, was elected by a portion of the people. At the beginning of the nineteenth century this parliamentary representation had not been in proportion to population, nor had more than one man out of ten the right to vote, the franchise being generally restricted by property qualifications. The French Revolution and ideas of political equality and the rights of man had little direct effect upon Britain for some time, save to cause a temporary reaction, but after the threatening danger of revolution and war had passed, gradually great changes were made. In 1832 the franchise was somewhat extended. In 1867 it was extended considerably more. Even this latter reform law by no means permitted all the men of the United Kingdom to vote, the franchise still being restricted by property qualifications. Such restriction might seem to compare unfavorably with conditions in the French Second Empire and in the new North German Confederation, where universal manhood suffrage now prevailed; but in the Confederation the legislature thus elected did not

Extension of
the fran-
chise

really control the government, and in France all real power had been taken into the emperor's hands. In Britain by the beginning of the nineteenth century the executive, the cabinet or ministry, had come to be, in effect, a committee of the House of Commons, directly dependent for a continuance of power on the support of a majority of the representatives elected to the Commons. In Prussia the ministers were the king's ministers, and in France since the Restoration, though the British system of government had been copied, as it was during the nineteenth century in most European countries when constitutionalism was established, generally the ministry had not been dependent upon a legislative majority and hence not controlled by it. However, it should be noticed, that in France at this very time, since the power of Napoleon III had been weakening year by year, he had been striving to conciliate the people to his rule by making the government more liberal to please them, and that in 1870 the ministry was made dependent upon the representatives elected, as in the United Kingdom.

During this time, while the franchise was being more widely extended in the United Kingdom—so that gradually the government was being transformed from an aristocracy, which it had been at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to a commonwealth in which a great part of the people had direct control of the government for themselves—the rule of the Empire also was liberalized. In the first half of the nineteenth century the armed forces previously stationed in the various outlying parts were gradually withdrawn from those communities in which white men predominated, at the same time that the government of these communities was being transferred to the control of their inhabitants. A beginning had been made by the Canada Government Act of 1840; and this was merely the first stage in a process by which the British Empire was to be gradually transformed in part from an

The govern-
ment con-
trolled by
representa-
tives elected

The British
Empire

imperial organization of the old type into a group of self-governing dominions bound together by common heritage and mutual attachment.

Social
reforms

During the period after the fall of Napoleon, old laws passed for discrimination or persecution had been removed, and presently efforts were made to better the lot of the mass of the people. The Church of England had been established as part of the government in the sixteenth century, and thereafter many discriminations were made against Roman Catholics and Protestants not adhering to the Anglican Church. Moreover, the government had during the eighteenth century come substantially under the control of the great aristocrats and property owners. But in 1828 and 1829 respectively were repealed the laws against Dissenters and Roman Catholics, which had debarred them from many of the rights of citizens. The passing of the electoral reform laws widened the electorate and gave a share of the government first to the middle class then to a portion of the lower class. Enlarged power of the lower class together with the increasing humanitarianism of the time led to the passing in 1833 and 1844 of laws to regulate hours of labor for women and children, while beginning with 1824 a series of laws was passed legalizing the trade unions of workers, formerly forbidden. For some time there was great discontent among the poorer people, the Chartist demanding more rapid reform and much more thorough change, but after 1848 this died out very largely. In 1846 the so-called Corn Laws had been repealed, thereby allowing the importation of cheap food for the masses. Then still greater industrial prosperity developed. In 1870 Britain was first in commerce and first in industry and wealth.

Evil condi-
tions in
Ireland

In the splendid prosperity and power of Great Britain, Ireland, the other part of the United Kingdom, had almost no share, though industrialism had been successfully developed in the northeastern portion among the British

immigrants in Ulster. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Ireland had finally been conquered by England, the land had been confiscated, and the Celtic people had been dispossessed. During the eighteenth century they had been subjected to discriminations which debarred most of them from almost all of a citizen's rights. The great majority of them lived as poverty-stricken tenants on the estates of landlords. In 1793, however, Irish Catholics were allowed to vote in elections, and in 1829 they, along with Catholics in Great Britain, were given political equality with Protestants. Forty years later the Irish Church, a Protestant Church imposed by the government upon an unwilling Catholic population, was abolished, and in 1870, indeed, a series of laws was begun by which in course of time the economic condition of the peasants would be immensely improved. Actually, however, by 1870, the condition of these people had not been greatly bettered. Since the beginning of the century the population, as is often the case, had been increasing very rapidly in the midst of ignorance, misery, and scanty living. Agriculture was the sole support of the peasants, who held the little patches of ground which they worked by paying rack-rents to English landlords. Frequently they suffered hunger and were near to starvation. In 1846-9 a great famine, followed by pestilence, swept away a large part of the population, after which there began an exodus of the surviving people to other lands, especially to the United States. The population, which had increased from 5,000,000 at the beginning of the century to 8,000,000 by 1846, was now rapidly declining, as emigrants year by year were leaving their home to carry unquenchable hatred of Britain to other countries all over the world. Just before 1870 the Fenians, an Irish revolutionary society, supported by Irishmen in America, were attempting to get independence for Ireland by creating a reign of terror in Ireland and in England,

The con-
quest of
Ireland


The Great
Famine


Great Britain and the United States

Irishmen in the United States had long been doing, what they afterward continued to do, as much as they could to embitter relations between Britain and the United States. These relations, which had not been good, were now nevertheless improving. In 1783, following the American Revolutionary War, the principal English colonies on the mainland of North America had won independence. Viewed in larger aspect now this struggle appears as one of the few civil wars among the English-speaking people. In the years 1641–1660 there had been civil war in England itself, but after great temporary upheaval this at last came to an end. In the years 1775–1783 there was conflict between the two principal parts of the English-speaking people on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean. This resulted in the secession of the American commonwealths and the permanent division of the English-speaking people into two principal separate parts. From 1861 to 1865 there was a struggle among the English-speaking people in the United States, but after the longest and most terrible war since Napoleon's time, the South, which had attempted to establish its separation and independence, was forcibly brought back and reunited in the United States. All during the period since the adoption of the American Constitution (1787–9), and indeed little interrupted by the conflict of the Civil War, the young nation had gone forward with giant strides to greater prosperity and power, until now it held promise of being, what it was destined to become in another fifty years, the wealthiest and most important group of civilized people in the world. Already by 1870 its population exceeded that of the United Kingdom.

The two great branches of the English-speaking people

Between Britain and the United States there had long been much rancor and ill-feeling, though since 1814 never any armed conflict. Memories of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 caused most Americans to think of the British as oppressors whose yoke had been cast off, at the





IN 1870

same time that they despised them as subjects of a king, while they boasted that they lived in a republic as free men. On the other hand, Englishmen thought of Americans as ungrateful colonists, who would bear none of the burdens of the British Empire, and who had ungratefully cast off their allegiance as soon as they could; and they looked down upon them as rough and inferior people in a new, rude country. All disputes between the two nations were arranged peaceably, however, after 1814, and slowly relations became better. The great crisis had just been reached during the Civil War, when the British Government recognized the Confederacy as a belligerent, sympathizing with its cause and hoping that it would win independence. Confederate privateers fitted out in England swept American commerce from the seas, arousing great bitterness in the North against England. Nevertheless, a great part of the middle and lower classes in Britain earnestly hoped that the North would win, and that negro slavery would be abolished. The turning-point came when the war ended in 1865 with the complete triumph of the North, and when two years later the Electoral Reform Law of 1867 made the Government of the United Kingdom much more of a government by its people than before. Gradually in spirit and character the governments of Britain and the United States came much closer together. The American Government was now asking that England pay for the damage done by the Southern privateers fitted out in English ports, and the dispute about this caused relations to be strained and unpleasant; but the *Alabama Claims* were about to be adjusted peaceably a little later (1871-2), by treaty and arbitration, perhaps the most important example of such settlement of a difference between two great nations up to that time.

In 1870 the leading nation on the Continent of Europe was France, who had recovered the position she had so

Mutual
bitter
feeling

The two
peoples
come closer
together

The position
of France

The leading
Continental
state

long held as the principal Continental state. During the eighteenth century, despite much failure and incompetent administration, she had held this position generally, because she contained twice as many energetic and highly civilized people as any other well-organized state then. During all this time the French were leaders in European civilization; their language was everywhere known or used by educated people; their styles, their taste, their manners were universally imitated, while the ideas of their philosophers and writers about social and economic matters were studied with enthusiasm in every quarter.

Greatness
and down-
fall

In France it was that the great Revolution began, which in the western half of Europe swept away the relics of the feudal system, bringing many civil and social inequalities to an end. Thence spread out over neighboring lands ideas about political equality and the rights of man. There was built up the stupendous power of Napoleon. For some years at the beginning of the century France had been the center of the greatest empire seen for ages, and from Paris edicts had gone forth to be obeyed from Warsaw unto Madrid. Then came the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire, and with it, for some time, the end of the leadership of France. The French emissary, Talleyrand, was soon admitted to the inner circle of the small group of great men who decided the destinies of Europe at Vienna; but the settlement of 1814-15 was essentially a reversal of much of what France had accomplished in the past generation. When Napoleon staked all on a final contest in 1813-14, France lost the "natural frontiers," which the Revolutionary armies had won, and which carried her boundary to the Rhine. These frontiers, perhaps, she might have retained permanently had Napoleon been willing to compromise before it was too late.

Recovery
of strength

After Waterloo for a generation or more France was remembered as a danger to the other nations and a disturber of the peace of Europe; and for some time she was

regarded with as much suspicion as defeated Germany was a hundred years later. During this time any attempt to alter the territorial arrangements made at Vienna, perhaps even the reëstablishing of a republic in France, would almost certainly have brought the French into conflict with another European coalition. It was the principal service of the French kings who reigned from 1814 to 1848 that they kept the peace, gradually allayed the suspicion of their neighbors, and gave the country time to recover from the exhaustion which the years preceding had entailed. In 1848 a series of revolutions shook the power of the conservative statesmen who had been standing guard since Napoleon went to St. Helena, and gradually the situation altered. A second republic was established in France in 1848, succeeded by a second empire, under the nephew of the great Napoleon, in 1852. Already the French people, because of the inexhaustible fertility of their soil, because of a rising industrialism, and most of all as a result of their own energy and amazing recuperative power, had fully recovered their strength. The emperor, Napoleon III, partly to strengthen his own position, soon embarked upon an ambitious policy in foreign relations, and soon, with Britain largely holding aloof from European affairs, France regained her old position as leader among the European nations. In 1854 France, along with Great Britain and afterward Piedmont, assisted the Turks against the Russians in the Crimean War; and the Congress which followed this struggle was held at Paris to make the treaty which brought the conflict to an end. In 1859 Napoleon assisted the Rumanians to unite. That same year he helped the Italians to shake off Austria's yoke, thus paving the way for Italian unity also.

Thereafter, however, French foreign policy was increasingly unsuccessful, notably in the attempt to control Mexico and in efforts to extend the French frontier

Regarded
with much
suspicion

The Second
Empire

France and
Germany

French
policy
thwarted

toward the Rhine. By 1870 Napoleon, baffled in all his recent undertakings, had brought France to the point where she was regarded with suspicion by most of the European powers, and by some of them was heartily disliked. A dangerous discord between the French Empire and the new North German Confederation was increasing each year. And by 1870 many people, realizing that Frenchmen viewed with hostility the rise of a new, strong, united Germany at their borders, and that a multitude of Germans did not believe their national unity could be completed until accounts had been settled with France, considered that war between the two was only a matter of time.

Political and
social prog-
ress

In France as in Great Britain there had been much political and social progress. After the too-rapid changes of the Revolution reaction had come first under Napoleon I, when a military despotism was established, afterward under the Bourbons (1814-30). But even with the Restoration in 1814 a constitutional government, modelled on that of England, had been established, and in the succeeding period this government was made more liberal and the franchise was extended. Political progress had recently been rapid, and in 1870 ministerial government had been established almost as it existed in England. In France, as across the Channel, the Industrial Revolution had brought great changes and large industrial expansion. In the French cities, as in the English, there had been many new baffling problems and much discontent among industrial workers. Socialism, which had its roots back before Revolutionary times, had developed much more in France than in England, and bodies of the workers awaited their opportunity to overthrow the existing system. The period of the Terror in 1793-4 had seen efforts of radicals to bring to pass a change in the interests of the masses of the French people. In 1848, during a political crisis, the workingmen of Paris

Socialism

under socialist leaders had attempted to bring about sweeping reforms, and, when thwarted, rose in a terrible revolt. In 1870 no such danger seemed imminent, but in the very next year, after the disastrous defeat in war with the Germans, there was to be a similar revolt in the *Commune* of Paris. Nevertheless, this radicalism was confined to a number comparatively small. Since the Revolution the rulers of France had been the *bourgeoisie*. Beyond them the great mass of the people, engaged in agriculture, were content with their lot, since the lands of the Church and the nobles had been sold to them in small holdings. They now formed with the *bourgeoisie* the great foundation of French institutions.

Radicalism
in France

By 1870 central Europe had undergone such great transformation that its arrangement was altogether different from what it had been two generations, even one generation, earlier. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Germanic people, and many Slavs whom once they had conquered, were grouped together in three hundred and thirty divisions, most of them quite small, some of respectable size, and two, Austria and Prussia, large and important European states. Very loosely they were then bound together in the so-called Holy Roman Empire, at the head of which was an emperor, the ruler of the Hapsburg or Austrian dominions. This Empire was actually not bound together by any strong or effectively organized government, so that the various parts acted much as they pleased, sometimes in unison, sometimes siding with foreign enemies against other members of the *Reich*.

Central
Europe

In 1806, when Napoleon was rearranging central Europe as seemed to him best, the venerable Holy Roman Empire came to an end, its *Kaiser* taking now the title of emperor of Austria, the dominions directly subject to his rule, while the various German states were not any longer bound together in any common organization.

Holy Roman
Empire and
Germanic
Confedera-
tion

The Germanic Confederation, 1815-66

After the downfall of Napoleon, however, the Congress of Vienna erected the Germanic Confederation, much like the old Empire which had disappeared, since the various states were only loosely bound together as before, and since the Diet, or general assembly, which was provided, had no power to enforce its decisions. The spirit of nationality rising then in central Europe, and stronger feeling of common possession of German language and culture, made many Germans yearn for a real union of the various German states into a closely united federation or one great national state. To this, however, Metternich and other leading statesmen were opposed. Austria, the most powerful of the states in question, was resolved that it should not come to pass, since, in any real and strong union of the German states, Austria, now the leader, would almost certainly lose her position of leadership, for the greater part of her extended dominions was peopled not by Germans but by subject Magyars, Rumans, and Slavs. Nevertheless, much had really been accomplished toward attaining the unity for which German patriots were yearning. "Germany" was not so divided as before Napoleon's time. When his work was done there remained only thirty-eight German states, several of them of considerable size.

Halting progress toward real union

During the generation which followed 1815 little progress seemed to be made. The system of Metternich prevailed, and his system was opposed to German unity and to any liberal constitutional progress. Gradually, however, the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in central Europe and the changing times undermined his régime to an end. Uprisings of the people in Prussia, in Austria, in Hungary, and in other states, yielded reform and constitutions temporarily, and the most ardent German liberals even believed for the moment that the time had come when it was possible to establish a united

German nation at last. At Frankfort a parliament assembled to try to bring this about, but reaction soon undid the work which the revolutions had accomplished, and the work of the Parliament came to nothing. By 1850 the loose and ineffective Germanic Confederation was restored.

Meanwhile, to a great extent unnoticed then, economic ties were binding large parts of Germany together. Between 1818 and 1842, excepting Austria and Hanover, all of the German states joined a customs union, the *Zollverein*. At the head of the antiquated Germanic Confederation was Austria, apparently still the most powerful of all the members; but the *Zollverein* was headed by Prussia, whose strength was constantly increasing, and whom more and more the smaller German states were beginning to regard as their leader. For some time she had been steadily building up her military power, and now she prepared to dispute with Austria for the leadership in Germany. Relations between the two steadily became worse, and were designedly made worse by the great Prussian leader, Bismarck, until the matter came to issue in the Austro-Prussian War in 1866. In this conflict the Prussians had just won complete triumph; they had annexed much neighboring German territory to their possessions, dissolved the old Germanic Confederation, expelled Austria from any association with the other German states, and out of the German states north of the river Main they had formed the new, powerful North German Confederation (1867). Thus was brought to pass what German patriots and statesmen had been dreaming of for ages, a Germany strong and united. The work was not yet complete, but Bismarck was already planning to bring the south German states into a larger German union. Actually the appearance of this new, strong German state in the midst of the older European states had disturbed the older balance of power, and equilibrium

Partial
union under
Prussia

The *Nord-deutsches Bund*, 1867

had not yet been adjusted. In after times it seemed a pity that German unity had not been brought about peaceably, if that were possible, by the republicans and liberals of Germany in 1848; for what had so far been achieved had largely been completed by Bismarck's genius and guile, and wrought by Prussian military might.

Austria and
Hungary

In 1870 what had been the Austrian Empire had recently become the Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary united by a compromise, the *Ausgleich*, as the Dual Monarchy (1867). In the Middle Ages, when the Germans were pushing eastward and southward at the expense of the Slavs, one of the principal border communities had been the East Mark (eastern frontier state), later known as the East Kingdom, *Oesterreich*, Austria. In course of time its rulers, the Hapsburgs, by fortunate marriages, by skilful diplomacy, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by successful wars against the waning power of the Turk, had enlarged their dominions, until the great majority of the people subject to their rule were not Germans but Magyars and Southern Slavs. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Austria and Hungary were the two principal parts of the Hapsburg dominions. In Austria the principal element of the population was the Germans, who were the ruling class, and most powerful and wealthy; but the majority of the inhabitants were the Czechs (West Slavs) of Bohemia and Moravia, the Poles (West Slavs) of Galicia, and the South Slavs of the country along the east shore of the Adriatic and inward. In Hungary the principal element of the population was the Magyars, who had once made the Kingdom of Hungary; but they were less than half of the entire population, the remaining inhabitants being the South Slavs of Croatia-Slavonia, and the Rumanians of Transylvania. Thus, Austria with Hungary had been a German state for the most part only because it was governed by Germans, and it was owing to the heteroge-

Peoples
of the
Hapsburg
dominions

neity of its population and its non-Germanic character that during the first half of the nineteenth century Austria gradually seemed less and less the natural leader of the German states. During the Revolution of 1848 the various subject peoples hoped they might win their freedom; and for a while it looked as though Hungary would obtain virtual independence; but in the end the Austrians, with the help of Russia, had subdued them all, and it seemed that Hapsburg power was once more completely established.

Actually, however, the subject peoples, especially the Magyars, were burning with a sense of their own nationality, and waiting for another opportunity to throw off the yoke. Then Austria was unsuccessful in her foreign relations, being defeated by France in 1859, and presently in 1866, suffering disastrous defeat at the hands of the Prussians. In the midst of this failure abroad and sullen discontent at home it was necessary to make some new arrangement. Accordingly, in 1867, by the *Ausgleich*, the Austrians came to a good understanding with the most powerful of the discontented peoples, the Magyars. The Dual Monarchy now established was to be a union of an Austria and a Hungary, substantially equal; with the Germans, the minority in Austria, controlling affairs there, and the Magyars, less than half of the population of Hungary, controlling affairs in that part. So the two most powerful minorities united to keep the rest in subjection. This arrangement was now working well, and Austria-Hungary was starting forward again on the road of prosperity and advancement. The others, Slavs and Rumans, could not yet make themselves heard, and only dreamed of their day which might, perhaps, come in the future.

To the east of the Central Powers lay the vast Russian Empire, stretching for seven thousand miles, from the Carpathian Mountains to the Pacific coast of northeast

The *Ausgleich*: a Dual Monarchy

The Russian Empire

Growth of
the power
of Russia

Asia, embracing all the great plain of the eastern half of Europe, and beyond the Ural Mountains, all the north part of Asia. Some far-reaching and fundamental reforms had just been made in Russia, but down to within a decade of 1870 the condition of the Russian people had changed but little in many generations. For a long time the history of this part of the world had had to do mostly with the expansion of the Great Russian race, one of the parts of the Northern Slavs, from the district about Moscow, where their power first arose. To the east and the south they had gone, until in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they had built up a great inland Muscovite state, and sent forth colonists and traders to take the Siberian country in Asia. Meanwhile to the west they had come into contact with the Poles, previously the leading Slavic people. During the eighteenth century they took what they wished from their neighbors to the west: Baltic provinces from Sweden in the north, territory from Turks and Tartars in the south, and most of Poland, when it was partitioned (1772, 1793, 1795). At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Russians had held their own against Napoleon, and at the Congress of Vienna the tsar had been looked upon as the mightiest ruler in Europe.

Condition of
the people in
Russia

The great French ideas of the Revolution and Napoleon's time scarcely even touched Russia, whose people remained unreached by the influences that so profoundly altered life in the western half of the Continent. The government was an autocracy, with all the power of Church and State concentrated in the hands of the ruler, the tsar, while administration was actually carried on by a bureaucracy of numerous officials appointed by him and responsible to him. There was a small upper class of nobles, many of them poor and without much power. There was a small *bourgeoisie*, so scanty as compared with the vast numbers in the realm as scarcely to have any weight.

Beneath was the great mass of the nation, the peasants, living in their lonely and dirty little villages in the forest and over the plains, carrying on a primitive agriculture, devoted adherents of the Greek Catholic or Orthodox faith, living in village communities and bound in serfdom, much as the peasants of western Europe had lived two or three centuries before. Few of these people could read or write. Most of them had the intellectual outlook of medieval peasants. Save in the petty concerns of their villages none of them had aught to do with the government of the country or any control over it. Many of them were oppressed by the judges and officials. For most of them life was hard and poverty-stricken, lonely, meager, and bare.

The Russian peasants

Generally the rulers of Russia had been conservative and intensely desirous of retaining autocratic power and established position. For a while Alexander I (1801–1825) had tried to act as a liberal, but his successor, Nicholas I (1825–1855), had been thoroughly reactionary, and resolved that none of the dangerous doctrines recently risen in the west should enter his country. He and others of the ruling class of Russia, as was afterward the case, were firmly resolved to maintain the power and privileges of their ruling class; but they were also anxious to keep unchanged Russian institutions, Russian character, and the Russian religion, which they considered to be superior to all others. During the lifetime of Nicholas I western and radical ideas had been almost completely kept out of Russia, through repression, censorship, and the unceasing vigilance of spies and police. Meanwhile, there was not only no progress in the country, but deterioration and decay set in, while the government became constantly more corrupt and inefficient. So long as Russia was considered invincible in war it was possible to uphold this system, but during the Crimean War (1854–6) Russian armies were shamefully defeated, and it was evident that

The govern-
ment of
Russia

The great
reforms

the people's discontent with evil conditions and poor administration at length would have to be appeased.

During the war a new tsar, Alexander II (1855-1881), had come to the throne. At once he undertook great reforms. By the abolition of serfdom (1859-1866) the peasants were relieved of manorial obligations, made completely free, and given part of the lands on which they had worked. In 1864 the judicial system was reformed, jury trial and western principles being introduced. At the same time larger rights of local self-government were granted in the rural divisions, and, in 1870, also in the cities. But by that time the reform movement in Russia had come to an end. On the one hand there was reaction because the upper class believed that too-great innovations had been made. On the other hand, there was great disillusion and disappointment on the part of numerous simple people who had expected everything to be reformed, but who at once discovered much of evil still remaining. Whether in the realm of the tsars the great changes which had come over western Europe could be brought about peaceably in course of time or only by force and revolution—all this lay hid in the future.

The King-
dom of
Italy

In Italy as in Germany a great alteration of affairs had recently taken place. After centuries of weakness, division, and subjection, the Italian people had been united in one nation, and almost all of the peninsula had been brought together in the Kingdom of Italy. By 1870 the process was nearly complete, and, indeed, later in that very year the last, crowning part of the work would be done. Italians then were in the midst of the grand part of their modern history, thrilling with patriotism, their hearts warm with new sense of dignity, greatness, and success. In 1870, however, a great part of all the people then living could remember when Italians were not only divided among several small states, as the Germans had been, but when some of them had been in subjection to

foreign masters, and almost all of the others ruled by despots dependent upon foreign masters.

During the Middle Ages, when nation states were being built up in England, in France, and in Spain, out of the smaller fragments in which these countries were previously divided, in Italy the spirit of localism was so strong, and such striking and brilliant individuality developed in different places, that for some time the peninsula was crowded with small city-states, much as old Greece once had been. During all this time there were efforts to consolidate these fragments into larger jurisdictions; but every effort to accomplish any Italian unity was brought to nothing, partly because the German emperors of the Holy Roman Empire always attempted to keep Italy a part of their dominions, and even more because the popes at Rome, wishing to be the most important sovereigns in the country, thwarted all attempts to make one, united Italian nation. Later on, when the Italians were conquered by foreign powers, Italy was only a geographical expression, as Metternich said some centuries later, and the Italian people remained divided among divers small states. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they were ruled by the pope, by the Spaniards, and by princes under the shadow of Spain. In the eighteenth century the power of Spain was succeeded by the dominion of Austria. During the French Revolution the Austrian masters were expelled, but Italy was soon made a part of the empire which Napoleon constructed. The Napoleonic era, along with much suffering, brought a great deal of good, since the previous smaller divisions were now consolidated into three large parts, and among the people feeling of nationality was awakened.

The Congress of Vienna, when it rearranged European affairs, had ignored the aspirations of the Italian people even as it disregarded those of the Germans. The north part of the country, around Milan and Venice, was left an

Italy in
earlier times

Italian na-
tionality
thwarted

Austrian province, and all the remainder, divided in parts as before, was ruled by sovereigns subservient to the Austrian power.

The *Risorgimento*

In vain had a secret society, the *Carbonari*, endeavored to throw off the foreigner's yoke. In vain the patriots rose to get reform and independence; always the movements were easily crushed by the superior Austrian power. Nevertheless, during all this time a *Risorgimento* (resurrection) had been going on, under the leadership of various aspiring men, chief among whom was Mazzini, who founded the society *Giovine Italia* (Young Italy), placing his hopes in the youth of the land. During this stirring of mind the Italian people were taught to consider themselves as one nation, with one language and common traditions, heirs of a glorious past, and destined to have happiness and glory once more when unity would be achieved in the future.

The unification of Italy

The establishment of the Italian nation was brought about under the leadership of the north Italian state of Piedmont (Sardinia), and was due, above all others, to the consummate leadership of the Italian statesman Cavour. With great skill he obtained the assistance of France, and then in a war with Austria (1859) Lombardy, part of Austria's possessions, was conquered. Fired with enthusiasm the people of the adjoining states expelled their princelings, and despite the opposition of France, the states were permitted to join with the greater Piedmont, so that most of the northern half of Italy was free and united. Next year Garibaldi, an Italian patriot and exile, led an expedition into Sicily and Naples, and easily conquered all the southern half of the peninsula, yielding all this country at once to the king of Piedmont. In 1861 the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed, embracing the entire peninsula excepting Venetia and the city of Rome with a small domain about it. In 1866 Italy, joining Prussia against Austria, obtained Venetia as her reward.

EUROPEAN STATES IN 1870 115

In 1870 a French garrison was still holding Rome for the pope, but the Italian people were hoping that some day the old capital of the country would become the capital of their new state.

In southern Europe, at the western and the eastern extremities, were two states, once great but now in decline and decay. At the western gateway of the Mediterranean was Spain, with grandeur departed and glory gone. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries she had for a while been the greatest power in the world, dominating much of western and central Europe, and in possession of the greatest commerce and the most extensive and wealthiest colonial empire which the world ever had seen. But poverty of natural resources in Spain, emigration of the best Spaniards to the colonies in America, expulsion of Moorish artisans and Jewish business men, and religious intolerance which forbade much intellectual activity, soon brought decline. Subject provinces in Europe were lost, Spanish armies were defeated, and Spain ceased to be leader in Europe. At the beginning of the eighteenth century a great European war was fought concerning the possessions of Spain, and in 1713 the Spanish dominions in Italy and the Netherlands were lost. The vast colonial empire remained for another hundred years, but more and more the trade passed to the English. Then, in the earlier years of the nineteenth century, save for some islands in the Caribbean, all of the American possessions of Spain won their complete independence.

During the French Revolution the Spaniards were somewhat affected by the new ideas, and in Napoleon's time many reforms were made in their country, but the national uprising there against Napoleon's power was followed by a period of reaction. Thereafter during the nineteenth century the history of Spain had been concerned with a succession of struggles between a minority of liberals, who would bring reform, and the majority of

Spain in the past

During the French Revolution

In 1870

the nation, conservative or ignorant and superstitious, while the country was also torn by strife between rival claimants to the throne. In 1870, indeed, the throne was vacant, as the result of a revolution, and the Spanish leaders were seeking a new sovereign throughout Europe. The fundamental cause of the lowly position in which the Spanish people now found themselves was that world-conditions had altered: other nations possessed greater resources and had become relatively richer and greater; change of the principal trade routes had left Spaniards more outside the world's greatest affairs; while the coal and iron which were making some industrial nations great were to no large extent available in Spain.

The Otto-
man Empire

At the other end of the Mediterranean were the relics of the Ottoman Empire, extending from Constantinople up through the Balkans, and down across the Bosphorus through Asia Minor, into Mesopotamia, into Palestine, and nominally around the north African shore, through Tripoli and Egypt. It was still great in size, but its power and its strength had departed. The Turks, like the Hungarians and the Finns, were alien intruders in Europe. In the fourteenth century they had crossed into Europe from Anatolia, in Asia Minor, where already they had laid the foundations of their state. In 1453 they captured Constantinople and by the sixteenth century, if they were not the greatest power in Europe, they were yet so powerful as to menace all of their neighbors. All the eastern Mediterranean as well as the Black Sea was held firmly in their grip, and their European boundaries were pushed up as far as the Danube. Brave as warriors and essentially a military nation, the developing civilization of western Europe presently left them behind, and they were no longer able to wage war with Christian states, which possessed superior organization and equipment. In 1571 they were defeated in the great naval battle of Lepanto; and in 1683 before the

walls of Vienna. Accordingly their conquests came to an end, and their outlying provinces began to fall away. Furthermore, they had never developed any good political organization, so that their empire merely consisted of a conglomeration of different subject peoples, oppressed and debased, but retaining their own religion, speech, and racial consciousness. Among these subjects the Turkish conquerors lived—a minority of the entire population—keeping their position by force and by maintaining the differences between the various bodies of their subjects.

The condition of the subject majority in the European dominions of Turkey was extremely bad. This was not so much because of the cruelty and wickedness of the Turks as from their lack of administrative ability and genius to govern wisely and well. Moreover, it was probably not much worse than the condition of most of the peasants in the Hapsburg dominions and in Russia. None the less, the Christian population of Greece and the Balkans yearned for their freedom, and a succession of revolts brought them independence in whole or in part. Already the Greeks, with the assistance of the great Christian powers, had achieved their independence, while the Serbs and the Rumanians had won autonomy under overlordship of the sultan. Long before 1870 Turkey would probably have been extinguished by a Russian conquest, had it not been for the opposition first of Great Britain, afterward of Austria and Britain. In the first half of the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire had seemed to Montesquieu as a sick man, and afterward its end was often predicted and expected. Many believed that it would be a blessing if this came to pass. "As a matter of humanity I wish with all my soul," said Stratford Canning in 1821, "that the Sultan were driven bag and baggage into the heart of Asia." During all this time, however, the failing power of the Turk was effectively protected by the jealousies of the

The waning
of the
crescent

Condition of
the subject
peoples

great European states. This had just been strikingly shown. Russia under Tsar Nicholas I aspired, apparently, to get possession of Constantinople, long desired by the Russians, and so obtain for Russia a better outlet on the great seas of the world. Against her France and England had fought the Crimean War (1854-6), defeating her and saving Turkey from destruction.

The smaller states

In 1870 the smaller states of Europe were going forward, some in quiet prosperity, under the shadow of their mightier neighbors. Greece was poor and small, but independent, and developing her commerce, as of old. In the Balkans some of the Christian peoples, like the Bulgars, still were ruled by the Turk; others, like the Serbs and the Rumanians, had their autonomy, and were expecting more complete independence in the future. The Scandinavian countries, once the source of so much terror and power, were now outside the current of mightier affairs, their scanty resources not having permitted development like that which had come to their neighbors to the south. Denmark was small and unimportant, and had recently lost her two southern provinces, Schleswig and Holstein (1864). The Congress of Vienna had given Norway to Sweden, in place of Finland, long a Swedish possession, but taken by Russia in 1809, so that Norway and Sweden, different as they were in the character of their peoples, and in economic development, were ruled by one king. Holland, though dispossessed of some of her colonies during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, still had one of the wealthiest colonial empires, and was prosperous through agriculture and commerce. The remaining three states had recently been neutralized, Switzerland in 1815, Belgium in 1831, and Luxemburg in 1867, thus giving them, it was hoped, security and peace, and at the same time putting them outside the greater currents of European politics. The Belgians, since their successful revolt from Holland in 1830, and the establishment of a

The neutralized states

Belgian state by the Great Powers in 1831, had gone forward greatly in industrial prosperity and wealth. Previous to 1848 the Swiss people had been united in a loose confederation. In that year civil war broke out, when the *Sonderbund*, an organization of the more conservative cantons, tried to leave the others. This secession was prevented, and in the same year a new constitution was adopted, making of the Swiss communities a strong, compact federal union.

The Swiss
Republic

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CHAPTER VI

THE MILITARY TRIUMPHS OF GERMANY, 1864-1871

The old political science was mistaken when it regarded the Army as nothing but the servant of diplomacy. . . . Such a conception . . . has vanished from our age of universal military service; for we all feel nowadays . . . that the very constitution of the State reposes upon the nation's share in bearing arms.

TREITSCHKE, *Politics* (trans. 1916), ii. 389.

The military becomes the normal form of life. Our civil life is to be recast. Every citizen is to be a soldier. . . . Moltke and Bismarck are the great men of our age. Prussia is our model state of an armed and drilled nation. . . . The military becomes the true type of human society; some pitiless strategist is a hero; some unscrupulous conspirator is a statesman; and the nation which is the best drilled and the best armed in Europe is to go to the van of modern civilization . . . this we owe to Prussia.

FREDERIC HARRISON in the *Fortnightly Review*, December, 1870.

Und Trommeln und Pfeifen, das war mein Klang,
Und Trommeln und Pfeifen, Soldatengesang,
Ihr Trommeln und Pfeifen, mein Leben lang,
Hoch Kaiser und Heer!

LILIENCRON (who served as an officer in 1866 and 1870-1).

The great
military
triumphs of
the Germans

SHORTLY after the middle of the nineteenth century there was a succession of wars which then and for some time afterward seemed of most importance because of their part in the unification of Germany and the founding of the German Empire. But seen now, in the longer perspective of the time passed since then, they have a greater importance because they completely shifted the center of power in European affairs, and because the conditions which decided their outcome after a while affected the

life of every great people in the world. They were the Danish War (1864), the Austro-Prussian War (1866), and the Franco-German War (1870-1). The first of these struggles is relatively unimportant now, but the second marked a new era in the history of modern Europe, and the third the definite ending of an old one. In these two great wars Prussia showed herself not only the new leader of the German peoples, but invincible in battle and of matchless military might.

The successes of the Prussians against Austria and of the Germans against France were so swift and so overwhelming that afterward the reputation of German military power was held almost as the legend of some strange and superhuman thing, growing in estimation until at last it seemed of uncanny and overpowering greatness. But actually, after this military power had reached the height of its grandeur and then been broken to pieces, it was seen to have been the carefully wrought work of men who introduced a new principle into military usage, and then perfected their work with wondrous care and organization. In the end it was evident that they had brought into effect one of the most important changes in the nineteenth century.

In the history of military organization in Europe since the breaking up of the Roman Empire there are seen to have been several great steps. In the Middle Ages, when the "feudal system" flourished, armies were composed of tenants who held land partly on terms of service in war. As the feudal system decayed, armies came to be composed much more largely of mercenaries or paid soldiers, sometimes hired by the ruler of a country, often assembled by some captain who made war a business. Such mercenaries served in the Hundred Years' War between England and France; they did most of the fighting in the numerous wars between Italian states; and they had a great part in ruining Germany in the Thirty Years' War.

Military
reputation of
the Germans

Armies in
earlier
times

**Hired
soldiers**

As strong national governments arose these mercenary soldiers were gathered together under direct authority of the central government. In the seventeenth century Louis XIV of France had a numerous army of paid soldiers; the German princes had smaller ones; and a very small force was maintained in England. A great number of Irishmen served in French armies and died in the service of France; and German princes, like the father of Frederick the Great, hired or kidnapped their soldiers from all over Europe. It was by building up the largest and best army of this kind in central Europe that Prussia laid the foundations of her greatness. In this system, which continued in effect until the period of the French Revolution, the armies were small in numbers, compared with the total population of the country; the soldiers were professional, making war their business, and they were paid for their military service.

**The national
army in the
French
Revolution**

The great innovation that followed was suggested by what the French did. During the dark period when the work of the Revolution seemed in danger of being overthrown by foreign foes, the French republic was saved by great new armies drawn from the entire nation, called out to serve their country in its need. "All France and whatsoever it contains of men and resources is put under requisition," said the decree. In so far as this was carried out it substituted the idea of the men of the nation in arms for the older idea of a small force of hired soldiers.

**Developed
by Prussia**

But it was left to Prussia really to effect this revolution in carrying on wars. It was with a standing army of the old type that Frederick the Great had won his triumphs, and it was an army of this sort which Napoleon had crushed at Jena. By the terms of the treaty which followed this defeat Napoleon, desiring permanently to cripple Prussia's military power, limited her army to 42,000 men. But from the degradation of this period almost at once began a splendid period of regeneration

and reform not unlike that which a few years before had made France herself so great. In the years from 1807 to 1813, while Stein and Hardenberg were freeing the serfs and abolishing class distinctions, the army was reorganized by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, who, in order to evade Napoleon's restriction, kept under arms the 42,000 men only so long as necessary to give them the proper military training, and then summoned in succession other forces of equal size to receive a like training. The result of this was that when, in 1813, Prussia rose against the French Empire in the War of Liberation, she was able to put into the field 270,000 well-trained soldiers. And the new principle, which had been used in accomplishing this, was strengthened and preserved as soon as Napoleon was overthrown. In 1814 the idea of the great reformers, that military service was the obligation of the citizen and that the army should be a national force, was embodied in the Military Law of Boyen, which, proclaiming that "Every citizen is bound to defend his Fatherland," provided for universal military service. Every man in Prussia was liable, on becoming twenty years old. He was to serve for three years in the standing army and two years in the reserve; then for fourteen years afterward he might be called to serve in the *Landwehr*, and for eleven years thereafter in the *Landsturm*. That is to say, there was now organized in Prussia an army of the men of the nation, part of whom were in active service and ready for sudden emergency, while the rest might be mobilized or called out from the various reserves, if the country should need them.

For a long time the importance of this regulation was not realized outside of Prussia. Even there it was not fully applied, for Prussia did not really have universal military service. Not all the young men were called to the colors when they came to be twenty years old, and as numbers increased, the proportion of those not called

Prussia pre-pares for the War of Liberation

Boyen's Law, 1814

The Prussian army enlarged

The work of
Bismarck

grew steadily larger. In 1860, when the population of Prussia was 18,000,000, with 150,000 young men of military age each year, she called into service only 40,000 as had been arranged in 1814 when the population was about 11,000,000. There was a bitter struggle in 1862, between the king and the Prussian parliament, over a plan brought forward by the king and his military advisers for enlarging the army by calling each year 65,000 youths to the colors. For this scheme the lower house of the *Landtag* refused to appropriate the necessary money. It was at this juncture that Bismarck was brought into the ministry. Under his guidance affairs were managed without parliamentary sanction. The desired military reforms were now carried through, and the standing army was increased to 400,000, with double that number of trained reserves in the *Landwehr*.

The work
of Von
Moltke and
Von Roon

Along with this development of a new army went the work of the greatest military genius in all the period between Napoleon and Foch. In 1857 Von Moltke was appointed chief of staff of the Prussian army. He was the second greatest master of military organization and preparation in the nineteenth century. Since the period of Napoleon European railway systems had grown up and communications had been much altered and improved. Von Moltke realized clearly the importance and the military meaning of these changes and began training the commanders of the Prussian armies in great schemes of maneuver, mobilization, and attack, worked out in advance. Not only were plans elaborated in minutest detail for the carrying on of possible wars with other great powers near by, but under Von Roon the most careful arrangements for rapid mobilization were prepared, so that when the hour for action came each man might quickly know just what to do. Military stores and equipment were got together, a splendid artillery was provided, and the "needle-gun," a breech-loading rifle, was adopted for infantry use.

The result of all this was that by 1864 Prussia had the largest and best-equipped army in the world, with the largest number of well-trained reserves behind it, and that this army could be moved down to the frontier with a speed hitherto undreamed of.

Outside of Prussian military circles much of this, as is often the case when great changes are developing, was little noticed or understood at the time. France was still considered the greatest military power on the Continent, and most people would have regarded Austria as more important than Prussia. That which opened the eyes of contemporaries and led directly to great changes which were to mark off the earlier from the latter part of the nineteenth century in Europe, was the series of wars in which the Prussian army was used and in which Bismarck consolidated the German Empire.

Moltke's plans for military campaigns were always conceived with respect to political conditions and diplomatic relations in Europe. With respect to these things he worked with Prussia's great statesman, Bismarck. The German statesmen who began the Great War in 1914 were not able to prevent Germany appearing as the aggressor and mostly in the wrong; but Bismarck always contrived, sometimes with baseness and cunning but always with most masterly skill, to put the odium on his opponents, and arrange matters so that they fought without the sympathy or the assistance of others.

The first contest, the Danish War, needs little attention, for it is principally important now because of what it led up to. South of Denmark were the two duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, peopled largely by Germans, but joined with Denmark by a personal union, since the Danish king was also Duke of Schleswig and of Holstein. Holstein was a member of the Germanic Confederation. The Schleswig-Holstein question had long been troublesome in the politics of Europe. Many people in these provinces

These
changes
attract
little atten-
tion

Diplomacy
and military
strategy

Schleswig-
Holstein

The German
Confedera-
tion, Den-
mark, and
the Duchies

War with
Denmark,
1864

preferred some connection with their kinsmen in the German Confederation, but the Danish kings naturally desired to attach the provinces more closely to their kingdom. In 1852 the so-called London Protocol provided that while the king of Denmark might be duke of Schleswig, the duchy should not be made part of Denmark. In 1863, however, the Danish Government prepared to annex both duchies. The Diet of the Confederation protested, and the Germans were eager that the incorporation should be prevented. Indeed, they desired that Schleswig also should be admitted into their Confederation. Bismarck began now to plan, as he afterward declared, to annex the duchies to Prussia. He contrived, however, to make it appear that measures were only being taken to maintain the provisions of the Protocol of London, or else merely to admit Schleswig to the Confederation. Accordingly, he was able to bring it about that Austria, whose measures he had just been opposing, acted with Prussia. In January 1864, the governments sent an ultimatum demanding that within forty-eight hours the Danish Government repeal the constitution which decreed that the provinces be annexed. This demand was purposely so contrived that it could not be accepted, and war was begun. The armies brought against Denmark were more than sufficient to overwhelm her. Von Moltke prepared a plan of campaign by which he expected in very short time to destroy the entire Danish army. The plan was not well carried out, but this only delayed the end. The Danes attempted to defend themselves behind the *Dannevirke*, a fortified line of defense across the narrowest part of Jutland; but their entrenchments were soon forced, and the entire peninsula overrun. The Danes at first had command of the sea, but this was lost and the invaders carried the war forward into the islands which are such an important part of the kingdom. In August the contest was abandoned; in October the Treaty of Vienna sealed the surrender of

Denmark; and Schleswig and Holstein were yielded to the joint possession of Austria and Prussia.

This was only a prelude to the greater struggle which followed. Bismarck was about to bring to a crisis the long contest between Austria and his country for leadership among the German peoples. He now plotted more openly to get the duchies for Prussia, and rapidly the relations between Austria and Prussia were strained to the breaking point. Austria was ill prepared to maintain her contentions, so that she yielded to an agreement not satisfactory to her, the Convention of Gastein, by which Prussia was to administer Schleswig and she would administer Holstein. Bismarck regarded this merely as a temporary measure, and busied himself so that when the conflict began, Austria would have no great allies but be obliged to fight single-handed. He knew that Russia was friendly, and that Great Britain was not disposed to interfere in Continental matters, if she could avoid it. It was apparent to all, however, that it would be disadvantageous to France if Austria were overthrown by Prussia; but Bismarck, through secret negotiations which have never been fully revealed, probably by appearing to promise Napoleon territorial gains on the Rhine, made it probable that France would be neutral. With Italy he concluded an alliance early in 1866. This was a dangerous period in Bismarck's career, for his war policy was not popular in Germany; and Austria might make terms with Italy, or else France intervene to support Austria or seize German territory bordering on the Rhine. But the hazard passed as the crisis moved swiftly forward. Austria, mobilizing her forces, demanded that the disposition of Schleswig and Holstein be referred to the Diet of the Confederation. Bismarck declared this a breach of the Convention just made, and seized Holstein. Almost all the German states supported Austria, the members voting in the Diet that the federal forces should be used against

Contest be-
tween Aus-
tria and
Prussia

Masterly
diplomacy of
Bismarck

Disappointment in France

had just made such gains. Not only did France get nothing of the German territory by the Rhine, which she seems to have expected, but when Napoleon strove to acquire Luxemburg, Bismarck opposed it and assisted in bringing about the neutralization of that country in 1867. Napoleon and his associates were completely disappointed. They perceived that the position of France in Europe had diminished through the mere change of circumstances elsewhere, and the French people felt instinctively that something was wrong. Accordingly arose in France the idea that there must be "Revenge for Sadowa" (Königgrätz). It is probably true that the great majority of the French people had no desire for war with Prussia because of these things, but the demand for action was skilfully cried about by the press, which was controlled and cleverly manipulated by those who preferred to have war. Actually the French leaders tried to form an alliance with Austria and Italy, and some arrangements were made for coöperation between Austrian and French armies against Prussia, to take place in 1871.

The plotting of Bismarck

The machinations of Bismarck on the other side were more culpable and far more cold-blooded. Desiring the union of the south German states with those already in the North German Confederation, he believed that a successful war against some foreign enemy—particularly France, the traditional enemy—would serve to bring them all together in a burst of patriotic ardor. He afterward said also that he did not believe the unification of Germany would be allowed if France could prevent it, and that it would be necessary first to overthrow her in battle. He felt certain, moreover, that Prussia would be victor, and so be raised higher in Europe than ever before. So he desired war with France, and tried with all of his craft and his skill to bring it about. These feelings did not yet affect most of the German people nor the king of Prussia, but were shared by Bismarck chiefly with the

army leaders. In Germany also, however, the press was so controlled and manipulated as to hasten on the contest as much as that could be done.

The direct cause, as in so many other cases, was not an important matter. The throne of Spain, becoming vacant, was offered to a member of the Hohenzollern family. France fearing Prussian influence in Spain, when it was elsewhere growing so rapidly, dispatched an arrogant note demanding Prince Leopold's withdrawal. Bismarck believed that this was the opportunity which he had been seeking to bring about war with France, but the king of Prussia directed that his relative's name be withdrawn. Bismarck's disappointment at this was such that he thought of resigning; but almost immediately the leaders of the war party in France gave him the opportunity which he sought. The French Government now demanded that under no circumstances should Leopold ever be a candidate in the future. The king of Prussia, then at the village of Ems, rejected this demand firmly, but courteously enough, and then telegraphed to Bismarck an account of what he had done, authorizing him to publish the news. Bismarck deliberately, as he afterward boasted, so condensed the king's words that the result was certain to seem insulting to the French, while at the same time the Prussian people would believe that their sovereign had been insulted by the insolent demands of the ambassador of France. Bismarck was dining with Von Moltke and with Von Roon, minister of war, when this was done; and they who a little before had been much dejected now rejoiced when they saw how this message so cunningly condensed would most probably bring the war that they wanted; and they finished their meal with right great joy, caring little, as a commentator has said, about the thousands of young men shortly to die and the misery to women and children sure to come. The French people easily fell into the trap, for immediately upon publication of what seemed

The throne
of Spain

The Ems
Dispatch

to them such an affront, war was declared. And so well had the thing been contrived that the war was very popular in Germany. All the rest of the North German Confederation immediately gave support to Prussia, and the south German states followed also. It was war between France and a Germany united.

The Franco-German War, 1870-1

In later years the Franco-German War, as it came to be called, appeared as the great landmark in the military annals of Europe in the nineteenth century. Seldom has any nation been so quickly triumphant as Prussia, and seldom has any people been humbled and overthrown as were the French. In after days nothing convinced men that German armies were unconquerable so much as memory of the victories of 1870. Not until the Battle of the Marne, forty-four years later, was the legend of German invincibility disturbed; and not till the very end of the Great War could it be completely destroyed. Actually, however, it is evident that the German military organization, with its system of universal training, had been developed with the most careful preparation for the contest, while the French military system had degenerated so far that France went into the struggle almost entirely unprepared.

France not prepared

In 1870, among the undiscerning, France was still regarded as the foremost military power in Europe. Although a new law had just been passed to some extent adopting the Prussian system, yet her army, like the Austrian, continued to be based on the old principle of conscription and hiring of soldiers, which produced a standing army, sometimes strong and efficient, but without the great mass of reserves behind it that came from the Prussian method. The total force was less than 600,000 men, little more than half of whom were available. The French did indeed have a better rifle than the Germans; and they were beginning to use the *mitrailleuse*, an early type of the machine or rapid-fire gun, but this weapon

was not yet generally effective, nor was it destined to be a factor in war until the Germans themselves brought such large numbers into use in 1914. Furthermore, the entire French military organization at this time was suffering from decay and poor administration. Plans of mobilization had not been effectively worked out, and supplies and munitions were lacking. Actually, when the war began, France was able to move down to the frontier 270,000 men with 925 cannon; and during the first period of the war, the first two or three months, not many more were ever put into the field. These forces were advanced quickly, in hope of taking the offensive, but there was considerable confusion, in which troops were moved without supplies and officers could not find their detachments. A slight offensive into Germany was indeed begun, but in face of the ominous and overwhelming movements of German troops it was at once abandoned; and the French troops prepared to try to repel the German invaders.

On the other side all was different. The French leaders had mistakenly boasted that their army was ready "to the last button," but the Germans were completely ready. Everything apparently had been thought out beforehand, and every emergency foreseen. The entire German plan had been carefully prepared, and all details of the mobilization worked out in advance. It was well known that any forward movement by the French must take place along the railroad through Alsace and the railroad through Lorraine. With extraordinary accuracy the German staff predicted in its estimates just where the French would arrive by a certain time. Calculations about their own movements were made no less truly. There is a story, which may not be true, but which accurately reveals the state of affairs, that when Moltke was aroused at night and news of the declaration of war brought to him, he merely directed that a paper in a certain drawer be taken out and

Her military system in decay

The Germans' preparations complete

The German forces ready

the instructions contained in it followed; after which he turned over and slept again. At all events, while the French were beginning to discover how little ready they were for the war, into which they had gone so rashly and with such light heart, the German troops were brought down to the frontier with such speed and precision as had never been seen before. The Germans had, all told, a million well-trained troops. Of this number they moved forward nearly 500,000 with 1,584 guns, and had them across into France in a little more than two weeks. The way had been prepared by an army of spies, who did all they could to confuse the French movements, while they collected information for the Germans.

First phase
of the war,
July 19–Sep-
tember 1,
1870

Outnumbered two to one in men and in cannon, and fighting against an enemy as brave and resourceful as themselves, the French were overwhelmed from the start, so that there could be only one outcome of the struggle. The French were in two armies, one under the emperor in Lorraine, the other under MacMahon in Alsace. The advancing Germans fell upon them both, striving to keep them from uniting. On the same day they won two victories: at Wörth in Alsace, and at Spicheren in Lorraine. The French fought bravely, though they were not led with aggressiveness or skill; but they were smothered by the superior artillery, and crushed by the masses of German infantry. Their northern army now retreated toward the fortress of Metz, while the southern one abandoned Alsace, the Germans following with little delay. August 18, the northern army, now commanded by Bazaine, was defeated in the Battle of Gravelotte-Saint Privat, and took refuge within the fortifications of Metz. A smaller army was left to surround it, while all the rest of the German forces hastened after the other French command. Had it been possible to take into account strategic considerations solely, MacMahon's army should have retreated upon Paris, delaying the war until it could be rein-

forced. Political conditions, however, made this altogether inadvisable, since such retreat would almost certainly mean the downfall of Napoleon's government. Therefore, in an evil hour, MacMahon turned in a forlorn attempt to relieve Metz. By a series of magnificent strategic moves Moltke presently drove him into the town of Sedan on the Meuse. There he was pushed back until his huddled troops were commanded by the German artillery brought up on to the surrounding hills. It was in vain that the French strove to break through the ring which so swiftly had been drawn about them. September 1, their entire army surrendered, and the emperor was among the captives.

Sedan

Actually France was now completely defeated, and, had the conditions of modern warfare been more clearly understood then, perhaps the French people might have abandoned the struggle. One of their armies had just surrendered. The other was surrounded; and the event was to prove that Bazaine's army could not escape, for just as the French soldiers were utterly unable to break through the encircling Germans at Sedan, so they were not able to do it at Metz. The German armament and equipment were so powerful that, as in the Great War, it was found almost impossible to break their lines when they occupied entrenched positions. Accordingly, the regular army of France was now lost, and she had no reserves of soldiers as had the Germans, because she had had nothing like the Prussian system of universal military training. None the less she had not lost her courage. In 1918, when the German armies were tottering, but not yet completely beaten, Germany did not prolong the struggle, but drew back her soldiers and surrendered her ships without any further attempt. In 1870 it was not so with the French. We see now that their cause was hopeless, but they made a gallant effort. The government of Napoleon III was overturned, and a republic established.

France now
defeated

The new government sought peace; but it refused to cede a stone of the fortresses or a single inch of the soil of France. Bismarck had desired the friendship of Austria in 1866, and to Austria he had given easy terms. Now he was resolved to have conquests in France, and so the struggle continued. The German armies closed in upon Paris, while detachments spread their conquest wide about over the country.

Second
phase: Sep-
tember 2,
1870–March
1, 1871

The siege
of Paris

The effort made by the French people was amazing. They called out the manhood of the nation, and raised altogether 1,800,000 men. But they had armies only in name. The men were without military training, and were no match for the Germans. It was impossible to get enough capable officers and commanders, and most of the military stores and equipment had been lost. In vain did they try to purchase munitions and supplies abroad; they got inferior goods at outrageous prices, and there was not sufficient time to get enough of anything even so. Such was their energy that they did put large forces in the field, but during the terrible winter of 1870–1, while France suffered fearfully, and while the French soldiers endured prodigious losses, the new armies never gained against the inferior numbers of the German troops a single substantial success. It was not even necessary for the Germans to draw to any extent on their reserves remaining over the Rhine. They held the fortresses, Belfort, Strassburg, Metz, and the fortified camp of Paris in grip of iron; and directed their principal effort to the taking of Paris. For four months that great city held out through a terrible siege, and finally a heavy bombardment. Provisions presently gave out and there was appalling suffering from the cold of winter and increasing famine. The old people and the young children died, as is ever the case. One by one, except for Belfort, the other fortresses surrendered. In Paris a great citizen army was raised, but it was ill-trained and insubordinate, and never able to break the lines of the


besiegers. Gradually all hope of deliverance from outside was abandoned. The Germans everywhere defeated and scattered the raw levies raised against them, and occupied more and more of the country. They acted with much harshness and severity, attempting to discourage the formation of the new armies, shooting down as *francs-tireurs* those who tried to defend their country without uniform or part in regular military organization, taking hostages, imposing fines and ransoms, and burning some places in reprisal; not so hardly and so terribly as when they reentered France in 1914, but in manner that was ominous of the future.

The Germans had really won the victory in the first two months. The heroic efforts of the French people prolonged the agony for four months longer. Nothing in those four months altered the outcome, and they merely imposed additional suffering on the nation. And yet, this heroism was not, perhaps, useless, for it gave stern warning that these people held high their honor, and would not yield till the uttermost had been endured. The events of 1918 showed that the Germans might well be expected to submit after they had been badly defeated; but what happened in France in the cold, horrible first months of 1871 made it evident that France did not surrender until her strength was annihilated and her people completely prostrate.

January 28, 1871, Paris surrendered, and the war was presently brought to an end. The triumph of the Germans was complete. By the Treaty of Frankfort (1871) France ceded Alsace and most of Lorraine, agreed to pay an indemnity of \$1,000,000,000, and granted favorable commercial terms to her enemy. The results were that France lost for the next two generations the primacy in Europe she had so long enjoyed; that her eastern frontier was now weaker, and Paris, the capital, left much more exposed to the Germans than before; that she was to

The lesson
of the rising
of the
French
people

The Treaty
of Frank-
fort



6. ALSACE-LORRAINE

crouch in fear before an all-powerful and arrogant Germany for the next forty years; that German manufactures, easily exported into France because of the favorable commercial terms now yielded, were to make it very difficult for France to enter upon great industrial development; and that Germany would thereafter feel invincible and superior and generally so behave. Moreover, the entire cost of the war, at the utmost, had been to the Germans not so much as \$500,000,000. But they received double that sum, and would believe in the future that all their wars would bring conquests and the defeated enemy would always pay and reward them with booty.

January 18, 1871, just before the surrender of Paris and the culmination of their triumph, William I, king of Prussia, was proclaimed German emperor in the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles. The South German states were now willing to join the North German Confederation, and so, form an empire, the *Deutsches Reich*. Thus was accomplished the task for which German patriots and statesmen had so long been striving. Fulfilment was possible now because of the unbounded enthusiasm of the German people in the midst of their common triumph, and because of the ardent spirit of nationalism which their efforts and victories called forth. Expectation of this was one of the principal reasons why Bismarck had hoped for the war.

The down-fall of France

Founding of the German Empire

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CHAPTER VII

THE GROWTH OF THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE

Die deutsche Nation ist trotz ihrer alten Geschichte das jüngste unter den grossen Völkern Westeuropas.

HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE, *Deutsche Geschichte im Neuzeitlichen Jahrhundert* (1879), i. 1.

Selten oder niemals hat ein Land in so kurzer Zeit einen so gewaltigen wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung erlebt wie das Deutsche Reich in der Epoche vom Frankfurter Frieden bis zum Ausbruch des Weltkrieges. . . . Aus dem armen deutschen Lande ist ein reiches Land geworden. . . . Das Volk der Denker, Dichter und Krieger ist zu einem Kaufmanns- und Handelsvolk ersten Ranges geworden, Wo sind die Zeiten, wo unser Schiller nur zwei gewaltige Nationen ringen sah um der Welt alleinigen Besitz, den Franken . . . und den Briten. . . ?

FÜRST VON BÜLOW, *Deutsche Politik* (ed. 1917), pp. 291, 292.

To the people of the new German Empire the period following their great military triumphs brought unparalleled prosperity and power. The years from 1871 to 1914 were like a mighty epic, or a period of triumph, grander and more splendid in time's progress. Such increase had probably never been seen anywhere else before. In modern times it was rivalled only by the rise of Japan and the growth of the United States. Sometimes there comes in a people's life vast quickening of spirit and hope, when it seems that youth will never depart, and boundless confidence and boundless ambition accompany limitless strength. Such a time had come to Italian communities in the days of the Renaissance; Englishmen had it under Elizabeth and Pitt; Frenchmen, in the French Revolution. It came to Germans after 1870. In industry, in commerce, in population, in wealth, and in power they went forward

Greatness of
the German
Empire

with amazing strides, surpassing the greatest things that their legends related of old. In time they believed that before them lay the destiny of men who would one day rule all the world.

Causes of
success

This success came from many causes: from the union at last achieved, from the splendid qualities of the people themselves, from the excellence of their educational system, from altered conditions respecting industry and trade which were working now in their favor, and from the German genius for organization which was applied to winning triumphs in peace as it had just been used to achieve victory in war.

Government
of the
Empire

Bismarck had succeeded where a long line of leaders had failed: there was a great, united Germany now with a strong central government. The system established was a very interesting one. It had the form of constitutional government with power based upon representatives of the people; but in reality it was devised to retain actual power for the upper class supporting an autocratic ruler at the top.

Ministerial
government

Like most nineteenth-century constitutions in Europe, the constitution of the *Deutsches Reich* was modelled after the English system. The British cabinet system—in which an executive, composed of a prime minister and other ministers of the cabinet, depends entirely upon the support of the majority of representatives of the people in the legislative body, the House of Commons—does actually give a government which is representative of the people, controlled by them, and more and more democratic in character. Generally speaking, wherever the cabinet system prevails in any form, the test of the government being controlled by the people is that the executive shall depend upon support of the majority of representatives elected by the voters; and that these representatives shall really make the laws, grant the taxes, and control the spending of public money.

In respect of these things it is interesting to study the government of the German Empire established in 1871. This government had been taken over, substantially, from the preceding North German Confederation; established in 1867. The German Empire was a federation consisting of twenty-five states and the *Reichsland*, Alsace-Lorraine. It was ruled by the *Kaiser* (emperor), who was the King of Prussia, the *Bundesrath* (council of the Federation), and the *Reichstag* (representative assembly of the Empire). The only part of this system which was directly or indirectly controlled by the people was the *Reichstag*. For the most part the constitution was so arranged as to concentrate a great deal of all the power in the hands of the *kaiser*.

The *Reichstag*, like the British House of Commons or the American House of Representatives, was elected by the voters—in Germany the men of twenty-five years and older. Its functions were to assist in making the laws and to pass appropriations of money. But it was defective in its representation and it had not very much real power. From 1871 to the time of the Great War there was no reapportionment of representation as population shifted from one district to another, notably from country to the cities. Hence, in course of time, conservative, agricultural East Prussia, one of the strongholds of the *Junkers*, had more than three times as much representation as some of the liberal industrial centers, and there were as scandalous inequalities in representation as had prevailed in England before the time of electoral reform. But more important than this was the fact that appropriations of money were often made by the *Reichstag* for periods of years, so that the representatives of the voters lost much of the power which comes from steady control of the purse. Moreover, no important piece of legislation could be passed without the *Bundesrath's* consent.

The *Bundesrath* was not, properly speaking, an upper

The German system

The Reichstag

Inequalities in representation

The *Bundesrath*

house of the legislature, and had little resemblance to the American Senate or the British House of Lords. It was composed at first of 58, and later on of 61, members sent by the various states of the Federation. The delegates represented not the people but the rulers and governments of these states; they were bound to vote in accordance with instructions given by the governments; and they acted really as ambassadors of the princes who sent them. In no way did these members depend upon German voters; they carried out the policies of the rulers and upper classes of the German states. No law could be passed without the assent of the *Bundesrath*, and as laws usually originated there, the legislative power of the Empire was to be found in the *Bundesrath*, not in the *Reichstag*. But as Prussia could always control enough votes in the *Bundesrath* to prevent the passage of a measure not approved by her, government was really in the keeping of Prussia, which had, indeed, three fifths of the population and two thirds of the territory of the Empire.

The government of Prussia

The smaller states in the west and the south were less military and more liberal; Prussia had the most backward government in the Empire. The legislative power was vested in the *Landtag* (assembly), of two chambers or houses. The upper consisted of princes and others appointed by the king as hereditary members or for life. The lower contained members elected by the voters. The upper house represented entirely the upper class and the king, and, because of a curious contrivance, the lower house represented them almost as completely. This was brought about by the famous three-class system of voting. "The primary voters," said the Prussian Constitution of 1850, "shall be divided into three classes in proportion to the amount of direct taxes they pay, and in such a manner that each class shall represent a third of the sum total of the taxes paid by the primary voters." The result of this was that two thirds of the

representation and the control of the lower house were given to one sixth of the voters, who composed the upper and wealthy class. In Berlin it came to be that a rich man's vote was worth the votes of fifty poor ones. Moreover, the king of Prussia had an absolute veto upon legislation, and in practice initiated such laws as were passed. That is to say, the government of Prussia, which in effect largely controlled the government of the Empire, was in the hands of the king of Prussia and the upper class. This class was made up of the industrial magnates and especially of the nobles and great landowners, the *Junkers*.

The *Junkers* were among the most aristocratic and conservative people in Europe, exceedingly tenacious of their privileges of class and high position. In Prussia and in other parts of the Empire they constituted an upper class apart from the people, having the social superiority of the aristocracy in England, but with much more real influence and power. If they could retain their privileges, they would support the king without flinching. Accordingly, in last resort the real power in the government of Prussia was in the hands of the king, and the real government of the Empire was also in his hands as emperor. The Prussian Constitution implied the doctrine of Divine Right, and even as late as the years before the Great War the emperor asserted this. "Looking upon myself as the instrument of the Lord," he said at Königsberg, in 1910: "without regard to contemporary opinions and intention, I go my way." He possessed the executive power, he appointed the important officials, he generally could control the *Bundesrath*. And his ministers were not responsible to the *Reichstag*. In Great Britain, opposition of a majority in the House of Commons would destroy the prime minister's power, but just after the Zabern Affair (1913), adverse debates and adverse votes affected the chancellor's position not at all. Indeed, he told the

Junkers
and *Kaiser*

Divine
Right in
Prussia

members of the *Reichstag* explicitly then that he was responsible to the emperor, not to them.

Sovereigns
and minis-
ters

In France and in England, where ministries wield the executive power, it is necessary to know something about the character and aspirations of the principal ministers, while the king of England, even the president of France, has usually been of far less importance for a comprehension of affairs. On the other hand, in Germany and in Russia an understanding of the aims and the character of the emperors is all important; as is, to be sure, understanding the character and intentions of the president in studying the history of the United States. In the United States the president's power is limited very definitely by a liberal constitution, and in Russia the tsar was surrounded and even controlled by a vast bureaucratic system, or system of important officials whose coöperation was nearly indispensable; but in the German Empire, the great officials who assisted the kaiser were strictly subordinate to him.

William I,
1871-1888

In 1871, William I, already for ten years king of Prussia, became first emperor of the new state. He ruled until 1888. He was a tall and stately man, and the portraits that were painted of him recalled to his subjects the strong German heroes of old. He was an elderly man when he came to Prussia's throne, already conservative with age. Always he had been slow, steady, and strong, not one to go after new matters, or sympathize with reform or ideas of other people, yet just and honorable as he saw things. He had served against Napoleon in the War of Liberation, and all through his life he was fond of his army and delighted in military things. In politics the newer ideas never appealed to him at all. He was filled with the old Prussian conception of the high position of kings, and believed in divine right of monarchs as thoroughly as the rulers of a hundred years before. "The kings of Prussia receive their crowns from God," he said,

when he came to the throne. The gigantic success of Germany during his years threw glamor about his person and added to the prestige of the crown. His character did not alter, nor in later years did he tend any more to follow the changing principles of his time. He was a good judge of councillors, and where he gave his confidence he gave loyal and faithful support. Actually during his reign the destinies of the Empire were guided by his trusted servant Bismarck, whose ideas about government were always much like his own.

During the long, splendid reign of William I, then, there could be little tendency toward a real parliamentary system of government or greater control by the people. It seemed that this might come about in the time of his son, Frederick III, who disliked Bismarck, and was disposed to alter the Prussian conception of kingship. He did, indeed, favor parliamentary control, which he may have come to admire partly through the influence of his wife, who was a daughter of Queen Victoria of England. But he had long been suffering from cancer in the throat, and when at last, in 1888, he came to the throne, he reigned only three months, and his ideas left no permanent trace.

He was followed by the third and last of the sovereigns of the German Empire, William II. William had been a great admirer of Bismarck and that leader's system, and he cherished the olden ideas. "The king's will is the supreme law," he declared on one occasion. Strong in mind, vigorous and aggressive, he tried to take part in all things. It is difficult to estimate his ability, and his character remains an enigma. So brilliant was his success for a while that some considered him a genius, while there were not a few in the meantime who whispered that he was headstrong, irresponsible, and rash. There can be no doubt, however, that with respect to ideas of government, he looked back to the past more than he regarded the present. Like his grandfather he tolerated the *Reichstag*,

Frederick
III, 1888

William II,
1888-1918

The spirit of
the past

but considered the ministers as his ministers, and was resolved to abate his prerogative not a bit. He loved to conceive of himself as medieval lord or strong knight, and a heroic statue represented him as a crusader of the Middle Ages. It is not surprising, then, that neither during the short time he remained under the influence of Bismarck, nor afterward during the much longer period when he himself governed, was there any important change in the German Constitution, or any change in the spirit of administering it, which tended to bring greater participation or control by the German people.

Origin of the
German
system

It must be remembered that such explanation of the German Government is from the point of view generally taken in English-speaking countries, where a different system, of real control by representatives of the people, has long prevailed, is much revered, and is assumed to be right. It must be remembered that the German system arose in the midst of circumstances very different from those which prevailed in England and the United States. The English-speaking peoples, protected by the sea, of which they had command, were generally safe from attacks and interference by their foes. In this favorable condition slowly, generation after generation, they developed self-government controlled by the people, gradually taking away from the king the power which once he had held. It was very different in Germany, especially in Prussia. Prussia had no natural frontiers to protect her; she was not made safe by waters which her foes could not cross. For ages Germany was despised by her enemies because she was weak and divided. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries she was ravaged by destructive wars, and the German people endured almost everything that invading armies and lawless soldiery could inflict. Small wonder then that they should come at last to desire above all things the strength which comes from union, and prize much more the security which a strong ruler can give

Germany
once weak
and helpless

than a system of parliamentary self-government. It had been so in France before the Hundred Years War was over, and in England after the troubles of the fifteenth century. In both countries strong centralized and despotic government arose and flourished for a long time, and Divine Right was cherished by many of the people. Evil conditions had continued longer in Germany, and the consequences had persisted longer. Accordingly, most Germans looked at these things the old way. There were many who desired the greater liberalization of their government, and hoped that soon there might be a parliamentary system more like that of England, with ministers responsible to the will of the people; but, on the other hand, there were a great many who declared that the German system was not only better for the German people but that it was really superior to any other. They said that the personal liberty of the Anglo-Saxon peoples was only license; that parliamentary control could never make Germany so strong or well fitted for the greatness before her as the strong executive control which she had; that while their government might be "autocratic," it was far more efficient than the "democratic" systems of America and Britain; and that it was able to give to its subjects far greater happiness and good. Truly they did not rule themselves, being governed from the top, but they were governed well and were better off, so they said, than any other people in the world. Many things were forbidden (*verboten*), but this was only restricting the behavior of individuals for the greater good of them all. Because all this was so sincerely maintained, and was true as the Germans looked at it, the Great War of 1914 came to be partly a struggle between democracy and the older, more autocratic systems.

It should be said that in one respect the Germans undoubtedly had more success than Americans, though not more than the British. The government of their cities

Weakness
and anarchy
make strong
government
desired

Alleged ex-
cellence of
the German
system

Excellent
municipal
government

was clean, efficient, and well-administered, as British municipal government came to be. It is well known that the people of the United States have been far less successful; and that especially since the Civil War the government of their cities has all too frequently been characterized by poor management, corruption, graft, and wasting of public money.

Economic
advance

The unification of Germany brought wonderful prosperity, and this strengthened and justified the government that had been set up. Seldom has such success ever come to any people. It is customary to affirm that the story may be better told by statistics than any other way; and that is true, except that statistics are not apt to make much impression. Suffice it to say that after the *Zollverein* was formed, and especially after the North German Confederation and the Empire, in almost every form of endeavor the German people went forward so far that it seemed at last only a matter of time when they would be first in whatever they attempted.

Agriculture

In the middle of the nineteenth century Germany was mainly an agricultural country. For most people, living was hard, since the soil, unlike that of America or France, was poor. Accordingly, in spite of the industry of the people, the wealth of the country was low. All through the following period, however, the most careful fertilizing and the best methods that science had devised were applied, so that as time went on the yields were increased. Moreover, Germany adopting a system which England had abandoned with the repeal of the Corn Laws, imposed protective duties to aid the agricultural classes. This was done not only because of the political influence of the *Junkers*, the great landed proprietors, but because the government desired that the country should continue to raise as much of its food as could be. The result was well seen when the Great War came. At that time England produced so little of the food eaten by her people that a

blockade would have starved her into surrender in a few months; but Germany, blockaded though she was, held out for more than four years.

Far more important was industrial growth. In the second half of the nineteenth century the German people left their hamlets and towns, and went to factories in the cities. These urban communities increased so wondrously that whereas in 1871 half of the population had been engaged in agriculture, in 1914 rural work kept less than a third. Berlin grew as fast as Chicago in the New World, and cities that had been quiet places or asleep since the Thirty Years' War woke up and expanded and became vast emporiums in a lifetime. Up and down the valley of the Rhine, in Saxony, and central Prussia there were huge factories and forests of chimneys as in central England, or in Pittsburgh, or Detroit.

The Germans were fortunate in having the basis of great industrial development in huge stores of coal and iron. After 1871 coal production was enormously increased. In 1905, when Great Britain, the principal coal-producing country after the United States, mined 236,000,000 tons, Germany already produced 173,000,000. Before the Franco-Prussian War the German states had no large supply of iron ore; but in Lorraine the new Empire acquired a part of the Briey Basin, the greatest deposit of ore in Europe. The deposit which is "low-grade" was not deemed very valuable until the later discovery of a new process of extraction of iron from the ore. Thereafter the German Empire drew from the Lorraine fields the greater part of its supply, some 4,870,000 metric tons out of 7,000,000, in 1910. It was afterward said, with some reason, perhaps, that had the Germans realized the value of this possession, they would have taken all of it when they imposed their terms on France in the Treaty of Frankfort. At all events, Germany came to be the greatest producer, excepting only the United States, of pig-iron and

Industrial
growth

Coal and
iron

Causes of
industrial
success

steel; and although it was not understood by many until later, this leadership was to make possible her enormous preponderance in the next great war fought in Europe.

The Germans entered upon their industrial revolution later than England or France. Thus they could profit by the experience of those who had gone before. It was soon found, moreover, that the genius of the German with his aptitude for organization and study of details was admirably adapted for the large-scale production of the later stages of the Industrial Revolution. Starting lower down than their more fortunate rivals, the German workmen were accustomed to a lower standard of living and so worked for lower wages; while habits of the past still made them willing to work industriously for longer hours. Furthermore, the rapidly increasing population, which had previously been emigrating to America and other places, was now absorbed in the enlarging industry and furnished a constant and abundant supply of labor; while the excellent system of education, particularly of technical instruction, made these workmen able to sustain any competition. In no other country was there such immense scientific activity and progress, and especially such successful adaptation of science to practical uses. The Germans made few brilliant discoveries, but by enormous industry and patient research they immensely extended scientific knowledge and then used it in furthering their industry and arts. Soon German goods were being sold all over the world. At first, just as with Japanese goods now, German manufactures were sold from their cheapness rather than their worth, but presently they were so much improved that their reputation was everywhere known. The result of this was that Germany, once low in the industrial scale, rose until she had passed by France and Great Britain, and finally had exceeded every one of her rivals save only the United States.

Application
of science to
industry

The rising industry was protected by high customs

duties. This device had been common in the Middle Ages and later, and was well known in the United States. England somewhat earlier had adopted the policy of free trade; but Bismarck was convinced that lack of regulation, *laissez-faire*, was wrong, and that industry and commerce should be regulated and fostered by the State. In 1879 he abandoned free trade and caused the adoption of a protective tariff. The result was tremendous stimulation of all the industries of the Empire.

Protection

Along with this industrial expansion went enormous increase in commerce. Some Germans in the Middle Ages had been great mariners and merchants, and for a long time the masters of the Hanseatic League were renowned. But with the discovery of America and the change of trade routes and the decline of German power all of this completely disappeared. In the early part of the nineteenth century German ships were seldom seen in foreign ports. After the middle of the century came a change. In the year when the Empire was founded there were only a million tons of German shipping, but this had doubled by 1900, and the increase was more rapid thereafter. A vast fleet of ships was created, some of them among the finest in the world; and the German mercantile marine everywhere competed for passenger business and carrying of freight. The government assisted this development by subsidies and state supervision. After 1900 the Hamburg-America and the North German Lloyd steamship companies had few rivals anywhere in the world. Hamburg was the greatest seaport on the Continent. From a lowly position Germany had in shipping and commerce passed all of her competitors except England.

Commercial development

As a consequence of this industrial and commercial development immense quantities of German goods were sold all over the world. Gradually the Russian market came largely under German control, great progress was made in South America, and there was no part of the world

Trade expansion

Study of
markets and
customers
abroad

where German merchants and traders were not seen. Much ingenuity and skill were shown in the opening of new markets. They entered the competition late, when such rivals as the English had had a long start, had long enjoyed monopoly of some of the markets, and had made their names widely known. The Germans now not only tried to make cheaper goods, and sometimes better goods, but they took great pains to study their customers' desires and then suit their wishes. The attitude of the English and others was that they had good wares to sell, the customer might buy or not as he chose, but if he did purchase he must buy what the manufacturer pleased to make. The Germans never insisted upon this. To every part of the world they sent commercial representatives to study the markets, find what customers wanted, and offer them easy terms. As the most enterprising young men of Britain went out to govern or work in the colonial possessions, so from Germany they went forth to reside in other countries, learn the language of the inhabitants, their customs and wishes, and establish business connections with them.

The German
Government
and trade

Not all the success that followed came merely from the care of German merchants and their representatives abroad. Not a little of it was because the German Government constantly lent its powerful assistance to forwarding and increasing German trade. Some of the methods by which this was accomplished afterward seemed insidious and unfair, and not unlike those by which "trusts" were built up in the United States. At a later time these methods brought hostility and condemnation such as attacked "big business" in the United States.

National
wealth

This making and selling of goods was accompanied by tremendous growth in population and wealth. Before the Empire the Germans were a poor people. The wealthy states were Great Britain and France, with the United States of America rising up like a giant and presently

surpassing them both. But the two generations after 1871 saw amazing progress. An increasing population of industrious and highly intelligent people, urged forward by aggressive leaders, and succeeding in business, accumulated huge stores of wealth and rapidly passed older rivals. Figures representing national wealth cannot possibly be very exact, and, indeed, they are mere estimates which have to be constantly changed as circumstances alter; but just before the Great War it was believed that the wealth of France was perhaps more than 50 billion dollars, that of Great Britain between 80 and 90, that of the German Empire between 80 and 90, that of the United States about 200 billions. By that time it was believed that Germany had passed every rival except the United States, though she always remained at immeasurable distance behind that wealthy and fortunate country.

Immense
economic
progress

Marvellous achievement and increasing wealth were partly the cause and partly the result of increase in number of people. This was, indeed, one of the most striking and important things in Europe in the nineteenth century. In 1816 there were within the limits of the present German Empire, 24,000,000 people. By 1837 the number had risen to 31,000,000; the German Empire began in 1871 with 41,000,000; by 1890 there were 49,000,000; in 1900, 56,000,000; in 1910, 65,000,000; and in 1914 the number was believed to be little short of 70,000,000. By that time the increase was nearly a million a year. During the nineteenth century the population of Great Britain had risen from 10,500,000 to 36,000,000; that of France from 27,000,000 to barely 40,000,000. At the beginning of that century France had been the most populous of the highly civilized states of Europe, but just before the war she had been so far displaced that Germany had nearly twice as many people. The results were both good and bad. This increase made Germany more powerful and it also made her richer, since it constantly gave her a

Growth of
population

Germany
passes
France

Belief that
more terri-
tory was
needed

larger number of workingmen who labored and produced goods and wealth. The country seemed well able to support them. Once there had been a large emigration of Germans to other places, but this had altogether come to an end, and almost all her people now found employment within their own country. None the less, it was increasingly apparent that so large a number, as was the case with England, could not be fed from the Fatherland's agricultural resources, and that they could be maintained only so long as Germany made goods which she was able to sell abroad. As time went on this was becoming more difficult, and it would be harder and harder as the number of people increased. England had in her empire vast quantities of raw materials, and in her colonies a great market also. With Germany this was not the case. Hence, as will be seen, there was increasing belief that she must have more territory to accommodate her enlarging population, that she required colonies, and ought to have her own sources of supply of raw materials. And in the minds of some there gradually developed the feeling that it was very wrong for Germany not to have what they thought she ought to possess, that she had been deprived of chance to obtain them by the wickedness of rivals, and that it was most proper for Germany to take from them whatever she wanted whenever she could.

Contest with
the Church

The first of the great domestic problems which confronted the new Empire was a struggle with the Catholics under its jurisdiction. The Reformation had made Germany Protestant, but the Counter-Reformation won many of the people back to the older faith, and a little later the result of the Thirty Years War left the German people partly in Protestant and partly in Catholic states. After 1648 there was little trouble about religion, since with respect to religion the different states went their own way, unhampered by the weak government of the Holy Roman Empire which bound them together so loosely.

But the Empire founded in 1871 bound firmly together Protestant north Germany and the Catholics of the Rhine and the south, and brought them all under a strong central power. It is said that Bismarck wished to assert the supremacy of the State's power over the Church, and desired an occasion to do this. The occasion was ready at hand. In 1870 the Vatican Council affirmed the doctrine that the pope, speaking *ex cathedra*, or in his capacity of pontiff, was infallible, not able to err. This doctrine, so counter to many of the tendencies of the time, was not assented to by the German bishops at the Council, and, indeed, they withdrew from the Council. But, as is usually the case in the strongly organized Catholic Church, the dissenters soon adopted that which their Church had received, though some German Catholics, including the celebrated theologian, Doctor Döllinger, refused to accede. Declining merely the new doctrine, they held, as they said, to the old doctrines of the Catholic faith; and so they were known as Old Catholics. Döllinger and his associates were excommunicated; they were attacked by the orthodox Catholic clergy, deprived of positions, and denied participation in the rites of the Church. They appealed to the government for protection and at this point Bismarck intervened. It seemed to him and to others that the doctrine of Papal Infallibility implied superiority of the Church over the State, and he desired to assert the supremacy of the State. Accordingly, a religious conflict began, famous then and since as the *Kulturkampf* (struggle for civilization). Strong measures were taken: religious orders were forbidden to teach, and Jesuits were expelled from Germany. Then in the Falk Laws, passed in Prussia, 1873-5, the State was given control over the education and appointment of clergy, and some control over the dismissal of priests; a law was passed making civil marriage compulsory; and all religious orders were suppressed.

The new
Empire and
the Roman
Catholics

The *Kultur-*
kampf

Bismarck
retreats

The Center
(Catholic)
Party

A bitter conflict ensued. Catholics protested; the pope declared the laws of no effect; the clergy refused to obey them and were supported by the strict Catholics in their congregations. Those who disobeyed were punished by fine and imprisonment, and the most recalcitrant were expelled from the country. Soon many bishoprics were vacant; everywhere churches were closed and religious services suspended; and presently there was the trouble and disturbance of life that had used to follow conflict between Church and State in the Middle Ages. In medieval times the Church had usually been the victor, but after the rise of national feeling in states this had generally not been the case. Now, however, the contest was bitter and prolonged. "We shall not go to Canossa," said Bismarck, recalling the old-time humiliation of the Emperor Henry IV by Pope Gregory VII. But Bismarck could not win complete triumph. Under persecution the Catholics rallied and strengthened their resistance. Already in 1871 a Catholic Party had been organized, and, as the Party of the Center, had become an important factor in the *Reichstag*. Now it became the largest group in that body. By 1878 it was evident that the policy of sternness was accomplishing little. Bismarck had antagonized one of the most conservative elements in the Empire, and now he needed the assistance of conservatives against what seemed to him the rising tide of socialist and radical agitation. Accordingly, most of the anti-clerical laws were repealed, though civil marriage and state regulation of schools were retained. By 1887 the conflict was at an end, the Catholic Party abandoned opposition and gave Bismarck the support which he needed for a policy which it approved. The State had asserted its supremacy, but found it wise not to make much use of its power. After that time the Center Party, the strongest and most solid in the Empire, remained on guard, ever watchful of its own peculiar interests.

The conflict to which Bismarck and German conservatives now turned was with socialism which had lately been making rapid progress. Socialism had been widely taught in Germany before the Empire was made, and the socialists elected two members to the first *Reichstag* which was chosen. Thereafter it grew steadily in importance, attracting more and more attention as the years passed, because of teachings which most people regarded as harmful and wild. Socialists and their leaders were considered not only dangerous but unpatriotic. These were the first glorious years of the new Empire, when the hearts of Germans were aglow with patriotism and with pride at what the Fatherland had wrought. Liebknecht and Bebel and others had not only opposed the founding of the North German Confederation but also of the Empire, the war with France, and the taking of Alsace-Lorraine. They cared not for military glory and greatness of dominion but for the rise and betterment of men and women. They had no admiration for Bismarck or Moltke and not much for the emperor and his court. As these radicals got to be better known they became more hated and feared. Especially the governing and conservative classes dreaded the undoing of the great work which had just been accomplished. The emperor looked upon socialists as enemies of himself, and Bismarck longed for a chance to repress them completely. It was largely for this reason, because he regarded socialists as more dangerous than clericals, that he brought the *Kulturkampf* to an end. The opportunity for action, which he sought, came in 1878, when in swift succession two attempts to assassinate William were made by socialist adherents. Socialists denounced these deeds and disclaimed all responsibility for them; but there was a great wave of indignation and anger, and it seemed that the time was at hand for crushing socialism in Germany completely.

New elections were held, and a *Reichstag* was returned

Socialism in
the German
Empire

Socialists
feared and
disliked

Repression
of the social-
ists

ready to proceed to extremities. Bismarck now entered upon another campaign of persecution and repression like that against the Catholics, from which he was just drawing back. In 1878 a drastic law forbade all publications, all gatherings, all associations having "socialistic tendencies." Martial law might be used, so that the government could easily get rid of socialists after removing from them the protection of the civil courts. This legislation was temporary, but it was reënacted and remained in force until 1890. During that time it was sternly applied, a great number of socialist publications were stopped, and a great many socialists imprisoned or expelled from the country. But again this whole policy of repression was a failure. Under persecution, leaders and their disciples became bolder and more active; and their doctrines, brought to the attention of more people because of the very measures taken against them, won many new converts. The Socialist Party in this time of degradation became greater than ever before; by 1890 it had grown to be thrice as large as in the year when the persecution began. It was now so clear that the policy of persecution was a failure that the repressive measures were dropped. In this again Bismarck had partly failed.

State social-
ism

But he was largely successful when he employed another method against them. He himself became one of the foremost leaders in social reform in Europe, and undertook to have the State do all of what he thought best in that which the socialists were striving to bring about. In effect he went further than any modern statesman had gone in reviving state regulation of economic and industrial conditions, so customary in Europe some centuries before. Thus he established "state socialism" and so left the socialists with less to fight for. He and the emperor strongly believed that the best interests of the State lay in advancing the welfare of the working class, and that the State should interest itself more than previously in

assisting such of its citizens as needed help. "Give the workingman the right to employment," said Bismarck, "assure him care when he is sick, and maintenance when he is old." If the workers understood that the government was interested in their welfare they would cease to go after socialist leaders. The measures which Bismarck proposed encountered almost as much opposition as, thirty years later, the social reforms of Lloyd George in England.

Conservatives were alarmed at such innovations, and socialists denounced them as not touching the root of the evils which they promised to cure. Gradually, however, the programme was carried through. In 1883 a Sickness Insurance Law was passed, the employer to pay a part and the employee a larger part of the premiums necessary to establish the fund. In 1884 and 1885 Accident Insurance Laws were passed, the employer to insure all his employees entirely at his own expense. In 1889 came an Old Age Insurance Law, the premiums to be paid by the employers, the employees, and the State.

This legislation was revolutionary in the nineteenth century. It was afterward widely studied, and was being more and more followed before the Great War temporarily put an end to social amendment. There can be no doubt that in Germany it had great success. Not that the Socialist Party disappeared in consequence. After 1890 that party constantly increased the number of its adherents, and after 1898 was much the largest party in the Empire. By that time it had drawn to itself most of the artisans and toilers in the cities, and had it not been for the old and unequal apportionment of representatives, the socialists would have had a still greater number of members in the *Reichstag*. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that by 1914 a great many Germans regarded themselves as better taken care of by their government than any other people in the world; and it is probably true

Bismarck
on State
supervision
and assist-
ance


Government
and people
in the Ger-
man Empire

Care of the
people by
the gov-
ernment

that nowhere else had the State been so successful in getting rid of the worst forms of misery and distress. There were many poor people in Germany, toiling for scanty wages and working for very long hours, but nowhere in the Empire such fearful poverty and physical deterioration as visitors could see in the slums of the English cities, or in the worst quarters of cities in the United States. The German Government was guaranteeing a certain minimum to its people, to make them content, and providing that the State might not be weakened by losing their services. All this contributed, moreover, to the centralization of the powers of the government and the greater supremacy of the State.

Slow progres-
s of
democracy
in the Em-
pire

As time went on it was not only the socialists who demanded change. With a great many people there was increasing desire that the government should be altered so as to make it more democratic and bring it more largely into the hands of representatives of the people. Usually, in other states, the progress of industrialism, which caused large numbers of people to come together in manufacturing centers, and the spread of education, which made the masses of the people more capable of self-government at the same time that they were more interested in governing themselves, had brought about larger participation by the people in their government and constantly increasing desire to have larger share. So it had been for a long time in England and in France, in the Scandinavian countries, in Belgium and Holland, and there had long been persistent efforts made by a few people in Russia. But in Germany, where one of the widest and most effective systems of education had prevailed throughout the nineteenth century, and where for fifty years there had been unceasing drift of people from the farms to the cities, the rise of democracy had been slow, and democracy always seemed to make very scant headway before the disasters of the years of the Great War.



7. THE GE



GERMAN EMPIRE IN 1914

Causes

This was partly because of the old associations and traditions of the German people. In England self-government and democracy grew up slowly and painfully during a long course of time. They were inherited by the English colonists of America and there developed under more favorable conditions. In France they were violently established at the time of the French Revolution, and then after repeated failures subsequent to that time they were gradually established among the French people. Germans, too, had sought these things and tried to bring them about; but for a great while they were confronted with the more pressing problem of unification, which England and France had long ago achieved, before they began to develop self-government and democratic institutions. When finally German unity was effected, it was brought about under the leadership of Prussia, whose rulers and people had always been far less influenced by democratic tendencies than the people of Bavaria or Baden. The ideas of Bismarck and the conservatives predominated in making the constitution of the German Empire, and their ideas continued potent in its governance. To some it seemed a pity that the unification of Germany could not have been accomplished by the liberal and peaceful Germans instead of through conquest and force. In 1870 Émile Ollivier, French premier, who strove so hard to avert war with Prussia, urged his countrymen not to oppose "the natural movement of Germany unity." "If," he said, "we allow it to complete itself quietly by successive stages, it will not give supremacy to the barbarous and sophistical Germany, it will assure it to the Germany of intellect and culture. War, on the other hand, would establish, during a time impossible to calculate, the domination of the Germany of the *Junkers* and the pedants." So it was. The greatness of Germany's success strengthened the conservatives who had brought it about, and disarmed their opponents. And

The Empire established by the conservatives and the militarists

The estab-
lished sys-
tem deemed
necessary
and good

as it had seemed necessary to many that the unity and prosperity of Germany should be achieved through force, so afterward it seemed to them that Germany, surrounded as she was by older powers and, perhaps, by enemies, could only keep her position by being strong and ever on guard. All through Bismarck's period, therefore, the central government, which gave Germany success and prosperity, but allowed itself to be affected little by the mass of the people, retained its power and its hold on the affection of most of the people. As conditions altered and a larger number desired some change, it was always possible for the ruling class to divert their attention or thwart their wishes. So long as the immense prosperity and expansion of the German Empire continued, there were not a great many who would oppose the rulers; and generally the prosperity continued.

The govern-
ment resists
reform

Moreover, many believed that even though Bismarck's work was thoroughly established, old dangers lasted on for other reasons. Germany of the twentieth century had mighty ambitions, which were constantly taught to her people. These ambitions alarmed other European powers, and in the years 1904-7 a combination of France, Russia, and England was effected. To the inhabitants of these countries this agreement seemed necessary because of probable danger from the German Empire; but German leaders easily persuaded the people that neighboring powers had combined to encircle and crush the Fatherland, which could be saved only if the army remained powerful and the government strong. These arguments were ridiculed by socialists, and they became less effective in time. It was partly because of the increasing demand for more democratic control that the Social-Democratic Party increased so greatly. In 1912 it received more than 4,000,000 votes, getting its support not only from socialists but from liberals who did not greatly favor socialist doctrines. Nevertheless, nothing was really accom-

plished. State socialism, which made Germany a leader in social reform, strengthened the central government as it was, much more than it assisted the tendency toward democratic reform. "This must be done by the State and not by the people," said William II in 1894. For all these reasons the movement to make ministers responsible to the *Reichstag*, though urgently sought for on several occasions, always came to nothing. The demand that representation be re-apportioned in accordance with changes of population went unheeded year after year. The antiquated Prussian Constitution continued to keep power and privilege for the few. In the midst of the Great War—when the government, failing in its design of getting a grand victory quickly, was compelled to seek the utmost assistance from its people in a long and exhausting contest—the beginning of reform was made at last, and promise was given that after the war something more would be done. But all this came too late; for presently Germany went down in defeat, and the old system was then swept away completely. Whether the old system was better suited to the Germans, whether they really desire to establish a democracy, can only be known in the future.

It was the same with militarism and the army. By war, it seemed, Prussia had risen, and the army had been the foundation of the Empire. Furthermore, Prussian universal military service had created a national army in which most of the young men had some part. For these reasons the army was cherished and generally held high in esteem. And it was so entrenched in the organization of the State that it seemed to have impregnable position. Its officers and leaders, drawn mostly from the aristocratic class, constituted a military caste, and on occasion assumed such privileges that they seemed to be above the law. From time to time officers treated civilians with violence or with the utmost contempt, and it was always

The Kaiser,
not the
Reichstag,
in control

Militarism

The Zabern
Affair

difficult in such instances to get any redress from the courts. A notorious instance, known abroad better than any of the others, was the Zabern Affair. In 1913 a certain Lieutenant von Forstner at Zabern in Alsace spoke contemptuously of the citizens there, and declared that instead of punishing a soldier who had stabbed an Alsatian, he would have given him a reward for his trouble. The townsmen, already weary of the conduct of the soldiers, showed their dislike, and presently the lieutenant in his wrath struck a lame cobbler on the forehead with his sword. Against such militarism public sentiment in Germany was aroused and the matter went to the *Reichstag*, where it was bitterly condemned. Von Forstner was tried by court martial, but no punishment followed. There were mass meetings in Germany to protest, and much feeling was aroused; but that year the government was teaching the people that great danger threatened the country, especially from the Russians, and the German army was increased to greater size than ever before.

Treatment
of subject
races

Essentially autocratic rule associated with militarism caused the treatment accorded to the alien subjects in the Empire. The English-speaking peoples had grown great partly by attracting others to themselves, and such assimilation as there was came largely from generous toleration. French Canadians were never troubled about their religion or their language, and the Boers within the British Empire kept all the rights they had fought to defend. Even in Ireland, where England's greatest failure had been, Irishmen were never coerced into abandoning the Gaelic language, though in the course of time most of them of their own accord adopted English. But in countries like Russia and Germany, of the régime before the Great War, it seemed to the rulers all-important that all their subjects should be respectively Russian or German. Accordingly, in Russia the Poles and the Finns were subjected to grievous persecution. In the German Em-

pire Frenchmen of Alsace-Lorraine, Danes in Schleswig, and the Poles of Posen, were treated as inferiors and subjected to discriminations in the hope of making them thoroughly German.

When in 1871 Alsace-Lorraine was annexed to the Empire the inhabitants, though most of them were more German than French by race, were strongly attached to France, and protested at the forcible separation. Bismarck believed that, with the passing away of the generation that had known French rule, attachment to France would disappear. The strongest French sympathizers left the country, and their places were taken by immigrants from the German states of the Empire. But Alsace-Lorraine was given a dependent and inferior status, as the *Reichsland*, or imperial territory. It had neither influence in the Empire nor sufficient self-government for itself. Therefore, as time passed, the feeling of discontent did not wane; love of the old memories of France did not die; and German immigrants themselves denounced the treatment of the *Reichsland*. The German authorities, who have usually not been able to conciliate other peoples, as the English and the French have done, but have relied on strong methods and force, strove to compel obedience and contentment. They only increased the irritation. This made a dangerous situation which they tried to meet by adding to the garrisons and subjecting the provinces to very strict military rule. This was resented still further. As far as possible French things were proscribed, and one boy of twelve was imprisoned for whistling the *Marseillaise*. German rulers did not realize as clearly as some foreigners that what the inhabitants of the *Reichsland* wanted most of all was not return to France but self-government. In 1911 a new constitution was granted, but it was not satisfactory to the people. After forty years nothing, aside from force, really held the population to the Empire except their increasingly prosper-

Alsace-Lorraine

Continued
resentment

ous industrial life, closely connected with German industry and mostly dependent upon it.

The Poles
in the east-
ern districts

The Germans so dealt with these provinces largely because of their strategic position, and because military considerations seemed all-important. German leaders would have felt safer if the *Reichsland* had been inhabited entirely by Germans. The same reasons had much to do with their treatment of the Poles in West Prussia and Posen. The Polish districts of Prussia lay right where Russian invaders might strike deep into the Empire. This country, when taken from Poland, had contained many people who spoke German; and in time, with good treatment, all of the inhabitants might have been made loyal subjects. It was considered necessary, however, to make them thoroughly German, especially after the *Kulturkampf* had aroused in the Catholic Poles a strong feeling of Polish nationality. Bismarck wished to prevent the use of Polish in their public schools, and he desired to populate the country with German peasants; but presently more lenient treatment was accorded. Repressive measures were undertaken in earnest, however, after a while, when it was seen clearly that the Poles were not giving up their own national feeling. As in Alsace-Lorraine, newspapers were suppressed and many people fined and imprisoned. In 1901 it was ordered that religious instruction in the schools should be given in German. Polish teachers were taken from their positions, school children were forbidden to pray in Polish, and Poles were forbidden to use their language in public assemblies. In 1907 the Prussian Government passed a law by which Polish owners might be compelled to sell their land, so that their estates might get into German possession; and in 1913 a large sum of money was appropriated for the purpose of colonizing Prussian Poland with Germans. Polish peasants were even forbidden to build houses upon their own land. But despite the severity of this persecution,

little more was accomplished than making the Polish subjects of the Empire burn with hatred, and desire freedom from the rule of the masters who oppressed them.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE LEADERSHIP OF GERMANY—THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

L. L. M. M. l'empereur d'Autriche, roi de Bohème etc. et roi apostolique de Hongrie, l'empereur d'Allemagne, roi de Prusse et le roi d'Italie, animées du désir d'augmenter les garanties de la paix générale, de fortifier le principe monarchique et d'assurer par cela-même le maintien intacte de l'ordre sociale et politique dans leurs états respectifs, sont tombées d'accord de conclure un traité. . . .

The Triple Alliance, May 20, 1882.

Wir liegen mitten in Europa. Wir haben mindestens drei Angriffsfronten. . . . Gott hat uns in eine Situation gesetzt, in welcher wir durch unsere Nachbarn daran verhindert werden, irgendwie in Trägheit oder Versumpfung zu gerathen. Er hat uns die kriegerischste und unruhigste Nation, die Franzosen, an die Seite gesetzt, und er hat in Russland kriegerische Neigungen gross werden lassen. . . . Wir Deutschen fürchten Gott, aber sonst nichts in der Welt.

BISMARCK in the *Reichstag*, February 6, 1888; *Stenographische Berichte, 1887–1888*, pp. 727, 728, 733.

. . . hold fast to the conviction that our God would never have taken such great pains with our German Fatherland and its people if he had not been preparing us for something still greater.

Speech of WILLIAM II at Bremen, March 22, 1905.

AFTER 1871 Bismarck's greater tasks had to do with foreign affairs. The new German Empire was a powerful state of 41,000,000 people. It was larger than France, in strong military position, flushed with victory, and with the prestige of unparalleled success. But it was also a new state, a newcomer among old neighbors, apt to be regarded as an upstart and an intruder. Its very appearance had completely upset the old balance of power, and there was bound to be some difficulty in adjusting the equi-

Bismarck's work

librium again. The German Empire had risen on the defeat of Austria and of France. The Austrians might try to regain the position they had lost. The French proclaimed, as some Germans do now, that assuredly they would have their revenge. The position of Germany was very strong, for in between other great powers she could strike out, if necessary, at one or the other; but the converse of this was that a hostile alliance of surrounding powers might be able to crush her completely.

The problems confronting Bismarck

It was the task of Bismarck now to consolidate and keep what had just been gained, to prevent the formation of an unfriendly alliance, to isolate Germany's foes, to make new friends and keep the old ones, and see that Germany would never be taken at a disadvantage during the period of readjustment of affairs. He succeeded magnificently in all of this. Great as had been his success in making possible the unification of Germany, his success in keeping the unity, prosperity, and commanding position of the German Empire now was still more striking. When in 1890 he retired from the management of public affairs, the foundations of the Empire seemed impregnable. Germany was the center of a powerful alliance; and was on friendly terms with most of the other great powers; while France continued in the lonely isolation in which her disaster had left her.

The situation in Europe

When Bismarck began his great schemes against Austria and France he had already assured himself of the friendship of Italy and Russia. With these powers he continued on excellent terms after 1871, and did all that he could to strengthen the connection. Great Britain had been increasingly alarmed at the actions of Prussia from 1864 to 1871, and among the British people there was no little sympathy for France during the terrible winter of the war. But this was a period when historians and novelists in England loved to think of the Teutonic origin of their people and the excellence of all things Germanic; so that

for some time many Englishmen felt that there were very close ties of relationship between the Germans and themselves. Moreover, since the ending of the Napoleonic wars, the activities of Britain had gone mostly into the administration of her ever-widening Empire, British leaders wished to avoid entanglements in Europe, and remain secure in "splendid isolation."

At once Bismarck proceeded to grander designs. He desired to draw together in close friendship and alliance the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. He had had something of this in mind in 1866, when terms were made with Austria defeated. By the Peace of Prague Austria lost no territory to Prussia, and paid almost no indemnity, while everything possible was done to soothe the feelings of the vanquished. Accordingly, it was not difficult to bring about good understanding again. In 1872, after skilful arranging, the emperors of Russia, Austria, and the German Empire were brought together in Berlin, where they arrived at a cordial agreement. No alliance was concluded; but this understanding of the three rulers so far effected Bismarck's plan of a new group of powers which would include the new German Empire that there was not any great misconception involved when people spoke of it as the League of Three Emperors (*Dreikaiserbund*).

For six years this condition continued, and Bismarck had little to fear, with Italy friendly, and England holding aloof. But now there developed another great change which made impossible continued intimate connection with Austria-Hungary and Russia at the same time; for they came into such opposition that not even his masterly skill sufficed to hold them together. Russia and Austria were rivals for the same thing, and by 1878 could no longer be good friends, since they could not each have the object desired, which both of them greatly wanted.

For a long time the Russian people had been extending

The *Drei-kaiserbund*

Austria-Hungary
and Russia

Expansion of
Russia to
the south-
west

westward and southward, always hoping for some good outlet on the sea, and looking forward to the day when expansion down through the Balkans would bring them to Constantinople, mother of their civilization and faith. From the Turk they had already taken much land on the northern shore of the Black Sea, and now it seemed to them that ambition and destiny both called them forward down the west shore, to free the Christian, Slavic peoples in the Balkan peninsula, and to drive the Turks out of their great city at last. But meanwhile Austria was reviving her ambitions to take Balkan territory from the Turk. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when Ottoman power in Europe was at its zenith, Austria was the bulwark of Christian Europe against the Turk. It was to her that the submerged Christian peoples to the south looked for their future deliverance; and she did enlarge her dominions by southward expansion when

Expansion of
Austria to
the south

the power of the Turk began to wane. After a while her ambitions were turned in this direction more than ever before. Once she had had great influence in northern Europe. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) gave her that part of the Netherlands which was afterward known as Belgium, and for a long while she was leader among the German states. But the wars of the French Revolution took away her Austrian Netherlands, and in 1866 she was thrust out of the community of the German peoples. At the same time she had just lost her hold on the Italian peninsula. But her ambitions rose quickly again. As soon as the Austrians and the Hungarians reached agreement, and good relations began with the new German Empire, the hopes of the leaders in the Dual Monarchy turned to new expansion, and it seemed now that the best chance for this was down the Adriatic, perhaps, through the Balkan peninsula to the Ægean. So it happened that in this period the ambitions of Russia and Austria-Hungary thwarted each other. Each strove for influence



8. THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO

The Russo-Turkish War

among the Balkan peoples and tried by all means to hinder the other from securing advantage. In 1878 a great crisis came, when Russia, eager to extend her power, but also sincerely aroused at the atrocities perpetrated by Turks on the Bulgarian people, began the Russo-Turkish War (1877-8), and, after a fierce struggle, shattered the enemy's resistance and forced the signing of a treaty which destroyed the power of Turkey in Europe. The subject peoples were set free, and most of the Ottoman territory in Europe was given to a new large Bulgarian state, which, it was then believed, would be dependent on Russia.

The Congress of Berlin, 1878

But this treaty was not allowed to stand. A British fleet prepared for action near Constantinople, and Austria-Hungary also let it be known that such a settlement was not satisfactory. In the following critical months the Russian ambassador to Great Britain reached a partial understanding with the British Government; and meanwhile Russia consented to submit the treaty to a congress of the powers. June 13, such a congress met at Berlin. Bismarck, who had declared that Germany had no territorial claims in the Balkans, and that he would be glad to act as an "honest broker" between the others, was elected president the first day. By the Treaty of Berlin which followed, Russia suffered a great diplomatic defeat. What she had done in the Balkans was largely undone. The Bulgaria she proposed to establish was greatly reduced, while Austria-Hungary, who had taken no part in defeating the Turks, got the right to administer the two Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which lay contiguous to her and now extended her dominion far southward.

Consequences:
Russia and
Prussia drift apart

The Congress and the Treaty of Berlin mark an epoch in the recent history of Europe. Many great consequences were to follow from the work of the diplomats who went there, but one of the first important results was the ending of the close friendship which had existed between Russia and Prussia since Prussia's friendly attitude to Russia

during the Polish rebellion of 1863. Gortchakov, the Russian chancellor, who already disliked Bismarck, believed that such humiliation would not have come to his country had he received German support. In 1866 Russia had been friendly to Prussia, and in 1870 she had even done something to keep Austria from assisting France. Now in her time of need the German Empire had done nothing for her. Russia had desired an offensive and defensive alliance with Germany, but Bismarck had refused; and forced at last to make his choice, he now chose Austria rather than Russia. Perhaps he feared that since Russia was opposing most of the principal European powers, Germany in alliance with Russia would have to oppose them also, and would thence be made too dependent on Russia's good will in the future. At all events, cordial friendship between them now came to an end for the time.

Indignation
in Russia

For the moment Germany was isolated, and there was danger that Russia might seek alliance with either Austria or France. But the danger soon passed. In October, 1879, after brief negotiations, an alliance was concluded between the German Empire and Austria-Hungary. By the terms of this agreement, kept secret then but afterward published, "the two High Contracting Parties" were bound to stand by each other with all their armed forces if either one were attacked by Russia; in case either were attacked by some other power than Russia "the other High Contracting Party" would observe "at least an attitude of benevolent neutrality" toward the partner in the treaty; but if the power attacking were supported by Russia, then the two High Contracting Parties would wage war jointly until peace was concluded by them together.

Alliance be-
tween the
German Em-
pire and
Austria-
Hungary,
1879

Scarcely had this Dual Alliance given the security Bismarck desired when he extended it to make the well-known Triple Alliance, which endured until the time of the Great War. This was done by drawing Italy to the two

Italy joins
the Triple
Alliance,
1882

Italy and
Austria-
Hungary

Central Powers. The general interests of Italy did not seem to lie in such company, since she must have as one of her partners Austria-Hungary, long Italy's master and oppressor, who only a few years before had been expelled from the peninsula, who still held many Italians as unwilling subjects, and against whom Italians cherished bitter hatred from recollection of a thousand acts of tyranny and evil. Moreover, the spirit of the Italian people and the ties of language, law, and custom, bound them rather to France than the German Empire. But there were then, as there were later on, reasons why the Italians should feel hostile to France.

Italy and
France

In 1915 Italy joined the Allies against Austria-Hungary and Germany, and after valiant and exhausting endeavors contributed to the victory which followed. During the course of the struggle it seemed to observers that Italy and France were drawn together by common sufferings and efforts as never before. But scarcely was the struggle at an end when bitter causes of difference arose almost at once. Italy wished to have the opposite coast of the Adriatic and become the controlling power in what had been the southern Slavic dominions of the former Austro-Hungarian state. France hoped that upon the ruins of the fallen Dual Monarchy would rise new Slavic commonwealths partly dependent on herself. Accordingly, there was such immediate conflict of ambition and desires between Italy and France, that already in 1919 predictions were being made that Italy would renew her connection with Germany as soon as she could.

Rivalry and
ambition

So it was when Bismarck sought to draw Italy into his schemes. Only a few years before the Austrian armies had been overthrown and Italy's unity forwarded through the powerful assistance of France. But since 1859 several things had occurred to alienate the Italian people. Napoleon III had supported the pope in maintaining his temporal power, and this was overthrown and uni-

fication completed only in 1870, when France was no longer able to interfere. Even after the Franco-German War there was some fear that French intervention might restore to the pope what he had lost. Furthermore, Italy was a young and ambitious state, and wished ardently to appear as one of the greater powers. Actually this was beyond her resources, but it seemed then more possible if she were closely associated with great companions. Finally the direct motive was craftily supplied by Bismarck himself. In Algeria France had long before begun the foundations of her north African empire. It was evident that she would be glad to expand into the neighboring country of Tunisia, but it was also apparent that Italy had high hopes of getting Tunisia for herself. At the Congress of Berlin Bismarck had secretly encouraged France to take Tunisia, hoping that if she were engrossed in distant enterprises she would think less of a war of revenge, and probably foreseeing that such seizure would enrage the Italians and drive them into Germany's arms.

So it came about. In 1881 France established a protectorate over Tunisia. There was an outburst of indignation in Italy, and the statesmen of Rome, hearkening to the persuasion of Bismarck, joined Germany and Austria-Hungary in alliance. Thus did Italy ally herself with an old enemy and a recent friend. No little gain came to her. When in 1866 she had obtained Venetia from Austria, the strong places on the border all remained in Austria's hands, and Italy with weak and exposed frontier was always at the mercy of an Austrian attack. From this danger she was now freed by being associated with Austria-Hungary, and by being in some sort under German protection. More and more did she come under German influence; and in the following years German merchants and financiers almost got economic control of the country. In course of time, however, as Italy grew stronger and less afraid of Austria-Hungary, she grew more ambitious and

Rivalry
about
Tunisia

Italy added
to the Ger-
manic alli-
ance, 1882

German
influence
in Italy

hoped to secure larger control of the Adriatic for herself. Thus she came into conflict with Austria, and in the end it was almost as difficult for Germany to reconcile her partners in the Triple Alliance as once it had been for Bismarck to hold Austria and Russia together. The Alliance was renewed again and again, and it lasted long beyond Bismarck's time. But before the Great War began Italy was an unwilling member; during that struggle she withdrew; and the war broke the Alliance to pieces.

The Austro-German Treaty of 1879 the principal link between the Central Powers

The history, the development, the character of the engagements binding Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy long remained enveloped in secrecy, to be guessed at by outsiders and ill understood. It was assumed that, roughly, their general character was known, but when, after the downfall of Austria-Hungary in 1918, the archives of Vienna were examined and the secret treaties of the Alliance made known, it was evident that much had remained concealed. It was then apparent that always the basis and strongest part of the arrangement was the Austro-German Treaty, the treaty of alliance concluded between the German Empire and Austria-Hungary in 1879. The duration of this treaty had been fixed at five years, but in accordance with its third article, which had remained undivulged, provision had been made for the automatic continuance of the arrangement for periods of three years, in case neither partner desired otherwise. In 1902, after a conference concerning the continuance of the Treaty, it was specifically agreed that the Treaty should be automatically renewed each three years. Meanwhile, in 1883, it had been renewed for a five-year period, to end in 1889. It was this treaty, and this one only, which obligated the German Empire to assist the Dual Monarchy if it were attacked by Russia.

The treaties of the Triple Alliance

Supplementary to this agreement and less important, but parallel to it, was the Triple Alliance proper. The treaty of this alliance was made in 1882. It was renewed

in 1887, at which time were added a separate treaty between Austria-Hungary and Italy concerning the Balkans and another treaty between the German Empire and Italy directed against France. In 1891 these three treaties were consolidated in the third Treaty of the Triple Alliance. Von Bülow, the German statesman, afterward declared that the Triple Alliance was "an insurance company" and not a "company for profit." It had, indeed, been purely defensive at first, but after 1891 it contained provisions which contemplated the possibility of aggression against France. The Treaty was to continue for six years, and for an additional six thereafter if not denounced. In 1902 it was specifically renewed unchanged, as it was again in 1912. It is now known that the Triple Alliance did not provide any definite military stipulations, though a convention between Germany and Italy in 1888 provided for the employment of Italian troops against France. Naval agreements, on the other hand, were made: in 1900 for independent naval operations by the partners; in 1913 for joint naval action, the scheme being drawn up in detail.

From the first the friendship or benevolent attitude of Great Britain was desired. In the first Treaty of the Triple Alliance in 1882 protocols attached declared that the contracting parties had no hostile intentions toward England. Five years later Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Italy came to an agreement concerning the Mediterranean. In the same year such an agreement was made between Italy and Spain, to which Austria-Hungary acceded; and this was prolonged in 1891. Knowledge of these arrangements makes clear now what was only feared or suspected then, how complete was the isolation of France, and how dangerous, indeed, was her position. In the third Treaty of the Triple Alliance in 1891 a protocol asserted the adherence in principle of England to certain stipulations of the arrangement, and declared that the contracting parties should exert them-

Character of
the Triple
Alliance

Great Brit-
ain, Italy,
and the
Triple Alli-
ance

Great Britain draws away

selves to obtain her adherence respecting other matters also. This was the moment of England's closest approach to the Triple Alliance, and marked the culmination of the power of the Alliance. In the next decade Germany and Great Britain began to drift apart, and as this took place Italy partly fell away. From the start it had been evident that Italy, entirely at the mercy of the principal sea power, would never be willing to oppose England. In 1896 she formally notified the Central Powers that she could not fight against France together with England. A few years later Italy came to a separate understanding with France concerning Tripoli, thus making a "re-insurance treaty," since her former engagements in the Triple Alliance were renewed, with their stipulations directed against France.

Rumania attached to the Alliance

But while Italy was getting from the Triple Alliance all she could, and yet gradually coming to be less dependable in it, the two principal partners, Austria-Hungary and the German Empire, came more closely together and tried to strengthen their position by additional arrangements. Not only Italy but Rumania was added. In 1883 a treaty of alliance was concluded between Austria-Hungary and Rumania. On the same day Germany was added, and Italy five years later. This adding of Rumania as an appendage to the Triple Alliance was renewed in 1892, 1902, and 1913. With respect to the Balkans, Austria strove to strengthen her position by making an arrangement with Russia in 1897, and with Italy in 1901 and 1909.

Hegemony of the German Empire

The Triple Alliance was to a considerable extent defensive, but by means of it Bismarck had none the less raised the German Empire to be the controlling power in Europe, and to a marvellous pitch of greatness. It was clearly realized by contemporary statesmen that the Alliance controlled all the central part of the Continent, extending from the northern waters to the Mediterranean, separating eastern Europe completely from the west, and thus

occupying an impregnable position. Within this territory were more than 100,000,000 people, and armies of 2,000,000 well-trained soldiers. It would have been the sheerest madness for any other single state to come into conflict with it. In this combination the German Empire was the most powerful member and the controlling force. Accordingly, after 1882, Germany had a manifest superiority, indeed an overlordship or hegemony in Europe, and Bismarck was the most powerful man in the world.

But high as was the position of Germany, and mighty as her power had become, Bismarck increased it still further. During all the remaining years of his power he succeeded in keeping the other great European states from entering into a counter alliance. Thus he kept France for the most part in the isolation in which he had placed her. At the same time he tried to avoid any misunderstanding with Great Britain, and tried successfully to renew the connection with Russia.

Scarcely had the Alliance of 1879 been made between Austria-Hungary and Germany, when Bismarck tried to draw Russia into another understanding like what had existed before the Congress of Berlin. The details of this very secret diplomacy were long unknown, but enough has recently been revealed from the Russian and the Austrian archives to explain clearly the main outlines of the thing. Bismarck had little confidence at first in the stability of the alliance with Austria. He wished, moreover, to prevent what did take place after his retirement, an alliance between Russia and France. Therefore, in 1881 he succeeded in bringing about an agreement between the emperors of Russia, Austria, and the German Empire, that in case any one of these three powers should be at war with a fourth, the other two parties to the understanding would preserve a "benevolent neutrality." This stipulation was also to apply in case of a war between one of the three parties and Turkey, provided

Bismarck's foreign policy

Renewal of good relations with Russia

Agreement
between
Russia,
Austria-
Hungary,
and the
German
Empire

that an understanding about such a war had already been reached between the parties. The understanding made special allowance for the continuance of the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, thus making the agreement more advantageous to Germany than to Russia. Nevertheless, by skillful management Bismarck brought it about that the agreement was renewed with slight modification in 1884. Three years later, however, this was not done, for Austria had been steadily acquiring a more dominating influence in the Balkans, and Russian importance there was declining. Therefore, Russia was unwilling to renew the agreement of 1881, but sought instead an alliance or agreement with Germany alone.

The "Rein-
surance
Treaty,"
1887

Then Bismarck read to the Russian ambassador the terms of the alliance with Austria, theretofore a secret, and let it be understood that this alliance must be maintained. But the two signed an agreement none the less. It provided that if one of the two contracting parties were at war with a third power, the other contracting party should maintain benevolent neutrality, though this provision was not to apply in case of an attack made by one of the contracting powers on either Austria or France, thus preserving the alliance with Austria, and safeguarding Russia's relations with France. Other articles provided that Germany should recognize Russia's rights in the Balkan peninsula and give her assistance to Russia in maintaining them. This agreement has been known as the "Reinsurance Treaty." In 1879 Bismarck had tried to insure Germany against attack by Russia in making the alliance with Austria-Hungary. Now in 1887 he got, as it were, insurance from the other side, for by this very secret "agreement" he provided largely against danger from France, who, under the terms of the agreement, would not be supported by Russia if she attacked the German Empire.

Seldom has there been a diplomacy abler or more astute. Bismarck, who had been the principal founder of the Empire, succeeded in keeping all that had been obtained. During the years since 1871 not once was France able to make alliance with some other European power and so strengthen herself as to dare to begin war on her foe. And in all that time Germany was seldom without close friends, while during most of the years she was the center of a powerful alliance, and had, besides, a friendly understanding with Russia. But in spite of the vast success which had come to his efforts, the time of the chancellor was nearing its end. His era was passing, and other men with other plans were rising about him. By 1887 he was still a mighty figure, but a new generation was coming forward with ideals which he had never cherished and which, indeed, he could scarcely understand.

It had been his purpose to unite the German states in a strong empire and then make Germany greatest of the European Powers. Difficulties in the way of German unity had baffled German statesmen for ages, but now the unification was accomplished almost completely. Among the European states the German Empire now towered like a giant. These tasks filled his mind and the world of diplomacy which he knew. But meanwhile Great Britain had been acquiring an ever-larger colonial empire, and France, humiliated in Europe, had gone beyond the seas and won for herself new dominions. All this had appealed little to Bismarck. Only late did he seek to get colonies for Germany, and he never seems to have had ambitions for Germany in the Balkans or in Asia. But all around him now were growing up young Germans who saw a new world which could not be clear to his eyes. They would try to make Germany a great naval power, which would bring her into conflict with Britain, something that Bismarck had not dreamed of doing. They wished

Greatness
of Bis-
marck's
success

The new
generation
in the Ger-
man Em-
pire

to have Germany secure colonies and markets all over the world. They wished to join Austria-Hungary in pushing forward in the Balkans, something that would bring to an end the possibility of cordial understanding with Russia.

The passing
of Bismarck

During the lifetime of his master, William I, the emperor whom he had made, his power continued unshaken, but after 1888 there was marked change. William II who became, after the brief reign of Frederick III, the new ruler, embodied new ideas and the new ambitions which were to carry Germany on so much further and at last bring her down to destruction. He regarded Bismarck with respect, but gave him none of the affectionate confidence that his grandfather so long had given. Bismarck soon found the management of affairs no longer unquestionably in his hands; while the young emperor, himself full of vigor and spirit, grew more and more impatient at the domination of one who had so long been first in Europe that he was unable to take second place. For more than a year relations between the two grew more strained. The actual government of the Empire was in the hands of Bismarck, who had under him in important places members of his own family or friends whom he had raised up to obey him. But the new emperor, believing in the divine right of his rule, and confident of his own capacity to govern, presently insisted that his ideas be followed. In 1890 Bismarck resigned, after being told that he was in the way. It seemed a strange thing to the older generation that this could ever come to pass. As a famous cartoon in *Punch* portrayed it, to them it was "Dropping the Pilot."

His achieve-
ments

Of Bismarck's work it was long difficult to form proper estimate. So gigantic had been his success, so tremendous and brilliant his achievements, that to contemporaries, and for some time after, it seemed that he was not only the most commanding figure of his century, after Napoleon I, but the greatest and the most successful statesman

of that time. His accomplishment had been vast, and when he died his success seemed so complete as to justify almost all he had tried to do. He found Prussia the second power among the German states, and the German people divided. In a single generation he had made Prussia the greatest state on the Continent, defeated every one of her rivals, achieved the unification of Germany, and made his country the center and foundation thereof. And then in the course of long, crowded years he had kept the new German Empire safe in the exalted position he had given her, surrounded by friends, the head and leader of the strongest alliance in the world. During all this time there had come to the German people such prosperity and material success that they looked upon the man who had brought it about as the father and founder of his country.

And yet there was another side of it all, which some people, though not many, understood then, but which more would understand in the future. The unification of Germany had not been brought about through liberal development and respect of the rights of others, but partly by force, and chicane, and fraud, by contempt for the rights of people, and cynical disregard of obligations and honor. All of this seemed good to Germans who saw it through the glamor of success, and a generation of Germans was about to grow up which would admire above all things the force and lack of scruple which Bismarck had employed and had taught so well. The leaders of Germany in the early part of the twentieth century, who had learned in the school of Bismarck as he had learned in that of Frederick the Great, would worship force and strength, just as he had once discarded all policy but the rule of "blood and iron"; and as he had altered the Ems dispatch, so would they tear up the treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality as a mere worthless "scrap of paper." This would array the world against

His
methods

them, and the Empire, overwhelmed in defeat, would at last lie prostrate and dismembered.

His failure

Moreover, since his work had been effected and maintained by military power, in another generation all the great states of Europe had striven to make themselves strong military powers on the Prussian model. By the end of the nineteenth century Europe was groaning under almost intolerable military burdens, and a few years after was divided into two great military camps. Finally, in some respects the work of Bismarck was manifestly a failure. His treatment of France was such that France never forgave it, and always thereafter the German Empire could count on French hostility as a danger whenever some other great danger should arise. It has often been said that Bismarck was opposed to taking Alsace-Lorraine from the French, knowing that such loss would leave them irreconcilable, and that he yielded only to the military advisors who insisted because of the strategic strength which the provinces would give. But at all events, he did yield, and thereafter the Empire was encumbered with the mortgage of the hatred of the French, who might despair of being able to take vengeance, but whose hatred nevertheless lived on. Bismarck does not seem to have looked into the future, beyond his own age. He scarcely realized the importance of a colonial empire, nor did he conceive how soon a great deal of German ambition would lie beyond Europe, on the oceans and in continents far away. It would have been better in all respects, some have thought, had he not seized from France territory in Europe, but taken of her colonies instead. So it was that some years before the Great War an author wrote, without being much heeded, that it was still too soon to know whether generally the chancellor's policy had really been successful.

French
hatred

With the passing of Bismarck began the second stage in the development of the new German nation. Between

1864 and 1888 the Empire had been created and made the greatest of the European states. From about 1890 on to 1914 it went forward to greater things; its leaders made it a mighty world power and strove at last to make it beyond all doubt the greatest power in the world. The outlook of German leaders became wider, their ambition vaster and grander; they played for great stakes higher and more boldly, until in the end, as it seemed to one of them, they sought "World Dominion or Downfall."

New policy
of the Ger-
man Empire

In what followed, at first, the young emperor took the lead. Some believed that he was rash and might easily plunge into a war, for he spoke with stern pride of the power of his army. But for more than a quarter of a century in his reign there was no great conflict in Europe, and often he boasted that he had striven to keep the peace. Doubtless he did. But always this desire for peace seems to have been on condition that Germany hold her superior position in Europe, and that her policy should not be thwarted. When there rose up against the alliance headed by Germany another great group of powers, and it was no longer so easy for Germany's word to be law as it had been in Bismarck's time, then German statesmen and the emperor strove so hard to maintain the German hegemony that one great crisis followed another in Europe for the space of ten years. At the end of that time the nations were plunged into the greatest of all their wars.

Results

When in 1890 William II took control of the government and its foreign policy there followed at once a great altering of political relations. Bismarck had always kept France nearly isolated and alone. In three years after this time she was closely joined in an understanding with Russia. He had tried by all means to retain Russia's friendship, and he had succeeded nearly all of the time. But Russia was allowed to draw away now, and almost immediately she sought the friendship and became the ally of France. Bismarck had desired not to antagonize

Changed
European
relations

Great Britain, and during his time no dangerous misunderstanding had arisen; but in less than ten years Germany entered upon a policy which profoundly alarmed Great Britain, and shortly caused her to take her place together with Russia and France.

End of the
"Reinsur-
ance" policy

The secret agreement between Russia and Germany in 1887 had been made for three years. Before it expired, in 1890, the tsar tried to have it renewed, but Germany would not consent. There is a great deal, not yet known, relating to all of this; but it has been conjectured that one of the important causes of disagreement between Bismarck and William II was concerning relations with Russia; that Bismarck would have had the understanding renewed and would have held Russia fast to the Empire, but that the young emperor now had other plans which ran counter to continuing this friendship. It has been thought also that this was the time when the government of Germany began to cherish ambitions in the Balkans and Turkey. If this were the case, then most probably it would soon be as impossible for Germany to remain in close friendship with Russia as for Austria-Hungary since 1876. "My foreign policy remains and will remain the same as it was in the time of my grandfather," was the message William sent to the tsar. But the Russian ambassador believed that Germany in the future would have greater regard for the alliance with Austria-Hungary. And so it was, for that alliance now became stronger with every year, until at last it was the closest in Europe.

Closer rela-
tions with
Great Brit-
ain

It also seemed to the Russian ambassador, who wrote of these changes, that Germany now counted on getting the friendship of Great Britain to replace that of Russia, and even that Great Britain might be added to the Triple Alliance. It might, indeed, have seemed to him that there was some chance of bringing this about. Friendly relations with England were a tradition. The mother of the German emperor was a daughter of Queen Victoria,

whose husband, Albert, had been a German. There were many people in England at this time who learned from the school of Freeman and Carlyle how excellent were German things, and how much that was good in England had been inherited from Germany of old; Lord Salisbury, prime minister at this time, believed strongly in best possible relations with the German Empire. Good relations with Britain were, accordingly, easy to maintain and improve for the present, though she would most probably not have entered into any alliance, and it is not certainly known that Germany desired her to do so.

The new German policy attracted less attention than might have seemed possible. The close relations between Germany and Russia had been largely a secret. The attention of men was still fastened mostly on the older issues, the feeling between France and Germany, and the rivalry between England and France, and England and Russia. But a very significant event occurred the year before Bismarck retired. In 1889 William II went to Constantinople and visited Abdul Hamid, the sultan of Turkey. As men afterward saw this event, it seemed the beginning of an epoch in the politics of Europe.

In the Middle Ages the German people had fought against the Slavs to the east, subduing or pressing them back, and extending eastward their German dominion. In this manner had the old Prussia been acquired, in this way Austria's empire built up. In the course of this movement to the east and the south some Germans had pushed beyond the mass of their fellows and made isolated settlements, which in the nineteenth century were still flourishing in Hungary, and in Poland, in the western and southern parts of Russia, and even far off in the Balkans. For a long while some Germans had dreamed of a day when these detached groups, and the aliens surrounding, might be incorporated in a greater German Empire. Heinrich Heine prophesied that Germans would some day possess

Relations
with Turkey

Expansion of
the German
people in the
past

lands as distant as the Ukraine. In the earlier half of the nineteenth century other Germans advised colonization in the valley of the Danube and beyond, saying that here was the best of fields for German expansion. After the Franco-German War, colonization of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia was suggested in the dominions of the sultan of Turkey. About 1880 a certain one urged his fellows not to emigrate to America, as they were doing: "We must create a central Europe by conquering for German colonization large spaces to the east of our frontiers."

*Drang nach
Osten*

The German
Empire and
Turkey

Now in the new generation which followed that of Bismarck such thoughts constantly gained greater importance, until gradually the idea of *Drang nach Osten*, or advance by Germans to the east, came to be the underlying motive in German foreign affairs, and at last principal among the causes leading to the great European War. William II sought the friendship of the sultan of Turkey. England had previously been friend and protector of the Turks, but events like the British occupation of Egypt had caused her influence to wane. In 1898, about the time when England and France were embroiled in the Fashoda dispute concerning the upper Sudan, about the time when Germany began her great naval expansion, William went to Constantinople again, and, going on to Jerusalem and Damascus, proclaimed himself the protector of Turkey and announced that he was the friend of Mohammedans all over the world. Year after year German representatives established the influence of their country more strongly. Most people had no conception how far they were succeeding, but in 1914 it was suddenly found that Turkey was more closely bound to Germany and Austria than was Italy, a member of the Triple Alliance; that she was actually a vassal of Germany, at whose behest she could be pushed into a war where her very existence must be staked.

In controlling Turkey and developing her resources the most important thing done by Germans was the construction of the Bagdad Railway. As early as 1875 German engineers had built for the Turkish Government a railway across Anatolia, connecting Konia with Skutari, opposite Constantinople. Thirteen years later this railway was transferred to a German company. Now in 1899, the year following the emperor's second visit, the sultan granted him a concession to extend this railroad across Asiatic Turkey down to the Persian Gulf. There was, however, at the head of the Gulf, and controlling the outlet to its waters, the district of Koweit, ruled by a sheik who gave little obedience to the sultan. With this sheik the British immediately made a treaty, so as to block the future completion of the railroad, which they conceived might be dangerous to them. None the less, work was taken up and continued at intervals until just before 1914 the road which had been constructed to Aleppo, with a branch down along the eastern Mediterranean coast, had also been taken on almost completely through to Bagdad, and the control and development of Asiatic Turkey had been put into the hands of the Germans.

It was not possible to exaggerate the importance of this undertaking. If the road were ever completed Germany, provided she had also secured control of the intervening territory in Europe, would be mistress, perhaps, of the most important line of communication in the world. It was in Europe and in Asia that most of the world's inhabitants lived. Communication between them had till then been mostly by water. Of water routes there were two: one long and one short. The long one ran down to the south of Africa then up toward India and China; for a great while it had been dominated by the British, who held India and South Africa, and numerous stations on the way. The better and the shorter was

The Bagdad
Railway

Mittel-
europa and
the *Bagh-
dad bahn*

through the Mediterranean Sea; and this also was even more securely in the hands of the British, who held Gibraltar at one end of the sea and the Suez Canal at the other. But, after all, communication by these routes was round-about and slow. The end of the nineteenth century was an era of railroad development, which furnished transportation swifter and easier than any by water. If only the Germans could secure railroad lines leading down from their own northern ports across Austria-Hungary and the Balkans to Constantinople, and then connect with the Bagdad Railway having a terminus on the Persian Gulf, Germany would control the shortest and the best route between Europe and Asia, and might in time dominate a great part of all the world's trade.

Strategic
con-
sequences

Even more important to a military power were the strategic advantages involved. Not only would the Germans and their friends, lying between their possible enemies, separate them and have them at disadvantage, but they would have incomparably the best line of interior communications for moving troops swiftly, a route, moreover, lying right across the most important part of the world, and perhaps capable of being rendered invulnerable to attacks by sea power. Furthermore, as some Germans boasted, one part of this railway system would lead close to Egypt, and always be a threat to the British there, while on the Persian Gulf they could at any time put masses of troops to strike over at India far more quickly than the British could bring reinforcements. In short, they would have in this railway system an instrument for making Germany the greatest power in the world.

Changing
relations in
Europe

This new policy about the Bagdad Railway, the Balkans, and a central Europe under the influence of Germany developed gradually in the period after 1888, but it became ever more prominent and important during the years just before the war. Long before that time the politics

of continental Europe had been altered completely. Russia, first dropped from close friendship by Germany, then antagonized by German policy in Turkey and in the Balkans, had entered into the Dual *Entente* or "Alliance" with France, opposing not only Austria-Hungary but Germany as well. And gradually the Triple Alliance changed. Italy, as time went on, had less interest in her connection with the Central Powers, and the old causes of antagonism with France slowly passed almost entirely. It was often believed after 1902 that Italy no longer had great interest in continuing in the Alliance, especially as her policy conflicted more with that of Austria-Hungary in the Adriatic and the western Balkans, and that she remained a member more through fear of withdrawing than because she desired to continue. The Triple Alliance continued to be renewed, but so far as Italy was concerned evidently no strong tie now remained. Very different was it with Austria-Hungary. When the alliance with Germany was made in 1879 Bismarck believed that the connection might not endure. Nevertheless, during his time it grew stronger; and now, with the development of the new German policy, connection with Austria-Hungary became firmer each year, since that connection was indispensable to the success of Germany's schemes. The empire planned in Middle Europe and nearer Asia had at one of its ends Asiatic Turkey and at the other the great German state. The scheme could never be fulfilled unless Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, which lay in between, were kept in close alliance or controlled. Therefore, firm alliance with the Dual Monarchy came to be the very cornerstone of German foreign policy; and it was more and more evident that Germany would give Austria-Hungary support, and that for the sake of her own greatness and ambitions she never could fail to do so. And the attachment of Austria-Hungary to the German Empire became equally strong. Not only did the Dual Monarchy require the

The oppos-
ing alliances

Strength-
ening of the
alliance be-
tween the
German Em-
pire and
Austria-
Hungary

support of its powerful neighbor against such a great rival as Russia, but the ambitions of Austria-Hungary coincided largely with German plans. If Germans hoped to control a great railroad down through the Balkans and across Turkey to the Persian Gulf, so did Austria-Hungary desire to be the greatest power in the western Balkans, rule all the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea, and extend down to the Mediterranean at Salonica.

Rivalry with
Great Brit-
ain

During these same years further change in international affairs brought another vast alteration. So immense was the development of the German Empire, so colossal its strength as it grew, that German ambitions developed in every direction—not only in eastern and central Europe, in sharper rivalry with Russia, but also on the seas and in distant places, which brought Germany at last into direct competition with England. As this came about, it was very evident that a second of Bismarck's axioms had been discarded. He had always striven to keep Russia as a friend and avoid any estrangement with Britain. The Germany of William II hesitated not to challenge and contend with them both.

Previous
relations be-
tween Ger-
many and
England

Previously relations between Germany and England had been very good. Between Englishmen and Germans there had long been friendship with little memory of old wrong or warfare, and there was always a certain feeling of kinship because of blood and common inheritance and speech. Spain, France, Russia had been the rivals of England, not the Germans. Englishmen had viewed the establishment of German unity with a great deal of sympathy and admiration. Some did question the methods by which this had been brought about, but actually for a time after 1871 the interests of Britain and the German Empire did not conflict and there was no direct cause for any hostile feeling. Great Britain was a sea power and her chief interests were outside of Europe. Germany was not a naval power during Bismarck's time

and her interest was altogether in keeping that which she had just achieved, first place in continental affairs. Presently, it is true, the immense maritime and industrial development of Germany brought keen competition and aroused some unpleasant feeling. But all this awakened no hostility in Britain, and as time went on it was seen that England could well hold her own.

In the later years of his power Bismarck had seen increasing need of a strong navy to guard the Empire's growing commercial and colonial interests, but the great change came after he had been dismissed, with the rise of the new school of statesmen, who looked beyond Europe and would make Germany the greatest of the great. The German army was incomparably the strongest in the world, but they were conscious of a surplus of strength in their country, not needed for the army, and they began to cherish the plan of making Germany a great naval power and a seeker for colonies also. It was probably foreseen that this would inevitably bring very different relations with England. Hitherto Britain had been on her guard against France and Russia, both of them strong naval powers and active rivals in Africa and Asia. For some years it had been her purpose to maintain the "two-power standard," to keep her fleet stronger than the two next greatest navies combined. In 1889 Great Britain had undertaken a comprehensive scheme of naval increase, and by 1898, when a crisis developed with France, the French had yielded completely, so overwhelming was British strength on the sea. Britain had no large army, and so could not defend herself against the great standing armies of European states if ever they reached her shores. Her sole reliance was on command of the sea, and it was justly felt that if this were lost, then all would be gone and the British Empire destroyed beyond hope. The British people accordingly were resolved at all costs to maintain their superiority on the

Germany
and British
sea power

Increase of
British naval
strength

German
ambitions
on the sea

ocean, and would probably come to regard with much dread any nation who challenged this position.

Suddenly and in dramatic way the German Government did do this. Germans were building up a great commerce, which was not interfered with by the British, but which they knew could be stopped or destroyed, if the British tried to do it. More and more they desired colonies and markets abroad. They had begun to seek colonies too late. There was little left for them to take. But they felt that they had better chance of being considered in distant places if they had a strong war fleet to establish their communications. They considered that the great British Empire, as well as the new French colonial empire, had been made possible by naval power. In this new era of great German ambitions the leaders felt that the German Empire was incomplete so long as it had no strong navy.

The Naval
Laws, 1898,
1900

The lead was taken by Admiral von Tirpitz and the emperor himself. There was opposition among the older school of thinkers in Germany, but after much effort a bill was passed by the *Reichstag* in 1898 providing for a great naval increase. The law provided for expending, during a course of years, 1,000,000,000 marks, and was considered to be the most ambitious naval programme undertaken by any state in the memory of man. That same year the *Flottenverein* (Navy League) was established, to interest the people in naval expansion. It had 600,000 members in two years, and shortly after a million. A vast amount of educational work and propaganda was done by this organization, and it was most successful in arousing the people. Much greater development soon followed. In 1900 a vaster sum was appropriated, and plans made for a navy twice as powerful as that provided two years before.

Such startling naval increase affected other powers at once and profoundly. It began to seem that Germany

was about to attempt upon the water what she had once succeeded in doing on the land; and this was an ominous thing when the triumphs of her armies were recalled. But of all Germany's neighbors none saw herself threatened so greatly as England. As this new German navy was built up Great Britain might be endangered, perhaps, by the German Empire more than by France. Moreover, the very preamble of the law of 1900 seemed directed against England. "Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that even for an adversary with the greatest sea power a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his own position in the world." "The ocean is indispensable to the greatness of Germany," said the emperor about the same time. "As my grandfather reorganized the army, so I shall reorganize my navy." And in 1901: "Our future lies upon the water."

There was, indeed, a great turning-point about 1898. In that year occurred the crisis between Britain and France, in which the French yielded, but remained filled with savage hatred and anger. On the other hand, Germany was still well liked in Great Britain. We now know that for some years certain leaders in Germany and in Britain had been striving to establish an *entente*. But during the Boer War, which began in 1899, Germans gave to the Boers such sympathy and encouragement as they could, and might perhaps have intervened if England had not controlled the sea. Next year, when German naval plans were so greatly enlarged, Englishmen began pondering upon the situation. It was difficult for most of them to conceive that Britain could be in any danger, for British supremacy on the seas was a tradition, and British control had been unquestioned since the day of Trafalgar. None the less, a new generation was coming into public life which saw things in terms of altered conditions, which believed that in the last generation Germany had increased so much more greatly than England, and

Apprehension in England

The diplomatic revolution, 1904-7

Great
Britain not
safe in
isolation

that this greater Germany now bade fair to be so very powerful on the sea that Britain was no longer safe as before, aloof in her old isolation. They believed that she could no longer wisely stand alone, and that she should enter into closer relations with friends in Europe and everywhere else in the world. Apparently the leader of this group in England was King Edward VII, who came to the throne in 1901. He seems to have understood how greatly conditions had changed. At the same time he had a sincere admiration for France. Therefore, he took the lead in seeking her friendship. As a result of the work of some of the new leaders in England and some of the new statesmen in France, the two nations soon settled all their differences, and in 1904 entered into the friendly understanding of the *Entente Cordiale*. Three years later, under what seemed increasing menace of German naval expansion, Britain and Russia settled their differences also. Accordingly, by 1907 the new naval policy of Germany had brought England out of her long aloofness from European affairs into close and friendly relations with France and cordial relations with Russia.

Growing uneasiness in England

Each year the leaders and statesmen of Britain saw greater peril across the North Sea. Everywhere they settled all their outstanding differences, not only with France and with Russia, but with Italy and the United States, and they had already made alliance with Japan. British naval forces, once scattered all over the world, were silently drawn in and concentrated in the waters about Britain and Ireland. But the uneasiness was felt rather for the future than the immediate present, since it was believed that England had such great superiority on the sea that it would be a long while before Germany's utmost efforts could really challenge the British navy.

The Dread-naught

A great change presently occurred. It was in 1904-5, during the Russo-Japanese War, that modern warships were really tested for the first time; and many lessons

were learned then. After the great battle of Tsushima it was seen, as some experts had before pointed out, that high speed, which would enable a warship to take such position as it wished, heavy armor, and great guns of long range, involved immense superiority at sea. But these principles could only be applied at their best on a ship of very great size. In 1907 the British launched the *Dreadnaught*, a battleship which was the largest, the swiftest, and most heavily armored warship that had ever been put afloat, and it had also the largest number of giant guns of long range. This monster, it was believed, would be invulnerable to the attacks of ordinary warships, able to overtake or outrange an antagonist, always able to choose its own range, and beyond the enemy's range batter the enemy to pieces. The *Dreadnaught* made the older warships antiquated. For a moment Britain seemed to have got great superiority over all her rivals, but actually she had begun a revolution which could soon bring her temporary disadvantage. Great Britain had the largest number of the older vessels, and it was possession of them which gave her such lead over the German navy. Germany, with her new naval programme, was building the greatest number of new ships, and immediately she altered the plans and began making new vessels of the *Dreadnaught* type. She was building swiftly and with such secrecy that it was difficult to know how swift her progress was. It was evident to the thinking that all unexpectedly she had a chance to overcome England's naval preponderance and threaten her command of the seas.

Even though it was evident that relations between the two countries were steadily growing worse, most of the English people could not quickly understand the large changes occurring, or the altered position of affairs. But now appeared a play, said to have been written at the wish of government officials, *An Englishman's Home*. It portrayed a nation so ignorant of its condition as to be without

An English-man's Home

fear, when it was really without means of defense. It told of England suddenly invaded, and unable to resist, of an Englishman shot for defending his home. It had little merit as a play, but it stirred the English people to their depths, and aroused them at last as the warnings of statesmen and writers had never been able to do. There was profound alarm and depression, during what was known as the Naval Panic of 1909. Some Englishmen felt hopeless, some wanted a great army, but most cried for huge naval increase, and this was swiftly undertaken. Eight great battleships were proposed for that year, and actually construction was so rapidly advanced that Britain after a short time of anxiety found herself, not indeed with a navy greater than the two next most powerful navies, but with a fleet considerably stronger than the battle fleet of the German Empire.

Growing alarm and suspicion

No longer was there any doubt about dangerous rivalry between the two powers. Many people in both countries declared that there was no reason for conflict, and sincerely deplored the growing suspicion and ill will, but uneasiness and anger increased. In both countries great newspapers and periodicals did not cease to point out how the foe threatened vital interests, and that preparations must be hastened so as to be ready for inevitable conflict. In England men recalled what had been done to France, and noted with alarm the utterances of German jingoes. In Germany the *Flottenverein* taught that England had ever been the greedy enemy in Germany's way, and that real greatness could come to the Fatherland only after a war of liberation against Britain. Germans believed that the British would suddenly try to destroy their fleet. Englishmen believed that Germans might suddenly try to dash across into England, and, once there, destroy the foundations of their empire.

Thus the force of events ranged Great Britain ever more closely with Germany's opponents. It may be that

most people in both countries abhorred the thought of war between the two. Certainly Englishmen felt that their preparations were merely defensive. But the great danger in the situation arose from the very fact that conflict seemed inevitable to so many. Englishmen often believed that the ambitions of the German Empire could only be fulfilled by sweeping the British Empire away, and taking the best parts for a greater Germany. Many Germans were taught that while England ruled the seas Germany could develop with difficulty and only on sufferance. Year by year the Germans were told more and more that England had joined their enemies in an *Einkreisung*, an effort to encircle and crush them. Year by year it came to be better understood that Englishmen must not make again the mistake of 1870, not again allow France to be crushed, for then afterward most probably they would have to fight alone against Germany with very small chance of success.

It is evident that before 1914 the policy of Bismarck had been discarded, and that some of the things he had achieved had been completely lost. Some of Germany's old friends had drawn off from her, and joined France to make a great combination, the *Triple Entente*. The alienation of Russia had been followed by increasing distrust on the part of Great Britain, and it was not improbable, in case of war, that Britain would be found with Germany's foes. Before the last evil days there was some effort to clear away the hostility and suspicion. Germans often said they desired the friendship of England, and that the two powers working together could ensure the peace of the world. Many Englishmen wished that a friendly understanding could be reached, and would have given much to win the true friendship of the German people. They were not, however, willing for their naval superiority to be impaired. A British leader speaking in 1912 declared that naval power was a necessity to English-

Conflict
feared in the
future

Efforts to
effect a bet-
ter under-
standing

Statement of
Winston
Churchill

men but not to Germans. To Germany it meant expansion, to England existence. All the greatness and power, he said, won through so many centuries of sacrifice and effort, could be swept away if British naval supremacy were impaired for a moment. In 1907, at the Second Hague Conference, England had proposed limitation of armaments, but Germany had absolutely refused to consider it. Indeed, Germans boasted that they could keep up the race, in which England must soon fall behind. English leaders announced that their naval construction would be regulated by what Germany did. They were most anxious to come to some understanding by which both powers would cease the construction of so many warships, but a decisive supremacy over the German Empire they were firmly resolved to maintain. Germans were not willing to grant a "naval holiday," but in 1913, at a time when great changes in the Balkans caused them to desire increase of the army above all things, there appeared to be some slackening in their building of warships, and peaceful men in both countries hoped that better things would result.

Failure of
the efforts

One particular effort was made to bring about better relations. In 1912 Lord Haldane, lord chancellor, and one who loved and respected the best of German things, went to Berlin on the emperor's invitation, to try to bring about an understanding. Germany proposed a treaty between the two countries by which each would engage not to attack the other. In event of either being involved in war, the other should observe toward the party involved a benevolent neutrality, though this agreement was not to affect existing engagements. England refused, for the result, it was thought, would have been to permit Germany to support her allies in the Triple Alliance, while Britain would have been debarred from supporting against German attack her friends, with whom she was not allied. The negotiation failed, therefore, but it seemed to smooth

the way for a settlement of the differences between the two. Indeed, in the earlier part of 1914 an Anglo-German agreement was drawn up, by which all the principal differences between England and Germany, with respect to the Bagdad Railway and Asiatic Turkey, were satisfactorily arranged, and it almost seemed that Sir Edward Grey had at last done with Germany what he had accomplished with France in 1904. This treaty, it is said, was to have been signed in the autumn, but before that time the Great War had begun and Germany and the British Empire were locked in a mortal struggle.

This would seem to have been one of the most tragic things in the recent history of Europe. The two great antagonists, whose enmity and rivalry had been so ominously growing, appear almost to have reached a peaceable and honorable settlement just before it was too late. It is probable that Great Britain was sincere in wishing for peaceable settlement of the issues between Germany and herself, and that she became at last most willing that the German Empire should have room for colonial expansion. What the real German intentions were cannot yet be certainly known. Doubtless many Germans sincerely desired to have friendship and good understanding with Britain. But some critics have seen good reason to believe that Germany entered into the negotiations of 1912 and 1914 not so much because she wished lasting peace with Great Britain, but because the military leaders hoped to keep Britain inactive until they had first dealt with Russia and France.

Projected
agreement
of 1914

Tragic con-
sequences

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CHAPTER IX

THE RECOVERY OF FRANCE—THE DUAL ALLIANCE

Français!

Le peuple a devancé la Chambre, qui hésitait. Pour sauver la patrie en danger, il a demandé la République.

Proclamation du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale aux Français, Septembre 4, 1870: *Archives Diplomatiques, 1871–1872*, ii. 503.

Si la France est attaquée par l'Allemagne, ou par l'Italie soutenue par l'Allemagne, la Russie emploiera toutes ses forces disponibles pour attaquer l'Allemagne.

Si la Russie est attaquée par l'Allemagne, ou par l'Autriche soutenue par l'Allemagne, la France emploiera toutes ses forces disponibles pour combattre l'Allemagne.

Military Convention, August 1892 (Basis of the Dual Alliance): *Documents Diplomatiques, L'Alliance Franco-Russe* (1918).

The down-fall of France

IF THE rise of the German Empire affords the most striking example of the swift growth of a European power, France after 1871 gives the best instance of the recovery of a people crushed down by terrible defeat. Before 1870 France was the leading state on the Continent. Her armies had the greatest reputation, and were supposed to be the best in the world. Paris was the center of European diplomacy. Frenchmen were the leaders in international affairs. But the events of the Franco-German War change all this at once and completely. France was utterly defeated. The German Empire suddenly took first place in Europe. The reputation of French arms was entirely destroyed for the time. And there were few who could really think that France would again contend successfully with her powerful and victori-

ous neighbor. Berlin now held the place that Paris long had had, and Bismarck directed the diplomacy of Europe.

The months between July, 1870, and June, 1871, have been remembered by the French as *L'Année Terrible*, the terrible year. In the course of that time France had been crushed to the dust by the foe, then torn by the uprising of the *Commune* in Paris. She had lost two important frontier provinces, with 1,600,000 inhabitants. From the war itself she had suffered casualties of almost half a million. Her war materials had been captured. The Germans had carried destruction and suffering over a wide extent of the country. And there had been an indemnity of five milliards of francs to pay to the victors, while the cost of the war had been ten milliards more. Germans believed that France was so far crushed that she could not recover or be dangerous to them again for a long time; and the friends of France could only look to the future with a hope which they could not yet feel.

Yet France began to recover almost at once. Soon she had risen up so far that German generals were filled with the uneasiness that always comes to the strong who have abused their strength, and Bismarck devoted himself to keeping France without friends and surrounding Germany with allies. After the defeats of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Spain slowly sank in decadence, nor did she ever grow great again. So it was with Sweden after her conflict with Russia, and Holland after struggling with France. Austria never regained her old place after 1866, and it has often been so with others. Either they had completely exhausted their strength and resources, or else they lacked stamina and the power of recuperation. But no nation has ever had the qualities of greatness more thoroughly than the French. From the ruin of the Hundred Years' War, from the losses of her wars of religion, from the disasters of the last years of Louis XIV, and from the complete overthrow

*L'Année
Terrible*

The in-
herent
greatness
of France

when Napoleon was defeated by Europe, always she easily recovered, because of the excellence and strength, the vitality, the brave character, the inexhaustible courage of French men and women. At present, after the long drain and exhaustion of the Great War, in which she bore the brunt, the best augury of the recovery of France from her grievous weakness is the memory of what she did in other times. And for Germany, in this time of humiliation and ruin, the example of France after 1871 may be, perhaps, the best encouragement that she can have.

Causes of the
communard
attempt

Before the recovery began, however, there was one more terrible disaster. The *Commune* of Paris came at the end of the war, while confusion was still reigning in France. Paris had long been the stronghold of republican, radical, and socialist sentiment. Many of the workmen of the city had hearkened to the preaching of doctrines which were not only opposed to empire and monarchy but to much of the existing social system; and they had taught that very sweeping changes would be necessary to bring happiness to the mass of the people. Opportunity now came for the application of some of these teachings. The siege of Paris was just over, and Paris had greatly suffered. In the general prostration of business many of the workingmen had no employment. They had until recently been members of the National Guard which undertook the defence of the city, but the Assembly which had been elected to make peace with the Germans now dissolved the Guard. At the same time the Assembly decided to hold its meetings in Versailles instead of in Paris. The people of Paris had proclaimed a republic in 1870; but the Assembly was monarchist and conservative, and the liberals and radicals of the cities distrusted what it might do. Moreover, payment of obligations, which had been suspended by a moratorium during the siege, was now ordered, and immense hardship resulted to a vast number of people who had no employment or business and so

Conditions
in Paris

could not pay their debts. Hence a great number of poor, hungry, savage people, who still had the arms with which they had fought against the Germans, stood in idleness, distrusting their government, and very ready to follow new leaders.

In the Middle Ages, when nations had not yet arisen and before states were completely formed, cities, and among them notably Paris, had often had much independence and right to regulate their own affairs. In medieval France, as elsewhere in western Europe, a local jurisdiction, whether rural or urban, with powers of self-government was known as *communitas* or *commune*. Afterward, in the later period, in France *commune* was the name of one of the small administrative districts into which the country was divided. Now France was strongly organized with almost everything regulated by a central government, of which the radicals did not approve. Therefore they taught that improvement could come only through decentralization of the power of the state, with the management of affairs in the *communes*. Thus the different *communes*, which had different interests, would be able to manage affairs to their own best advantage, and, especially, the cities, more liberal than the rural districts, would be able to develop without interference from a government based largely on the country. This scheme was supported by some republicans who feared that monarchy would be restored by the central government, and by socialists, who believed that thus they could effect the reforms which they sought for. In Paris the idea was taken up by the discontented. After some conflict, in March, 1871, they seized control of the *commune*, and the red flag of the socialists was adopted.

The men of this *Commune* appealed to the people of France to follow them in their revolution, and for a moment it seemed to observers that France, just defeated by the Germans, was now about to split up into pieces.

The Commune of Paris, 1871

The Commune overthrown

But the revolution in Paris was not destined to spread like the uprising of 1917 in disorganized Russia. The people were against such innovation. As the French prisoners were returned from Germany, the Assembly made ready to overthrow the *Commune*, and this was done after a second terrible siege during April and May, and a fearful week of fighting in the streets. The city suffered far more from the bombardment of the French armies and the incendiaryism of the Communists than it had from the Germans, and the government showed no mercy in the vengeance which it took. The radicals and the socialists and extremists were completely put down, and again they nursed in silence savage hatred against the *bourgeoisie* who had crushed them.

Emmunity
1

France now proceeded to the work of restoration and building for the future. May 10, 1871, the Treaty of Frankfort was ratified by the National Assembly. This Assembly, having chosen Thiers to exercise the executive power, was now carrying on the government of the country. The first tasks were to free the occupied districts of Germans by paying the indemnity. The French people responded magnificently to the appeals of the government, and far more money was subscribed to the loans than was needed. In the autumn of 1873, six months before the term allowed by the Treaty, all the indemnity had been paid, and the last German soldiers were out of France. Financiers all over the world were surprised at the amount of money which French peasants and workmen had brought forth. There were not wanting Germans who declared that if their government had known what France had, a greater amount would have been taken; and that if France were ever conquered by Germany again, the indemnity would be vastly greater.

forms:
al govern-
nt and
army

For two years, until May 24, 1873, Thiers and the Assembly governed France. During his time two important reforms were made. In 1871 the excessive cen-

tralization of the government, which had prevailed since Napoleon I, was partly undone when a larger amount of local government was established. Local voters were to elect the council of the *commune*, and in the smaller *communes* the mayor was to be chosen by the council. The central government was to appoint the mayors only in the principal towns. In 1872 the army system was reorganized, by a law which, in effect, introduced the military system which had given so much success to Prussia.

As the work of reconstruction proceeded, the most important problem was to settle the form of the government. Thiers had been appointed by the Assembly. The Assembly had been elected for the purpose of making peace; but neither the term of its power nor the extent of its powers had been defined. The Assembly did not dissolve itself, however, and in the existing state of things there was no power able to dismiss it. In September, 1870, the revolutionists in Paris, who overthrew the imperial government, had proclaimed a republic. This Republic had been promptly acknowledged by the United States, and, after a little delay, by the principal governments of Europe. But such a government had not been constituted by the people, and it was soon evident that the representatives whom they had elected to the National Assembly were not for the most part in favor of a republic in France. In August, 1871, however, the Assembly accepted for the time being the government existing, and gave to the executive the title of "President of the French Republic." The *Rivet* Law by which this was done asserted also that the Assembly had constituent powers. Accordingly, the Assembly undertook to decide what form of government should be permanently established.

Most of the members of the Assembly wished a restoration of the monarchy. Some hoped for a Bonapartist empire again. Thiers himself had been made executive and president because he favored having a king. But as

A republic
proclaimed

The Re-
public
established



9. FRANCE IN 1920

the months passed Thiers concluded that the best interests of France required the establishment of a republic, and so the majority in the Assembly displaced him, choosing now Marshal MacMahon as president, since they believed that he would willingly resign as soon as monarchy could be reestablished. And perhaps it might have been restored now, except that the monarchists were divided in two parties, the Legitimists and those who supported the House of Orleans. It was hoped that these two branches of the Bourbon family could unite, but it proved impossible to bring this about. Thus time drifted on, with no permanent government established, and the people showing more and more that they wished a republic. After a while those who desired a monarchy, but believed it unwise to insist on their wishes, combined with those who wanted a republic, and agreed upon a conservative arrangement. In 1875 a series of "organic laws" in effect constituted a republican government, and are often referred to as the Constitution of 1875. A republic was not formally set up. It was, indeed, merely recognized in the phrase "President of the Republic," in a proviso which could only be carried by one vote in a chamber of 705. The French Republic has endured now considerably longer than any government in France since 1789, but it was established unwillingly and with great hesitation, and never formally proclaimed.

The government of the French Republic was based on models which the English-speaking people had worked out in the experience of a long time. In some respects it resembles the American form, but substantially the British system was followed. The executive power is apparently vested in a president, who is elected for seven years by the two chambers of the legislative body meeting together as a National Assembly. An outsider might think that he really is head of the army and navy and that he really administers the laws and appoints the

The mon-
archs fail
to combine

Govern-
ment: the
president

officials. But the power which seems to be in his hands is not real like that of the president of the United States nor that which was held by the German Kaiser. His position is rather like that of the king of England, except that he has more power. Actually, as in England, the executive and administrative powers are in the hands of the ministry. As in Great Britain, also, the ministry is entirely dependent upon a majority in the Chambers, the legislative body. It is in the legislative body, then, that power actually lies.

The
legislative
body

The legislative is composed of two houses, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Senate consists of 300 members elected indirectly by electoral colleges for a term of nine years, one third to be renewed every three years. By the Constitution of 1875 some of the members were to be elected for life, but this was done away with in 1884. The more important house, however, is the Chamber of Deputies, whose members are elected by manhood suffrage for a term of four years. The ministry is responsible to this parliament, and practically to the lower branch, the Chamber of Deputies, which is all-powerful in the making of laws and passing appropriations. Actually, the ministry is a committee of the Chamber, as the cabinet in Britain is of the House of Commons.

The French
system

This system of government, which makes France a parliamentary republic, differs in one very important respect from what is substantially the British system and from what really prevails in the United States. In both these countries, while there may be several political parties, there have usually been two important parties, opposing each other, and contending in elections for control of the government, the result of such elections giving the control to one or the other, the second party being then the opposition. This system tends to make political stability in Great Britain, since the ministry, usually resting on the solid support of one of the great parties,

remains in power until the opposition gets a majority for itself. But in France, as in most continental countries, the two-party system does not prevail. Rather, there are many parties, often differing from each other only a little, and representing various political affiliations. No one of them is large enough to control a majority of the votes in the legislative assembly, and support for a ministry can be obtained only by effecting a combination, or as it is called in France, a *bloc*, of those parties which are willing to make common cause. But this brings instability and shortness of tenure, since the fall of a ministry can easily be brought about by some of the parties withdrawing from the *bloc* to enter into new combinations. Therefore ministries in France, as in Italy, often change with bewildering rapidity, causing outsiders uninformed to believe that the French are fickle in politics and not yet trained in governing themselves. Such is not the case, a different system is producing results different from those obtained in English-speaking countries. Foreign critics declare that such insecurity of ministries tends to weaken administration and hamper France in her dealings with other countries. Frenchmen, admitting this, assert that their system nevertheless represents, more delicately than does the British, different shades of political thought.

The administration of the central government in France has all too frequently been debased by corruption, jobbery, scandal, and intrigue. Nevertheless, generally speaking, since the establishment of the République in 1875, Frenchmen have gone steadily forward on the way of learning real self-government. Of all tasks that is one of the hardest. The English people developed it slowly and painfully during a long course of time. The French tried to establish it suddenly in 1791. In a few years it was evident that they had failed, and most Frenchmen were willing to have Napoleon give them strong government even though it was despotic. Again in 1848 a re-

The *bloc*

Develop-
ment of
self-govern-
ment in
France

public was established, but this again was easily and quickly overthrown. When a third republic was proclaimed in 1870, it might seem that it also had little chance to survive; many were opposed to it, and many believed it must soon disappear. The French people, however, were learning more about self-government and republican institutions as time went on, and the Third Republic bellying the prophecies of many of its enemies and some of its friends, and acquiring stability year after year, was by 1920 so thoroughly established that its overthrow seemed outside of proper calculations. There can be little doubt that this was partly because the people of France got more and more acquaintance with self-government in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Government
and people

It is not sufficient that a constitution be written and adopted providing that the people have certain institutions. Such constitutions in Portugal and in Spain and in some of the South American countries result in little more than that the elections are controlled by the army and the government by a few politicians. In spite of many excellent provisions, these constitutions fail because the people have little education, little interest in political affairs, and almost no training in them. Great Britain has no written constitution in any single document, and yet her government continues stable and firm, and at the same time flexible and increasingly democratic; for it rests now on the support of a vast number of men and women who have considerable acquaintance with the management of their government, and who have inherited this knowledge from ancestors who before them had interest in the government of the realm.

Local gov-
ernment
in France

Participation by the ordinary man or woman in governing can usually not be in the affairs of the central organization but in the smaller and humbler things of the local district. The continued success of self-government among the people of England is in great measure due to the train-

ing which English people long had in the affairs of county and parish, to the vigorous local self-government which has existed for generations in England. In France this had once existed also, but it withered away and disappeared when the strongly centralized monarchy of the Old Régime was made by the kings. Matters, which in England would have been attended to by the leading men of the parish or the county, were in France directed from Paris or managed by officials sent out from the central government. This tended to produce, as it always does for a while, a very efficient government machine; but in course of time the people in the localities, having very little to do in managing their affairs, to a great extent lost their capacity for self-government. Therefore, the first two French republics were made at the top rather than the bottom, and soon fell for lack of strong foundation in the political experience of the people themselves. This was, perhaps, apparent to the republican leaders as time went on. By the Constitution of 1875 a greater measure of local government was provided for. This was extended in 1882, when the elected councils of municipalities were permitted to elect the mayors, and in 1884 when localities were given still larger powers of self-government. Since then French people have been slowly learning to some extent the art of governing themselves, in the only places in which it can be well learned, where they live and carry on their own affairs. As they really learned to manage the little things themselves, they became able to manage the greater affairs, and the foundations of the Republic became constantly stronger in the hearts and intelligence of the people.

However admirable the local government of England may have been in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was for the most part in the hands of the upper classes, and the extension of self-government and democratic control of affairs in Britain came only slowly in the

Formerly
directed
from Paris

Education
improved
and ex-
tended

Education
necessary
for the suc-
cess of self-
government

nineteenth century. It was accompanied by considerable improvement in the education of the mass of the people. Self-government may be extended to the people of a country, but if they are ignorant and illiterate there can be little hope that they will wisely use or really keep the powers entrusted to them. This was well understood by the republican leaders in France, and they set about extending and improving education. If there was to be universal suffrage for men, there must be general education of the children. In 1881 a law was passed to make primary education free of cost to parents and the next year it was made compulsory for children from six to thirteen. Previous to this time a quarter of the men and more than a third of the women of the country were illiterate, and education was to a considerable extent, as it had long been, in the hands of religious orders and teachers. Gradually education was extended until very few men and women were unable to read and write, though the percentage of illiteracy was never reduced so low as in Germany, which had long led the world in the thoroughness and extent of its educational work, though not, perhaps, in the final excellence of its character. Gradually, also, in France education was made entirely secular, and withdrawn completely from religious teachers.

Higher
education

Along with this, moreover, went a splendid development of higher education, in upper schools and universities. Technical and industrial teaching was not neglected, though it never attained the prominence or the reputation abroad that the German system got. Foreigners who went to Europe for their education went almost always to the German Empire rather than to England or France; and this was especially true of students from the United States, who went to Germany and then developed in America the German system of higher education. This was due not only to the merits of German universities but also to the prestige which Germany enjoyed as the result of her

successful wars and her mighty development, though it also seems to have resulted in no small part from advertising and clever propaganda. But critics realized more clearly after a time that the English system and especially the French, if they produced less visible efficiency and erudition, yet trained the character and cultivated spirit and taste, and fineness of soul and good judgment, as the more mechanically regulated, state-supervised system of Germany never could do.

So the work of restoration and establishing solidly the foundation of the Republic went steadily forward. Bismarck, it is said, favored a republic in France because he believed such a government would be unstable and make her weak, and because it would also keep her isolated and without friends, since France a republic would be alone among the monarchies and empires of Europe. For a long time she was without allies, but the Republic held its own steadily, and while it was disliked by a considerable and powerful portion of the population who were anxiously awaiting its overthrow, it was able to weather each crisis that developed. Business became settled; the government undertook great and expensive schemes of material development, improving railroads and canals; and presently the French people found themselves in the midst of the greatest prosperity which had come to them in the nineteenth century. Taxes were high and there was a huge national debt, but this debt was held almost entirely in France, and interest payments on it, derived from taxes taken from the people, went back to them again.

But however fair the picture may seem now, there was much trouble during the time when the improvement was gradually taking place. Many times it seemed to outsiders that French temperament was such, and so great were the difficulties confronting the French leaders, that the Republic would endure little longer. There was constant

Recovery
and ma-
terial pro-
gress

Dangers
besetting
the Republic

Restoration
of monarchy
desired

though diminishing danger in the relations with Germany, and there were internal problems of the greatest difficulty resulting from the opposition of the monarchists and clericals, and the relations between Church and State.

The English, who in government matters are conservative but at the same time bold, have made great constructive constitutional changes, slowly, without violent break. In course of time they have altered their monarchy so far that of the kingship nothing remains but the name of king, and actually their government is far more democratic than the governance of most republics. They have clung to king and some monarchical forms, however, because of attachment to the past, and probably for some time to come they will not part with scepter and crown. The French, who are more logical and direct in processes of thought, did away with monarchy more abruptly, though in their case also the alteration could not be achieved at once, and restorations, of king or emperor, followed the establishment of two republics. There was a considerable and strong body of people in the country, the more conservative ones and those who loved to venerate the past, who preferred monarchy to a republic, who distrusted government by the people, and who did not believe that France could be strong and respected until she had received a king once more. After 1871 these men and women looked confidently for the fall of the Republic through incapacity and weakness; and when the course of time disappointed them, they plotted and hoped for an opportunity to bring this about. Generally they were supported by the clericals, whose policy also they approved.

The
Boulanger
Crisis

When the hazards of the first few years after 1871 had successfully been passed, the most dangerous crisis came in 1888, in the affair of General Boulanger. The general was a handsome, striking figure whose very appearance excited the admiration and attachment of the unthinking.

He made himself popular among the soldiers by some of his measures while he was minister of war. Great enthusiasm was worked up for him. He took advantage of some scandals of the time, and of certain grievances which always exist, and presently let it be known that the government needed reforming. It was also told among his friends that if he were at the head of affairs, France might get revenge on the Germans. He soon had supporting him, besides the undiscriminating multitude, monarchists, clericals, and others. Friends of the Republic feared that if he tried a *coup d'état*, as Louis Napoleon once had, he might indeed be able to seize power. But the government was firm, and at the critical moment he hesitated to act, and presently fled to Belgium. Then he was condemned for plotting against the State. His party fell to pieces almost at once, and he died by his own hand in exile. Other disquieting times followed, but never one so serious again. Once this storm was past, evidence multiplied that the Republic was solidly established. Five years later Russia had joined France in a Dual Alliance.

In 1896 began the scandal of the Dreyfus Case, which continued to disrupt French society and disturb the government for the next ten years. Two years previously Dreyfus, an Alsatian Jew, a captain of artillery in the French army, had been arrested very secretly and condemned to be imprisoned for life in French Guiana for selling military information, it was said. He protested his innocence, and soon his cause was taken up by friends and by others who wished justice to be done, and a bitter and sensational controversy resulted. After many vicissitudes, which attracted the attention of people all over the world then, but which are of little importance now, it was demonstrated that the accused man was innocent and that scandalous conditions existed in military circles. As this became clear, the French Government undertook

A *coup
d'état* ap-
prehended

The Dreyfus
Affair

to undo the wrong done, and in the end gave Dreyfus and his associates complete and honorable vindication. But during the years of passionate struggle, while this end was being attained, the government was attacked and undermined by monarchists and reactionaries, by clericals, and by many who desired France to be a military power more than a democratic state. In the end all of this came to naught and was largely forgotten.

Church
and State

As the years went on still further, with France getting back some of her old prestige in Europe, prospering greatly and increasing her wealth, and making the Republic constantly stronger, the French Government proceeded to deal with the adjustment of the relations between Church and State. In the Middle Ages the Church had claimed superiority over all earthly things, supremacy over secular government, and immunity from interference by the civil power. As stronger secular governments developed, their officials refused to accept the supremacy of the Church, and attempted, while not interfering with religious matters, to subject ecclesiastical matters, or the things that concerned church regulation, to the civil authority of the State. Some of the greatest and most memorable struggles in medieval times arose from conflicts between these two powers. In the period of the Reformation and of the development of strong nation states the matter was settled differently in various places. In Lutheran countries the Church was made strictly subordinate to the State, and in England the Church became part of the government itself. In Catholic countries various arrangements had been made.

The Con-
cordat of
1801

In France of the nineteenth century the settlement was one which had been arranged between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII, the so-called *Concordat of 1801*. This arrangement provided that the churches and buildings, which along with the church lands had been confiscated during the French Revolution, and which were in 1801 the prop-

erty of the people, should be granted to the use of the clergy. The higher ecclesiastics, the archbishops and bishops, were to be appointed by the French government with the consent of the pope. Such appointments had been one of the great causes of struggle between Empire and Papacy in the Middle Ages, and between kings of England and popes, and had usually then been settled by a compromise like the *Concordat*. The lower ecclesiastics, the priests, were to be appointed by the bishops with the consent of the government of France. The Church was controlled to a considerable extent by the State, and supported by it as part of the State, for the salaries of the ecclesiastics were paid by the government. On the other hand, in the government the Church had much influence and power. This condition of affairs continued on through the nineteenth century, with the clericals looking back fondly to the time before the Revolution, detesting the republicans, supporting and teaching monarchical principles, and hoping for a restoration of kings.

After 1871 the system worked less well. Those who supported the Republic believed that Church and State should be separate. On the other hand, the bishops and priests hesitated not to use their influence against the Republic. Meanwhile, the government removed all clerical influence from the national system of education, allowing no religious exercises in the public schools and not permitting clergymen to teach in them. Peculiar conditions existed in France. Almost all of the population was Roman Catholic, but a great part of the men were held lightly by religious ties, and had become accustomed to decide matters affecting the country from the point of view of politics rather than religion. They now proceeded to measures which had never before been brought about in a Roman Catholic country except in violent change or upheaval.

The leaders of the Republic declared, with much truth,

Church and
State con-
nected in
France

Clericalism
and the Re-
public

The Law of
Associa-
tions, 1901

that under existing conditions there could not be national unity, since notwithstanding the educational reforms, the religious orders, which had in recent years increased enormously in influence and wealth, did a great deal of teaching in their private schools which was directly hostile to the government. Accordingly, in 1901, while the controversy about the Dreyfus Affair was still raging, the government passed the so-called Law of Associations, by which religious orders would not be allowed to exist unless they were authorized by the State. Many of the religious orders were not willing to ask the government for permission to exist, but the law was enforced vigorously, and large numbers of monks and nuns were driven out of their establishments. In 1904 the government went further, passing an act which forbade even the authorized orders to do any teaching after 1914. All this was denounced by the faithful, who supported the orders, and who believed that their liberty was infringed when they were deprived of the right to have their children taught by the instructors they most preferred. The State, however, was now resolved to have a monopoly of the education of its children and let hostile teachers do none of it.

Separation
of Church
and State

Matters soon went much further. Many Frenchmen, moved by intellectual forces more than religious impulses, regarded Roman Catholicism, along with other religions, as something to be cherished by those who wished it, but not imposed in any manner by the State or supported by government taxes. A great number of Frenchmen reasoned thus with much of the tolerant or contemptuous feeling for the Catholic faith which Voltaire and Diderot had long before them. They were reinforced by many others who believed that clericalism was and had from the first been strongly hostile to the Republic, and that the priests as well as the members of the teaching orders aroused opposition to the government, and made division and weakness in the nation. They supported a

principle, therefore, which had long before been established in the United States, that Church and State should be separate, and that while the Church in its religious capacity was not to be interfered with by the government, it was not any longer to be supported by the government, but by voluntary contributions from its members. Therefore in 1905 a law was passed which brought to an end the *Concordat* of 1801. By the terms of the law, which now separated Church and State, something was to be done for aged clergymen and for those who had just become priests, but the State was no longer to pay the salaries of churchmen, nor was it any longer to control their appointments. The church buildings, still national property, might be used freely by members of the Roman Catholic Church or of other sects, provided the members of a congregation formed an *association cultuelle* (association of worship).

This arrangement seemed proper to many Frenchmen who were without strong religious ties. It seemed most natural to people, like those in the United States, who had long been accustomed to separation of Church and State and believed that such separation was not only best for the State but of greatest possible good for the Church. But it violated much that was deeply rooted in a venerable past and loved and respected by many men and most of the women in France. There had been a great deal of sympathy for the members of religious orders who seemed dispossessed of their property and driven forth from their homes. Now there were riotous scenes about some of the churches. Not a few Catholics, however, believed that the trend of modern conditions made separation best for the Church; and some of the ecclesiastics were willing at least to compromise with the authorities of the State. But the pope condemned the law, and good Catholics had then to oppose it. In 1907 the government passed a further law by which the churches might be used free of cost provided the priest or minister made a

The Church
to be sup-
ported by
its members

Troubles
resultant

France torn
by the
struggle

contract therefor with the local officials. The Republic was stirred to its depths during the years which followed, and division between two bodies of the population seemed greater than ever; but the authorities, supported by socialists, progressives, radicals, and others, were firm, and in the end seemed to have the support of most of the nation. Separation of Church and State was definitely accomplished in spite of the opposition raised up against it. Nevertheless, it was truly felt that there was now between the Roman Catholic Church, which taught the faith nominally, at least, of almost all the French people, and the government of the Republic, a breach which time only could heal. Actually the division continued until the beginning of the Great War, when in the fearful danger and sufferings of the years after 1914 churchmen rallied loyally to the *patrie*, and many of the people came back to the Church more than for a great while before.

National
wealth

During all the latter part of the nineteenth century wealth increased in France, not as in Britain where it was based on industrial development and the carrying trade of the world, nor in Germany where it came from marvellous industrial and commercial expansion, nor in the United States where the people had as gifts from nature the greatest resources man ever fell heir to, but beyond what Frenchmen had ever possessed before. And if the total amount of this wealth was not so great as in England or the United States, and if the standard of living was lower than in the English-speaking countries, yet it was apparently true that nowhere else was there so high an average prosperity or such a wide distribution of property among so great a number of people. This arose from two causes, in which France seemed, whether rightly or wrongly, to be in advance of the rest of the world; the land was very widely distributed among a large number of proprietors, and the size of families was small.

In France one of the most important results of the

Revolution was that the lands, previously owned by nobles or Church, were taken from their owners and sold by the State to the people. In this way a great deal of landed property, formerly in possession of a few wealthy proprietors—as was the case in Russia until the Revolution of 1917, and as was largely the case in Britain until the terrible taxation of the war—changed hands, and in course of time was sold to numerous peasant farmers. The result of this was to create a large body of small owners, having the means to achieve greater prosperity and well-being than ever before. Some observers who lived then believed that this amelioration was only for the time. They said that the lands would soon get out of the possession of the new owners, or else that they, having more children because they could support them, would be no better off; and that when the holdings were divided among these larger families of the next generation there would again be miserable cultivators living upon scanty patches of ground. Previous to this time the birth-rate in France had been high. Now, Arthur Young, the celebrated traveller, predicted that the country would become a veritable rabbit-warren, so fast would the population breed. But this did not take place. About the middle of the nineteenth century the English economist, John Stuart Mill, noticed that the French birth-rate had fallen, and that families were much smaller. He explained this by saying that the new body of proprietors, accustomed to a higher standard of living, refused to lower it by having more children than they could properly support; that they were also unwilling to lower the standard of the next generation by dividing their property among so many children that the amount for each would be insufficient.

All through the century this tendency continued with ever-greater force. By the time of the Franco-German War the population of the country was no longer increasing

Property
and birth-
rate

Previous
high birth-
rate in
France

Declining birth-rate and stationary population

Birth-rate and standard of living

rapidly, and since that time it has scarcely increased at all. The results have seemed good and bad. On the one hand, there has been, compared with the past and with the present in other European countries, a generally high standard of living. For many Frenchmen there has been a great amount of leisure and comfort, which has enabled them to be the foremost leaders of civilization and thought, and to enjoy deeply, in their manner, the civilization of their era. On the other hand, the population of France has stood still while that of Britain has overtaken it, and while that of Germany threatened to become twice as large. Hence, there was always the danger that France might be overwhelmed by superior numbers. It was, perhaps, this growing numerical inferiority more than anything else that made it impossible for France, after she had recovered from the defeat of 1871, to think of undertaking a successful war of revenge. It was in vain that the government tried to encourage larger families, offering to exempt the father of several children from taxation, and even offering prizes to the mothers of large families. There were a few large families, but always they were the exception. Generally the birth-rate remained so low that in the latter part of the nineteenth century there was much fear that the population might even be declining, and that France was a dying nation, destined after a while to disappear. Enemies of France declared that this stationary or declining population and small birth-rate showed that the French were a decadent people; and that in France in 1900, as in the dying Roman Empire long before, there was no longer enough vigor to produce the men and women to carry on the destiny of the nation. On the other hand, it was insistently declared that what was taking place in France was only what had always characterized highly civilized people, who had risen to better intelligence and standard of living; that it was actually manifest among the upper and more intelligent

classes in all of the highly developed nations of the world; and that the only thing which was peculiar in France was that well-being and intelligence were so universally diffused, that what existed solely among the upper classes elsewhere prevailed in France among most of the people.

The foreign affairs of the nation during this period were concerned chiefly with the recovery of France, getting allies to stand with her against the combination formed by the German Empire, and building up a colonial empire. The recovery of France was beset with difficulties that seemed very disheartening then. Not only did she have to pay the indemnity and repair the losses caused by her disastrous defeat, but when once the money had been paid to Germany and recovery was going well forward, she was watched with jealous suspicion by the Germans. They, having overthrown and plundered her, wished that she might remain weak and without friends to assist her, so that she could not possibly take vengeance. At first the French, smarting under their humiliation and the sense of their wrongs, declared openly that they would have revenge as soon as they could. Bismarck and his military colleagues had believed that the terms of the treaty were such that France would remain weak for some time; but when the indemnity was paid off sooner than had been considered possible, and the French people went forward in marvellously swift recuperation, Germany looked on with growing uneasiness and suspicion. It was not that Germans doubted that they could defeat France again; but some of the leaders taught the doctrine that if another war must be fought, it would be easier and wiser to strike the enemy down before he recovered full strength.

In this manner arose the once famous Affair of 1875. France had adopted the Prussian system of universal military training, and in that year passed a law to complete the reorganization of her army. What followed is

Foreign
relations

The Affair
of 1875

Alleged German plan to strike France

still enveloped in some obscurity; but it would seem that German leaders believed it would be well to strike before the new law could produce its effects, and that Bismarck desired to impose a new treaty by which France would not be permitted to maintain a large army. However this be, it is certain that there was a great war scare, and that the French feared they would be attacked. If such was the German intention, it speedily brought from Russia and from Great Britain intimation that they would not this time stand aside and see France first attacked and then crushed; and soon the crisis was over. The result was that France now passed definitely out of the position of hopeless inferiority in which she had been left in 1871, and gained steadily in strength and assurance.

The Schnæbelé Affair

But however swift and splendid her recovery was, it came too late to enable her to settle her account with the Germans. As the years passed France grew stronger and greater than before, but meanwhile Germany was growing much more rapidly still in population, wealth, and military power. It would have been madness for France to begin war upon Germany single-handed, and meanwhile she had no allies. The German Empire was the center and head of the greatest military alliance in the world, and all through Bismarck's time France remained in isolation. But as time went on Russia drew away from Germany; and it seemed to Frenchmen that their chance might some day come if Germany were involved in war with Russia, or if Russia formed an alliance with France. In 1887 relations between the two countries were strained as a result of the Boulanger Affair, and also because of the arrest by the German Government of M. Schnæbelé, a French official, near the frontier. During the crisis Russia moved troops toward the German border, showing clearly her attitude toward Germany and France. Bismarck speaking in the *Reichstag* had said that if France again attacked Germany "we should endeavor to make

France incapable of attacking us for thirty years . . . each would seek to bleed the other white." But Schnæbelé was released, and Boulanger's efforts came to nothing.

With the passing of Bismarck and the beginning of a new policy by William II, a great change came swiftly to pass; Russia and France drew together in the Dual Alliance. There had been obstacles enough in the way without the skilful manipulation of Bismarck. Napoleon I had invaded Russia and brought about the burning of Moscow, and Napoleon III had been the leader of the combination which crushed Russia in the Crimean War. On the other hand, Frenchmen remembered the terrible retreat of the Grand Army in 1812, and they had recently seen Russia stand as the friend of Prussia while Prussia was humbling France in the dust. Moreover, Frenchmen had been the leaders in political reform in Europe, and now constituted the largest body of self-governing freemen on the Continent; while in Russia it seemed that selfish and reactionary autocrats held the people in lowly condition. But the mere fact that Russia and France were separated and some distance apart served to remove evil memories and causes of friction. Now they were both isolated as a result of German statecraft, France in the west, Russia in the east. They both needed allies. France felt insecure without the support of some powerful friend, as did Russia who, moreover, badly needed money for internal development, which could be obtained now in France better than anywhere else. These causes operated swiftly, once the influence of Bismarck was removed. Even before his fall the Russian Government, which had previously borrowed in Germany, began placing huge loans in France. Apparently also she desired to have France as a helper. Negotiations and friendly visits began in 1890. Then in 1892 the two powers entered into an *entente* or friendly understanding, and in the next year a military convention was signed. It was believed then

The Dual
Alliance:
Russia and
France

Russia and
France need
each other

and for a long time afterward that a treaty of alliance had been made, but in 1918 the publication of a French *Yellow Book* made it plain that no treaty of alliance had been signed, and that what had long popularly been designated as the Dual Alliance rested upon the *entente* and the Military Convention of 1892-3. The agreement stipulated that in case one of the parties to the treaty were attacked by Germany, the other would stand by its partner with all its power. When in 1914 Germany was about to declare war upon Russia, she demanded to know what France would then do, and the French Government not satisfying her, she declared war also upon France.

Effect of the
Dual Alli-
ance

The result of the Dual Alliance of 1893 was in some sense to restore the balance of power in Europe, to take France out of her position of loneliness and inferiority, and to shake the hegemony of the German Empire. But actually it did little beyond making France feel more secure. The Triple Alliance was believed by competent observers to be stronger than its rival; and France and Russia were, moreover, in active rivalry with Great Britain. Therefore, after 1893, as before, France found that it was hopeless to think of attacking Germany to get back the lost provinces and restore her position; and in course of time desire and expectation of doing this so far died out that they cannot be reckoned as important causes of the War of 1914-18.

Rivalry of
France and
Great
Britain

In the course of the generation after the Franco-German War France came into dangerous and increasing rivalry with Great Britain. This resulted from colonial expansion and the naval expansion which went with it. When once her recovery was well begun, France again turned her eyes beyond Europe with the purpose of building up a larger colonial empire and retrieving abroad her losses. She had great success in north Africa, in southeastern Asia, and in some of the islands, especially Madagascar; and it was no long time before she had built up the second

colonial empire in the world. Along with this went naval expansion, which awakened the ever-watchful jealousy of Britain. Especially was this so after the formation of the Dual Alliance, for England was apprehensive of Russian expansion in Asia down toward India, just as she was of French naval increase and French expansion in northern Africa toward the Nile. Great tension and much hostility developed year by year, and in the latter part of the century the situation seemed fraught with the ominous possibilities of conflict which a decade later made the relations between Germany and England so dangerous. The crisis came in 1898, when British forces, which had moved up from Egypt and just conquered the Sudan, came in contact with French forces which had moved eastward across Africa to Fashoda on the upper Nile and there hoisted the French flag. England demanded that France withdraw, and this was at first refused. But it was as hopeless for France to contend with the overwhelming sea power of Britain as it was for her to contest with Germany on the Rhine, and so she yielded completely. The episode left great bitterness in the hearts of Frenchmen. At this time some of them believed that they had best forget the past and join with Germany against England, their traditional foe. Until this time, however, Germany had seemed drawing closer and closer to England. But in reality a turning-point had been reached. Germany and England were just about to begin drawing apart in bitterest rivalry, which was one day to lead to war; while after a few years England and France were to enter into a friendship which would be the salvation of them both later on.

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CHAPTER X

DEMOCRATIC BRITAIN

Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks; methinks I see her as an eagle mewing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam.

MILTON, *Areopagitica* (1644).

There is no country so interested in the maintenance of peace as England. . . . She is not an aggressive power, for there is nothing that she desires. . . . What she wishes is to maintain and to enjoy the unexampled Empire which she has built up, and which it is her pride to remember exists as much upon sympathy as upon force.

Speech of the EARL OF BEACONSFIELD at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, London *Times*, November 10, 1876.

Britische Herrschaftsucht und Handelsifiersucht sind die Triebfedern gewesen, welche die Welt organisiert und in Bewegung gesetzt haben, um den Vernichtungskrieg gegen ein friedliebendes Volk zu führen;

Graf Ernst Reventlow, *Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik, 1888–1914* (ed. 1918), p. 477.

Great Britain in the past generation

THE history of Great Britain in the later period has to do largely with the growth of the British Empire, with great and increasing dangers which threatened, and afterward with a mighty triumph. In most respects it is a record of prosperity and power. But more important, perhaps, it is also a story of increasing control of the government by the people, until at last the British have become one of the most democratic nations in the world. This very progress has brought them serious problems, perplexing and not yet settled.

By the Electoral Reform Law of 1867 only a part of the lower class was allowed to vote, but seventeen years later

the franchise was extended also to the agricultural workers and the laborers in the mines. By this Reform Law of 1884, 2,000,000 men were added to the electorate so that 5,000,000 persons had the franchise, or one person out of every seven of the population. Manhood suffrage was not yet established, as it had been in France and in the German Empire, though actually almost every man was now allowed to vote, and the representatives elected by them to the House of Commons held the principal powers of the government and directly controlled the executive organ of the State. Meanwhile, the year before, a Corrupt Practices Act limited the amount of money a candidate might spend for election expenses, and provided such severe penalties for bribery and corruption as to bring them virtually to an end in Great Britain. The year after the Electoral Reform Law, the Redistribution Act of 1885 practically divided Great Britain into electoral districts, bringing representation into accord with population. Previously representation had been by counties and by boroughs. Now the small boroughs were merged into their counties, most of the larger ones were made one-member constituencies, the counties were divided into one-member constituencies on the basis of the population within them, and the larger cities were given representation in accordance with the number of inhabitants in them. Thus practically was brought to pass parliamentary representation of people, instead of districts or corporations, something that had been proposed in Cromwell's time but soon discarded.

This wide extension of the electorate in England was accompanied, as it was in the United States, by persistent demand for the extension of democracy upon a broader basis by admitting not only more men to a share in the government but also the women of the nation. The women's movement in Great Britain, as in the United States, went on for a considerable time before it got much

The Rep-
repre-
sentation of the
People Act,
1884

The
women's
movement

In earlier times

attention, and when at last it was noticed, it was older than most people suspected. During the period of the Puritan Revolution, and also more than a hundred years later in France during the French Revolution, women demanded their "rights" as equals with men, and asked to share in the governing of the State. Nevertheless, the feminist movement is essentially a thing of the nineteenth century. It was only the effects of the French Revolution, and more particularly of the Industrial Revolution, that made it possible for most women to escape from the inferior position in which they had always previously been held. When in 1792 Mary Godwin declared that "women ought to have representatives instead of being arbitrarily governed," she was regarded as a foolish radical. It is true that in New Jersey, one of the American states, in the period 1797–1807, women were actually permitted to vote, but this was an isolated case, and in both of the great English-speaking countries during the first half of the nineteenth century the advocates of women's suffrage, principally Quakers, were considered to be urging something impracticable and immoral, something contrary to the laws of God. But in England especially, where the Industrial Revolution first made such great headway, conditions changed profoundly, and, with them, the position of women, so that it was no longer possible to apply the old arguments with such effect as before. Formerly woman's place had been the home, and it was supposed that almost all would marry, but now a great number worked for wages in factories outside the supervision of their men at the same time that more and more men emigrated to the colonies of the Empire. By the middle of the nineteenth century there were 365,000 more women than men in England, and over 1,000,000 more in 1900. It was obviously impossible for a large number of English women to marry, and it was evident that many were supporting themselves. In many cases they were paying

The work of the Quakers

Women more numerous than men in England

taxes, but they had no voice in the government, no control over those who made laws affecting them; they were subject to taxation without representation. At the same time women were steadily having their minds broadened by more education than women had ever had before, and they were developing a greater sense of responsibility, stronger feeling of individuality, and greater sense of their dignity and power. It seemed to them that the doctrines established by their forefathers, and proclaimed so grandly during the French Revolution, that all men were equal and that government depended on the consent of the governed, that these doctrines applied to women as well as to men.


Both in England and the United States feminist reformers got some ridicule but not much attention. Most of the women, conservative and timid, had no interest in the movement, and most men were opposed to it because it ran counter to a vast mass of old custom and established ideas. But in 1866 John Stuart Mill moved in the House of Commons to include women in the provisions of the bill then pending to extend the franchise. He declared that women's interests were closely connected with men's, and that unless men helped them to rise, they would pull men down to a lower condition. His proposal was easily defeated, but thereafter almost every year a bill was proposed to allow women to vote.

To advocates the progress of the movement often seemed slow, but actually it was far more rapid than any previous movement to extend the suffrage to men. It was not always remembered that until the beginning of the nineteenth century the franchise, if held at all, was confined almost entirely to a few men of the upper classes. Actually after a while women in England were allowed to vote and be voted for in local elections, and it was generally believed that they had a higher position than the women of any other country except, probably, the United States.

Changes
affecting
women

The
women's
suffrage
movement

Progress of
the move-
ment



10. THE BRITISH ISLES

One by one the old legal inequalities were abolished, until scarcely any remained, and women's economic opportunities became constantly better. Nevertheless, they were still subject to some discriminations, and an ever-increasing number of them, who desired complete equality with men, believed that this could never be attained, and that women would never be able to take their proper share of the duties of the commonwealth until they were admitted to vote for members of parliament upon the same conditions as men.

The movement continued to make slow but certain progress, though the majority of the people, both men and women, continued to be against it. Finally, about 1905, a small number of more radical women, under the leadership of Mrs. Emmeline Pankhurst, tiring at impediments and delay, lack of public interest and attention, undertook to procure votes for women by force and compulsion, which, they said, had been the method that men had employed. Then for a few years was carried on a campaign ridiculous and alarming. "Wild women," as they were called, screamed and interrupted public meetings, harassed public officials, interfered with the carrying on of the government in which they had no part, and perpetrated all sorts of petty violence and outrage. When arrested and imprisoned they tried the "hunger strike," which had previously been employed by political prisoners in Russia, starving themselves, so that the government, which desired that no woman should be killed in this contest, invariably released them. By 1914 these suffragettes had become so great a menace and nuisance that some foreigners believed Englishmen to be decadent and not capable of dealing with troublesome questions. The suffragettes did attract a great deal of attention for their cause, but they also aroused much hostility and strong dislike. They had set the dangerous precedent of women employing force, when the whole tendency of civilization

The
suffragettes

had been for force not to be employed against women. Moreover, they afforded one of the first conspicuous examples of a procedure—since not uncommon—of an organized minority boldly making itself intolerable so as to compel the yielding of the things which it wanted. But when the war began in 1914 they immediately ceased their campaign, and rallied to the support of the country. During the contest the women of Great Britain performed indispensable and tremendous service, and it was generally recognized that the suffrage should be given to them if they desired it.

Extension
of the
franchise,
1918

The great expansion of democratic feeling in English-speaking countries during the war now led to a further extension of the suffrage to men, and at the same time many women were also admitted. In 1918 all men over twenty-one, with fixed residence or business premises for six months, and all women already entitled to vote in local elections and women whose husbands were so entitled, were given the parliamentary franchise. The electorate was thus increased by 2,000,000 men and 6,000,000 women, so that now one out of every three of the entire population could vote, thus extending the suffrage to a larger portion of the population than had been done in any great country before. The government of the United Kingdom had been put into the hands of its people about as far as was possible under the existing system; and the people had more complete control and were able to make their wishes felt more immediately and directly than in any other great nation in the world. It was said now by some that further reform must lie, not so much in the direction of extending the suffrage as in so changing the system that industries and groups, rather than districts, should be represented. Thus, it was believed, the people might, perhaps, get more complete economic control as well as control of political matters. But opponents protested that such an arrangement would

Changes in
representa-
tion sug-
gested

merely be a reversion to a more primitive and less good system, tried and discarded in the past.

During the period 1867–1918 all sorts of reforms were carried forward for the purpose of making the body of the people able to share in their government and also for the bettering of their condition. In 1867 Robert Lowe had said: “We must now educate our masters.” This was undertaken by the Liberals who came into power under Gladstone almost immediately after Disraeli had carried the second Electoral Reform Law. A great change was made in 1870. Down to this time English education, except for a very few of the wealthy, was far behind what existed in Germany or the United States. There were the two old universities of Oxford and Cambridge, unrivalled in beauty and ancient charm, but giving only the culture which befitted the children of the ruling classes. Beneath them were certain “public schools” like Eton and Rugby, where also sons of the aristocrats might receive splendid teaching of the humanities and fine training in the development of character. But this was by far the best part of a system which had been devised principally for the upper classes. In 1870 there were thought to be about 4,000,000 children of school age, of whom only half attended any school. Of these 2,000,000, half attended schools poorly organized and often not well conducted. The rest went to schools under government inspection and partly supported by the government but managed by the Church of England, so that in England, as in France and in Spain, a considerable part of the education remained in the hands of the Church. Several small reforms had already been made, but it was evident that a great deal was yet to be done. There was much difference of opinion, as there was in similar instances in most European countries. Some believed that it was well for religious teaching to be given; others that education ought to be entirely without religious influence, and compulsory and free. The Edu-

Improvement of education

Education of the children in 1870

Reform: the
Education
Act of 1870

cation Act of 1870 was a compromise, as has usually been the case in England. Existing voluntary schools doing good work were to be retained and get more assistance from the government, and they might continue their religious instruction. Elsewhere "board schools" were to be established, supported by the government, by the local rates, and partly by fees paid by the parents of the children attending. In them no religious denominational instruction was to be allowed. This reform by no means brought the educational system of Great Britain up to the standards of Switzerland and the German Empire; it did not make education entirely free and compulsory, and it left it partly under denominational control. None the less, it greatly bettered conditions and to a considerable extent provided education free of cost to the children. Before the end of the century four fifths of the children went to school. The work was carried far forward in 1918 by one of the great reforms of the period of the war, when a law was passed providing that all children between five and fourteen years must go to school, and providing that the expense of education should be divided equally between the central government and the local authorities.

Social and
economic
reforms

The admission of the lower classes to the electorate and to a share in the government in 1867 and 1884 was not followed by an overturning of the government, such as people in the upper classes had feared, nor by any exceedingly radical demands. Nevertheless, as in the earlier part of the century, a whole series of reforms was gradually carried out, the two parties vying with each other in making the changes. The Liberals believed that they ought to be made; the Conservatives considered them inevitable and believed it better for the government to grant them than for the mass of the people to compel them. Some of the changes had to do with taking away privileges from particular classes. In 1870 the civil service was reformed. Next year the University Tests Act practically completed

the removal of the religious tests, which before had restricted the privileges of the great universities mostly to members of the Church of England. Another group had to do with bettering economic conditions and protecting labor. In the period 1878–1901 factory legislation was extended and simplified; and during the same time laws were passed to regulate better the conditions in the mines. The state socialism of Bismarck had put the German Empire ahead of other countries for a while in the improvement of social and economic conditions, but similar work was undertaken also in the United Kingdom when the Liberal Party came into power under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. Asquith, and Mr. Lloyd George in 1905. In the course of the years immediately following a Workmen's Compensation Act (1906) made employers liable to pay compensation to employees injured by accident. An Old Age Pension Act (1909) provided that every person over seventy years of age with an income of less than £31 10s. should receive a pension from the State. Long effort had been needed to secure this law, since while its advocates asserted that it would make happier the last years of deserving unfortunates, opponents declared that all such legislation was ruinous since it tended to pauperize people, encouraging them to rely on assistance from the State rather than on their own efforts. In 1911 was passed a National Insurance Act which provided insurance for sickness and loss of employment, the funds to be subscribed generally, though not always, by the employees, and by the employers and the State.

Beginning with 1824 a series of statutes, especially the statute of 1871, gradually legalized the trade unions, which workingmen had already formed for protection and advancement of their interests, and in order to raise their wages, but which the State long continued to oppose. In 1901, it is true, the House of Lords declared, in the *Taff Vale* Case, that members of trade unions were liable

Regulation
of industry
and labor

Trade
unions

The Taff
Vale Case

singly and collectively for the acts of their union. This was merely corporate responsibility added to the corporate privileges which unions had already acquired; but it was felt by many that workingmen's unions were so much weaker than the powerful employers, and so much more in need of assistance, that they needed special protection. Therefore in 1906 the Trades Disputes Act gave immunity to trade-union funds. Actually, however, trade unions were becoming exceedingly powerful in Great Britain. More and more they were able to deal as equals or superiors with the employers, and cause the government itself to heed their wishes. Memories of long oppression and tyranny on the part of capitalists and employers made many leaders of the workingmen regard all employers with dislike and suspicion; and gradually they adopted socialist ideas and began to hope that a day might come when capitalism and middle-class employers would be done away with completely. Numerous strikes were called, it sometimes seemed, more for the purpose of harassing the employers than anything else. Particularly did the doctrine spread among British workingmen that they were made to work too many hours for the benefit of employers, that thus numerous people could find no work to do, and that only if hours were reduced and production restrained would there be work enough for them all.

The Labor
Party

As Britain became a completely industrialized country with its artisans composing so great a portion of the people, leaders aspired to found a Labor Party, to take control of the government some day for organized labor, which would then be able to reconstruct the State. In 1893 an Independent Labor Party was founded, which proposed to have the government bring about an eight-hour day of labor, collective ownership, and State control of railways, shipping, and banks. Most of the British laborers were not yet ready to accept socialistic doctrines, and they did not give this party their support. In 1906

another Labor Party was formed. It became one of the smaller groups in the House of Commons, with power increasing as time went on, and its advocates expecting it to be the dominant party in the future.

Labor disputes became constantly more bitter and labor leaders more aggressive in the years just before the war. The wiser of the leaders desired nothing more than the real improvement of laboring people; but it was often believed that the numerous harassing strikes and refusal to work more than a certain amount were seriously hindering production and putting Britain behind in industrial competition with Germany and the United States. During the Great War British labor gave splendid response to the needs of the country, the unions consenting to put aside the rules which they had made for their protection. But it was very evident that they expected their reward to come after their country had triumphed. Some of them declared that then the State must take over the mines and the railways and other great instruments and sources of production to be used for the people themselves, and that much must be done by the government to give the workers a larger share in the goods of the State. In 1917 the British Labor Committee issued a *Report* in which it declared that there must be democratic control of all the machinery of the State, and that the system of private capitalists must yield to common ownership of land and capital by the people. At the end of the struggle the powerful "Triple Alliance" of miners, transport workers, and railwaymen was strengthened, and the organized laborers of the country drew up in powerful array threatening to enforce their wishes by "direct action" of paralyzing strikes. By this time it seemed that the trade unions in Great Britain, as in some other countries, were no longer struggling so much for the protection of themselves as to enforce the special interests of their particular class.

Social betterment in the United Kingdom had lagged

Labor
powerful
and aggres-
sive

Report of
the British
Labor Com-
mittee

Wealth and
poverty in
Great
Britain

far behind the wishes of enlightened leaders like Mr. Lloyd George, and the desires of the socialist and radical teachers. The condition of a great part of the people seemed far less good than that of the Germans, protected by their vigorous and paternal government, or of the inhabitants of the United States and some of the British dominions, where new lands were being opened up and great natural resources made use of. The evils of industrialism had by no means yet disappeared. For its size Britain was the wealthiest country in the world, but this wealth was largely concentrated in the hands of a few. It was estimated that half of the national income went to 12 per cent. of the population, that all the rest of the people were poor, and that in some communities a third of them were always on the verge of starvation. Before 1914 travellers were struck by the appalling misery of the slums of Glasgow and the dreadful poverty of wide areas about the Whitechapel district in London. To some extent it was against such conditions that the British trade unions were struggling; and their ignorant, obstinate, and arbitrary methods were often to be explained and excused because of the long-standing and terrible evils which they confronted.

The land
owned by
a few
aristocrats

Most of the land had long since come into the possession of a few great owners. In England two thirds of the soil was owned by 10,000 persons, and almost all of Scotland by 1,700 persons; many of the large estates being entailed, so that they could not easily be alienated or divided, and so that usually they passed intact from one generation to another. To a considerable extent Britain was a country of beautiful parks and estates, with picturesque old villages, delightful to the tourist's eye, though often antiquated, unsanitary, and not sufficient for the needs of the rural population. The agricultural laborers were crowded off the land, or else entirely at the mercy of powerful landowners. At the other extreme were the

great landed proprietors, with large fortunes and extensive investments, taxed lightly on their lands, wealthy, powerful, constituting—far more than in France and as much as in Germany—an aristocratic caste above the other inhabitants. They completely dominated fashionable and social life; they filled many of the important places in the government; and some of them composed the House of Lords. Generally they had been wise and careful, and had contributed not a little to the welfare of the country; and it was partly for these reasons that they had been able to retain so much of their position and their power. But many Englishmen had long thought it a misfortune that their agriculture should so far decline and their rural population diminish; and there had long been agitation, which increased during the war, for the government in some way to compel the breaking up of the great estates and to settle part of the population upon them.

The nobility
in Britain

It was partly the cost of the social legislation, which was sought and which was being carried through, that led to one of the greatest revolutions in British government for generations. This was the virtual taking away of the power of the House of Lords by the Parliament Act of 1911. More money was needed by the government, and Mr. Lloyd George, chancellor of the exchequer, now proposed to increase the budget partly by increased income taxes and also by heavy taxation on the unearned increment of land values, that is, where the value of unoccupied or unimproved land was increased not through anything done by the owner but by the mere increase in population or surrounding values. Thus, he proposed to get the larger amounts of money needed by higher taxes on the possessions of the wealthy; but his scheme was denounced as striking at the very security of property; and when the provision passed the House of Commons at the end of 1909 it was at once rejected by the Lords.

The House
of Lords
and the
budget

The House
of Lords
and the
House of
Commons

Creation of
new peers

When parliament was now dissolved and a new election held the issue before the country was the "veto power" of the Upper House. Parliament in the beginning had been an assembly of estates, as the States General continued to be in France, which after a while developed into a body of two houses. Its principal functions were advisory and judicial, and it long continued to be known as the "High Court of Parliament." In course of time, however, the principal business of parliament came to be the passing of legislation and the appropriation of money. In the passing of bills it was necessary that both houses give their consent, nor could a bill become law if either the Lords or the Commons refused. During the eighteenth century the principle was equally well established that bills for the appropriation of money were to originate in the Commons and not to be altered by the Lords. In other respects, however, the House of Lords continued to have the veto power and used it not infrequently. On several important occasions there had been bitter disputes between the two Houses, and in two memorable instances the government had employed a particular device to overcome the opposition of the Lords. In 1711 the government wished to have the approval of parliament for the Treaty of Utrecht which had just been negotiated. It was easy to get such approval from the Commons, but there was a majority opposing in the Lords. Thereupon Queen Anne announced the creation of twelve new peers, whose coming into the House of Lords made a majority favorable to the measure, which was then approved. Similarly in 1830 and 1831 the Lords vetoed the bill for electoral reform, which the Commons had passed, and which a majority of the people wanted. There was no ordinary way by which this opposition could be removed, since the Lords held their seats by hereditary title, but again the government made ready to create a large number of Whig peers who would ensure the passage

of the bill. Under this threat the Lords yielded, and the Reform Bill of 1832 became law. Now in 1910, after the Lords had rejected the Finance Bill, parliament was dissolved and elections held on the issue of abolishing the veto power of the Lords. The Liberals won and brought forward such a bill, which the Lords rejected. Again parliament was dissolved and the issue bitterly contested in general elections, and again the Liberals triumphed. Early in 1911 it was announced that a sufficient number of new peers would be created to carry the bill. Then the House of Lords yielded and the bill was enacted into law.

This Parliament Law of 1911 provided that the Lords should have no power whatever to reject any money bill, and that any other measure passing the Commons in three successive sessions within a period of not less than two years should become law despite the Lords' veto. Thus the constitution of parliament was fundamentally altered. For a long time the Lords had been more powerful and important than the Commons, but since the eighteenth century the Commons had been getting an ascendancy greater and greater. None the less, the Lords might still oppose and successfully obstruct. Now substantially this power was taken away from them, and only that part of parliament which was elected by the people remained with great influence in the State. According to the law the king still possessed the right to veto a bill; but no sovereign had done this since 1707, and actually this prerogative had been completely lost. It should be said that in 1719 a bill had nearly passed parliament by which the government would have lost the right to create new peers. Had this taken place, neither the Reform Law of 1832 nor the Parliament Act of 1911 could have been enacted without a revolution, since it was only upon the threat of creating new peers that the House of Lords had yielded and surrendered its power. It is probable that

The Parlia-
ment Law of
1911

The Peerage
Bill of 1719

the Upper House of the English parliament will presently be reconstituted on a more modern basis. At present its power is far less than that of the American Senate, which, since 1913, has been made directly dependent on the people. In 1911, also, by this same law, the maximum duration of a parliament was fixed at five years, instead of seven years, as previously since 1716. In the same year also the Commons voted to pay their members, something once done, but not done for a long while.

The Irish Question

The struggle over the power of the House of Lords was intimately connected with the long contest for Irish Home Rule; and when the veto was taken from the Lords it seemed for the moment that the Irish Question was nearer settlement than it had ever been in the past. In the midst of the great success that had come to England and the British Empire in the nineteenth century Ireland was the principal failure. Its story was an old story of tragedy and misfortune and woe. The errors of times past had been so great, and the enmities which had resulted were so lasting, that the settlement of the Irish Question had baffled generations of statesmen and was now one of the most difficult of all the problems for which Britain must find a solution.

Conquest
of Ireland
by the
English

Ireland in the early ages was inhabited by Celtic people much like those in Britain. As a result of the Anglo-Saxon conquest the Brythonic Celts disappeared from most of what then became England, but across in *Erin*, the other island, the Goidelic Celts kept possession of the country and developed in some places considerable culture. Like the Anglo-Saxons in England, the Celts in Ireland failed to develop a nation and remained divided in tribes or small kingdoms; and they continued thus disunited long after the conquest of England by the Normans had made the English a nation and given to England a strong central government. Thus they fell an easy prey to invaders, first the Danes, then Norman adventurers from England,

and finally the English Government itself; but for a long time they were never completely conquered. The invaders held the east coast and the natives held the rest of the country. The Celts could not drive the intruders out; the invaders could not make a complete conquest, but were able to prevent the better development of Irish civilization and the establishment of an Irish nation. In the sixteenth century, at a time when Englishmen were becoming Protestants and Irishmen were clinging to the old Catholic faith, the English began a systematic reduction of the country, and in the course of long and terribly destructive wars, during which a great many of the Irish perished by starvation and the sword, the country was completely conquered and reduced to a state of subjection.

By the end of the seventeenth century this process was complete. Ireland was now treated as a conquest of the British crown, much as a dependent colony. Most of the land was taken from the Irish proprietors and given to English landlords. All the privileges and power were restricted to members of the Anglican Church of Ireland, and the native Irish were kept under penal laws because of their Catholic faith. In a few generations most of the Irish natives, many of whom continued to speak their Celtic tongue and love the old Celtic tribal law, were reduced virtually to the position of serfs. And even the English and Scottish colonists in the country, a great many of whom were in the northern part, in the province of Ulster, were not allowed to develop much industry or commerce, but were put under the same sort of economic restrictions as those which later on contributed to cause the American colonies to rebel and fight for independence.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century the Thirteen Colonies of Britain in America did win their independence; but Ireland was too close to Great Britain to break away. Nevertheless, the British Government made some con-

The con-
quest long
incomplete

Subjection
of the
Irish

The Act of
Union, 1801

Ireland
joined to
Great Brit-
ain: the
United
Kingdom

cessions. During the period 1782–1800 Ireland was permitted to have a separate parliament, and during this era considerable prosperity came to some of the people. It was not long, however, before trouble developed. Catholics and Protestants quarreled; and some of the Irish, desiring to separate completely from Great Britain, sought the aid of the French. This was in the midst of the great struggle with Napoleon, and so grave was the situation that Pitt, the British prime minister, resolved to end the danger by binding Ireland to Britain more closely than ever before. Accordingly, in 1800, an Act of Union was passed which joined Ireland to Great Britain in the United Kingdom in much the same way that Scotland and England had been united to form Great Britain in 1707. There was now to be one parliament for the United Kingdom, in which the Irish were to have representatives just as were the English and the Scots. This had worked very well for the Scots; but it failed to satisfy the Irish, who after a while began to try to undo it. The failure was owing to the fact that most of the Irish were still obliged to make their living by working on some plot of ground for which they paid high rent to an English landlord, and because the Catholics of Ireland, who were three fourths of the population, were still partly disfranchised and subjected to discrimination because of their faith. Nothing would have done more to content them than complete Catholic emancipation, but largely owing to the obstinacy of George III this was not given until 1829, by which time it was too late to make Irishmen feel any gratitude for it.

The Great
Famine
and emigra-
tion

Throughout all this time population was increasing rapidly, and as these people could only be supported by agriculture, the struggle for existence on the limited amount of cultivable land became more and more terrible, and the danger from starvation always greater. The main support of the people was the potato, but in 1846

the potato crop was a total failure, and for three years afterward there were famine and pestilence and appalling misery in the land. A half million or more people perished of starvation, and a million and a half others were stricken with the fever that followed. From this disaster Ireland never recovered. When the famine was past, those who could began leaving the country, most of them to settle in the United States, where they taught to their children and their children's children hatred of the England which, they said, had caused their ruin. The population of Ireland was about 5,000,000 in 1801. By 1841 it was more than 8,000,000. After 1846 it rapidly declined, and at the beginning of the twentieth century it had fallen to little more than 4,000,000. The best people had gone to America, as in the eighteenth century they had gone away to France. Those who remained in Ireland, assisted often by their brethren in the United States, continued to hate England and hope for the day of her destruction, which would, they thought, be the day of deliverance for them.

Failure of
the potato
crop

Bad as these conditions were, they had arisen not from any special wickedness of Englishmen, but as a result of methods that were everywhere applied in times past, and because of circumstances particularly unhappy. These conditions were changed all too slowly. But in the latter part of the nineteenth century a great alteration came to pass. The Irish were able to make their protests and resistance more troublesome and much more effective. Steadily the people of Britain had been becoming more humane and more sensitive to wrong and the suffering about them. Moreover, Britain was slowly being transformed into a democracy, with the power of the government increasingly in the hands of the people. And just as in the nineteenth century a great series of reforms had been carried out for the betterment of the lot of the mass of the people in Britain, so, after a while, as the people of

England and
Ireland

Britain and their leaders understood more clearly the conditions in Ireland, they turned themselves to the long and difficult task of improving them and undoing the wrongs which had once been committed.

Reforms in
Ireland

Roman Catholics had been emancipated in 1829, but the work of completing the removal of religious discrimination was effected in 1869 by the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland, the Protestant Church which the British Government had long before established and endowed with property, and which had until recently been supported with tithes paid by the Catholic Irish. Next, urged on by violent agitation and the savage lawlessness of some of the Irish, the government gave its attention to the question of the land. Beginning with 1870 a series of acts was passed by which Irish tenants were protected in their tenures, and assured some compensation for their improvements made on land while it had been in their possession; and presently the government itself took measures to see that they were not made to pay excessive rents. More important still, another series of laws, passed in the last quarter of the century, gave government assistance to the peasants so that they might buy their lands and become owners themselves. They were to repay the government, with moderate interest, in small payments over a long period of time, the terms being so generously arranged that presently it was cheaper for an Irishman to buy his land than it was to pay rent. By 1910 half of the island was in possession of small holders, who were slowly paying the government; and it was evident that in the course of time Ireland would be owned by peasant proprietors more than almost any other country. Slowly but surely now the people were laying the foundation for considerable prosperity. Further progress would lie in setting up again, if modern conditions made that possible, the old commerce and industry of the island.


The Land
Purchase
Acts

But Irishmen were not yet satisfied. They remained discontented with the government that made them part of the United Kingdom. Some of them wished complete independence and separation, like the adherents of Young Ireland who arose about 1840, and like the Fenians who were active after 1860. But most of the people followed more conservative leaders. About 1870 the Home Rule movement began under Isaac Butt, and was soon carried forward by Parnell. This was designed to secure Irish self-government for an Ireland which would nevertheless continue in the United Kingdom, joined with Great Britain. Most of the people in Britain, however, were opposed even to this partial separation. Home Rule was advocated by the Liberal Party under Gladstone in 1886 and in 1893; but both times the bill that was introduced into parliament failed to be enacted as a law. For some years nothing further was accomplished, but the Irish under their new leader, John Redmond, continued their efforts. The great opportunity came when the Liberal Party under Asquith and Lloyd George were trying to bring about their social reforms. They soon needed all the support in parliament that they could get. The Irish Nationalist members were willing to vote with them on condition that, in return, a Home Rule bill should be passed. The Liberals were the more willing to do this since many of them favored Irish self-government. Thus it was by Irish support that the Parliament Act of 1911 was finally put through; and in the following year a third Home Rule Bill was brought into parliament.

A memorable struggle followed. It was known that the House of Lords would refuse to sanction such a measure, but no longer could the Lords do more than delay the passage of any measure. The Home Rule Bill of 1912, which satisfied many of the Irish people, was passed again by the Commons in 1913 and 1914, in spite of the

The strug-
gle for Home
Rule

The Third
Home Rule
Bill passed



11. IRELAND: SHOWING THE SINK FEIN AREAS IN 1918, AND THE UNIONIST AREAS IN ULSTER

veto of the Lords, and was on the point of becoming law when the Great War broke out.

Meanwhile, however, very serious opposition had developed from a large part of the inhabitants of Ulster, the northern province, partly peopled by Protestant immigrants from England and Scotland, who declared that they would under no circumstances permit themselves to be separated from the government of the United Kingdom. They said that they feared religious and economic oppression from the Catholic majority in Ireland if Home Rule were established over them; and they proclaimed that they would resist such separation by force. The Great War put an end to the question for a while, the Home Rule Bill being passed, but the law suspended for the duration of the conflict.

Ulster

It was most unfortunate that this question had not been completely settled long before, since events were now to show that it was almost too late to undertake any settlement at all. For some time there had been coming into greater prominence a group of Irishmen who desired to revive the Celtic literature and character of the past. In 1893 they had founded the Gaelic League. From this had come a great deal of excellent writing in the so-called Irish Literary Revival, and also some attempt to revive the use of the Celtic tongue, which by the beginning of the twentieth century had almost come to an end in the island. This movement went further under the guidance of men whose motto was *Sinn Fein* (We ourselves), who wished to get complete political independence for Ireland. In 1904, under the leadership of Arthur Griffith and others, they established the Society of *Sinn Fein*. They endeavored to teach the Irish people to have nothing to do with the British government in Ireland.

Sinn Fein

The spirit of these people and of other radicals in Ireland was greatly stirred by the mighty changes of the war. In April, 1916, some of them suddenly rose in re-

Ireland and
Britain

The
Rebellion
of 1916

bellion in Dublin. The insurrection was quickly crushed and the rebels sternly punished, but large results followed. The Irish people had not yet received the Home Rule and self-government they had so long sought for, and they felt now little disposed to make allowance for the difficulties in which the British Government found itself during the struggle of the nations. When the government ruled with firmness it alienated most of the people; when it tried leniency they merely turned to the leadership of *Sinn Fein*. Many of them now lost their desire for Home Rule, and hoped that soon under *Sinn Fein* they would get complete independence. This the people of Britain would in no wise consider, since for hundreds of years rulers and statesmen had been trying to bring about the union of the British Isles, and also because the geographical position of Ireland was such that she could control the principal lines of communication from Great Britain over the seas to the sources of her raw materials and her food. If an independent Ireland were ever hostile to Great Britain in war, or if she got into the enemy's hands, then the British might be starved into surrender and their empire destroyed.

An Irish Re-
public pro-
claimed,
1919

By 1917 the people of Britain were quite willing to have Irishmen govern themselves in domestic matters, but they insisted that Ireland should continue to be united with Great Britain and under the control of a central government in the matters which affected them all. Mr. Lloyd George, who had become the prime minister, called an Irish Convention to settle a scheme of Irish self-government, but no agreement could be reached that was satisfactory to either of the extreme parties, the Ulster Unionists or *Sinn Fein*. Most of the Protestants of Ulster wanted no Home Rule, and the adherents of *Sinn Fein* sought independence. At the end of the war, when a general election was held in the United Kingdom, *Sinn Fein* won a sweeping victory in Ireland, electing three fourths of the representatives chosen. They announced

that they would not sit in the parliament at Westminster, and early in 1919 proclaimed a republic, appealing to America and the Peace Conference at Paris to give them assistance. At first the resistance to British authority was passive, but soon an active rebellion was raging, carried on by guerilla methods. After the extreme passions of the period have subsided it is probable that the Irish will have self-government satisfactory to them, yet, in outside affairs, retaining their union with Great Britain.

The foreign relations of Great Britain during this period are best related in other connections. Down to about 1900 she strove to stand aloof as much as possible from continental affairs. Her interests were principally imperial and colonial: the protection of the colonies which she had already acquired, and, from time to time, the acquiring of new ones. For this a strong navy rather than a strong army was necessary, and so Britain did not come into rivalry with great military powers like Austria-Hungary and the German Empire, but with those, like France and Russia, whose interests were also colonial and naval, and whose ambition it was to extend territorial possessions. All through the nineteenth century there was fear that Russia might expand down through the Balkans and along the Black Sea until Constantinople was obtained, or that she might push southward from Turkestan until British control of India was endangered. So it was that in 1878, during the Russo-Turkish War, Britain made ready to oppose Russia as she had done before in the Crimean War; and at the Congress of Berlin, as before at the Congress of Paris, she succeeded in holding Russia back. More acute was the rivalry with France, the old enemy with whom in the past England had carried on so many wars. With France there had been good relations after the overthrow of Napoleon I. But following the establishment of the Third Republic, when Frenchmen turned from Europe to build up a great colonial

Fashoda

empire again, and when in furthering this they developed strong naval power, Britain became cold and suspicious. The rivalry culminated in 1898, when British moving southward from Egypt met Frenchmen moving eastward in the Sudan, at Fashoda. The two nations came to the very brink of war, which was only avoided through surrender by France. Thereafter conditions became better and 1898 was seen to have been a great turning-point. Hitherto Germany and England had had few conflicting interests. While the most dangerous opponents of Britain seemed to be Russia and France, the partners in the Dual Alliance, there were many ties between Germany and England. England had been friendly to the Triple Alliance. In 1887 she had made with Austria-Hungary and Italy an agreement concerning the Mediterranean. In 1898 it seemed for a moment that Germany and Britain might come together in a common agreement. But a great revolution in diplomatic affairs now took place. In less than a decade Britain regarded the German Empire as her most formidable and dangerous rival, and helped to form the Triple Entente with Russia and France.

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CHAPTER XI

RUSSIA

Ты и убогая, ты и обильная,
Ты и могучая, ты и безсильная,
Матушка Русь!

[Thou art destitute, yet abounding,
Thou art powerful, thou art weak,
O beloved Mother Russia!]

NEKRASOV (1821-1878)

For ever extending its base, the new Democracy now aspires to universal suffrage—a fatal error, and one of the most remarkable in the history of mankind. . . . We may well ask in what consists the superiority of Democracy. Everywhere the strongest man becomes master of the State. . . .

Among the falsest of political principles is the principle of the sovereignty of the people . . . a principle which has unhappily become more firmly established since the time of the French Revolution.

Were we to attempt a true definition of Parliament, we should say that Parliament is an institution serving for the satisfaction of the personal ambition, vanity, and self-interest of its members. The institution of Parliament is indeed one of the greatest illustrations of human delusion.

KONSTANTIN POBIEDONOSTSEV, *Reflections of a Russian Statesman* (trans. R. C. Long, 1898), 26, 27, 32, 34, 35.

THE great turning-point in the history of Russia in the nineteenth century had come a little before 1870, following the disasters of the Crimean War and the death of Nicholas I, when, after a long period of conservatism and repression, it had seemed necessary at last to undertake changes and reforms. The new tsar, Alexander II (1855-1881), was a man of humane and liberal disposition.

At once he reversed the policy of his father and thus awakened among progressive Russians the highest hopes

The era of
reform in
Russia:
Alexander
II

of what would be done. He allowed exiles to return to Russia and pardoned other political offenders. The universities were given freedom again, and Russians allowed to travel abroad. These actions made a most favorable impression, and, as is always the case, ardent and enthusiastic people believed that all the ills of Russia were about to be cured. Generally the sentiment was much like that which had prevailed in France just before 1789. There was no desire to overthrow the government, but to reform long-standing abuses. This it was thought the tsar himself could best do.

Abolition of
serfdom
in Russia,
1859-66

At once Alexander turned himself to the principal problem awaiting solution. Most of the inhabitants of his dominions were still partly unfree. Serfdom had already been abolished in Poland, and there were many free peasants in the north and the Cossacks in the south, but over most of the Russian Empire serfdom prevailed. He began by freeing the 23,000,000 serfs on the royal domain or crown lands. They had a much better position than any of the others, being practically free and merely owing to the tsar payments that were the equivalent of rent. Whenever he wished, he could declare them free, proclaim that they were the owners of lands they had formerly cultivated under the crown, and abolish the dues they had previously paid. In 1859 this was begun and the process was complete seven years later. Meanwhile, he was busy persuading the nobles not to resist the freeing of their serfs also. The change was bound to come to pass, he told them, and it was much better that it be granted from above than forced by revolution from below. The noblemen made no determined resistance, and in March, 1861, an edict of emancipation was proclaimed which abolished all serfdom in the Empire, thus emancipating the 26,000,000 serfs of private owners. This edict was of immense importance in the history of the freedom of the human race. By no other legislation had so many

The nobles
yield to the
tsar

people ever been made free. It brought serfdom in Europe to an end. Thereafter of serfdom and of slavery there was very little left anywhere in the world, except for the 4,000,000 negro slaves in the southern commonwealths of the United States and the slaves still held in Brazil.

The substance of this edict is very interesting. In England and France serfdom had disappeared a long time before—gradually, as the result of the working of economic causes. Serfdom was not abolished in England, but in course of time all of the serfs had become free. Such was largely the case also in France, for when serfdom was formally abolished there in 1789 most of the peasants were already free. In Russia now, as in the United States two years later, the unfree population was made free in a few years, almost at a stroke. In Russia this would be very apt to bring about considerable dislocation and confusion, as indeed it did in the United States, for society was being altered not by gradual development, but quickly and artificially, by law. In the Southern States of America the enfranchised negroes, made completely free by the Federal Government, sank back after a while, many of them, into a condition of economic servitude. From this condition the utmost efforts of their Northern friends could not save them, and from it they have only gradually and in part escaped after many years, as they have been able to acquire the ownership of land. In England, long before, the decline of serfdom had made many villeins free, indeed, but driven them away from the land which they had cultivated, and often reduced them to a worse economic position than before. This the Russian Government now strove to avert. Not only were the old services abolished, but to the free peasants was given that portion of the land which formerly they had cultivated, that is to say, a part of what had belonged to the nobles or the crown. For the most

Method
of the
emancipa-
tion

Difficulties
attending
emancipa-
tion

part the ownership of this property was vested not in the individual peasants, but, in accordance with communal ideas which had long prevailed in Russia, in the village communities or *mirs*. The former owners were to be paid by these *communes*, to which the government would advance the money necessary for this, the *communes* for forty-nine years to pay back to the government 6 per cent. of the amount thus advanced.

Results of
emancipa-
tion

This change involved less alteration than might have been expected. To the world at large the edict seemed a great triumph of liberty, and it did, in conferring on the peasants the status of free men and women, abolish a condition that discredited Russia in the eyes of the world. But emancipation did not make much change in the condition of most of the peasants, and doubtless nothing could have produced much difference in any short time. The peasants who had formerly cultivated land, for which they made payments and rendered service, now cultivated the same land, or in many cases a smaller extent, of which they collectively were owners, but for which they had to make yearly payments nevertheless. Where before they had been bound to the lord's estate, now they were bound to the *mir*. Before they had been serfs to great noblemen; now, it was said, they were virtually serfs of the State. Indeed they were bitterly disappointed. They had long hoped that some day the lands on which they lived would be given to them free of any encumbrance. Furthermore, with the rapidly increasing population of Russia, it became more and more evident in the years which followed that not enough land had been given to support the peasants. Most of them continued to live in very abject poverty, and in ignorance and filth, even though they were now free men. The peasants began to hope for a day when more of the lands that remained to the nobles and the crown might be given them. Only so, it was believed, would such benefits

The
peasants
disappointed

result as gradually came to the peasantry of France in consequence of the French Revolution.

Other reforms followed. In 1864 the Russian judicial system was radically changed, in accordance with principles long before gradually developed in western Europe. Judges were made independent, jury trial was introduced, judicial and administrative powers were separated, and a system of courts established, with appeal from the lower to the higher. The vast mass of petty cases, which in all countries always make up the bulk of judicial business, and which for a long time in England had been dealt with by justices of the peace, was now to be handled in Russia by similar officials, elected by the people of the locality.

Judicial system reformed

In the same year also a decree of the tsar established a greater measure of local self-government. In their pettiest concerns the peasants had some self-government in the village communities, or *mirs*, but this was all. Russia was already divided into thirty-four "governments" which were composed of provinces and districts. Self-government was now given in these larger administrative divisions, the provinces and districts. Each of these jurisdictions was now to have an assembly, *zemstvo*, made up of the large landed proprietors of the locality and of delegates indirectly elected by the peasants and people of the towns. Substantially, the nobles, the peasants, and the *bourgeoisie* were represented in the *zemstvos*. The district council or *zemstvo* was to be elected by the people of the locality, the district councils themselves were to choose the members of the provincial *zemstvos*. These councils were to impose the local taxes and make the local regulations, which were to be carried out by standing committees. In 1870 *dumas*, or councils, were established in the Russian cities, the members being elected according to the Prussian three-class system, by the citizens in proportion to their wealth.

Local government reformed

Other changes were made, and it seemed that much

Disappoint-
ment in
Russia

improvement must result, but disappointment and reaction soon clouded the prospect. The Russian liberals, who had so long been repressed by Nicholas, were at first filled with all sorts of pent-up hopes, believing that extensive reforms would regenerate their country at once. These idealists and enthusiasts had no real conception of the difficulties besetting any programme of reform in the country, weighed down as it must be by the dead hand of the centuries of ignorance and oppression gone before. Only very gradually could the Russian people be changed by any reforms, and no improvement could be very marked until a new generation had grown up in the midst of the new age. Hence the boundless hopes were soon disappointed. The peasants saw little difference between their former condition and that in which emancipation now placed them. The liberals and the radicals who had no practical experience, but some knowledge of what prevailed elsewhere, were grieved that conditions in Russia were not speedily made like what they knew of in England and France. Furthermore, the reforms that had been made could not be well administered at first, since they were opposed by all the conservatives, and no band of capable administrators could at once be produced to make them work well. Local government could not be very efficient until there had been a time of training and experience, and the new courts could not give fair and cheap justice until upright and capable judges were procured.

Alexander
becomes
conservative

Alexander himself changed also. It is said that he was not really a liberal, but one who believed that alterations were inevitable, and so preferred to make them in time rather than wait for violent upheaval. Furthermore, he was surrounded by reactionary officials, who had grown up in the reign preceding. In course of time their influence was felt. And finally in 1863 came another rebellion of the Poles, after which the tsar soon ceased making reforms.



12. MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE HISTORY OF POLAND

The Polish
Rebellion,
1863

It was another despairing effort of the Poles to win their freedom. At the end of the eighteenth century their country had been partitioned between Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Now the country in which most of them lived was merely a part of the Russian Empire. But the spirit of nationality, which was rising again strongly in Europe, aroused certain classes of this people. The Italians had just achieved their unity, and the Germans were about to make a united nation. Polish patriots began to dream of a day when Poland would be free again, reviving the ancient glories of the time when she held Lithuania and other districts subject. Moreover, the tsar had made some concessions to them, enough to raise their expectations, but less than they desired. Suddenly an insurrection broke out. The Poles appealed to the free nations of Europe for assistance, and much sympathy was aroused in England and France and elsewhere. Actually, however, the movement was not formidable. The Prussian Government offered help to the tsar, but it was never needed. Generally the Polish population remained passive. Through long previous centuries this peasantry had been bowed under the most degrading serfdom, in hopeless poverty, without attachment to the masters who oppressed them, and without any feeling of patriotism for a state which did nothing for them. Therefore, when now in the hour of need Polish leaders and nobles called upon them to rise for the sake of their nation, they looked on with indifference, having not yet learned to care enough for Poland, and caring little who were their masters. The rebellion was crushed, and when this was done the Russian Government took measures to crush permanently the power of those who had made it. The monasteries of the religious orders were suppressed and their lands taken away from them. About half of the lands of the nobility was taken and given to the peasants, with a view to reducing the nobles'

The masses
in Poland in-
different



13. RACIAL MAP OF RUSSIA

Agrarian
changes in
Poland

; and making the peasants friendly to the Russian Government. These lands were to be paid for, but by a tax not only upon the possessions of the peasants but on those of the nobles as well, so that the former owners were compensated only in part. The results of this were important. The influence of the upper classes, among whom the spirit of Polish nationality was strongest, was crippled. Furthermore, the condition of the Polish lower classes was improved, and contrary to what was sometimes believed in other parts of the world, the economic condition of most of the Polish people under Russia was better even than in Galicia, where the Austrian Government had done little to interfere with the privileges of the Polish nobles, but where the peasants continued in low degradation. On the other hand, the Russian Government, resolving to make a Russian province out of Poland, now forbade the use of the Polish language in any government business, in university lectures, in newspapers, in theaters, in schools, and in churches. Against this the Polish people made vigorous resistance, and in the struggle that ensued the spirit of nationality was at last strongly awakened in the mass of the people, who began to hope for a free Polish nation in the future.

Discontent
increases in
Russia

Some of Alexander's reforms were put into effect after this time, but he now became conservative and suspicious. In 1865 the nobles of Moscow petitioned the tsar to establish representative government, but neither then nor afterward would he grant either parliament or constitution. He had begun to feel that autocracy might be weakened by further concessions, and he resolved firmly to uphold his power. Discontent increased. Some thought not enough had been done, and expectation was aroused by what had been done. Moreover, the mere passage of time and the changes going on elsewhere created greater demands. So, in the despair which now came to the liberals, violence and extreme radicalism took the place

of a progressive liberal movement. Nihilists, extreme socialists, and terrorists supplanted the liberal reformers.

The term *nihilist* (*nihil*, nothing) is said to have been first used by the Russian novelist Turgeniev in his novel, *Fathers and Sons*, published in 1862, to signify one who accepted nothing without critical examination, nothing on authority merely. It was soon applied in Russia to intellectuals who accepted nothing in Russia as good, contrasting what they saw there with conditions in other countries. They accepted neither the autocratic government of Russia nor the Greek Catholic faith which had so long ruled men's minds there. Turgeniev described his character as one who believed that there was no institution which ought not to be destroyed completely and at once. What was, ought to be overthrown, in order that society might be constructed anew. At first all this was merely held by intellectuals, who talked about it but were not prepared to go further. After a few years, however, it was translated into action. About 1871 there was a great stirring in the minds of economic radicals in Europe. The *Commune* of Paris had just attempted to institute a new social and political order, and even its failure had attracted much attention. Furthermore, the socialism of western Europe was beginning to have its effect upon Russian thinkers, and, more important still, the doctrines of violence which the anarchists taught.

Active anarchism had been largely developed by the Russian Bakunin, who had elaborated his ideas from the teachings of the Frenchman Proudhon. Before Marx had begun his great career in the founding of modern socialism Proudhon published in 1840 a work in which he asserted that property was theft, and declared that the existing social system was wrong. But he did not propose, as did Marx somewhat later, to substitute public ownership for private. He believed that each individual

The
nihilists

The
anarchists

Teachings of
Proudhon
and
Bakunin

should use what he produced with his labor. This led him to leave everything to the individual and to attack all government. He believed that the best system would be that in which there was no government, *anarchy* (ἀναρχία). He himself did not believe in using violence to bring this about, but his doctrines were taken up by Bakunin, who declared that capitalism and autocratic government ought to be destroyed through violence, and, where this was not possible, through secret assassination and terror. Now in Russia, when the efforts of the peaceful radicals were checked by the government, and many were punished or sent into exile, the movement of reform and opposition, after changing into nihilism, a doctrine held by philosophers and students, and then into socialist propaganda, got into the hands of the anarchists, who attempted to create a reign of terror, and paralyze the government, or at least take vengeance on their oppressors.

Agitation,
unrest, and
repression

An attempt had been made to assassinate the tsar in 1866. Thereafter he hearkened more than ever to the reactionaries, and in the ten years after the Polish revolt a great number of people were sent to Siberia. Then the agitators rose in petty insurrections. As the revolutionaries became more violent, the governing classes were more repressive. The old censorship was partly revived, and the harshest punishments were imposed. In 1878 a secret committee was established at St. Petersburg to carry on war against the government. Literature was printed for secret distribution, and bombs were manufactured for the assassination of public officials. In a short time prominent officials were done to death by members of the society, and attempts were made to kill the tsar himself. Martial law was proclaimed, and a minister was appointed with the fullest powers of a dictator. In 1881 the tsar, yielding somewhat, gave his consent that a general commission, partly representative,

Assassina-
tion of
Alexander
II, 1881

should be summoned to consult about reforms. But on the day that this decree was signed a fourth attempt was made to assassinate him, and he was blown to pieces by a bomb hurled as he was passing through the streets. Thus perished the Tsar Liberator, author of the most important reform made in Russia for generations, victim very largely of the conditions which older times had bequeathed to him. The terrorists at once published a manifesto in which they promised to cease their activities, if freedom of speech, of the press, and of meeting, were allowed in Russia, and if a national assembly were elected by manhood suffrage. But their deed was about to usher in a period of sterner and more terrible reaction, and when at last changes were made in Russia, they were to come—as in France long before—not through constitutional amendment, but through destruction of the old system by revolution.

Alexander III (1881–1894), son of the murdered tsar, was determined to avenge the death of his father, and crush all elements of disorder. 'The voice of God, he said, bade him strengthen and preserve his autocratic power.' In temperament he was a reactionary like his grandfather Nicholas I. And in the efforts which he now made he was constantly abetted by Pobiedonostsev, Procurator of the Holy Synod, a minister who at the end of the century stood for the conservatism and the reactionary ideas which Metternich had upheld at its beginning. Alexander III believed that the good of the Russian state would be obtained if autocracy were strengthened and new liberal ideas kept out. He set himself to the task of undoing what the reactionaries thought were his father's mistakes. Pobiedonostsev, who encouraged him in all that he did, developed with sincerity a philosophical basis for the ideas which he strove to apply, and, like Metternich, he afterward explained them in his *Reflections*. He believed that autocratic government was not only best for the Russians,

Alexander
III and
Pobiedon-
ostsev

but best in itself, and that democracy was a cumbersome thing which had arisen in the errors of the western peoples. In the parliamentary system he not only saw the defects which others have seen, but believed it to be useless. So Alexander and Pobiedonostsev undertook to keep Russia undefiled by contamination with western ideas, to withdraw such concessions as had recently been granted, and by stern and rigid rule, keep Russia what they thought she should be.

Reaction

In a short time the great reforms of Alexander II were largely undone. The peasants who had received freedom, though little economic betterment, by the edict of emancipation, were put back under the control of the local upper classes as much as possible, in something like the same way that the white people of the South immediately after the Civil War tried to keep the newly enfranchised negroes in inferior and servile position. In 1886 it was decreed that breach of contract by a Russian laborer should be a criminal offense, thus binding the lower classes with stricter economic control. More important still, in 1889 the local elected magistrates were replaced by officials known as Land Captains, to be appointed by the provincial governor from among the upper classes of the neighborhood. They were given not only judicial but also administrative functions, so that they had practically unlimited authority over the peasants, ruling them at the behest of the central government. In this way the administration of justice sank back into the evil state of a generation before. About the same time the character of the *zemstvos* or provincial assemblies and the *dumas* or councils of the cities was changed, by increasing the representation of the upper classes and diminishing that of the lower, and then taking from the assemblies thus altered much of their power. Some of the *zemstvos* had done excellent work in local government and in bettering the condition of the people, but the autocracy of

The Land
Captains

Alexander and Pobiedonostsev had no desire to see the people governing themselves even in their local affairs.

In upholding their system the methods of Metternich's age were again employed. There was stern regulation of the press, and many newspapers were stopped. The universities were put under strictest control, and such supervision was extended to the lower branches of education. A great part of all the Russian people were illiterate, but from those who got an education in Russia all pernicious western ideas were to be kept. The radicals and nihilists were remorselessly pursued by the secret police, and the police of Russia under the direction of another reactionary, Von Plehve, reached a terrible efficiency previously not attained. For a long time all this seemed to succeed well enough. The tsar spent the thirteen years of his reign apart from his people, apart from his ministers even, guarded by the secret police and by innumerable sentries, safe from the enemies who continued to threaten his life as they had threatened his father's. The old system of government and church remained unaltered and unshaken. The nihilists lost influence after the assassination of Alexander II, and presently they also lost heart. The great mass of the people, an ignorant peasantry devoted to the old Russian system and traditions, even in the midst of misery which they endured but did not understand how to cure, remained passive and loyal. There was no powerful middle class yet, and the central government with its vast organization of officials seemed to hold unassailable position.

In accordance also with his ideas of governing Russia well and making her great, Alexander entered vigorously upon a policy of Russifying all the people in his empire. He wished to bring about greater unity and strength by obliterating the local differences that divided the population of his domain. Such an ideal was no new thing. It had been cherished by the rulers of Austria half a

Repression

Russifica-
tion

The attain-
ment of
national
unity

century before, and also by the Hungarians as soon as they had the power to govern. It was a policy which the rulers of Germany were vigorously carrying out in Schleswig and Posen. Most of the great states of Europe had once been formed by bringing together different peoples. This was so of France and Spain and Italy, and, though long time had obliterated most of the differences, some of them still remained. The differences were more striking in Germany and the British Isles, for the Poles of Posen and some of the Irish longed to separate from the government over them. But the divisions were far more marked and much more important in Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire. In the Dual Monarchy Germans and Magyars often worked together with utmost difficulty, while a great number of Bohemians, Rumanians, Poles, and South Slavs were held together only by force. In the western world it was not generally realized that the Russian Empire contained peoples as diverse and forces almost as disruptive as those within Austria-Hungary. There was, indeed, a great difference between the circumstances of the two, for whereas the power of the Dual Monarchy was based upon a minority made up of Germans and Magyars, the power of Russia was founded upon the Great Russians who were much the largest, the strongest, and the most important element in the State. None the less, the vast expanse of the Empire contained other elements of much importance which had not yet been welded together, while in the outlying portions were large districts containing non-Russian peoples who had lost their freedom and were held in unwilling subjection.

The peoples
of Russia

All of central and most of north Russia were held by the Great Russians. But to the south in the Ukraine, the richest district of the Empire and one of the chief sources of the wheat supply of the world, the people, while Slavic in race, and adherents of the Eastern Catholic faith, spoke a dialect which differed from that of the Great

Russians, as much as Low German was unlike High German, and they had developed a literature of their own. To the west lay the White Russians, also Slavs and also belonging to the Orthodox Church, but speaking yet another dialect of Slavic; and the Lithuanians, an Indo-European people closely related to the Slavs, with their own distinct speech, and adhering to the Roman Catholic religion. Over Lithuania, and to a less extent the Ukraine, Polish culture prevailed and some of the upper classes were Polish, for in the days of its greatness the Kingdom of Poland had included these outlying dominions. To the east of European Russia the vast reaches of her Asiatic empire contained a sparse population of many diverse peoples but also, as the principal class, Russian immigrants from Europe. All of these parts, Great Russia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Siberia, were sufficiently alike to unite naturally, and the local differences that persisted, would, under good administration, do no harm or else disappear in course of time.

This was not so in some of the outlying parts which brought Russia down to the sea or into contact with central Europe. In the far north were the Lapps, a Mongolian people, unimportant in their distant frozen plains. To the south of them, and on the sea, were the Finns, also an Asiatic people, whose country formerly had for a long time been possessed by Sweden, so that not only was the civilization Swedish and the religion Lutheran but the people of the upper class were Swedish. Finland had long been a distinct state, as Poland had been at first, organized as a grand duchy, and connected with Russia through the person of the tsar. These people had been taken by conquest. They had no real bond of union with the Russian people; they were greatly jealous of any encroachment upon their privileges, and were determined to maintain their identity and character. To the south of the Gulf of Finland, on the Gulf of Riga, and down the

The lesser
Slavic
elements

Outlying
parts
of the
Empire

Diversity of peoples

coast of the Baltic were provinces—Estonia, Livonia, Courland—taken from Sweden or Poland when Russia won her outlets here on the sea. Their people were Finns or Letts, a branch of the Lithuanian people, completely dominated by a German upper class, the “Baltic Barons.” Farther to the west and the south, and thrusting itself in between Prussia and Austria-Hungary, was Poland, formerly the Kingdom of Poland which Russia had organized and united with herself under the tsar, and a part of the independent Poland of earlier days. The Poles were Roman Catholic in religion, and while Slavic in race, were a distinct branch of the Slavic people, speaking a tongue as different from Russian as Swedish was from German. For a long time they had been the leading branch of the Slavs in Europe. Now they continued to feel that their civilization was higher than that of the Russians; they clung to their nationality and Roman Catholic faith with passionate devotion; and longed vainly, it seemed, for freedom and independence once more. Far to the southeast, between the Black and the Caspian seas, was Caucasia, comprising a great number of little peoples of different races and religions, strongly conscious of their separate nationality. The great diversity of peoples in the Russian Empire was strikingly seen in some of the cities on the Volga, where the market places were thronged with multitudes of strange people speaking a babble of different tongues.

The Jews in Russia

Nor was this all. In European Russia the larger number of the Jews of the world long continued to live, clinging to their faith, their customs, and their racial consciousness as the Jews have generally done. More important but less striking was the German element. The German people, whose eastward extension in the Middle Ages had laid the foundations of Austrian and Prussian power, had continued their movement to the east, and for a long time had been penetrating the lands of the Russian Empire,

where by their superior culture and efficiency they were able to exploit the natives. In the Baltic Provinces the upper class was German. In other places were isolated colonies of Germans, who preserved their language and racial character. Almost everywhere were German business men and skilled artisans, who controlled or directed a great part of the economic life of the state. For a century and a half the tsars had usually married German princesses, and been attended by German favorites and assistants. All of this was natural enough, and probably there would be more of it in the future. Russia, indeed, with a huge population of backward people, with illimitable resources and raw materials to be exploited and used, lying right to the east of the German Empire with its intelligent, highly developed, and aggressive people, was for Germans the best field for economic expansion. In the days to come almost certainly such relations between Germany and Russia will be resumed.

It had generally been the ambition and the proper policy of states to achieve as complete a unity as possible. In France and Great Britain such unification had long since been almost completely effected. But it was not entirely achieved in the German Empire, much less in Russia, and only to a small extent in Austria-Hungary. Posen with its unwilling and oppressed Poles on Germany's border might be a source of grave danger in war; so Poland, and Finland, and the Baltic country on the Russian frontier might, unless they could be more closely united, bring great weakness in time of danger, and try to separate themselves. Indeed, when the great disaster came in 1917, the Ukraine, Finland, and certain Caucasian districts soon broke away, while Poland and the Baltic Provinces had already been lost. It was, therefore, the desire of Russian rulers to do away with the differences that divided their subjects, and make of them one Russian nation.

Germans in
Russia

Unification

Assimila-
tion by com-
pulsion

In the United States of America, where the population had been increased by immigration from all parts of Europe, an English-speaking nation, with much coherence and unity, had been easily achieved because of an excellent system of education and as a result of liberal institutions, which, with all their imperfections, gave men great freedom to use the abundant economic resources of the country. The children of immigrants in the United States of their own accord gave up the alien speech and the foreign customs which their parents had brought. But in Russia, where there was no general system of education, and where the government was comparatively inefficient, such unification could only be attempted through compulsion, and this the Russian Government tried in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Methods
of Russifica-
tion

Under Alexander III continued attempt was made to Russianize all the people of Russia. The Jews, the most evidently alien part of the population and greatly disliked by the people because of their financial ability and hardness, were subjected to such persecution as to deprive them of "the most common rights of citizens." They were concentrated together in the west, in what was known as the Jewish Pale, forbidden to own land, debarred to a great extent from schools and the professions, and often left to the mercy of furious mobs. In Poland Alexander continued the work of his father; Poles were excluded from the government and Russian was to be taught in the schools. In the next reign the particular privileges of Finland were withdrawn, and the government put in the hands of Russian officials; in the Baltic Provinces Russian was proclaimed as the official tongue. The Russian Church, as always, coöperating with the Russian Government, forwarded the work. The Holy Synod persecuted the members of other sects, forcibly converted some of them to the Orthodox Church again, and persecuted the missionaries of other sects.

The treatment of the Poles and the Finns awakened great sympathy in other parts of the world, and some of its results were terrible indeed. But this policy of Russification was only one aspect of the extreme nationalism which grew constantly so much stronger in the nineteenth century. In the latter half of that period in the German Empire a whole school of writers and teachers proclaimed that the German people were the best and the greatest in the world, that their civilization was superior to any other, and that it was destined to spread far over the earth, and deserved so to spread, since wherever it came it would better the people whom it reached. So, during the same time there rose up among the Slavs, and especially among the Great Russians, a host of writers who asserted that almost all of the inhabitants of the Russian Empire, and many peoples of central Europe and the Balkans, were of the great Slavic race, foremost of races in its character and institutions, and destined to have the most glorious future of all the peoples of the earth. The Russian autocracy, the Orthodox Church, the village community of the Slavs, were all the best things of their kind. These nationalists inculcated the doctrine of Pan-Slavism, just as in central Europe Pan-Germanism was similarly taught. It was their object first to unify the peoples within Russia, and so make her stronger and then ready to undertake the mission of protecting all the other Slavs, perhaps some day of uniting them all together.

The Russian Government under Alexander III was able to maintain itself and strengthen the old order of things and resist all progress. The tsar and some of his principal officials believed sincerely that the system they upheld was best in itself and for the best interests of the people. In their own way they labored hard to make Russia strong and great. But such government as they succeeded in establishing, above the influence

Extreme
Slavic na-
tionalism

Strength and
weakness
of the
system

The autocracy weakened by inefficiency and corruption

and criticism of the mass of the people, controlled entirely by the Autocrat of all the Russias, yet mostly administered by a large number of officials with whom he rarely if ever came in contact, and who therefore did much as they pleased, contained within itself the causes of its own destruction. Many of the officials were corrupt and inefficient, powerful in oppressing the people beneath them, but not able to rule honestly or well. After a while the Russian Government came to be something like the systems that had endured so long in western Europe, then fell almost of their own weight about the time of the French Revolution. It might maintain itself in ordinary times over the multitude of passive Russian peasants, but most probably it would be silently undermined by imperceptible forces, and if some great disaster came it would suddenly crash down into ruins. During the last part of the nineteenth century the old Russian system was in reality being shaken by the Industrial Revolution. Then in 1905 the disasters of the Russo-Japanese War shook it to its base, and the greater calamities of the War of the Nations at last destroyed it altogether.

Nicholas II

The policy of Alexander III was continued by his son Nicholas II (1894–1918). The history and the fate of this ruler have caused him to be compared with Louis XVI of France. Like the last French ruler of the Old Régime; he was amiable in character, but also weak and easily swayed, whether by the German Emperor in foreign affairs or his wife and his ministers at home. He took what he found, and he upheld it because he believed it was good. To diminish his autocratic power would be most foolish, he thought. For a long time his most trusted adviser also was Pobiedonostsev. Von Plehve was made minister of the interior and given enormous power for the continuance of his work. Nicholas approved the policy of Russianizing all the parts of his dominions. It may be that had he been stronger in character, and abler as a

ruler, the tragedy which overwhelmed him and the disaster which came to Russia might have been averted; but it may also be that conditions in the country were such, and reforms had so long been repressed and held back, that if any violent dislocation occurred reforms would be carried out by revolution.

The forerunner of the great changes soon to take place was the Industrial Revolution, after the emancipation of the serfs the most important thing in the history of Russia in the nineteenth century. Especially under the guidance of Count Sergei Witte, who became minister of finance in 1893, an immense industrial development went forward. The Dual Alliance had just been made between Russia and France, and a great amount of capital was loaned by the French. Rapid increase of the Russian agricultural population, which was obliged to support itself upon holdings of land not sufficiently large, drove increasing numbers of Russian peasants to the cities in search of work, and so provided an abundant supply of cheap labor. Tariffs were imposed to protect new industries, factories multiplied, and the population of the cities rapidly increased. Railroads were constructed or extended, until Russian mileage exceeded that of any European country, though because of the long distances within the Empire railway facilities continued to be more inadequate than in any other great country of Europe.

The consequences of the new industrialism in Russia were to some extent what they had been long before in England and France and later on in Austria-Hungary and the German Empire. About the middle of the nineteenth century more than nine tenths of the people of the Russian Empire lived scattered in the country, where they carried on their rude agricultural work. Upon this rural population, ignorant and extremely conservative, the earlier reformers and radicals had been unable to make any impression, and so the nihilist movement had come

The Industrial Revolution in Russia


Social consequences

Larger
urban
population


to an end largely because it remained a movement with leaders but without followers among the people. Now there grew up a larger urban population, an industrial proletariat more quickly responsive to the ideas of leaders who wished to change the government and the system that existed. In Moscow and St. Petersburg and in the Polish cities where the Russian Industrial Revolution had begun there were increasing crowds of over-worked, ill-paid workingmen, whose economic grievances made them very willing to think of changes in the State. There now rose up the party of the Social Democrats, who hoped that later on the existing system would be overthrown, after which, in a regenerated Russia, there might be established the socialism which Karl Marx had once taught in western Europe. The new leaders obtained adherents more easily than the old, yet the urban population of Russia at the end of the century was still less than 14 per cent. of the whole. But the new ideas soon began to affect also the mass of the peasants, hitherto inert. The Social Democratic Party of the workmen organized the factory operatives of the towns, who tried to better their condition and get their reforms by strikes. Among the peasants, who had no land or who had not enough land to support them, the Socialist Revolutionary Party rose up, these peasants desiring to take from the great proprietors their estates, which were then to be divided among the peasants in small holdings.

Foreign
affairs

The great changes which shortly took place resulted from failure in foreign relations and terrible disasters which profoundly affected all the people. For some time in the latter part of the nineteenth century Russian foreign policy continued as it had been in the earlier part: friendship was maintained with Prussia and the German Empire, and Russia continued to try to expand toward the sea. Her efforts to dominate the Balkans and, perhaps, control Constantinople were frustrated by Great



14. THE :



RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN 1914

Britain after the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, and thereafter by the opposition of Austria-Hungary. Germany drew closer in alliance with the Dual Monarchy, but under Bismarck's masterly handling of foreign relations Russia was bound to Germany by a secret treaty. In 1890, however, the new German Emperor refused to prolong this; and three years later Russia joined France in the Dual Alliance, thus changing her foreign policy completely. She now had increasingly the opposition of Germany as well as of Austria in the Balkans, and while continuing to take great interest in affairs there she turned her attention more and more to the expansion of her dominions in Asia. Long before, all of northern Asia, or Siberia, had been taken as far as the Pacific, but always the Russians hoped to go to the southward and reach ports on the warmer seas. Much progress was made, but always in western Asia the power of Great Britain in the end blocked the way.

In the eastern half of the continent Russia's southern neighbor was China, and here the prospect of success was greater, for China was stagnant and in decay, and, at the end of the century, seemed just about to fall to pieces. Still farther to the east, it is true, the Japanese, in their island empire, had taken up western civilization and methods with amazing capacity, and in 1894-5 gained a complete triumph in the Chinese-Japanese War. But Japan was not yet regarded as a match for any great European power, and at once she was compelled by Russia, Germany, and France to renounce most of the fruits of her victory. The so-called Trans-Siberian Railway, which had been begun in 1891, and which was to run from Moscow to Vladivostok on the Pacific, was being pushed steadily forward, and Russian expansionists dreamed of splendid possessions soon to be got from the dying Chinese Empire, and the acquisition at last of an ice-free port. This was a time when apparently China was about to be divided up among predatory European powers. In 1897 the Germans

Russia, the
German
Empire,
Austria-
Hungary

Russia,
China, and
Japan

European
powers
seize parts
of China


seized Kiao-chau. Next year France secured concessions in southern China. At the same time Russia obtained much greater ones in the north. In 1898 she procured from the Chinese Government the right to build the Siberian Railway across Manchuria, and she was soon in possession of that province. She also got a lease of the great stronghold and strategic position, Port Arthur, at the end of the Liao-tung Peninsula, from which Japan had shortly before been compelled to go, and which she now joined with her railway by a branch line, and converted into one of the strongest positions in the world. After the Boxer outbreak in 1900 the Russians took complete possession of Manchuria, and in the years which followed threatened to advance farther and absorb Korea, which lay on the flank of their communication between Manchuria and Liao-tung. Not only had the Japanese long wished to obtain Korea, but such was its geographical position, pointed directly at the heart of Japan, that in the hands of Russia it might be as dangerous as Belgium, in the possession of Napoleon or the German Empire, would have been to Great Britain. Quickly, therefore, a great conflict loomed up. In February, 1904, the Japanese suddenly struck and then declared war.

The Russo-
Japanese
War, 1904-5

Japan was greatly inferior in resources, but she had a modern army, with brave, hardy, and devoted soldiers, and an excellent fleet. Russia, far stronger, with greater army and fleet, was badly organized and poorly prepared, and fought, moreover, at a long distance from her base. Her communications lay practically over the one line of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Japan was closer to the area of conflict.

Japan gets
control of
the sea

For Japan the first essential and the indispensable condition was control of the sea. The beginning of the struggle found the Russian fleet in the East divided, part at Port Arthur, part at Vladivostok. At once, before declaration of war had been made, the warships in Port Arthur were



15. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

attacked and greatly damaged. When at last, some months later, this fleet came forth to battle; it sustained a terrible defeat, and the shattered remains were withdrawn into the inner harbor. The squadron at Vladivostok was also destroyed, and the Japanese held undisputed control of the sea for a time.

Japanese
victories
on land

Meanwhile, they had not hesitated to send a great army over into Korea, from which an inferior force of Russians was quickly driven. Then one Japanese army advanced into Manchuria, while another went down the Liao-tung Peninsula to lay siege to Port Arthur. Everywhere the Russians were defeated. In September at Liao-yang was fought the first great battle in which the fearful new devices of war were used by large armies. The Russians were entrenched in a fortified position, but after terrible slaughter the Japanese drove them out. All the time the Russians were being rapidly reinforced and they soon turned upon their enemies, but they had little success. Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted to carry the almost impregnable fortress of Port Arthur by storm. Hideous slaughter resulted, but after a long siege they won the commanding position of 203-Metre Hill, from which their artillery fire could be directed, and in January, 1905, the fortress was taken. At the end of February the main Japanese army, reinforced by the army which had captured Port Arthur, and now amounting to about 300,000 men, attacked the Russians who had nearly the same number. In the next two weeks, in a great struggle known as the Battle of Mukden, the Russians were driven back in complete defeat, losing a third of their number; but the Japanese were unable to do that which they strove for: surround the beaten enemy and destroy or capture their army.

Mukden

Tsushima,
the decisive
victory

In all the principal engagements thus far the Russians had been beaten. But bad as was their record they might still hope for victory in the end, for whereas the Japanese

had brought into play nearly all their force, the Russians, who were not yet vitally wounded, had used only part of theirs. If they could get control of the sea, the Japanese armies would at once be cut off from their base, and quickly forced to yield. If this failed, then in a contest of resources Japan might first be worn out. The Baltic Fleet, what remained of Russia's power on the sea, was already on the way around the world. After a long voyage it drew near to the Sea of Japan, superior to the enemy in numbers, but far inferior in equipment and personnel. May 27, 1905, it encountered the Japanese fleet under Admiral Togo in the Battle of Tsushima, by far the greatest sea fight since Trafalgar, and one of the most decisive in history. There the Japanese ships, with superior speed and range of fire, took up the position they desired, and performed the maneuver of "capping the line." As the Russian fleet advanced in column formation, the Japanese ships at their own distance steamed across the path of the approaching enemy, and destroyed his ships, one by one. The Russian fleet was annihilated, and Japanese control of the sea finally assured.

The war was not yet won, however. The Russian army, constantly reinforced, was now stronger than at any previous time in the war. On the other hand, what was only suspected then but revealed later on, Japan was almost completely exhausted. If the Russians persisted, time was almost certainly on their side. But domestic considerations now caused them to lose heart and abandon the struggle. President Roosevelt of the United States attempted to mediate between the contestants, and their plenipotentiaries met at Portsmouth, where a treaty was signed September 5. By the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth Russia abandoned to Japan Port Arthur and her rights in the Liao-tung Peninsula, gave over her attempts upon Manchuria and Korea, and ceded to Japan the southern part of Sakhalin, an island to the north of

Struggle for
control of
the sea

The Treaty
of Ports-
mouth, 1905

the Japanese group, and, indeed, forming an extension of the archipelago of Japan. The enormous consequences that followed from this war, which even yet can but dimly be seen, belong only in part to the history of Europe. In the Far East Japan became the dominant power, and presently seemed to threaten China. In Europe, so greatly was Russia weakened that the balance of power was completely destroyed, and Germany for a while dictated the politics of Europe.

Discontent
and disorder
in Russia

Russia had yielded to Japan partly because her resources were strained, but mostly because such unrest and confusion had arisen that the whole structure of her government seemed near to collapse. The system which the government had upheld by force, by arbitrary arrests, by secret trial, by banishment to Siberia, through the power of the secret police and the army, could be maintained only so long as Russia was at peace. Now the government was deeply involved in a distant war, which was never popular, which most of the people ill understood, in which patriotic fervor was never aroused. Had there been a great success, the military glory abroad might have stilled discontent at home; but when news came of repeated and shameful defeats in Manchuria and on the seas about China, popular fury burst out. So the radicals among the workingmen of the towns, the radical peasants in the country, the liberals of the upper and middle classes, and all the oppressed peoples—the Jews, the Poles, the Finns, and others—turned against the authorities; and in the confusion of the war it was no longer possible to resist them.

Terror and
uprising: the
Russian Re-
volution of
1905

In July, 1904, Von Plehve was blown to pieces by a bomb. In the following February the Grand Duke Sergei, reactionary uncle of the tsar, was assassinated. Thereafter a great many murders of officials took place. In the cities workingmen declared great strikes, and presently a general strike brought widespread demoralization.

In the country districts angry and ignorant peasants drove away country gentlemen and noble landlords, burning their houses and taking their lands as peasants in France had done a century before. In some parts of the country it was difficult to operate the railways, and in outlying provinces armed insurrections broke out. On "Red Sunday," January 22, 1905, a great procession of strikers in St. Petersburg followed a priest to present a petition to the tsar; but the troops fired upon them, and the bloodshed aroused wild indignation and horror. During all this time the liberals of the upper classes were demanding reforms; and they along with many others insisted that the war should be ended.

Nicholas II soon yielded to the general clamor. He tried at first to satisfy the people with small reform. Some concessions were made to the Poles, the Lithuanians, and the Jews; presently Finland recovered her constitution; and the arrears due from the Russian peasants were remitted. But he was urged to summon a national assembly; so in August, 1905, he proclaimed a law establishing an Imperial *Duma*, or assembly, to advise him in legislative work. He dismissed Pobiedonostsev and other reactionaries previously all-powerful, and appointed Witte to be prime minister in the cabinet now to be set up. Then he issued the *October Manifesto* which established freedom of religion, of speech, and of association, and promised that thereafter no law should be made without the *Duma's* consent. A series of decrees provided that the members of the *Duma* should be elected practically by universal suffrage. The old Council of State, which had been much like a king's council in the Middle Ages, was now changed so that part of its members were indirectly elected, and it was made the upper house of the National Assembly with the *Duma* as the lower.

These reforms had been yielded in a period of great weakness. It was soon possible for most of them to be

The first
Duma pro-
claimed 1905

The October
Manifesto

Speedy
reaction

The
reformers
divided

taken away. The bureaucracy of officials and most of the powerful upper class were sternly against the concessions. Moreover, the reformers almost immediately began to fall apart. To the radicals it seemed that little had been accomplished, and they desired to bring about much more fundamental changes. The liberals divided into two parties: the "Octobrists" were content with what had been granted by the tsar in the *October Manifesto*, and they wanted a strong united Russia now under his rule; the "Constitutional Democrats" or "Cadets" under their well-known leader Professor Miliukov, wanted a constitutional government like that of England or France, with responsible ministers completely controlled by elected representatives of the people, and they advocated a federal union for the different parts of the Empire.

The "Black
Hundreds"

In September, 1905, the war with Japan was ended. The government was immediately relieved from much of its embarrassment, and it had now a far greater military force to be used at home. It was not long before the nobles, great landlords, and reactionaries generally, united, and becoming stronger, by means of armed forces known as the "Black Hundreds," began to drive away the radicals and undo the changes which they had accomplished. During the same time the tsar began to withdraw the powers he had given to the *Duma*. In a decree of March, 1906, he proclaimed that the fundamental laws of the Empire were not to be within the power of the *Duma*, and declared that foreign affairs, the army, the navy were exclusively within his own jurisdiction. In May, 1906, the first *Duma* assembled, but it was unable to control the ministers, and after a bitter struggle it was dissolved in July. The Cadets, who had made up the majority of the body, would not accept the dismissal, and, retiring to Viborg in Finland, called on the Russian people to support them. But reaction was now running

The first
Duma, 1906

strongly; many of the government's opponents were put to death, and many more banished from the country.

A second *Duma* was assembled next year, but the opponents of the government again controlling it, and again seeking radical changes, it also was dissolved after sitting for three months. The tsar now issued a decree by which the electoral law was so altered that control would pass to the conservatives and the wealthy classes. The third *Duma*, elected in 1907, contained a majority willing to acquiesce in the government's policy. The *Duma*, accordingly, remained a consultative body, much like the English parliament had been three hundred years before, which was, perhaps, as much as the Russian people were capable of using in their stage of political evolution. The *Almanach de Gotha*, with what the Russian radical Trotzky described as unconscious humor, declared that the government of Russia was "a constitutional monarchy under an autocratic tsar." Under Stolypin, the principal minister, stern measures were taken against the radicals, and they were completely suppressed. Some reforms were indeed made. In 1906 the peasants were allowed to become individual owners of their land allotments in the *Mir*; and so far as this was carried out, it brought the old communal holding to an end.

Such was this first Russian Revolution. Temporarily, in the midst of the weakness of the government, it accomplished striking reforms, and was not unlike the first part of the French Revolution long before. But it was soon seen to be more like the Revolution of 1848 in central Europe, for its movers were really too weak to accomplish important, lasting results, and it soon lost most of its gains in the period of reaction that followed. There was needed a mightier outburst, more like the destructive part of the French Revolution, to quickly break the old order to pieces.

What the future of Russia might have been had peace

The second
Duma, 1907

The third
Duma, 1907

Failure of
the Russian
Revolution
of 1905

The years
before the
Great War

Russia and
the Balkans

lasted, whether the reactionaries would have seated themselves more firmly in power, or whether constitutional progress would have gone slowly forward, cannot be known. In the years between the Revolution of 1905 and the Great War the country seemed to settle down; slowly the harsh measures of government were lessened; the ravages of the war were repaired; the army was strengthened; a great appropriation was made to rebuild the navy; and increasingly Russia took her place once more in European councils. Again she became a powerful member of the Dual Alliance, and presently settling her differences with England, along with England and France made the Triple Entente. Her expansion in the Far East having been checked she turned again with greater interest to the Balkans, coming there into more and more dangerous rivalry with Austria-Hungary and the German Empire. It was this clash of interests which produced the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9, in which Russia yielded; the crisis of 1912, occasioned by the Balkan War, in which she held her own; and the crisis of 1914, which led to the War of the Nations, in which presently Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the German Empire all went down into ruin.

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CHAPTER XII

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, TURKEY, AND THE BALKANS

A E I O U

[*Austria Erit In Orbe Ultima*
Austriae Est Imperare Orbi Universo
Alles Erdreich Ist Oesterreich Unterthan]
Motto of the Hapsburgs, adopted in 1443.

Ich bin kein Deutscher, sondern ein Oesterreicher, ja ein Nieder-oesterreicher, und vor allem ein Wiener.

Letter of FRANZ GRILLPARZER to Adolf Foglar, November 1, 1870.

The Turkish Empire is in its last stage of ruin, and it cannot be doubted but that the time is approaching when the deserts of Asia Minor and of Greece will be colonized by the overflowing population of countries less enslaved and debased. . . .

SHELLEY, *A Philosophical View of Reform* (1820, printed 1920), p. 26.

Austria be-
fore 1867

IN THE seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the history of Austria has to do largely with contests against France on the one hand and contests with the Turks on the other. After the downfall of Napoleon and the decay of the Ottoman Empire the activities of the Austrian Government were directed principally to maintaining the restored system in Europe and Austria's primacy among the German peoples. After her defeat in 1866 Austria settled her most pressing domestic difficulties by admitting the Hungarians to partnership with her German citizens in the government, and forming the Dual Monarchy. Shut out from Germany and expelled from Italy now she turned her attention and ambitions from the north and the west to the south, and dreamed of enlarging her do-

minion and expanding her power down the Adriatic and down through the Balkans to the Ægean. For more than a generation she was successful, especially as she had increasing support from the German Empire as time went on; so that she added to the number of her subject Slavs, and continued to increase her influence in Balkan affairs. In all this her great rival was Russia, with whom at last she came into fatal collision over one of the Balkan states. In the Great War which then began she encountered irremediable destruction.

By the *Ausgleich* or Compromise of 1867 Hungary was put on a footing of complete equality with Austria, and given entire control over her internal affairs. There were now two states, each with its own ministry, its own parliament, and its own officials. They were to have one flag and a single ruler, who was to be emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. Thus they were to be united. But they were also to be united with respect to affairs concerning them jointly, such as war, finance, and foreign affairs, by a joint ministry of three parts, these "ministries" to be supervised by "delegations," or committees of the two parliaments, meeting together alternately in Vienna and Budapest.

This remarkable system of dual government, which seemed strange enough to peoples more uniform and united, lasted successfully for half a century, and was not destroyed until the Great War broke it to pieces. It was, indeed, a very successful solution of the difficult problem of holding together, under one government, two peoples not like enough to unite completely, and not strong enough to go their own separate way. Its greatest defect, as was afterward clearly seen, was that it erected a system of dualism in an empire where there were three important races, not two. Hungarians and Germans were largely content, but the more numerous Slavs were not. Indeed, the *Ausgleich* was an arrangement whereby

The *Aus-*
gleich, 1867

Success of
the *Aus-*
gleich

a minority, the Germans in Austria, allied themselves with a minority, the Magyars in Hungary, to hold in subjection the more numerous Slavs whom they ruled. And in after years it was to be seen that the Slovaks, the Jugo-Slavs, and the Rumanians were just as discontented with the Dual Monarchy as ever the Magyars had been before the *Ausgleich* was granted.

Discord and
progress

The domestic history of Austria during the period 1867–1914 was one of political discord and much discontent on the part of the subject peoples, but withal much advance in prosperity and material greatness. The Industrial Revolution, which had for a generation been changing central Europe, went forward in the Dual Monarchy as in the new German Empire, though it was far eclipsed by the mighty progress there. Railway communications were developed and great factories arose in Austria and Bohemia, bringing industrial prosperity for part of the people. During the second half of the nineteenth century also agriculture in the fertile plain of Hungary was developed as never before there, until Hungary became one of the great wheat-producing districts of Europe. Furthermore, public improvements were made, and education was fostered, not as in Germany and in France, yet so far that Austria-Hungary was one of the progressive countries of Europe.

Difficulties
under the
Ausgleich

The domestic politics of all this period were concerned with the relations between the two partners in the Dual Monarchy, and then with the relations between each one of them and the subject peoples whom they ruled. By the *Ausgleich* Austria and Hungary were joined together under an agreement which was arranged for ten years. Accordingly, once in a decade the arrangement was brought forward for renewal, and on each occasion there was more strain and confusion than a presidential election caused in the United States. Each time it was necessary to renew or rearrange commercial relations and decide

about apportionment of contributions to support the general government. Austria continued her industrial development, while Hungary remained for the most part an agricultural district. There was accordingly between the two of them the same difference that had once existed between the North and the South before the American Civil War. In the Monarchy, however, the interests of both were subserved by putting protective tariff duties upon foreign manufactures for the benefit of Austria, and protective duties upon foreign agricultural products to benefit Hungarian proprietors. The proportion to be contributed by each for joint expenditure caused much difficulty. By the first *Ausgleich* treaty Austria was to give 70 per cent. and Hungary 30 per cent., but forty years later Hungary's share was increased to 36.4 per cent., she having meanwhile enjoyed much advantage. More furious were the disputes which raged about the question of the army. Like France, Austria-Hungary, after the defeat by Prussia, adopted the system of compulsory military service. Since unity was deemed necessary in the making of strong military power, the authorities at Vienna declared that German should be the language of command throughout the army; but the Hungarians sternly insisted that their language should be used for the troops which Hungary furnished. This question threatened at times to destroy the *Ausgleich*, and in 1897 it was not possible to come to any agreement. The use of German was enforced, however, by decree of the emperor-king. Meanwhile, recruiting and the appointing of officers were left to the governments of the two parts.

During all of this time the two partners were held together because people in Austria and in Hungary saw that the two countries could not easily stand alone in the midst of their hostile subjects and surrounded by more powerful neighbors. There were always many differences between them; and at times disputes were so furious and bitter

Renewing
the
Ausgleich

Language of
command in
the army

Ties con-
necting Aus-
tria and
Hungary


Need of
mutual
support

that to outsiders it seemed impossible for them to live together longer; but always the fundamental need of association remained and was well understood. Furthermore, there was a strong connecting link in the person of Franz Josef, emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. Personal qualities and the continuance of a long reign made him popular in both parts of his domain, and a long train of personal misfortunes endeared him to his subjects still further. Much about his character and motives remains ill understood, but the series of strange and terrible calamities which came to him made him the most romantic and pathetic of all the great figures of Europe.

The end of
the House
of Hapsburg

He came to his throne young and in the midst of the disasters of 1848. Not many years later he lost in wars with France and with Prussia the Italian provinces, which seemed then his brightest possession, and the position of leadership in Germany which Austria had so long had. The State was constituted anew, and much prosperity came to it. But in the year after the disastrous war with Prussia, his brother, Maximilian, who had been made emperor of Mexico by France, and then deserted on the intervention of the United States, was captured by the enraged Mexicans and shot as a conspirator against them. In 1889 his only son, the Archduke Rudolph, died, supposedly by suicide, in the midst of mysterious and romantic circumstances never entirely cleared up. Eight years after this the emperor's wife, the beautiful Elizabeth, from whom he had long been estranged, was stabbed to death by an anarchist at Geneva. Finally, after the fates had dealt with his house as in some olden tragedy of Greece, his nephew, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir now to the throne, was assassinated at Sarajevo in Bosnia. In 1916, during the war which followed hard on this deed, the aged emperor, who had survived all the members of his house, passed away just before his empire was destroyed.

Death of
Franz
Joseph



16. RACIAL MAP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Parts of the
Dual Mon-
archy

In the Dual Monarchy the Empire of Austria included the archduchies of Upper Austria and Lower Austria, the kingdoms of Bohemia, Dalmatia, and Galicia, and the various districts of Bukowina, Carinthia, Carniola, Istria, Moravia, Salzburg, Styria, and Trieste. The Kingdom of Hungary included Hungary, Transylvania, and Croatia-Slavonia. The total area of Austria was 116,000 square miles, a little less than the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, which was 125,000. In 1910, at the time of the last census, the population of Austria was 28,000,000 while that of Hungary was 21,000,000. The total population, including that of Bosnia-Herzegovina—which was annexed to Austria-Hungary jointly, in somewhat the way that Alsace-Lorraine had been made a *Reichsland* in the German Empire—was 51,000,000. Of the inhabitants of the Monarchy a fifth were Germans and a little less than a fifth were Magyars. The remaining population embraced a diversity of peoples. In Austria, besides the Germans, there were: West Slavs (Czechs) in Bohemia and Moravia; West Slavs (Poles) and Little Russians (Ruthenians) in Galicia; Rumanians in Bukowina; Italians in the Trentino; and South Slavs (Slovenes) in Carniola. In Hungary, besides the Magyars, were the Rumanians of Transylvania, West Slavs (Slovaks) in the north, and South Slavs (Serbs and Croatians) in Croatia-Slavonia in the south. The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was entirely Jugo (South) Slavic.

The govern-
ment of
Austria

By the constitutional laws of 1867 the government of Austria was vested in the emperor and in the *Reichsrath* (imperial assembly), a parliament composed of two houses, a house of lords consisting of peers hereditary or appointed by the emperor for life, and a house of representatives, consisting of members elected at first by the provincial diets or assemblies, but after 1873 chosen directly by a narrow electorate. The franchise was widened by an electoral reform in 1896, and in 1907 equal and direct

manhood suffrage was established. The government was carried on by ministers, responsible to the *Reichsrath* in theory, but actually dependent mostly on the emperor. He was also easily able to control the *Reichsrath*, of which the upper house was extremely conservative and aristocratic, and the lower divided among numerous political parties and constantly torn by bitter racial disputes.

The general policy of the Austrian Government was the maintenance of the power and privileges of the German inhabitants who had brought together the parts and long been the masters. Out of 28,000,000 inhabitants they numbered only 10,000,000; and with the development of greater national feeling in the different parts their task became constantly harder. Some local self-government was granted to the different parts, but not enough to satisfy the local populations. The Czechs of Bohemia had long wanted an autonomy like that which had been granted to the Hungarians, and often in their fury and disappointment they adopted such tactics in the *Abgeordnetenhaus*, the lower chamber of the *Reichsrath*, that the uproar and confusion made it impossible for anything to be done. The Slovaks and the South Slavs nursed their grievances, and, in spite of no little advance in prosperity, longed for their freedom. In Galicia the Austrian Government succeeded better than anywhere else, but that was because it conserved the privileges of the Polish upper class, and so won their good will, while it left the Ruthenians and the Polish masses in lowly condition.

The system of government in Hungary had been gradually worked out through a long course of time, but it was founded directly upon a series of laws passed during the Hungarian uprising in 1848, suppressed as soon as the uprising failed, but guaranteed in 1867 when the *Ausgleich* was agreed on. It was vested in the king of Hungary, who was emperor of Austria, and exercised by

Peoples in
Austria

The govern-
ment of
Hungary

In the hands
of the
Magyars

his ministers who were responsible to a parliament. This parliament consisted of an upper aristocratic house, the *Table of Magnates*, most of them hereditary noblemen, and a lower, the *Chamber of Deputies*, consisting of members almost all of whom were elected from Hungary proper by a narrow electorate rigidly limited by property qualifications. This electorate was so arranged as to keep power altogether in the hands of the 10,000,000 Hungarians, who were a little less than half of the entire population. Local self-government was given to the subject peoples in Hungary, the Rumanians of Transylvania, and the South Slavs of Croatia-Slavonia, more grudgingly than the Germans of Austria gave it to the peoples in their portion.

General
character of
govern-
ment in the
Dual Mon-
archy

Altogether, in the Hapsburg Monarchy while government was modelled on the British system of ministers responsible to a parliament dependent on the people, such government was actually established only in small part. In Hungary most of the people had no voice in electing representatives, and until 1896 this had been the case in Austria also. In both parts of the Dual Monarchy government was in the hands of ministers controlled by the crown, and a bureaucracy, cumbersome and inefficient, also dependent on the crown.

Foreign
policy

The foreign policy of Austria-Hungary during this period had to do with ambitions in the Balkans and attempts to extend to the south. With the new German Empire cordial relations were soon established. With respect to Italy the old ambitions were completely given over. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, while other European powers were making themselves greater by colonial expansion, the Dual Monarchy hoped to reach southward along the eastern shore of the Adriatic and down through the Balkans to an outlet, perhaps at Salonica. As early as the War for Greek Independence it was evident that Austria and Russia were suspicious of

each other in rivalry over the Balkans. This was more apparent in 1877, when the Russo-Turkish War began. In the next year, at the Congress of Berlin, when Russia was forced to let a great part of what she had accomplished be undone, Austria-Hungary was given the administration of the two Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, peopled with South Slavs, and conveniently adjoining her own Slavic provinces of Dalmatia and Croatia-Slavonia. In the following year she joined the German Empire in alliance, from which she got added protection against Russia, though Germany was not yet disposed to forfeit the friendship of Russia.

Rivalry with
Russia

Year by year the rivalry of Austria-Hungary and Russia for greater power and influence in the Balkans increased, and the small countries which had recently arisen from the decay of Turkey were the scene of continued plots and intrigue. In 1897 an agreement was made between Austria and Russia, and their "superior interest" in the provinces of European Turkey was recognized by the Great Powers. About that very time, however, began the new direction of German policy which tended toward expansion in Asiatic Turkey, and which therefore supported Austria-Hungary. The two powers now worked together in close understanding, for predominant influence in the Balkans and at Constantinople, for the gradual exclusion of Russia, and the connecting of the German-planned Bagdad Railway with the road running from Constantinople to Vienna and Berlin. The first great clash came in 1908-9 when the Dual Monarchy annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, in defiance of Russia, who yielded to German threats. Four years later came the Balkan Wars in which Germany and Austria lost influence and prestige, since in the first war they favored Turkey and in the second Bulgaria, both of whom were completely defeated. It was partly because they were trying to recover what had been lost that the ultimatum was sent

Austria-
Hungary,
Russia, and
the Balkans

to Servia in 1914, which occasioned the conflict that shattered German power and destroyed the Austro-Hungarian state.

The Dual
Monarchy
and the Bal-
kan States

It was not merely ambition but sound policy that caused statesmen of the Dual Monarchy to take interest in Balkan affairs. As the Ottoman Empire had shrunk and decayed in Europe part of the South Slavic and Rumanian people whom Turkey ruled were incorporated in Austria and in Hungary, while part of them afterward shook off the sultan's yoke and set up independent states for themselves. In Transylvania and Bukowina there were more than 3,000,000 Rumanians, while in Rumania, just across the Carpathian Mountains, there were 8,000,000 more. In the southern provinces of the Monarchy just before the war there were 7,000,000 Jugo-Slavs, while across the border in Montenegro and Servia there were 5,000,000. Once these people had been glad to escape the Turkish yoke by being taken into the Austrian dominions, and now in the Dual Monarchy they had no little prosperity and progress. But meanwhile, Rumania and Servia had grown up, and in course of time, as the Rumān and South Slavic subjects of Austria-Hungary saw themselves treated as inferiors and debarred from equal rights, they began to yearn for the day when they might be united with their brethren. Thus the statesmen of the Dual Monarchy saw it threatened with disintegration. Just before the Great War, it is said, the ill-fated Archduke Franz Ferdinand cherished the scheme of admitting the Slavs to a partnership with Magyars and Germans; but this plan, which would probably have failed to cure the ills of the state, was never tried. Generally it had seemed best to the leaders to pursue an aggressive policy, and try to control the small neighboring states in the Balkans, and thus make it impossible to draw parts of the Monarchy away. In 1883 an alliance was made with Rumania which became thus an appendage of the Triple Alliance.

Neighbor-
ing South-
Slavic
states

For some time very friendly relations were established with Servia, while Russia had great influence in Bulgaria; but after a while Bulgaria was drawn close to the Teutonic Powers, and Servia came under the influence of Russia.

For more than a decade previous to the Great War Servia dreamed of future greatness, to come when the Dual Monarchy broke up. She was overwhelmed with fury and despair when Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed, because she had hoped to get them for herself, but she was compelled to submit. From that time on Austria seemed resolved to make Servia completely subservient, and thus, as she thought, lessen the possible danger from her. During the First Balkan War she prevented Servia from getting an outlet on the Adriatic Sea, and in the Second Balkan War she encouraged Bulgaria to attack her. After 1913 Servia, stronger than before, was also more ambitious, and altogether hostile to her neighbor. Discontented South Slavs in the Dual Monarchy were encouraged and supported by Servians, until finally the menace became a grave one. So Austria-Hungary resolved to reduce Servia to vassalage, and wished to attack her in 1913. In the next year the assassination at Sarajevo was ascribed to Servian plotting, though no proofs were ever given, and then the ultimatum was sent from Austria to Servia which led straight to the War of the Nations.

The history of the Balkans in the nineteenth century is largely a story of the disintegration of the Turkish Empire in Europe and the establishment of separate states from its ruins. The Turks, who two centuries before had been dreaded by all Christian peoples, were now weak and decadent, and would undoubtedly have suffered the fate of the Poles had they not been farther removed from strong neighbors, and had the Great Powers not been too jealous to unite to despoil them. They had come into Europe from Asia Minor in the fourteenth century. In

The Dual
Monarchy
and Servia

The former
greatness
of Turkey

Ottoman power established in Europe

1361 they took Adrianople. In 1389 they broke the power of Servia; and soon afterward overran Bulgaria and Wallachia. A pitiful remnant of the Eastern Roman Empire survived on the Bosphorus, but in 1453 they captured Constantinople, which was thenceforth the center of their power. Their dominion was rapidly extended up through the Balkans; Hungary was overrun; and turning to the east they subjected the Russians and the Tartars along the northern shore of the Black Sea. For a while they were the greatest naval power in the world; their galleys swept the eastern Mediterranean; they conquered the islands and much of the north African shore. In 1571 the Christian powers of the west combined to defeat them in the great naval battle of Lepanto, and this was in fact a decisive triumph. But for another century the Ottoman power continued to be mighty and terrible on land. The king of Poland was reduced to pay tribute, and in 1683 Vienna itself was besieged by a Turkish host.

Decline of the Ottoman power

But the foundations of this mighty structure presently began to decay, and though the edifice long stood erect in apparent splendor, it was destined to collapse completely. Gradually the vigor of the rulers declined amidst the luxury and the pleasures of Constantinople. The Janissaries, the terrible organized mercenaries, who had so long defeated all their enemies, fell behind rival armies in discipline and military equipment, and were finally able to inspire terror only in the Turkish Government itself. Moreover, the Turks had never perfected any strong organization in their empire. Always deficient in political ability, they depended on force and chicanery for holding together their dominions. Like the Mongols once in Russia, the Turks ruled their Christian subjects in the Balkans by taking advantage of differences in race and religion to keep them apart, and by punishing them savagely if they resisted or failed to pay tribute. They

did not attempt really to incorporate the Servians, the Bulgarians, the Hungarians, and the Greeks in a compact Ottoman empire, but reduced them to serfdom or put them under tribute, otherwise leaving them largely to themselves, so long as they continued submissive. Always the Turks were a minority of the population, and so far as they lived among their subjects they lived as an upper, ruling class, never winning affection or loyalty or gratitude from their subjects, and never mingling with them to form one united people. Misgovernment and oppression of subject Christians by the Turks proceeded less from Turkish brutality than incapacity. And it must be remembered that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, at a time when Catholics in Ireland and England and Protestants in the Austrian dominions suffered under disabilities and persecution, the Ottoman Empire allowed the greatest measure of religious freedom permitted by any government in Europe. In Turkey Christians exercised their religion, as a rule, unmolested, and were freely admitted to hold office in the State.

Such an empire, like the ancient empires of the east, could be held together only so long as its military organization remained strong enough to crush all rebellions within and meet its enemies without. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this was so. The turning-point came in 1699, when by the Treaty of Carlowitz the Turks were forced to yield their outlying possessions in Hungary, in Transylvania, on the northeastern Adriatic, and about the Sea of Azov. In the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire continued to yield before Austria and Russia. In the nineteenth it began to break up from within.

In the days of their greatness, after Constantinople fell and the Janissaries encamped before Vienna, the Turks had been a concern and a danger to all Europe, though the protection of Christian Europe usually fell to Austria

Organization
of the
Ottoman
power

Rapid
decline

Rivalry
concerning
the spoils

The Balkan
Question

alone. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while the strength of the Turks was ebbing, their European provinces became a great international question, until at last the Balkans were recognized as the principal danger spot of Europe. This was because of the intense rivalry which arose for possession of the spoils. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, especially under Catherine II, Russia expanding southward took the Turkish territories along the north of the Black Sea, and afterward threatened to go slowly forward until she dominated the Balkans and arrived at Constantinople. Austria was much interested in this, for already she had many subjects who had once belonged to Turkey, and expected to get more. At first, however, she was not greatly hostile to Russian expansion, and in 1790 an arrangement was planned by which the Ottoman dominions should be divided between Austria and Russia. England, however, already dreaded the appearance of a great European power on the ruins of Turkey, and exerted herself then, as afterward, to save the Ottoman state from destruction.

England,
then Austria,
opposes
Russia

During the first half of the nineteenth century England was the principal supporter of Turkey, and, along with France, fought the Crimean War in 1854 to save her from Russian aggression. She intervened decisively also in 1878, and again saved Turkey from destruction. But, after that time Austria came more and more to be Russia's principal opponent in the Balkans, dreading, as she did, to see the extension of Russian power southward, or the bringing of the new Balkan states into dependence on her. During much of this time either Russia or Austria would gladly have taken the Ottoman provinces, but failing that, each was resolved that no other power should get them. Gradually it was recognized that a European war might very easily grow out of attempted aggrandizement by any of the great powers in the Balkans; and so, for the most part, the powers exerted themselves to preserve the Otto-

man state. It was due almost solely to this that Turkey survived down to the time of the Great War, and owing to similar rivalries and international conditions part of her has still been allowed to remain.

But by 1914 only a vestige of Ottoman power remained in Europe. In less than a century she had lost all her possessions in Africa, and in Europe saved only a small district around Constantinople. The principal steps in the dismemberment of European Turkey since the time of the French Revolution were: the Treaty of Adrianople between Russia and Turkey in 1829, which ended the War for Greek Independence; the Treaty of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin which brought to an end the struggle between Russia and Turkey in 1877-8; and the Treaty of London, 1913, which concluded the First Balkan War. All of the crises that led to these settlements were brought about partly because of misgovernment and oppression of Christian subjects by the Turkish authorities, partly because of the indignation which this aroused either in Russia or among the Balkan peoples themselves, and partly because of the desire of Russia or Austria at first, and later of the Balkan States, to seize for themselves what was slipping away from the weakening grasp of the Turks.

In the early part of the nineteenth century the submerged peoples of Turkey began to seek their freedom at the same time that the Turkish dominions were beginning to crumble from internal decay. Ali, pasha of Janina, first made himself almost independent in Albania, then as governor of Rumelia began to intrigue with foreign powers. In 1804 the Serbs, still under Turkish rule, began a long struggle for their independence, and in 1817 some of them won their autonomy, thus laying the foundation of the Servian kingdom.

Meanwhile, the Greeks had begun a struggle which aroused sympathy all over Europe. They had, indeed,

The dismemberment of Turkey, 1829-1913

The beginning of Servia

Revolt of the Greeks

Condition of
the Greeks

been treated with considerable moderation, and in the islands of the *Ægean* they were already practically independent. They had retained their distinctive character. In the Greek Catholic Church they had a strong organization which served to maintain their national spirit and urge them forward to obtain their independence. The spirit of nationality was aroused among them early in the nineteenth century by revived study of the Greek classics and recollections of the Hellas of old. In 1814 was founded the *Hetairia Philike* (friendly union), a secret society something like the *Carbonari* in Italy later on. Revolt broke out in 1821. It was led by Prince Ypsilanti in the north and by various others of the *Hetairia* in the Peloponnesus or Morea. The northern movement was broken at once, but in the south the Greeks had command of the sea, and a long struggle inclined in their favor. In 1824, however, the sultan called to his assistance the great pasha, Mehemet Ali, of Egypt, and the powerful fleet that was now brought to the Turkish side soon reduced the Greeks to despair. Unless they could get help from abroad it was apparent that their cause was doomed. Volunteers from other countries, notable among whom was the English poet, Lord Byron, enlisted in their service, but were able to accomplish little of importance.

The inde-
pendence of
Greece

The European governments, whatever the sympathies of their people, were at first reluctant to intervene, because it was clearly understood by Metternich and the principal statesmen then that any disturbance of the existing arrangement might in the end destroy what had been established by the Congress of Vienna. In 1823 Great Britain had recognized the belligerency of the Greeks, and already the sympathy of the Russian people had been stirred profoundly; but the only result was negotiations which dragged on and led to nothing. Russia wanted no independent Greece, while Austria and England, fearing that a dependent Greek state would really

depend upon Russia, preferred, after a while, that the Greeks be made entirely independent. In 1827, however, the combined fleets of England and France, attempting to enforce a truce between the Greeks and the Turks, destroyed the fleet of Mehemet Ali at Navarino. The sultan now rashly declared war. Then a Russian army entering the Balkans pressed on to Constantinople itself.

By the Treaty of Adrianople Turkey practically acknowledged the independence of Greece, which was defined and established at an international conference in London three years later. At the same time she acknowledged the autonomy of Servia; of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Danubian Principalities, which became a Russian protectorate; and gave up to Russia such claims as she had to certain districts in the Caucasus, which Russia afterward acquired for herself. Thus by the settlement of 1829 Turkey lost her outlying European provinces—Greece, Servia, and what was afterward the Rumanian Kingdom.

The old conditions continued in what was left to her, for in the midst of the great growth and changes of the nineteenth century the Turks changed almost not at all. There was the same stagnation, inefficiency, heavy oppression, and lack of progress, and the fierce wildness of the rude and long-oppressed Christian population was suppressed from time to time by outbursts of fearful cruelty and destruction. About 1875 an insurrection broke out in Herzegovina, a district to the west of Servia, peopled by Serbs, but still under Turkish rule. While the rebels were being encouraged by the surrounding states, Montenegro, Austria, and Servia, in 1876 the inhabitants of Bulgaria, a large province east of Servia and south of the Danube, and so nearer to Constantinople and Turkish oppression, rose against the Turks also. Servia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey, and great sympathy was aroused in Russia, many of the tsar's subjects enlisting to fight as volunteers. Generally

The Treaty
of Adriano-
ple, 1829

Revolt of the
Bulgars,
1876



17. THE BALKANS IN 1878

the Turks were successful, but the fearful atrocities committed by them upon the Bulgarian peasants aroused the strongest indignation and horror in Europe, especially in England, where Gladstone declared that the Turks must be expelled "bag and baggage" from Europe, and in Russia, which made ready to intervene.

In the spring of 1877 Russia did begin war. Rumania, declaring now complete independence, joined her, and the allies pushing rapidly southward soon seized the passes of the Balkan Mountains which were the gateway into the country. At Plevna, in northern Bulgaria, where a network of highways converged, Osman Pasha, an able Turkish commander, fortified himself to oppose them. The allies had not sufficient forces completely to mask this fortress and also advance against Constantinople, but for some time they were unable to take it. In December, however, Plevna fell, after a memorable siege. In another month the Russians had pushed on and taken Adrianople, and Constantinople itself would have fallen except for the rising jealousy of Austria now, and above all the determined hostility of Great Britain. None the less, in March, 1878, the Turks concluded with Russia the Treaty of San Stefano by which at last was acknowledged the complete independence of Montenegro and Servia, to whom some territory was yielded; while almost all of Turkey's European territory, except for a small area including Adrianople and the capital and another area in Albania on the Adriatic, was given to a new Bulgaria, autonomous but tributary to the sultan.

This would have made Bulgaria the most important state in the Balkans, and for some time, doubtless, she would have been largely dependent on Russia. But owing to the efforts of Austria and Great Britain this treaty was almost at once undone at the Congress of Berlin, which reduced Bulgaria and restored to the sultan much of what he had lost, though Bosnia and Herze-

The Russo-Turkish War, 1877-8

The Treaty of San Stefano, 1878

The Treaty of Berlin, 1878

govina were put under the administration of Austria-Hungary. The result of this was that Turkey, though considerably reduced, still stretched from the Black Sea to the Adriatic Sea and still rested on the Ægean. She continued to be the foremost power in the Near East.

Continued
decline of
Turkey

In the generation that followed the old conditions lasted on. The decline and decay of Turkey continued, although after 1876 she was ruled by Abdul Hamid, a man of sinister and evil reputation, but subtle and skilful in upholding Turkey by playing upon the rivalries of the powers. Meanwhile, the new Balkan states were growing in experience and strength, and beginning to hope for the day when the complete break-up of the Ottoman power would enable them to become greater still.

Loss of
Bosnia and
Herzegovina

At the end of the century as at the beginning, the decay of the Turkish Empire continued. As the atrophy proceeded all the outlying members had dropped off or had been cut away. In the early part of the twentieth century nothing was left in Africa but Tripoli; Arabia and other districts in Asia no longer obeyed Ottoman commands; in Europe Turkish dominion had steadily shrunk in the Balkans. In 1908 Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Bulgaria declared her complete independence. In 1911 Italy—which had at last acquiesced in French possession of Tunis and approved French expansion in Morocco, on condition that France make no objection to Italian occupation of what was left to take east of Tunis—suddenly invaded Tripoli. A long and exhausting struggle was maintained by the tribesmen in their deserts, supported by officers from Turkey, but in 1912 the Ottoman Government was compelled to yield its last African possession. These incidents were of much importance in the changes of these years. The German Government strongly disapproved of the attack on its friend, but could not hinder its ally. On the other hand, both England and France encouraged Italy and approved

Loss of
Tripoli



18. THE OTTOMAN DOMINIONS: GREAT



PRESENT, SUCCESSIVE LOSSES, PRESENT EXTENT

her action, and it was evident that Italy would be loath now to offend these powers since they controlled absolutely the Mediterranean, and only with their good will could Italy keep her new possession. But more than that, the annexation of Bosnia and the seizure of Tripoli opened a new era, which led directly to the Great War. Since 1878 it had been a recognized axiom in European politics that in Turkey and the Balkans lay the great danger of Europe, and that any changes there were apt to be fraught with the utmost hazard. It was for this reason that Turkey had been allowed to die slowly, with the Great Powers fearing to meddle, lest quarrels arise and conflict begin. But Austria had broken a European treaty and Italy had dared to make war on Turkey, regardless of the effects so long feared, and they had taken what they desired. The example was speedily followed.

In Turkey the old evils of misgovernment continued. The Turks had been brave and admirable soldiers, and under favorable circumstances they had revealed a character pleasant and with noble traits. But they had never mastered the art of organizing and governing well. They were often tricked and deceived by their subjects; and in last recourse their method was usually nothing more than to employ dull, stupid, and brutal force, and with the greatest cruelty compel submission. In the country left to them outside Constantinople their subjects were still oppressed with ruinous and ancient taxes, held as inferiors, and treated with contempt. In the western district, the mountainous country of Albania, Turkish authority was defied; but in Macedonia and Thrace the people groaned under grievous misrule. The people of Macedonia were Servians, Greeks, and Bulgars, mingled together. They often looked with longing eyes to their brethren in Servia, Greece, and Bulgaria, over the borders; and always the governments of these countries, especially Bulgaria, looked forward to the day when, on the dissolution of Turkey,

Conse-
quences of
the seizure
of Tripoli

The Turks,
Macedonia,
and the
Balkan
States

Disaffection
and intrigue
in Mace-
donia

these populations would be incorporated in the greater Balkan states of the future. Ceaselessly agents from over the border tried to stir up the Christians of the Turkish country to be ready for the day of deliverance, and always they tried to prepare the way for the incorporation of as many of them as possible in their respective countries, Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece. These three little nations hated with a great hatred the Turk, who had once oppressed their fathers, but so acute had their own rivalries become that in the earlier years of the twentieth century they hated one another still more. It was accordingly an extraordinary diplomatic triumph and a surprise to the rest of Europe, when, after secret negotiations early in 1912, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece concluded an arrangement by which they agreed to act together. This agreement, it is believed, was largely the work of the Greek statesman, Venizelos.

Causes of
the First
Balkan War,
1912

In 1908 the Ottoman Government had been overthrown by a revolution. The new leaders, the Young Turks, strove to reform the administration and restore the vigor and power of the State. Actually, in the end it seemed that they did more harm than good. They soon undertook a policy of nationalization, attempting to assimilate their various subjects. So they withdrew privileges from the Christian peoples in Macedonia, and began bringing Mohammedans in. This led to disorder, massacre, and reprisal. The Balkan States desired that this should come to an end. Apparently at first they did not wish to go to war; but public opinion drove them forward. In the autumn the Turks concentrated some of their best troops north of Adrianople for maneuvers, and immediately the four Balkan States issued simultaneous orders for mobilization, after which the Turks ordered mobilization next day. It was evident that the little states of the peninsula, encouraged by the example of Italy, were really willing to go to war. The Great Powers in much

alarm endeavored now, too late, to prevent a conflict. October 8 they issued a note in which they condemned any act leading to war, and stated that if nevertheless a war did break out "they will not admit, at the end of the conflict, any modification in the territorial *status quo* in European Turkey." But Montenegro immediately declared war, and her representative is reported to have said that the Balkan States did not fear the Great Powers. October 14, Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece presented an ultimatum to Turkey, and the next day fighting began. Such was the beginning of the First Balkan War.

This contest gave almost as great a surprise as had the Franco-German War. Turkey was known to be in the later stages of decay, but the Turks had always been brave and steady fighters, and, weak though their state might be, it was supposed that their army, organized and trained by Germany, was still in fair shape, and it was believed to be superior to any military force which the Balkan States could assemble. But the four Balkan armies moved forward at once, and struck a series of terrible blows by which the power of Turkey in Europe was ruined. The little Montenegrin army advanced to the southward and laid siege to Scutari. The Servians defeated the Turks in the great battle of Kumanovo, overran part of Macedonia, presently captured a large Turkish force in the stronghold of Monastir, and even crossed Albania and reached the Adriatic at Durazzo. The Greeks at once got control of the Ægean Sea, the task that had been assigned them, and, in addition, moved their army rapidly forward, pushing the Turks back and driving some of them into the fortress of Janina and some into the seaport of Salonica.

Meanwhile, greater deeds were being done by the Bulgars. To them had been assigned the task of holding the main Turkish forces in Thrace. At once they moved down upon the principal fortress, Adrianople, sacred in the eyes of the Turks, and key to the Thracian plain.

The Balkan
allies victori-
ous

Great vic-
tories of the
Bulgars

Near by they encountered a Turkish army, which was defeated at Kirk-Kilisse, and driven from the field in total rout. A week later they destroyed the military power of the Turks in a greater and more desperate battle at Lüle Burgas. Thrace was now cleared, and the Bulgarians, moving swiftly on in triumph, were stopped only by the fortifications of the Tchataldja lines, which protect Constantinople, and had in days of need long before stayed other invaders from the north. Here the Bulgars were halted.

The London Conference

The general result was that within six weeks Turkish power in Europe had been destroyed. The Turks had been defeated in the principal battles and had lost command of the sea. The relics of their forces had been driven down upon Constantinople or were hopelessly shut up in the beleaguered fortresses of Adrianople, Scutari, and Janina. The Turks asked for an armistice, and a peace conference assembled in London.

End of the First Balkan War

This conference between the Turks and their foes was soon broken off, and at the beginning of February hostilities were again begun. The Bulgarian troops at Tchataldja were not able to force the Turkish lines and take Constantinople, but no more were the Turks able to drive them away. Meanwhile, the Greeks took Janina, and the Bulgars Adrianople. The Great Powers had already proposed mediation, and April 19 an armistice was signed. At the end of May a treaty was made whereby an Albania was to be constituted by the powers, and the Turks were to keep a small district outside of Constantinople; otherwise what had belonged to Turkey in Europe was to go to the victorious Balkan states. This would probably meet the wishes of Greece and Bulgaria, provided they could agree among themselves, but it debarred Servia and Montenegro from getting a great part of what they had expected, on the shores of the Adriatic, in Albania. Servia yielded, because of the injunctions of the Great

The Treaty of London, 1913

AUSTRIA, TURKEY, BALKANS 329

Powers and because she hoped for compensation elsewhere; but Montenegro, bent on having possession of Scutari, continued the siege of that mountain stronghold, and, defying the wishes of the powers, after prodigies of valor her soldiers took it. Presently, however, the threats of the powers compelled her to give it up again.

A second Balkan war soon followed. This struggle was directly the result of the decision of the powers not to permit Servia, Montenegro, or Greece to take territory in Albania, and this had been done because of the insistence of Austria that an Albania should be maintained. It had in the first place seemed almost inconceivable that the Balkan states with their bitter rivalries would be able to act in alliance, but they had carefully agreed beforehand what each one should have, provided they defeated Turkey, and it is possible that if there had been no interference they might have divided the spoils without fighting. Now that it was forbidden to touch Albanian territory, however, Servia demanded that the agreement of 1912 be revised so that she would have compensation elsewhere. A week later this was refused. Savage fighting had already broken out between Bulgarians and Servians and Greeks. At the end of June, suddenly, without any declaration of war, the Bulgarian armies attacked the Servian and the Greek forces, and a few days later Montenegro, Servia, and Greece declared war on Bulgaria, so recently their ally.

It is probable that Bulgaria had been encouraged by the Teutonic powers to resist the Servian request, and it is certain that they expected her to win an easy victory, just as they had expected a Turkish triumph the preceding autumn. But again they were grievously mistaken. Neither the Greeks nor the Serbs were overwhelmed, but began driving the Bulgars back before them. While this struggle was being waged, with inconceivable atrocities on both sides, the doom of Bulgaria was sealed

The Second
Balkan War,
1913

Bulgaria
crushed



19. THE BALKANS IN 1913

by the sudden action of the Rumanian Government. Rumania had just seen all the Balkan states except herself make large gains in territory and power. She now suddenly demanded that Bulgaria cede her a strip of territory on her southern border. When this was refused the powerful Rumanian army was moved down upon the Bulgarian capital while the Greeks and the Serbs were advancing from other sides. Nor was this all. The Turks, seeing the difficulty in which Bulgaria was, re-occupied Adrianople. All hope was at an end, and the king of Bulgaria threw himself upon the mercy of his foes.

In August the stern Treaty of Bucharest was imposed, by which Bulgaria lost most of what her great victories had gained from the Turks; Rumania took that which she had demanded; and Servia and Greece got the territories which they had taken in the First Balkan War, while Bulgaria was engaging the main Turkish forces. It was said at the time that this treaty would lead to other wars in the future. Bulgaria was left greatly weakened, but also burning with a sense of wrong and evidently waiting for the day when she might strike a blow at Rumania, or Servia, or Greece, to have revenge, and get back the territory which they had taken, in which, indeed, a large part of the population was Bulgarian. Little mercy was shown her, but she herself had cynically refused any generosity in the brief moment of her greatness.

The result of the two Balkan wars was that to Turkey in Europe there was left only Constantinople and a small area of territory northward. Steadily the state sank lower and lower into feebleness, décrépitude, and ruin, while foreign capitalists and diplomatic agents came in to intrigue and control. Turkey had drifted away from the old friendship with Britain and became more and more dependent on the Germans. Early in the Great War she was brought into the struggle to aid Germany almost like a vassal state.

The Treaty
of Bucharest,
1913

The relics of
the Ottoman
state

Montenegro

Of the Balkan countries the oldest was Montenegro, whose hardy population of rude mountaineers had never been entirely conquered even when the Turkish dominions extended far to the north of their district. Her bold warriors carried on constant war with the Turks, supporting themselves by their herds and their flocks, by rude tillage, and by forage for plunder, as the Scottish highlanders once had done. Her complete independence was formally acknowledged by the Treaty of San Stefano and by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The people were Serbs, closely related to the population of Servia. Because of the conditions of their life only slight material progress was possible. Owing to the good offices of England an outlet was procured for them in 1880 on the Adriatic, at Dulcigno. The government was in theory a constitutional monarchy, but actually the prince was a patriarch and leader of a tribal people.

**Servia, 1817,
1878**

Next in age was Servia, who attained autonomous government in 1817, this autonomy being recognized more formally in the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. Her freedom came after a long contest with the Turks. In 1804 the struggle was begun by a peasant leader, Kara (Black) George, the father of Servian independence. After successful guerilla warfare in the mountains he completely overwhelmed the Turks at Mischoz in 1806. For a few years the Turks granted virtual autonomy, but when Russia, the patron of the Balkan Slavs, was occupied in the great struggle with Napoleon, the sultan again reduced the country. Presently, however, the Servians rose under another peasant leader, Milosh Obrenovitch, and Russia being free to intervene again, the sultan yielded once more.

**Rival
dynasties**

The circumstances of the Servian war of liberation were unfortunate in that freedom was won through the efforts of two leaders, both of whose families now desired to rule the country. The result was that the country was torn

by family and dynastic disputes much like the feuds of Irish princes in the Middle Ages. In a country of peasants, where tribal instincts were still very strong, it would, in any event, have been difficult to avoid this. In 1817 Kara George was assassinated so that the Obrenovitch family might rule. This was avenged in 1868 when Michael III was assassinated by partisans of the Karageorgevitch house, and in 1903 when they murdered Alexander and his queen. The Obrenovitch dynasty was now extinct, and the throne came finally into the possession of the House of Kara George.

In foreign relations Servia long remained dependent on Austria, with whom she made an alliance in 1881. Austria supported and protected her in her rash war with Bulgaria in 1886, in which she was badly defeated at Slivnitsa. But at the Congress of Berlin, eight years before, Austria-Hungary had been given the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which dwelt a large part of the Servian race. As time went on Servia greatly hoped some day to obtain these provinces for herself. Accordingly, the friendship with Austria gradually cooled, and Servia, getting more and more under Russian influence, strove to free herself from economic dependence on her neighbor to the north. In 1908, when Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed by the Dual Monarchy, and the last chance of Servia acquiring them seemed to have gone, the Servians were filled with the rage of despair, and apparently hoped to be able to fight against Austria along with Russia as an ally. When Russia yielded to Austria and Germany together it seemed for a moment that Servia would strike by herself, but she also yielded and was compelled to accept what had been done. In 1912 she helped to form the Balkan Alliance which dismembered Turkey. She overcame all opposition and even obtained the long-desired outlet on the sea, at Durazzo. But Austria-Hungary, unwilling that Servia should grow great or have a

Servia,
Austria-
Hungary,
and Russia

Servia in
the Balkan
wars

port on the Adriatic, compelled her to withdraw from Albania. She did, indeed, at this time yield to Servia the *sanjak* (province) of Novi-Bazar, which lay between Servia and Montenegro, and which she had undertaken to administer when she got possession of Bosnia. But the Serbs, deprived of the fruits of their victory, turned for compensation to the east, and this helped to bring on the Second Balkan War. In this struggle Servia and Greece defeated Bulgaria, and, as a result of the Treaty of Bucharest, Servia, although terribly weakened, was left with greatly increased possessions and prestige. In 1915, during the Great War, she was destroyed by her enemies, but part of her army escaped and afterward assisted the Allies in their final triumph. As a result of this war Servia became the leader of a great federation of South Slavs, based upon the eastern Adriatic Sea.

Domestic affairs

The domestic history of the country records the long, slow rise of the peasants to better economic conditions. The principal occupations of the people were agriculture and the raising of cattle. Generally speaking, the land was in the hands of small peasant proprietors, who lived a rude, hard life, but enjoyed more economic independence than most of the peasants outside of France, and of Ireland after the Land Purchase Acts. The government was vested in a prince, until 1882, when the title of king was assumed. There was a legislature, the *Skupština*, and for some years before the war a considerable measure of constitutional self-government had been developing. The religion of the people is the Greek Catholic faith.

Greece,
1829-1832

For ages the fate of Greece has been closely associated with that of Turkey and the Balkans. The Greeks obtained their freedom in 1829, about the time that the Serbs won theirs. When Turkey had abandoned her claims, there was some delay about fixing the status of the country. Russia desired that Servia should have self-government but remain tributary to the sultan; but since it was believed that

this would make her really dependent on Russia, Austria and England opposed it. Metternich was unwilling for any assistance to be given to the Greeks; he greatly wished to prevent the break-up of the Ottoman dominions, and hence some part of the existing arrangement in Europe; but since that had already occurred, he joined England in helping to establish Greece as a sovereign and independent state. This was done in 1832 as the result of an international conference in London.

In her foreign relations Greece was generally fortunate. England and France occupied Piræus in 1856 to prevent Greece attacking Turkey during the Crimean War; but in 1862 the British Government gave her the Ionian Islands, which lay just off the west coast, and which England had acquired during the Napoleonic wars. By the Congress of Berlin the northern boundaries of Greece were extended, and five years later, after some pressure by the powers, she received parts of Thessaly and Epirus. In 1897, during a rebellion in the large Greek-inhabited island of Crete, Greece declared war on Turkey, but was at once overwhelmed and would have lost some of her territory in the north but for prompt intervention by the powers. None the less, the Cretans, who had repeatedly risen in rebellions since the time of the Greek War of Independence, were now given autonomy under Turkey. In 1905, under their leader, Venizelos, the ablest Greek of his generation, they declared for union with Greece, and five years later the Treaty of London, at the end of the First Balkan War, brought this about. In the First Balkan War the Greeks got command of the sea, and occupied such islands in the Ægean as Italy had not taken the year before, and, defeating the Turkish armies opposed to them, got the long-coveted city of Salonica. In the second war, she helped Servia to defeat Bulgaria, and kept what she had won. In the Great War Venizelos would have had her join the Allies, but the sympathy of the sovereign was

Foreign
relations

Greece in
the Balkan
wars

with Germany, and for a long time Greece remained neutral. The Allies presently occupied Salonica, and in 1917 a revolution drove King Constantine out, whereupon Greece entered the war with England and France. In 1920, during the settlement of European affairs, by the Treaty of Sèvres, Greece received considerable portions of Turkish territory along the *Ægean* and up beyond Adrianople, and also in Asia Minor.

Domestic
affairs

The domestic history of the country during this period has no great general interest. The people are descended from the ancient Hellenes, though their forefathers mingled with the Slavic intruders who came into the peninsula in the early Middle Ages. Their language is a modification of the Greek spoken by the countrymen of Aristotle and Pericles. Indeed, modern Greek is much more like the Greek of classical times than modern English is like Anglo-Saxon. The people belong to the Greek Catholic Church. The government is a constitutional monarchy. The people have continued the traditions of old Greece and developed much commerce and shipping, but the country is poor and opportunity small, and large numbers of emigrants have left the homeland. The new possessions of Greece together with the advantages of her geographical position will probably bring much greater prosperity and expansion in the future.

Rumania,
1829-61-78

Rumania dates from about the time when Greece was established. By the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 the two Danubian principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, were left under the nominal sovereignty of the sultan, but actually autonomous and largely dependent on Russia, who had gained them their freedom. Russian control of the country, which commanded the mouths of the Danube, awakened the jealousy of Austria, and in 1856 at the Congress of Paris the principalities were formally declared autonomous states under Turkish suzerainty and the Russian protectorate abolished. At the same time

Bessarabia, formerly an eastern part of Moldavia, lying across the Danube, and taken by Russia from Turkey in 1812, was joined to Moldavia once more. The constituent assemblies now called, in the two provinces, declared for union in one state; but this was opposed by England who feared Russia, and by Austria who wanted no strong Rumanian state right on the border of her province of Transylvania which was peopled by Rumans. None the less, the people of the two principalities proceeded to elect the same prince, Alexander Couza, and supported by Napoleon III, who shortly afterward made war upon Austria to assist Italian nationality, they were united. The union was sanctioned by Turkey in 1861. The great reforms which Couza undertook raised enemies who drove him from his throne five years later. He was succeeded by a German prince, Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, in whose long reign the country went forward in development and progress.

With Russia Rumania made war upon Turkey in 1877, and her soldiers won great distinction; but she gained nothing; for, in the settlement that followed, Russia took back Bessarabia and gave the less valuable Dobrudja to the south, which had just been taken from Turkey. But the complete independence of Rumania was recognized by the Treaty of Berlin, and in 1881 her ruler assumed the title of king. Rumania took no part in the First Balkan War, but intervened decisively in the Second, and by the Treaty of Bucharest obtained a small portion of Bulgarian territory. During the Great War, like Italy and Greece, Rumania maintained neutrality for some time, but in 1916 joined the Allies. After a brief struggle she was overwhelmed, and presently forced to make an ignominious peace and see her country stripped bare. Two years later, however, her enemies were completely overthrown, and in the general settlement of European affairs, in Paris, she obtained what she had so long hoped for: Tran-

The
Danubian
Principali-
ties auto-
nomous

Foreign
affairs

sylvania, *Romania Irredenta*, and proceeded to take back Bessarabia also.

Domestic affairs

The domestic history of the country reveals steady development and increase in material prosperity. Even before her latest acquisitions Rumania was the largest and most populous of the Balkan States; she was rich in resources, one of the great wheat- and oil-producing districts of Europe, and she had a trade almost as great as that of all the other Balkan States combined. After the Treaty of St. Germain (1919) and the taking of Bessarabia her size was nearly doubled, and she became greater and more important than her neighbors, Austria, Hungary, or any of the Balkan States. Rumania was free from the uprisings and violent overturns that interfered with the development of neighboring states. Constitutional monarchy was established but a restricted franchise kept control in the hands of the upper classes. Under their prince, Alexander (1859–1866), a series of notable reforms was made; the property of the monasteries was confiscated, and part of the holdings of the great landowners was sold to the peasants, who at the same time were relieved of the more onerous of the feudal or manorial obligations. These changes, which were carried through just about the time when Alexander II was making his great reform for the Russian serfs, partly failed in the end largely for the same reasons as in Russia. The amount of land given to the peasants was small, and since the population increased rapidly, after a while the amount was altogether insufficient. Furthermore, some of the feudal obligations were left upon the peasants, such obligations lingering in Rumania longer than anywhere else in Europe. The result was that while the wealth and prosperity of the country increased, it was largely for the upper classes. The mass of the people were poor, and agrarian discontent was very great. During the period of the Great War, however, large estates were

Agrarian reforms

divided among the peasants, and universal suffrage was granted. The people claim descent from Roman colonists of the time of Trajan, and their language is an offspring of the Latin; but most of the people are Slavic, and most of them adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church.

Youngest of the Balkan States was Bulgaria. The Bulgars, like the Serbs, have a long history. Both of them were formidable enemies of the Eastern Roman Empire in the days of the Empire's decline, and both founded great states in the Balkan peninsula during the Middle Ages. Both of them were afterward overwhelmed by the Turks, and spent long ages in dumb and hopeless subjection. Because of their rivalry and their disputes the Turks found it easy to conquer them and afterward play them off against each other.

In 1876, following the uprising of the people of Herzegovina, Bulgarian peasants rose against their Turkish masters. The revolt was easily suppressed, but it was suppressed with such cruelty that all Europe was aroused. The "Bulgarian Atrocities," as the massacres were called, awakened a storm of indignation in Europe. In 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey. She was moved partly by ambition to extend her influence toward Constantinople, but she was aroused also because of the sincere sympathy of the Russian people for their kinsmen in the midst of the horrors which they were enduring. Joined by Rumania, she quickly destroyed Turkey's power, and by the Treaty of San Stefano stripped her of nearly all her possessions in Europe. This territory was mostly given to a new Bulgarian state, autonomous though tributary to the sultan, which would now have been the most powerful state in the Balkans. But this arrangement was not allowed to stand. The entire Balkan question was soon dealt with by a European congress which met at Berlin. By the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 the Bulgarian country was divided into three.

The Bulgars

Bulgaria,
1878

parts, the southernmost, Macedonia, which contained many Bulgarians, was left to the Turks; the middle part, Eastern Rumelia, was made an autonomous province under a Christian governor, but was to be under the direct authority of Turkey in military and political matters; the northern part was made into the autonomous principality of Bulgaria tributary to the sultan. Part of this enforced division of the Bulgarian people was soon undone. In 1885 Eastern Rumelia joined Bulgaria. Greece and Servia were unwilling to see their new rival strengthened, and Servia suddenly attacked her. But the Bulgars completely defeated their enemies at Slivnitsa, and the union was then assured.

The Kingdom of Bulgaria, 1908

The first ruler of the country was a German, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, but after a troublous reign of seven years he withdrew from the country. Presently another German, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, was chosen. For some years the country was directed by the one great statesman whom Bulgaria has produced, Stephen Stambulov, in whose time Bulgaria threw off the tutelage of Russia and made herself truly independent. The young nation constantly grew in strength and prestige, and in 1908, at the time when Austria annexed the two Turkish provinces, the Bulgarian prince cast off all Turkish allegiance and proclaimed the independent Kingdom of Bulgaria.

Misfortune in war

Four years later Bulgaria was the principal member in the Balkan coalition which destroyed Turkish power, and after her armies had everywhere gained great triumphs she found herself in possession of the province of Thrace down beyond Adrianople. But in the next year, unwilling to compromise with her allies, she attacked Servia and Greece. She did not succeed in defeating them, and while they were driving her back the Rumanians suddenly came down from the north, while the Turks took back Adrianople. Bulgaria was forced to make abject sub-

mission, and by the Treaty of Bucharest yielded some of her own territory to Rumania, and lost nearly all she had gained in the First Balkan War. It was partly to get revenge and partly to undo the settlement of Bucharest that the Bulgarians joined the Teutonic powers in 1915 and helped to destroy first Servia then Rumania. But in 1918 she was the first to surrender to the Allies, and the war left her poverty-stricken, ruined, and bare.

The origin of the Bulgarians is not certainly known. Like the Magyars and the Finns they are apparently Asiatic intruders in Europe, but they are much mixed with Slavic people, and speak a Slavic language. Their religion is the Greek Catholic, but they have an independent church, the Bulgarian Exarchate. The principal industry is agriculture, and the Bulgars constitute a state of small, sturdy, free, independent peasant proprietors. The government is a constitutional monarchy, under a king and a parliament, the *Sobranje*, elected by the people.

The Treaty
of Bucharest

Bulgaria a
peasant
state

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EUROPE SINCE 1870

342

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CHAPTER XIII

ITALY, SPAIN, AND THE LESSER STATES

Sono celebri le parole pronunziate da Bismarck al 1879, che l'Italia non era una potenza militare temibile . . . Oggi tutto è mutato in nostro vantaggio ed io non permetterò che l'Italia ritorni in quello stato di umiliazione. . . .

FRANCESCO CRISPI to Commendatore Ressman, September 2, 1890.

El partido liberal español, sin culpa suya, por culpa de otros, es el partido liberal más avanzado que hay en toda Europa. . . . Es necesario, completamente necesario, que la monarquía histórica española se una, se confunda, se aligue con el partido democrático histórico español.

Speech of EMILIO CASTELAR, July 12, 1883.

If this is the day of great Empires it is also preëminently the day of little nations. . . . Their destiny is interwoven with that of humanity.

Speech of Mr. LLOYD GEORGE, September 6, 1917.

Rome and
the comple-
tion of
Italian unity,
1870

THE UNIFICATION of Italy was completed with the taking of Rome in 1870. This acquisition was one of the consequences of the Franco-German War. Napoleon III, who had had so much to do with making possible the establishment of the Italian nation, by the help which he gave to Sardinia against the Austrians in 1859, had not expected the work to be carried as far as it was, and viewed with displeasure the appearance of a new great state on the southern border of France. Moreover, the powerful Catholic party in France, then very active and aggressive, was deeply offended at the taking by the new state of most of the territories of the pope in 1860. Partly to appease them and gain their good will, Napoleon III

occupied Rome, still in the pope's possession, with French troops. Soon after the beginning of the war with the Germans these troops were withdrawn, Rome was occupied by Italian forces, and the capital of the Kingdom of Italy, which had first been at Turin, then in 1865 had been removed to Florence, was now brought to Rome.

The government of the state was based on the *Statuto fondamentale del Regno*, which had been granted by Charles Albert of Sardinia (Piedmont) to his subjects in 1848, and later extended to the other districts as they were added to Sardinia to make the new kingdom. In course of time the *Statuto*, while not changed or amended, was enlarged and overlaid by much supplementary legislation and with custom having the force of law. By virtue of this constitution Italy became a monarchy, with a government of the model of England or France, where the authority was vested in a parliament, of two houses, with an executive, the ministry, responsible to it. The franchise was at first restricted by rigid property and educational qualifications, so that only one person in forty could vote. A great extension was made in 1882, while in 1912 a reform was made by which manhood suffrage was, in effect, introduced.

The extending of the franchise in Italy was long delayed and much hampered because of the illiteracy of a large part of the population, especially in the south. The effective working of the government was long impeded by the hostility of the pope. When Rome and the little strip of territory around it were occupied in 1870, it was not the purpose of the Italian Government to drive the pope away or to interfere with him as pope. Cavour's ideal had been: *libera chiesa in stato libero* (a free church in a free state). Next year the Italian Parliament passed the Law of Papal Guarantees, still in force, which guaranteed the pope's sovereignty, possession of the Vatican and other places, and a large pension in perpetuity. Pius IX

The govern-
ment of the
Kingdom of
Italy

Vatican and
Quirinal:
Church and
State in
Italy

Prisoners of
the Vatican

refused to accept this, hoping that the lost temporal possessions of the Church would be returned to him, and as late as 1914 Benedict XIV expressed hope that this would be brought about. The popes refused to take the pension, and remained in voluntary isolation, "prisoners" in the Vatican. As the years went by and no Catholic power restored to the Papacy what had been lost, the popes tried to thwart and obstruct the Italian authorities. In 1883 the decree *Non expedit* (not expedient) declared it not well for Catholics to vote at parliamentary elections or to hold office under the Italian Government; and in 1895 a further decree, *Non licet* (not allowable), proclaimed that the Church forbade these things. The trend of ideas in the nineteenth century was such that there were numerous Catholics who no longer considered it well for the Church to be a temporal power, who conceived its functions to be purely spiritual and ecclesiastical, and who therefore had no hostility toward the Italian Government because of the seizure of the papal states. Accordingly, the orders of the popes concerning Italian politics were by no means generally obeyed. The strongest impulse in Italy continued to be the fervent feeling of patriotism awakened during the great years of unification. The Catholic population was divided by a conflict between nationalism and the Church. Many had no hesitation in zealously supporting the government; many, more scrupulous and obedient, heeded the behests of the Church.

Improvements necessary for union and progress

Huge tasks confronted the new state. The effects of the weakness, the misery, the oppression of the centuries past, were not to be made up at once by any device. Especially in the south, so long weighed down under the oppressive tyranny of the Bourbons, there were old conditions surviving, poverty, illiteracy, ignorance, that it would take much to overcome and remove. In this southern part there were no railroads yet, ecclesiastics and rulers there having long considered them to be works

Conditions
in Italy

of the devil, good communications had not yet been opened, and manufactures were utterly wanting. In the north there were railroads, good communications, and flourishing industrial cities. In this part there was a sturdy body of small proprietors, among whom the lands had been parcelled out. In the south, especially in Sicily, the land was held in large estates by the nobles, as in Russia, and as in western Europe during the Middle Ages, worked by an ignorant and debased peasantry. The nation was poor and taxation inevitably oppressive; but though the south contributed least, it was necessary for a while that the greater part of the revenue should be spent there, since the country could not be truly united until the chief differences between the northern and the southern portions were done away with.

Considerable development followed. New railroads were constructed, manufacturing extended, commerce developed. Much of this was accomplished in the face of difficulties that remained very great. The principal occupation, as in France, was agriculture, but much of the soil was not rich, methods of cultivation were primitive, the peasants in the south very backward, and the land there held in the manner of the Ancient Régime. It was difficult to develop manufactures as Great Britain and Germany were then doing, since Italy was almost entirely without iron and coal, and could obtain these essentials only by buying them at high price abroad. Italy had no large quantity of exports to send out, and it was difficult merely to develop carrying trade in competition with the great seafaring nations. From a country thus poor and lacking rich natural resources it was necessary to raise huge taxes, partly to do the necessary things long left undone, and partly to sustain the ambitious foreign policy upon which the country soon embarked. The taxation was so crushing as to bow down the people and hamper the development of business; yet for a long time almost all

Develop-
ment and
progress

Heavy
taxation

Increase of population

the public revenue thus raised was devoted to paying interest on the large national debt, and to paying for the army and the navy. Notwithstanding all these things, and notwithstanding that many people could barely make a living, the birth-rate was high and the population increased rapidly, just as it had under still worse circumstances in Ireland in the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1914 the population of Italy was almost as great as that of France, and nearly twice as large as that of Spain, though the area of each one of these countries was twice as great as her own. Italy, indeed, like Japan at the same time, was unable to support her rapidly increasing numbers. Accordingly, there was a large and increasing emigration, to the South American countries, and especially to the United States where myriads of Italian peasants became small farmers, sellers of fruit, or did the construction work on railways, sewers, and public improvements, always hoping for the day when enough money would be saved to enable them to return to the beloved land of their birth.

Italian nationalism

It was ardent nationalism that made possible the strong union which was accomplished in Italy. During the Middle Ages Italy had been divided into states as completely self-conscious and as completely distinct as was Germany at the same time; and these divisions had been maintained down into the nineteenth century. Yet when the unification of the country was brought about a centralized nation state was erected, like England or France, whereas in the German Empire no more than a federal union of the parts was effected. The people also were filled with recollection of the greatness of Rome in the past, and with desire to have Italy important in the present. The Italian leaders resolved to make their country a great power. Partly through fear of France and also because of anger at her course, and partly because of previous association with Prussia, Italy joined

Italy enters the Triple Alliance

the alliance which the German Empire and Austria-Hungary had made, and thus helped to form the Triple Alliance (1882). A large army and a large navy were now deemed necessary, and the expense of maintaining them not only constituted a burden beyond the real resources of the country, but took a great part of the public revenue which was sorely needed for education and internal improvements.

During this time, while Italy was an appendage of the German alliance, she felt that she had security from France, and set out to acquire a colonial empire. Some possessions were taken in eastern Africa, but when attempt was made to conquer the independent kingdom of Abyssinia, the Italian forces suffered a crushing defeat (1896). For some years Italian colonial aspirations remained in abeyance, until in 1912, when a great change had come over international relations, Italy suddenly tried to take Tripoli away from Turkey. During this time Italy's connection with her partners had been growing weaker and weaker. The old fear and suspicion of France seemed to disappear. On the other hand, while relations with the German Empire remained cordial, with the Dual Monarchy they never became completely satisfactory. In 1866 Italy had joined Prussia against Austria, and though defeated had shared in the Prussian success. It was then that she had obtained Venetia, rounding out her possessions in the northeast. But at this time not all the Italian population in this part of Europe was given to her, a considerable portion remaining under Austrian rule across the Alps in the Trentino, at the head of the Adriatic about Trieste, and scattered along the Dalmatian shore of the Adriatic. Italian nationalists, fired with patriotic feeling, longed to bring their brethren of this *Italia Irredenta* into union with themselves. This could never be accomplished, so it seemed, until Austria-Hungary was defeated and conquered. Furthermore, extension of

Foreign
relations

*Italia
Irredenta*

Austrian power down the eastern shore of the Adriatic always seemed threatening to Italy, whose own Adriatic coast, low and defenceless, might lie helpless before the naval power of Austria based on the fortresses of the mountainous shore over the sea. Finally, there was in the twentieth century a conflict of ambition between the two, since both Austria-Hungary and Italy desired to extend their power and dominion in the Balkans. This opposition gradually weakened the Triple Alliance, and it was the principal factor in bringing Italy into the Great War against the Teutonic powers in 1915.

Spain: the
republic,
1873-5

In 1870 the people of Spain were in the midst of troublous times. During the long reign of Isabella II the reputation of the Bourbon dynasty had sunk lower and lower, until in 1868 she was driven away by a liberal uprising, and a provisional government was set up while the revolutionists sought a new monarch. It was during this search for a sovereign that the crown was offered to a relative of the king of Prussia, thus causing the tension between Prussia and France, the immediate occasion of the Franco-German War. In 1871 Amadeo of Savoy accepted the throne, but after two years in the midst of disheartening difficulties he abandoned his attempt to rule the country. In 1873 the liberals set up a republic. This was contrary to the wishes of most of the people, and Spain now fell into the greatest confusion. Order was restored only by the stern rule and the military despotism of the president, Emilio Castelar. In 1875 the Bourbon line was restored when the son of Isabella was made king as Alfonso XIII. During the ensuing reign order was maintained and the affairs of the state were administered by the conservatives with wisdom and success. On the death of the monarch in 1885, and after the birth of his posthumous son, Alfonso XIII, in the following year, the government was administered under the regency of the Queen Mother, Maria Christina, who turned to the liberals. In 1902 the young

The Bour-
bons re-
stored, 1875

king came of age. His personal qualities endeared him to his subjects, and despite great difficulties the dynasty still keeps a hold upon the throne, though the tenure has become more precarious each year.

Most of the Spanish people had cared nothing for a republic when Castelar was trying to establish one, and the nation welcomed back a king with as much delight as the English once received Charles II. A period of improvement and reform began, which slowly produced good results. In 1876 a constitution was adopted which in form gave the people a government like that of Italy or Belgium, vested in the *cortes*, or parliament, elected by the people. In 1890 the principle of manhood suffrage was adopted for electing members of the lower house of the *Cortes*. As in Great Britain the ministry is dependent upon a majority in the parliament, and as in France this majority is formed by a combination of political parties willing to act together. But actually the Spanish people, for ages without experience in self-government, cared little about their government and were utterly unable to control it. Parliamentary majorities were made by the ministry, and a government could always get sanction from the electorate by controlling the elections. Moreover, the extension of the suffrage in 1890 to the mass of the people strengthened the conservative and reactionary elements in the state, especially the Church, since the voters, many of whom were illiterate as well as inexperienced, voted entirely at the dictation of the priests. Nevertheless, after 1880 a period of reform began, in which trial by jury was introduced, taxation reformed, and obstacles removed from industry and trade, obstacles that had survived in Spain longer than almost anywhere else in Europe. The liberal leader, Sagasta, wished also to improve education and take it out of the hands of the clergy, and effect such a separation of Church and State as was afterward brought about in France: but, notwithstanding

The govern-
ment

Reforms

standing that there was considerable hostility to the religious orders because of their vast wealth and possessions, the body of the people supported the clericals and enabled them almost entirely to prevent such changes.

Recent
conditions

After three centuries of decline and decadence there were immense obstacles in the way of recovery, and the loss from those centuries was not easily to be made up. The country was poor, agriculture languished, there was little industry and not much trade. No longer did great quantities of gold come from colonies, for most of them had long ago been lost, and those which remained were a burden and expense. Most of the people were ignorant and superstitious, and more than half of them could neither read nor write. Taxation was heavy and the national debt almost too great to be borne. None the less, gradually there has been an improvement in the last generation. What appeared at first a great disaster, the loss of most of the remaining Spanish colonies to the United States in 1898, soon seemed a benefit, since it removed much trouble and expense. Of late the population has been increasing, and wealth and prosperity along with it. The land has been getting more and more into the hands of peasant proprietors, and manufacturing and commerce have once more begun to flourish. The country remains poor, and in the midst of their splendid cathedrals and vast palaces the people have memories of the past more than possessions in the present. Nevertheless, Spain, once the land of the Inquisition, of *autos da fe*, of proud noblemen, of innumerable beggars, is coming to be a land of some industry and prosperity, and may have a large future before her.

Portugal:
past great-
ness and
present
decay

Portugal, like Spain, had played her part long before the beginning of the nineteenth century, and, like Spain, the best of her heritage in 1870 consisted of glorious memories from the past. For her also the nineteenth century had been a period of weakness, quietude, and decay. After

the Napoleonic wars and after the withdrawal of the British troops who had occupied the country, Portugal was the scene of struggles between parties of progress and reaction. No great advance was made and not much was possible, for the country had no large national wealth and no great industries or trade. Its finances were hopelessly tangled, taxes were very high, and the debt of the nation was large. Brazil had proclaimed her independence in 1822, but Portugal still possessed a colonial empire, mostly in Africa, much beyond her resources to maintain. As time went on her debt increased and her affairs became more embarrassed. It was not possible to improve education or economic conditions, and most of the people remained poor and illiterate, with small understanding of political matters and no previous experience in self-government. So the Portuguese people, in their out-of-the-way corner of Europe, lived on in the decay of their country, in the midst of monuments of departed grandeur, attracting little foreign attention, except when other countries, like Germany or England, hoped some day to inherit their colonial possessions. It is believed that in 1898 Great Britain and Germany did make a secret agreement about how these possessions might be divided between them later on, if ever Portugal could be persuaded to sell.

Economic stagnation

In 1910, when the reigning dynasty had sunk into complete disrepute, Manoel II, young, inexperienced, and foolish, was driven from the throne and a republic proclaimed. A constitution modelled on that of France was adopted, providing for a legislature, the *Cortes*, with a ministry responsible to it, and a president. But it was evident at once that it would take generations of education and training in self-government before the Portuguese people could make it work successfully; and the new government had to sustain itself by force and by many of the arbitrary methods of imprisonment and suppression

The Portuguese Republic, 1910

which had made the monarchy odious. Furthermore, there were violent disputes between the clericals and friends of the republic, for notwithstanding that the entire population was Roman Catholic, the republican government at once proceeded to separate Church from State, suppress the wealthy religious orders, and confiscate what they owned. It would probably be long before the settlement was complete.

Greatness
of the Dutch
Netherlands
in the past

The history of Holland in the nineteenth century was mostly a record of quiet prosperity and of solid achievement by a nation once great but now for a long time small in the midst of mightier neighbors. When after a prolonged and desperate struggle during the sixteenth century the Dutch succeeded in winning their independence from the Spanish crown, they had become the greatest sea power in Europe. It was their ships and their command of the sea, more than anything else, that had given them their triumph; and not only had they come through the contest successfully, but they had obtained an extensive colonial empire in the Far East, and become the greatest commercial nation as well. During the earlier years of the seventeenth century they had a great part of the carrying trade of Europe in their hands, and they so developed the herring fisheries of the North Sea that the waters yielded them greater wealth than Spain got from her mines in Peru.

Decline

But England now began to rise up as a great commercial power. Her geographical position was more favorable than that of the Dutch, since she lay across the routes by which the Dutch reached the outside world, and could, if she desired, always close them. Sea wars followed, resulting largely from commercial and colonial competition, in which the Dutch failed to hold their own. Worse still, they were exposed to attacks from France, then, under Louis XIV, the greatest and most aggressive military power in Europe, and they were not, like England, protected by the sea. The Dutch did save themselves,

and afterward, together with England, they checked the aggressions of France. But by 1713, when this was achieved, they were exhausted by a task which had been beyond their strength, and whereas in the seventeenth century they were one of the principal European powers, in the eighteenth they sank to the second class and no longer played a great part. Like Spain, the United Netherlands, even in this period of decline, continued to possess large colonial dominion, mostly in the Far East; but unlike the Spaniards, the Dutch continued to be, what they had been from the first, industrious and successful workers. They played a lesser part because neighboring powers had grown far greater and more rapidly than themselves, so that relatively they were less than before.

During the wars of the French Revolution the Dutch Netherlands were overrun like others countries near by; and in 1810 they were annexed directly to France. But when Napoleon's power was crumbling, the Dutch proclaimed their freedom and made themselves a kingdom under William I, son of the last stadholder who had ruled before the Frenchmen came. When the Congress of Vienna was doing its work, the leaders determined to strengthen Holland against possible aggression from France in the future, and in 1815 what had before the French Revolution been the Austrian Netherlands, and before that the Spanish, was joined to the new Dutch kingdom, the united territories being known as the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

This union was not destined to last. The people of the Dutch Netherlands were mostly Protestant and Germanic, while the population of the Belgic provinces was Catholic and part of it had derived its culture from France. The Belgian population was more numerous than the Dutch, but while Belgium was compelled to contribute the larger part of the taxation, the offices and power in the government were reserved for Dutch officials. William I was


The King-
dom of the
Netherlands

Separation
of Belgium
from Hol-
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
very conservative; he offended the liberals, and he further outraged the feelings of his Belgian subjects by trying to impose on them Dutch language and laws. When in 1830 the Bourbon monarchy was overthrown in France by a revolution in Paris, the Belgians rose against their masters, and demanded a separate legislature. William refused any concessions, so they proclaimed their complete independence. The Dutch people, inflamed by strong national feeling, supported their monarch, and he might have reconquered the rebels had it not been that England and France intervened. Thus Belgium won her independence; and, so different were the two peoples in character, aspirations, and ideals, that it was probably best that the separation took place.

Holland in
the nine-
teenth cen-
tury

The political history of Holland in the nineteenth century was uneventful. The Dutch, with many proud memories from the past, were intensely conscious of their nationality, and passionately resolved to keep their independence. They had no great love for England, who had once beaten them in great trade wars and taken from them some of their colonial possessions; but in the past France had been the great enemy, and then they had only been saved by assistance from Britain. During the nineteenth century these conditions no longer existed, but at the beginning of the twentieth, a danger that had long been looming up appeared more threatening. The most ambitious German leaders were thought to look forward to a day when the German Empire would be greater, and when it would include possessions which they thought should properly belong to it but which were not yet within the Empire. Some German writers asserted that the Dutch were closely related to the Germans, that of right they should enter a Germanic federal union, and that Holland, lying across the mouths of Germany's great river, the Rhine, ought to be brought into such union. More and more did the Dutch dread incorporation with their power-



20. ASI.



ASIA IN 1800

ful neighbor, and the loss of independent existence. In 1890 Queen Wilhelmina, a girl of ten, came to the throne, and for a while her subjects feared that there would be no heir to the crown and that, the dynasty dying out, their country might lose its independence. After the birth of an heir, however, this fear abated; though the Dutch continued to guard with great jealousy against any infringement of their freedom. After the beginning of the Great War they guarded their neutrality likewise.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Netherlands lost some of their colonies to England, and as a result of the Napoleonic wars, Ceylon and South Africa also. Nevertheless, they continued to retain one of the wealthiest of colonial empires, especially in the Spice Islands off southeast Asia. This empire, lucrative and important, was until recently administered without great consideration for the welfare and advancement of the natives, primarily in the interests of Holland.

The Dutch
colonial
dominions

The Dutch governing classes were conservative and very tenacious in upholding the system established, so that constitutional change was made more slowly than in neighboring countries, and throughout the nineteenth century constitutional progress lagged behind what was accomplished in Great Britain or France. In 1848, when the revolutionary movements were overturning so much in Europe, the Dutch King, William II, quietly and wisely, though against his own wishes, granted a more liberal constitution, which with slight changes satisfied his people thereafter. The ministry now became responsible to the States General, the Dutch Parliament, though the representatives in the lower chamber were still elected by a small number of voters. In the later part of the nineteenth century, in 1887 and in 1896, the franchise was extended to a larger number of voters, but as late as 1914 more than a third of the men were not yet permitted to vote.

The govern-
ment of
Holland

**Belgium in
the past**

The history of the Belgian people is a long record of prosperity and misfortune. In the Middle Ages they had the most thriving industry in Europe, and splendid guild halls and bell towers still attest the magnificence of that era. But the country was also a debatable land, between Germany and France, the road for attack by one on the other, and therefore the battleground in many wars now long forgotten. For a long time the sovereigns of France strove to add these provinces to their dominions, as they built up the kingdom of France; but they got only part of what they tried for, since England in the fourteenth century, as in the sixteenth and the seventeenth and the nineteenth and the twentieth, dreaded to see the country right across the narrow waters from her, and almost at the mouth of the estuary of the Thames, in the hands of some powerful rival. The Belgian provinces joined the other Netherlands in the revolt against Philip II, but the population, being almost entirely Roman Catholic, accepted the overtures of Spain, and in 1579 abandoned the contest.

**Decline of
prosperity**

Under the languishing rule of Spain, and afterward under the ineffective administration of Austria, these provinces suffered decline. By the Treaty of Münster the port of Antwerp was closed, so that its commerce was ruined, in order to promote the interests of Holland. During the Revolutionary period the Austrian Netherlands were easily occupied by the French and presently annexed to France. This annexation of Belgium and the opening of the port of Antwerp had much to do with the unyielding opposition of Great Britain to the Revolutionary governments and to Napoleon. After the destruction of the French Empire Austria resigned her Belgian possessions, since they were too distant to be easily defended, and in exchange for them she took territory in the north part of Italy. Belgium was then added to the Dutch Netherlands, partly to make a strong state on the French frontier, partly to compensate Holland for the colonies she had lost

to England. For fifteen years the Belgian people endured a union which they disliked, a union that was made burdensome and oppressive by the Dutch rulers. In 1830 they rebelled, and, by the assistance of Great Britain and France, they got their independence.

In 1831 Belgium was established as a state independent and perpetually neutral; and when in 1839 Holland at last accepted Belgian independence, this provision was again confirmed by the five great powers: Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. Thus Belgium was made a neutralized state as Switzerland had been in 1815. The country now went forward with its development in safety. Shortly before the Franco-German War, it is true, Napoleon III entered into secret negotiations with Prussia, apparently in hope that he might be able to add Belgium to France; but this came to nothing. When later, in 1870, Bismarck revealed the proposal, the British Government at once made treaties with France and with Prussia respectively, engaging to join forces with either one if the other violated Belgian neutrality.

After 1831 the little country experienced a great industrial development, its population and its prosperity increasing. Unlike Holland, which remained an agricultural and commercial country, Belgium possessed great resources of coal and iron, and became one of the great industrial regions of Europe. The constitution, which had been adopted in 1831, was the most liberal at the time in continental Europe. As in Great Britain the ministry was responsible to a parliament. As elsewhere then the franchise was narrow, being allowed only to those who paid a considerable tax. In 1848 it was extended a little, but thereafter for nearly half a century no change was made. Meanwhile, great industrial populations had been assembled in the cities, and after the franchise had been widely extended in all the neighboring countries still in Belgium only one man in ten could vote. Therefore, at

The neu-
tralization
of Belgium

Economic
and political
progress

last in 1893, the labor leaders called a general strike, and the legislature, soon yielding, provided for manhood suffrage, though with double votes or even triple votes to men of property and at the head of a family or with unusual educational attainments or experience in public office. The result of this extension of the franchise, as in Spain, was to give much greater power to the clergy, who controlled the Catholic voters.

The Swiss
cantons in
the past

The history of Switzerland during this period is a record of prosperous peace. Some of the Swiss, in the midst of their mountains, won their freedom from Austria in the Middle Ages, and joined together in a confederation. After first defending themselves successfully, they presently became renowned as the best mercenary soldiers in Europe, fighting in most of the great wars for pay. The government was a federation of smaller units, or cantons. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Switzerland and the United Provinces (Holland) were the only two important republics in the world. They were also two of the principal places of refuge for the oppressed and those who desired freedom of thought. During the French Revolution Switzerland was first penetrated by the new ideas and then overrun by French soldiers, and in 1798 the Helvetic Republic was established. During the Napoleonic period other cantons were added, and still more were joined to the Confederation in 1815 when the Congress of Vienna re-established it and guaranteed its neutrality. The cantons remained, as they had been for a long time before the French Revolution, united in a loose confederacy, each with complete local autonomy, much as were the American commonwealths before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.

Disunion
and stronger
union

In the first half of the nineteenth century the cantons, which had so long remained in partnership, developed a division which, after a while, threatened to disrupt the Confederation. Some of the cantons were Catholic and

agricultural and were under clerical influence; others were Protestant, they contained large cities, and in 1830 they liberalized their governments and tended toward newer ideas. Thus Switzerland, like the United States of America about the same time, was split into two parts, in which the people had different ideals and purpose, and seemed unwilling to continue in the old association. In 1840 the radical party triumphed in an election in Aargau. The clericals revolted, and when they were suppressed their opponents proceeded to dissolve the monasteries of the canton. Then in 1843 the Roman Catholic cantons formed a *Sonderbund*, or separate league, to protect clerical interests wherever they should be attacked. This was much like the establishment of the Southern Confederacy in America in 1861. In 1847 the federal diet of the Confederation ordered the *Sonderbund* to dissolve. In the contest that followed the separatist movement was crushed. The triumphant party now remodelled the constitution, and what had before been a loose confederation became a federal republic, with a constitution something like that of the United States. By this constitution of 1848 a federal assembly of two houses was established: an upper house, the Council of States, consisting of two delegates from each canton, chosen by the legislature of the canton; the lower house, the National Council, consisting of representatives elected by voters in electoral districts, all adult males having the franchise. The executive was vested in a Federal Council of seven members and a president, chosen by the Federal Assembly. The cantons, like the states of the American Union, had their own constitutions and governments.

Thereafter the Swiss people went on in remarkable progress and prosperity. They continued, as for a long time before, to show that it was possible for men of different races and religions to live side by side under the same government, each having large measure of freedom, un-

The *Sonderbund*

Progress
and develop-
ment in self-
government

The Referendum

molested by the others. Most of the population was German, but considerable portions were French and Italian. Some were Protestants and some were Catholics. There was no attempt to enforce uniformity of language or customs, as in Russia and Austria-Hungary, but so much freedom was left to all that the Swiss Confederation was reckoned to be the most successful democracy in the world. And while its people perfected their educational system until their schools were as good as any in Europe, and while they were developing great industrial prosperity, they continued to teach other nations the art of self-government. In attempting to work out devices by which the people might more directly control their government they perfected the *Referendum* and originated the *Initiative*. The Referendum, or referring back for popular vote measures already passed by the legislature, had been employed by some of the American States in the latter part of the eighteenth century, and afterward was put into one of the provisions of the French Revolutionary Constitution of the Year I; but its use was extended by the Swiss Constitution of 1848 and it has since been frequently employed. The Initiative, by which legislation or an amendment is brought forward by petition of a certain number of voters, was introduced in Switzerland, then established in their constitution of 1848, and since widely extended there. Both these devices were afterward copied in the constitutions of some of the commonwealths of the United States.

The Initiative

The Scandinavian countries in the past

The Scandinavian countries, during most of their career, were outside the great currents of European affairs, though twice they greatly affected neighboring countries. In the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, sailors and pirates from Norway and Denmark spread terror of the Northmen's name all over western Europe, and some of them established themselves on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The Danes ravaged Ireland, and

conquered England for a while; the Northmen sailed to Iceland, Greenland, and even Vineland or America, and established themselves in Normandy (northern France) and afterward in southern Italy. Meanwhile, bands of Swedes entered Russia. After these great Scandinavian wanderings came to an end, for a long time the northern peoples affected the rest of Europe but little, for neither their population nor their resources made it possible for them to take a great part among wealthy and powerful peoples. In 1397 the three countries were loosely united under the headship of Denmark, but from this union Sweden broke away in 1523, and presently rose to a position of considerable greatness. Her zenith was reached during the seventeenth century. When central Europe was torn to pieces by the religious struggles of the Thirty Years War, and when the fortunes of Protestantism were at their lowest ebb, Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden, became the Protestant champion, and, bringing to Germany an army of zealous soldiers with a powerful train of artillery, he won great battles and saved Protestantism from the Counter-Reformation. He also established the greatness of his country, for the settlement made after his death in 1648 left the shores of the Baltic under Swedish control. But during the eighteenth century greater neighbors, like Russia and Prussia, rose up against her, and Sweden's resources were hopelessly wasted in vain struggles to keep her outlying possessions. At the time of the French Revolution Scandinavian greatness was definitely past. By 1814 Denmark, to which Norway was still joined, was an unimportant country, and Sweden had lost her possessions outside the Scandinavian peninsula. In each of these countries the Lutheran faith was the religion of almost all of the people.

From Denmark the Congress of Vienna took Norway and joined it to Sweden. In 1814 the Norwegian people declared their country a sovereign state. They yielded,

The greatness of Sweden

Sweden and Norway

Different circumstances in the two countries

Foreign relations

however, to the Great Powers, and the two countries were loosely joined, each having its own constitution, but the two being united under one king. This arrangement lasted throughout the nineteenth century, because of the moderation and prudence of the rulers, but the interests of the two peoples were incompatible and divergent. The Swedish kings always desired to make their state stronger by bringing about a closer union of the two countries, and having the two peoples cherish the same interests in common; the people of Norway, with different ideas and desires, wished that there were no union at all, and strove to have it made looser. Sweden was larger and more populous, but while there was more wealth in the country, wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of nobles and aristocracy, leaving the mass of the people without property or political power. The government was vested entirely in the hands of the king, checked, when at all, only by an assembly of estates, something like those which had disappeared in England and Spain long before, and like those which had been resurrected in France in 1789. In Norway, while the resources of the country were little and the soil was poor, the land had become divided among a large number of small farmers, there was much democratic feeling, and the constitution adopted in 1814 put the government in the hands of a *Storthing* or legislature, in which the representatives were elected by voters whose franchise depended upon a low property qualification. In the nineteenth century the Industrial Revolution gradually became important in Sweden, and then manufacturing was added to her agriculture. In Norway commerce was developed until the Norwegian merchant marine was the fourth largest in the world. In foreign relations Norway was drawn more and more toward England and France, while Sweden, resenting the Russian seizure of Finland, and always fearing further Russian expansion toward the sea, more and

more imitated Germany's methods and sympathized with her purpose and desires.

So the two peoples drew ever further apart. In 1863 a Swedish constitution was granted, with a parliament like those of western Europe, but great power was left to the king and also to the wealthy upper classes. Meanwhile, Norway became increasingly liberal and democratic. In 1884 manhood suffrage was established. In 1901 she gave the municipal franchise to women tax-payers, and six years later followed this by granting the parliamentary franchise to women and allowing them to sit in the *Storthing*. Moreover, in Norway a great literary national revival was carried on, so that the people became more conscious of their nationality and more eager for complete independence. For a long time they insisted that they should have a separate flag, and particularly that their immense shipping entitled them to appoint their own consuls abroad. Sweden refused to allow this, and great tension arose, though, because of restraint and moderation on both sides, there was never a resort to arms. Finally, in 1905, the *Storthing* declared the independence of Norway. The Swedes, more powerful though they were, wisely decided not to try to force their neighbors back into a distasteful allegiance of no use to themselves, and so they acceded to the separation. A Danish prince was invited to be king, but the monarchy was as limited and as democratic as in England. In 1907 Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia signed a treaty with Norwegian representatives guaranteeing the integrity and also the neutrality of Norway. Good relations between the two Scandinavian countries were soon resumed, despite the fact that some resentment lingered in Sweden. The two countries, accordingly, proceeded peaceably on their separate ways.

During all this time Denmark had gradually become the least important of the northern nations. Norway

Separation
of Norway
from
Sweden

The inde-
pendence of
Norway,
1905

Denmark

Loss of
Schleswig-
Holstein

had been taken from her in 1814; Schleswig-Holstein, containing some Danish population, had been lost in 1864. Across the base of the Jutland peninsula, which had previously been hers, the great German Kiel Canal was cut, and through it went ships that would formerly have gone around through the Danish channels. She still had Iceland and Greenland, far away and unimportant, and a few islands in the West Indies, which finally she sold to the United States. Furthermore, her territory seemed to some of the ambitious German pleaders to be properly a German outpost like Holland or Belgium. In 1905 the German emperor told the tsar that, in the event of war with England, Russia and Germany should occupy Denmark; and increasingly the people of the country lived under the shadow of their neighbor to the south. Meanwhile, in Denmark, as in Norway and in Sweden, democracy and constitutional government made progress, though much less rapidly than among the Norwegians. In 1849 a constitution was granted, establishing a parliament or *Rigsdag*, but actually government remained in the hands of the king and the upper class, and the ministry was not responsible to representatives of the people any more than it was in Prussia. Indeed, in the latter part of the nineteenth century money was frequently collected as a result of royal decree, and not because appropriation was made by the *Folkething* or lower chamber. But the people developed their intensive agriculture and their dairy farming and established a remarkably successful system of co-operative enterprise, by which middlemen were largely eliminated, and so far improved their economic position that they really became more and more important. Accordingly, in 1901 the king granted what he knew they desired, that the ministry should be dependent upon the majority elected to the *Folkething* by the people. By the constitution of 1849, which was revised in 1866, the franchise was given to men who were householders and not

The
franchise

dependent upon charity, who were thirty years of age or more. In 1915 the suffrage was granted to all men twenty-five years old and upward, and also to most of the women.

Extension of
the franchise

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CHAPTER XIV

COLONIES AND IMPERIAL EXPANSION

God of our fathers, known of old,
Lord of our far-flung battle-line,
Beneath whose awful Hand we hold
Dominion over palm and pine—
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget—lest we forget!

RUDYARD KIPLING, "Recessional" (1897)

If Germany becomes a Colonizing Power, all I can say is "God speed her." She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of a great purpose of Providence for the benefit of mankind, and I hail her entrance upon that operation, and gladly shall I hope that she will become associated with us in carrying the light of civilization, and the blessings that depend thereon, among the more backward, and, as yet, less significant regions of the world.

GLADSTONE, in the House of Commons, March 12, 1885.

THE LATTER half of the nineteenth century was strikingly marked by a great movement, which had, indeed, been going on for some hundreds of years: the extending of the power of European governments and the expansion of their peoples into other parts of the world. If in the second half of the nineteenth century the process was more rapid than ever before, this was mostly because some of the European powers had become stronger and more capable of great undertakings and because the world was relatively smaller through new means of communication: telegraph, steamship, and railroad. The principal motives continued, as in the earlier times, to be desire for new sources of raw materials and wealth, the hope which individuals had of making their fortune, and the belief that acquiring colonies would render the mother country

The
expansion
of Europe
and Euro-
pean power

richer and stronger and greater. As the Virginia Company of London and the Dutch East India Company had carried colonists and power to America or Asia in the seventeenth century, so in the nineteenth did the Association of the Congo and the British South Africa Company acquire great African dominions. As in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries England and France aspired to get colonial possessions from which they might have assured supply of naval stores and raw materials, so in the nineteenth and twentieth was it the highest ambition of the German Empire to possess colonies containing copper, cotton, and rubber. And as Great Britain in the time of George II and George III wished America to buy British manufactures and supply business for the British ships, so did France and Germany now hope that they might build up colonial empires to assure them of a market for the sale of the goods which they made.

Europe
much less
important
in the past

Few things are more wonderful than this expansion of European people and power into America, Asia, and Africa in the past four hundred years, and nothing better reveals the primacy which Europe has acquired. Only a small part of the land of the earth is in Europe, and only a small part of its population formerly lived there. In early times the north shore of Africa, with Egypt and Carthage, was more important than southern Europe with Greece and Rome. From far-away times Asia rightly seemed the center of the world and the cradle of civilization. Then western culture was only beginning in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates and in Africa in the valley of the Nile. At that time dim in the distance and scarcely known were the teeming myriads of old India, and farther remote the vast numbers and immobile character of immemorial China. Later on, to the wealthy and cultured upper classes of Hindustan and Persia, Europe must have seemed small and sparsely peopled and unimportant, on the dim frontier of the world. Presently the Roman Empire was

built up in southern Europe, but after a while this Empire passed. During all this time and long after, the great American continents lay hidden beyond their ocean, almost unpeopled, and, to the rest of the world, unsuspected and unknown, unless sometimes faintly imagined as Atlantis or *Ultima Thule*.

During the past four hundred years a vast change has come over the world. Asia, whose people as late as the thirteenth century threatened to overrun Europe, long ago lost her superiority, and Europe going forward with immense acceleration, has gained unquestioned primacy in culture and power. First she discovered and appropriated the Americas, then parts of Asia, then almost all of Africa also. By the beginning of the twentieth century European people and their rule had gone forth into all the four quarters of the world. America North and South had been occupied by England, France, Portugal, and Spain, and notwithstanding that most of this western world was now divided into independent states, yet the language and culture of Europe predominated almost completely. In Asia all the northern half had been taken by Russia, and Russian power was being steadily pushed to the southward; India had long been under the rule of Englishmen, the great islands off its southeast coast had been colonized or mastered by the English and the Dutch; and France had obtained valuable possessions. Africa, whose immense interior had until the nineteenth century been largely unknown and mostly unexplored, had now been penetrated from all sides, and with the exception of the kingdom of Abyssinia and the republic of Liberia, completely occupied by European powers.

The greatest though not the oldest of these colonial empires was the British. At the end of the nineteenth century it contained 13,000,000 square miles of territory, more than a fourth of the landed surface of the earth, and 425,000,000 people. While England was still unimportant.

European
people now
dominate the
world


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
Beginning
of English
colonization

in Europe, Portugal had found the first sea routes to the east and founded a wealthy empire and trade, and about the same time Spain had taken the Americas and built up a huge empire beyond the Atlantic. But the Dutch soon took the best of the Portuguese possessions and founded their own colonial empire in the Spice Islands of the East, and after a period of stagnation and decay the Spanish colonies in America broke their connection with the mother country and completely established their independence. Meanwhile, England, starting a hundred years later than these rivals, had slowly and without any settled design been building up a widespread dominion. As early as 1583 she established a claim to Newfoundland, the center of the wondrous new American fisheries. In the early years of the seventeenth century she carried forward her settlements and acquisitions in America. She took possession of some of the smaller islands of the West Indies, and presently, in 1655, the more important island of Jamaica. During this same period she began the establishment of her colonies on the mainland, and in the years from 1607, when Virginia was founded, to 1733, when Georgia was established, she obtained the best part of the Atlantic coast of North America. Meanwhile, in 1638, she had taken Honduras in Central America. In the first half of the seventeenth century also she obtained a footing in Africa at Gambia and on the Gold Coast, and in 1651 the little island off the west African coast, St. Helena, afterward so renowned. Meanwhile, in Hindustan the English East India Company was establishing forts and factories that were the forerunners of an Indian empire.

Increase by
conquest

Down to the end of the seventeenth century the English colonies were largely the result of settlement or exploration, and most of them lay in North America. In the eighteenth century Britain greatly extended her holdings as the result of successful wars, mostly at the expense of France. In 1704, during the War of the Spanish Succes-





21. AFRICA IN 1800

sion, she seized Gibraltar, then the gateway to the Mediterranean, which ever since she has kept; while in 1713, by the Treaty of Utrecht, which brought the struggle to an end, she got from France New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, the outposts of Canada, and undisputed title to the territory of Hudson Bay. In 1763, by the Peace of Paris, which ended the Seven Years War between England and France, she got from France the remainder of Canada, what is now Prince Edward Island, Ontario, and Quebec, as well as important islands in the West Indies; and at the same time the supremacy of the British in India was confirmed. A little later she took the Falkland Islands not far east of the southern extremity of South America, memorable for a sea battle long after. Now, however, came the great disaster in the history of the British Empire: in 1775 the Thirteen Colonies on the mainland of North America rebelled, and by 1783 had won the acknowledgment of their independence.

Gibraltar

It seemed then that an irreparable loss had been sustained; and in truth not only had the most precious possessions of Britain over the seas been lost, but nothing afterward obtained could be compared to the United States in value. It seemed to some of the British leaders then a mistake to establish colonies, since the best of them cut themselves away as soon as they could, and the others were not worth the trouble and expense of holding. None the less, development of the British colonial empire soon went rapidly forward again. In 1786 a beginning was made of obtaining the Straits Settlements, situated by the great trade routes that run past south-east Asia, and near to the world's greatest supply of tin. In 1788 in New South Wales began the occupation of Australia, largest of all the islands, indeed a continent in itself. During the wars of the French Revolution and with Napoleon, British control of the sea was at no time shaken, and new colonial acquisitions were made, at

Further growth

Acquisitions
from France
and from
Holland

the expense of France, or of Holland under French control. Thus it was that Ceylon, south of India, was taken in 1795, Trinidad, off the north coast of South America, two years later, and Cape Colony in 1806, all from the Dutch; and Britain kept them when the affairs of Europe were settled at the Congress of Vienna, Holland getting Belgium as compensation. In addition she got other West India Islands from France, also Malta, one of the principal keys of the Mediterranean, and Helgoland, once owned by Denmark, destined later to be the impregnable German fortress guarding Germany's North Sea coast. Meanwhile, the servants of the East India Company had extended the Company's sway over a vast territory and population in India, and in 1858, after the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, the Company's powers were transferred to the British Crown, the country becoming the greatest domain of the Empire. During the first half of the nineteenth century also, while the United States was growing across the middle of North America to the Pacific, Great Britain extended her possessions in Canada to the Pacific, and, except for Alaska, got possession of all North America from the United States to the Arctic. In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, in return for support against Russia, Turkey ceded to Great Britain the island of Cyprus, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea.

Egypt

In the second half of the nineteenth century England obtained complete control of the eastern Mediterranean Sea, as she had long held the other end at Gibraltar. Egypt had always been on one of the great trade routes, and the British had long been interested in it, but now occurred an event which gave it command of the principal ocean highway of the world. A Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps, organized a company, partly French, partly shared in by the Egyptian Government, for the purpose of cutting a ship canal through the isthmus that joined Africa and Asia. He afterward failed in a still

greater undertaking at Panama, but in 1869 the Suez Canal was opened to traffic, and the route to the East, formerly around the Cape of Good Hope far to the south, was shortened by six thousand miles. Before the discovery of America the Mediterranean Sea had been the most important of all bodies of water; after the time of Columbus and Da Gama changed conditions had made its consequence less; but now the opening of the canal in Egypt made the Mediterranean the short water route between Europe and Asia, and the greatest sea way in the world. This route was now to pass under British control. In 1875, the *Khedive*, the ruler of Egypt, a spendthrift at the end of his resources, sold to the British Government Egypt's shares for £5,000,000. Thus Britain, owning nearly half of the stock, became the principal shareholder in the Company.

The condition of Egyptian finances soon became so involved that the European powers intervened, and a Dual Control of the country was established by Great Britain and France. In 1881 a nationalist movement under Arabi Pasha threatened this foreign control and, France declining to participate, England suppressed the uprising and took possession of the country. France protested, but the British Government declared that it was not establishing a protectorate, and would withdraw as soon as conditions made it possible to do so. Egypt under British guidance and control settled down to prosperity and order, and the masses of the people were better off than they had been for ages. But as the years went on British occupation continued. At length, in 1904, when Britain and France entered into the *Entente Cordiale*, France withdrew her opposition; and in 1914, early in the Great War, Egypt was made a protectorate of the British Empire. Thus did the Mediterranean, held at its two ends, at Port Said and Gibraltar, come definitely under British control.

The
Sudan

Under British administration Egypt's domain was greatly extended. To the south lay the Sudan. Formerly it had been under Egyptian rule, but in 1881 the Sudanese, under a *Mahdi*, made themselves independent. At first, after Egypt had come under British control, the British Government would not undertake to reconquer the Sudan; but in 1898 an English and Egyptian army under General Kitchener overthrew the Sudanese in the battle of Omdurman, and all the country of the upper Nile was taken again. It was at this time that British and French ambitions in northern Africa came into conflict at Fashoda, and a great struggle between the two powers was so narrowly averted.

Other pos-
sessions in
Africa

France was not the only power now interested in Africa, and Fashoda was not the only place where conflict might have arisen. Actually, however, the division of Africa was peacefully accomplished. In 1884 a conference was held at Berlin upon African affairs; and in 1890 agreements were made between Germany and Great Britain and between France and Great Britain, by which rival claims were adjusted without any trouble. British possessions were now extended south from the Sudan through Uganda to British East Africa which had been already obtained. In exchange for Helgoland, which she ceded to the German Empire, Britain got the island of Zanzibar just off the east African coast. Thus an African empire had been built up from the mouths of the Nile to the Indian Ocean.

South
Africa

To the south an empire equally magnificent had been constructed in the meantime. At the beginning of the century Cape Colony had been taken from the Dutch. Then the Boers, or Dutch farmers, went away to the interior and founded independent communities: the Orange Free State, Natal, and the Transvaal. In 1843 Natal was annexed by the British, and the Orange Free State and the Transvaal were taken for a while, but soon given independence again. In course of time British

dominion was extended far to the north of these small states. In 1889 the British South Africa Company was chartered, and under the leadership of Cecil Rhodes acquired the vast country afterward known as Rhodesia. So British territory in Africa extended down from the Mediterranean to German East Africa and up from the Cape of Good Hope to this same German possession. In 1899 the trouble which had long been growing between the British in South Africa and the Boer republics developed into a war, in which the small Dutch communities of hardy farmers, expert with rifle, well provided with artillery made in France, and taking advantage of the great distances of the country, proved themselves no ill match for Great Britain, obliged to carry on a difficult contest far from her base of operations. After skilful and heroic resistance, however, the Boers were completely conquered, and the two states annexed by Great Britain. As a result of these various developments one third of the continent had come into British hands.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century the British continued to enlarge their dominions in Asia. It was they who in the "Opium War" in 1842 forced the Chinese Government to open five "treaty" ports to foreign trade and also to cede to the British the small island of Hong Kong off the south China coast which later became a great emporium of trade with China. The Opium War itself was an exceedingly ugly affair. Notwithstanding its larger results, this war was intervention by the British because of vigorous and high-handed action by the Chinese Government trying to suppress the opium traffic and save its people from ruin of body and soul. One result of the British victory was that during many years the Chinese Government was unable to prevent the importation and use of opium. The despair and indignation of the enlightened people of China was for a long time ill understood, but after a while people in the

The work
of Cecil
Rhodes

Possessions
in China

The opium traffic

western hemisphere came to realize the enormity and horror of the thing, and finally the British authorities themselves intervened to help to bring it to an end. From the opening of the Chinese ports an enormous and wealthy trade developed, of which the Great World Powers obtained increasing share. Toward the end of the century it appeared for a while that China was about to be broken up into parts, as some of the Great Powers began seizing upon "spheres of influence." In 1898, at a time when it seemed that Russia was about to get the greatest part of the spoils of the country, the British demanded and obtained the port of Wei-hai-wei, not far from Korea and Port Arthur, and far to the north of the old settlement at Hong Kong. A little later they crossed over the Indian frontier and began establishing their control in the outlying Chinese province of Tibet.

The approaches to India

India had from the first been the most important British possession in Asia. After the defeat of the French in the eighteenth century it had long seemed far from possible enemies and safe from attack; but as the nineteenth century passed by, the constant expansion of Russia brought the Muscovite power nearer, until vigilance against Russian expansion in Asia and the getting of a strong Indian frontier were of large moment in the policy of Great Britain. With Afghanistan, to the northwest and leading to some of the great approaches down into India, two wars were fought, in 1838 and in 1878, in the first of which an English army was annihilated, but as a result of which the country became in its foreign relations practically a protectorate of the British Empire, and a buffer state between India and Russia. In 1854 Baluchistan, west of India, across which Alexander the Great's soldiers once marched, was made partly dependent, and later on a portion of it was made completely so and the rest of it was annexed. To the west of these two little-known countries lay the ancient state of Persia. By the

end of the nineteenth century Russian expansion threatened to absorb it, and at last bring the Russian Empire out to the warm waters of the south, on the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, over across from India. To counteract this, while the Russians were getting control of northern Persia, the British tried to dominate the south, and a long contest was ended when Great Britain and Russia made their agreement of 1907 by which the northern portion of Persia became Russia's sphere of influence and the southern a British sphere, with a neutral zone in between. To the east of India also British power was extended. In 1885 Burma, on the other side of the Bay of Bengal, was annexed. To the northeast the mountain states of Nepal and Bhutan were made dependent, and then after a while the British crossed through the vast mountains which separate India from the dominion of China, and by 1914 had made of Tibet practically an outlying dependent state.

By this time Britain had beyond dispute the greatest colonial empire in the world. With the aggregate of her domain there was nothing to compare except the possessions of the United States, the vaster but less valuable territory of Russia, the huge expanses of stagnant China, and the colonial empire of France. The British Empire had been built up easily because England's geographical position had given her advantages over the greatest of her rivals, and her control of the sea had enabled her to increase her possessions from time to time in peace and as the result of every great war in which she fought. The area of the British Isles was only 120,000 square miles, and England less than half that much. The population of the United Kingdom was only about 45,000,000. But England, at the beginning of the sixteenth century one of the less important countries in Europe, was now the greatest, and the Empire of which she was the center embraced a fourth of the land surface of the earth. From this vast

Persia
divided into
"zones"

Extent and
character of
the British
Empire

area came a large part of the world's tin, half of its gold, a third of its coal and a third of its wool, a fifth of its wheat, and other products without number. Its great weakness was that it was widely scattered, with the seas of the world separating its principal parts, and great land powers growing ever more powerful near them. It was held together by the thing which had built it up: the strongest navy in the world. If ever the British fleet were beaten or dispersed, then the Empire would lie before the enemy like spoil to be taken at will.

Peoples of
the Empire

The British Empire was, in some respects, a strange and conglomerate affair. Not only were its parts widely separate and distant, but it embraced peoples of every race and religion and in all stages of culture and political progress. Its elements were far more diverse than those which composed Russia, so soon to break up, or the Dual Monarchy, which a great war was about to destroy. Outside of the British Isles there were in this Empire some 12,000,000 of English people, and about 3,000,000 more of the white race. They were mostly in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Of the remaining 365,000,000, all but 50,000,000 were in the vast aggregation of races in the Indian domain, while in Africa there were 40,000,000 negroes, and in the other lands some millions of Malays, Chinese, and others. A great part of all the Mohammedans of the world were under British rule, as were Brahmins, Buddhists, and many others. In holding together these peoples the British showed themselves the ablest colonial administrators whom the world ever had seen.

British rule

It is very true that under British rule there were some great evils. It is also true that in the Empire the people of England and Scotland had obtained great wealth and had made investments that rendered much of the world tributary to London; while the British mercantile marine, largely supported by trade between the parts of the Em-

pire, was the largest ever seen in the world. It is also true that some of the peoples in the Empire, in India and Egypt, were held unwillingly and longed to obtain independence. None the less, considering all the difficulties involved, it was also true that never had so great an empire been ruled so justly and well, and that wherever British rule had come, in India or the islands of the sea, better conditions had resulted for most of the people. In 1917 an English writer said: "This Commonwealth . . . is . . . a living home of divine freedom, in which the ends of the earth are knit together . . . in the name and the hope of self-government."

To all the white peoples outside of the United Kingdom self-government had been granted, in Newfoundland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. These self-governing dominions had such complete control of their own affairs that they were independent in all except name, ruling themselves through their own elected representatives. So loose was the connection, indeed, that a statesman declared that in August, 1914, the British Empire had come to an end. But at this very time it was abundantly shown that the bonds had never been stronger, and that while the dominions were no longer attached by any compulsion they were strongly bound by race and language and by ties of love and devotion. For some years statesmen in these different English-speaking communities had been considering the problem of closer imperial federation, and conferences had been held for this purpose.

To the remaining 365,000,000 people of the Empire self-government had not been given. Theoretically, it was wrong that a modern democratic state should hold under its sway people to whom democracy and self-government had not been extended. But it could scarcely be doubted that the condition of the masses of India, bad as it was, had never been so good before, and that the *fella-*

Self-government
in parts of
the Empire

Subject
peoples

heen were attaining some prosperity and economic well-being for the first time in the history of Egypt. There could be no doubt that most of the non-white population of the Empire would not, if left to themselves, have evolved any representative system of self-government, and were not yet fitted to make it work. The comparative liberality of British rule made it the more possible for some of the educated minority and the upper classes among these people to demand independence, and it was most proper that they should desire to have it. None the less, it is probable that in 1914 the greatest good of most of the people in the Empire demanded the continuance of British rule, and that the British Empire was one of the most useful and beneficent organizations in the world.

The French
colonial
Empire

Next in age and greatness was the colonial empire of France, which in 1914 had an area of more than 3,000,000 square miles and a population of 44,000,000. Once the French had lost great possessions, and this was their second colonial empire, the work of the nineteenth century. After the Seven Years War and the contests of the Revolution and Napoleon's time, France's colonial domain was reduced to a few trading posts in India, French Guiana on the north coast of South America, and a few islands, of which the most important were Martinique and Guadeloupe, in the West Indies. Since the losses her first conspicuous advance had been during the period of the Orleans Monarchy. Across the Mediterranean in north Africa were the countries of the Barbary pirates: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli, whose people had preyed upon European commerce for ages, and carried off Christians into the terrible slavery which Cervantes once suffered and described. In 1830, after the Dey of Algeria had struck the French consul in Algiers, an expedition was despatched which captured the city. After a while the reduction of the country was decided on and a long and

Algeria
acquired

troublesome war was waged which was not ended till 1847, and the conquest was not entirely completed until ten years later. This was in the period of the Second Empire, when Napoleon III was endeavoring to reconcile Frenchmen to his rule by conquest and glory abroad. An ambitious colonial policy was now carried forward, some islands in the Pacific acquired, and, after a war with China, commercial concessions were obtained there. In 1862 the French obtained part of Cochin China and the rest of it five years later. In 1863 they established a protectorate over Cambodia. In 1867 a beginning was made of the acquisition of French Somaliland in East Africa, commanding one side of the outlet of the Red Sea. Notwithstanding that Napoleon failed to make a dependency of Mexico, France was by the end of his reign getting to be the second colonial power in the world.

The great defeat of France in the Franco-German War, had, as is well known, an important effect upon the development of her colonial policy. France recovered with amazing rapidity, but it seemed hopeless to try to get back the provinces which Germany had taken. She turned, therefore, to seek compensation abroad, and Bismarck encouraged French statesmen to do this, glad to divert their attention elsewhere. In 1885, after a war with China, a protectorate was established over Tonkin and Annam, states in southeastern Asia upon which the Chinese had long had some shadowy claim. All these acquisitions, from Cambodia to the border of China, became French Cochin China, the chief Asiatic possession of France.

But the greatest expansion of the French colonial empire now was made in northern Africa, where the French extended their power out from Algeria and through the Sahara, until all the north part of the continent to the borders of Egypt and Tripoli was included. In 1881 Tunisia, to the east of Algeria, was occupied and became a

Expansion
after 1871

The French
in Africa

Fashoda

protectorate, though this cost the friendship of Italy for a generation, and had much to do with driving Italy into the Triple Alliance. In 1892 Dahomey, on the southern shore of the great north African bulge, was conquered, and from there, and from the mouth of the Senegal River, which they had long held, expeditions were despatched to the north. About the same time, farther south, French traders pushed inland and acquired the French Congo. From all these points, north and south, explorers, as enterprising and bold as Champlain and La Salle once had been, entered the country and took it for France, until nearly all of the Sahara and its oases and trade routes were obtained. Eastward they pushed until Major Marchand unfurled the French flag at Fashoda in the Sudan. But by the Anglo-French agreement of 1899 the French withdrew, and Britain remained in possession of this country. In 1895 France established a protectorate over the island of Madagascar, off the southeast coast, once the haunt of pirates, a huge extent to which the French had laid claim since before the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1904 England and France settled all their differences in the agreement known as the *Entente Cordiale*: France agreed to make no further objection to British management of Egypt, and in return Britain promised support for French plans about Morocco. This country, which adjoined Algeria, was, in the eyes of the French, necessary to round out their north African possessions. But Germany now intervened and two great crises, in 1905 and in 1911, brought Europe to the brink of war. On the first occasion France yielded; but after the second she established a protectorate in Morocco also.

Extent and character of this empire

As a result of this expansion in Africa and in Asia France had a magnificent colonial empire. Her possessions were far less in area, population, and resources than those of the British Empire, yet some of them, like Morocco and Algeria, lay in a position of great importance,

they were a storehouse of raw materials, and furnished the products for a lucrative trade. Algeria had been annexed directly to France, and sent representatives to the legislature in Paris, though only a small portion of the population might vote, and the people had little control over the officials who ruled them. In Algeria to a considerable extent, and in the other colonies entirely, the French were an upper and ruling class. To none of the French colonies had complete self-government been extended; largely, no doubt, because to none of them had many Frenchmen ever gone to live. The French had shown great ability and skill in acquiring possessions, but they were not colonizers as the British were, for most Frenchmen were unwilling to live anywhere but in France, and no high birth-rate produced a surplus population to send abroad. As in the British Empire so in the French, capitalists had large concessions and had made great investments from which large revenues came. Yet for the most part the advent of France into these distant places had brought better conditions for the people; and it was usually believed that France had succeeded in establishing a greater degree of order, good government, and contentment in her African colonies than any other European power had brought to that continent, except the British in the white communities of the South African Union.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century the German Empire also acquired colonial possessions, but they were far inferior in size and in value to those of Great Britain or France. It was often said that Germany entered the colonial field too late. At a time when Great Britain had obtained vast possessions, and when France was building a new empire also, the Germans were just achieving their national unity. Even after 1871 it seemed for some time, to Bismarck and his contemporaries, that colonies were of little importance, that the primary task was holding for Germany the position she had just attained, and keep-

Algeria an extension of France

The German colonies

Germany
late in the
colonial field

ing leadership in Europe. Bismarck thought little about colonies, but much about his Triple Alliance and the friendship of Russia, and he was glad to encourage France to go forth and get what colonies she could. But to a younger generation colonies seemed indispensable, and about 1879 business men and merchants made the beginning of colonial development. In that year concessions were obtained in the Samoan islands. In the next few years other trading posts were established in islands of the Pacific and also in various regions in Africa. In 1883 a German merchant, Lüderitz, laid the foundations of German Southwest Africa. A year later Togoland and Kamerun on the Gulf of Guinea were obtained by a German traveller. In the same year three other adventurous Germans acquired what was made into the most important of all Germany's colonial possessions, German East Africa, on the Indian Ocean. All these African holdings were got in the first place by travellers or merchants making treaties with native rulers. By this time the interest of Bismarck had been enlisted, and the German Government established protectorates in the new acquisitions..

Disappoint-
ment and
relative fail-
ure

Nevertheless, when Germany strove to obtain colonies she found that the best were already taken by England or France, or lesser powers. She had gained a few islands in the Pacific, and some African lands, considerable in extent, but mostly unfit for white men, and far less rich than what others possessed. Gradually there developed in the minds of many Germans a strong sense of grievance, and resentment because their rivals had done so much better. To some of them it seemed unjust that France with a stationary population of but 40,000,000 should have enormous colonial dominions capable of immense development, while the German Empire with 65,000,000, and that population rapidly increasing, had no colonies to which Germans could emigrate, and only such possessions as others for the most part had not cared to take. To them

it seemed necessary for Germany's greatness that more should be obtained. In the early years of the twentieth century certain Germans explained how, after a successful war, the colonies of France or of Great Britain would be taken; and undoubtedly the desire of some Germans to possess a larger colonial empire was one of the causes that led to the Great War of 1914.

Many efforts were made to extend German possessions, mostly without any success. British and German schemes soon came into conflict. It was the ambition of some Englishmen to get a broad strip of territory from the Cape of Good Hope to Alexandria, while some Germans hoped that their country might acquire a stretch of territory straight across the breadth of the continent, from German Southwest Africa on the Atlantic to German East Africa on the Indian Ocean. In 1919, as a result of the Great War, the British ambition was realized, but previously a compromise had been made. In 1890 an Anglo-German agreement was made which so established German East Africa that the British were unable to connect the northern and southern parts of their African empire, and German Southwest Africa and Kamerun were enlarged. This was a period when Britain and the German Empire were still on quite friendly terms. Some leaders in both countries wished to bring about an alliance between the two, and England looked on France as her most dangerous foe. In 1898, about the time when British and French ambitions conflicting nearly brought the two countries to war, a secret treaty was negotiated between Germany and England with respect to the Portuguese colonies in Africa. Above German Southwest Africa lay the large Portuguese dominion of Angola and on the other side of the continent, between German East Africa and the Transvaal, Portuguese East Africa intervened. The terms of the treaty have never been revealed, but it is believed that they arranged a division of these

The English
and the Ger-
mans in
Africa

Anglo-
German
agreement
of 1898


territories to take place later on when impoverished Portugal would be willing to sell them. This treaty came to nothing, partly because Germany and England now began drifting apart.


The Germans in Asia and in South America

In Asia, where Germany had got no foothold, she had, after a while, one temporary success. In 1897, to avenge, as they said, the murder of two missionaries, the German authorities seized Kiao-chau Bay in the Chinese province of Shantung, and compelled the Chinese Government to yield them a ninety-nine year lease of the place. Then they proceeded to fortify it and thus make of it a great naval base, which might later be the foundation of a German protectorate in China. In South America, especially in southern Brazil, where many German immigrants had settled, it was believed that the German Empire hoped to get possessions, but here the Monroe Doctrine of the United States always stood in the way. The best opportunity that remained seemed to be in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, but here Germany encountered the opposition of Great Britain, until an agreement was made in 1914, just before the Great War broke out.

Scanty colonial success of the Germans

Altogether the efforts of the Germans to found a colonial empire had met with scanty success. What they acquired yielded little revenue and cost a great deal to retain. It might have been that in the future the best of their colonies could have been successfully developed, but meanwhile the Germans seemed to show less skill than the British or the French. In attempting to impose their system and their organization upon the natives of their colonies they sometimes acted with great harshness and brutality, provoking the natives to rise, and then carrying on wars of extermination against them. This conduct brought them an evil renown, but it is necessary to remember that the terrible climate of central Africa and the distance from the customs and civilization of white men led other colonizers besides the Germans to do deeds





which might well bring the blush of shame. Altogether, the German colonies afforded hope for the future rather than a present benefit, and entailed expense to German taxpayers greater than the revenue that was yielded by them.

Italy, like Germany, entered upon the quest for colonies almost too late. Like the Germans the Italian people were long occupied in the effort to achieve national unity and make strong their position at home. When they turned to colonial expansion their first desire was to take Tunisia, which lay directly across the Mediterranean and seemed to them the most natural field for enlargement. But France also wished to have this country which lay on the border of Algeria, her new possession. Acting with greater promptness and decision France took possession of Tunisia in 1881. It was long before the Italians could bring themselves to forgive this. They continued to be more numerous there than the French. Next they turned to an adventure in another part of Africa. Some years before, an Italian steamship company had obtained a port at the southern end of the Red Sea, and after 1882 Italy built up from this the colony of Eritrea. Seven years later she obtained Italian Somaliland, some distance to the south, lying on the Indian Ocean. Between these two possessions lay the old mountainous kingdom of Abyssinia, inhabited by hardy tribesmen who from ancient times had professed the Christian faith. Over Abyssinia the Italian Government tried to establish a protectorate, but the inhabitants of the country would by no means submit, and in 1896 inflicted a terrible defeat on an invading Italian army at Adowa. Ten years after, Italy joined with Great Britain and France in acknowledging the independence of the country.

About this time the Italians turned their attention to northern Africa once more. In 1901 the Italians and the French had settled their differences, and it was under-

Italian
coloniza-
tion

Tripoli

stood that France recognized the paramount interest of Italy in the country of Tripoli. This was practically the last remaining possession of the Ottoman Empire in Africa. Once all the north coast from Algeria to Egypt had been subject to Constantinople, though often the authority was nominal only. But in the course of the nineteenth century Algeria and Tunisia had been taken by France, and Egypt occupied by the British, until only Tripoli and Cyrenaica remained. In 1911 Italy suddenly demanded that the sultan yield these districts, and when this was refused, an army of invasion was sent. After a year of fighting Turkey was forced to cede them. The natives of the interior, however, long continued an harassing conflict which cost the Italians dear in money and men.

Spain and
Portugal

Some of the lesser Powers like Spain, Portugal, and Holland, still retained important colonial dominions, the relics of what had been won in their great days of long ago, while in the nineteenth century Belgium obtained a domain in Africa, rich in tropical resources. In 1898 Spain lost to the United States nearly all of what still remained of her colonies: Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands in the Far East. Portugal had long since lost the best of her colonies to the Dutch, from whom some had been taken by the British; but she still retained, in addition to some islands and trading stations, two large possessions on the opposite coasts of southern Africa, Angola in the west, and Portuguese East Africa which included Mozambique. The Portuguese Government no longer showed vigor in colonial development and expansion, and its finances were so hopelessly involved that it often seemed that it might be well if it could surrender its outlying possessions in settlement of national debts.

The Dutch
colonies

The Dutch had lost long ago their important settlement at the mouth of the Hudson in North America, and, in South America, Brazil, which they had held for a while, though in the northern part of that continent they still

retained Dutch Guiana. Of the other possessions which they had once had South Africa, Trinidad, and Ceylon had been lost to the British, but they still held the great islands of the Malay Archipelago, off southeastern Asia, Java, Borneo, Sumatra, Celebes, the Moluccas, and the western part of New Guinea, after Australia the largest island in the world, which they shared with the British and the Germans.

The Dutch colonial empire for a great while had yielded huge store of raw materials and large revenue to Holland. It was far more valuable than the colonies of the German Empire and for a long time more valuable than those of France. It made Holland much more important than she would otherwise have been, and also constituted a mortgage upon her political actions. To Germans, who hoped for the later inclusion of Holland within their larger empire, the Dutch islands near Asia seemed a splendid addition to be made to the German colonies; while Holland, not a great naval power herself, could never afford to offend the powers who commanded the sea lest she lose her distant possessions.

Belgium did not achieve independence until 1831, but within half a century she had obtained an extensive African possession. Following the explorations of Livingstone and Stanley in central Africa and the revelations they made of the possibilities and resources of this region, Leopold II of Belgium, after a conference of the powers held at Brussels, founded what he called the International Association of the Congo. He presently obtained the sanction of the Conference of Powers, which met at Berlin in 1884, to make of the Congo region an independent neutral jurisdiction, the Congo Free State, of which in the following year he became sovereign. He had invested large sums of money in this enterprise, but now, taking for himself great tracts of the rubber country as a personal domain, he began to reap a huge fortune from it. This

Dutch colonial administration

The Belgian Congo

was accomplished partly by forcing the natives to labor, and such stories of cruel brutality began to spread around the world that the administration of the Congo became a great scandal. After much contention the rights of Leopold were purchased by the Belgian Government in 1908, the Congo Free State was annexed by Belgium, and reforms were introduced there.

Imperialism

Imperialism, the getting and holding colonial empire, was probably an inevitable stage in the evolution of mankind. It resulted partly from the superior power of some of the European nations and their greater ambitions which developed, partly because of the changes which accompanied the Industrial Revolution. After the introduction of the railroad and the steamship the world seemed smaller and its parts closer together. As a consequence of changes in the nineteenth century the population and the industries of Europe greatly expanded. The surplus population of England, Italy, and Germany went outside to other places. Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa were all built up by such emigration, while the abler or the more adventurous went forth to such countries as India and Egypt to direct and govern the natives. For a long time great numbers of Germans left their homes, and many Italians went also, but they settled in the possessions of other powers, and were lost to the countries that produced them. There was nothing which German leaders lamented more than that Germany had no colonies to which her emigrants would go and there develop a greater and vaster German Empire. Moreover, the expanding industrialism of countries like the German Empire and Great Britain fostered an increasing population, which could not be supported by domestic agriculture and which could get its food only by selling manufactured products abroad. Often it seemed to imperialists that these manufactures could be best sold in colonial possessions, and it was true that the colonies of

Imperialism
and national
greatness

Britain and France bought many things from them. Furthermore, industrialism depended on a supply of raw materials. A considerable portion of such products was in the colonial empires, especially of Great Britain, Holland, and France. After the old colonial system was ended in the earlier part of the nineteenth century Britain did not bar other countries from trading with her colonies, but some powers were not so liberal, and there was always the possibility that a state might attempt to monopolize the resources of its colonial possessions. So, German imperialists believed it necessary for Germany's greatness that lands producing cotton, copper, rubber, and oil should be taken and held.

Colonies and
industrial
development

Even when it was doubtful whether the mass of the people would be benefited by colonial acquisitions, and very doubtful whether colonies were wanted by them, individuals who hoped to gain special privileges of great wealth, or who wanted protection for their investments, were often able to arouse the patriotism of the rest of the people and their love of greatness and glory for their country, and lead them on to support colonial adventure. And just as small businesses were being consolidated into great corporations, so a large part of the resources of the earth were being gathered into the possession of the principal powers. It seemed to many that the future lay only with those powers, like Russia and the United States, which had vast territory in which to expand, or with those like Great Britain and France, which had obtained colonies over the sea. The German desire to get more territory or colonies while time still remained was probably one of the major causes of the Great War.

Patriotism
and
colonies

The subject populations were, probably, on the whole, better off than they would have been if left to themselves. That some of them were harshly and cruelly treated, that at best they had usually an inferior status, that they were often exploited, that they were ruled by aliens, that de-

Subject
colonial
populations

Not allowed
to govern
themselves

mocracy and self-government were never extended to them, that they were denied many things which their European masters had, is quite true. If all this be considered from the point of view of what European liberals wanted for themselves, it appears very lamentable indeed. But it must be remembered that the people of Algeria, of India, of Egypt, and of Burma had not been able to develop democracy or much well being for the masses; that the negroes of Africa were far down in the scale of mankind, and that those who could survive were being rapidly lifted up through whole stages of human progress. Whatever evils attended imperialism, and they were not few or small, it is probable that the peoples affected were benefited and prepared for things better to come. It is certain, also, that Americans and Englishmen and Frenchmen were coming to have greater concern for their responsibilities and ever-greater desire to protect and improve the condition of the peoples over whom they ruled.

Sense of
responsibil-
ity in ruling
countries

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CHAPTER XV

TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE ENTENTES

. . . l'aigle provoqué prendra son vol, saisira l'ennemi dans ses serres acérées, et le rendra inoffensif. Nous nous souviendrons alors que les provinces de l'ancien empire allemand: Comté de Bourgogne et une belle part de la Lorraine, sont encore aux mains des Francs; que des milliers de frères allemands des provinces balтиques gémissent sous le joug slave. C'est une question nationale de rendre à l'Allemagne ce qu'elle a autrefois possédé.

Alleged secret German official report, communicated by the French Minister of War to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 2, 1913.

Immer enger werden die Maschen des Netzes, in die es der französischen Diplomatie gelingt, England zu verstricken. Schon in den ersten Phasen des Marokkokonflicts hat bekanntlich England an Frankreich Zusagen militärischer Natur gemacht. . . . Die Englische Flotte übernimmt den Schutz der Nordsee, des Kanals und des Atlantischen Ozeans. . . . Die Englische Regierung spielt ein gefährliches Spiel.

A report of 1913, published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 16, 1914.

Preëmi-
nence of the
German
Empire,
1871-1904

FOR a generation after the Franco-German War the German Empire enjoyed undisputed preëminence in Europe, not only because of its own enormous strength, but from the fact that it was the head of the Triple Alliance with Italy and Austria-Hungary. Even after the arrangement between France and Russia in 1892-3 the supremacy of Germany was not seriously disturbed. This Dual Alliance was regarded with suspicion not only by the rival alliance but by Great Britain as well. Therefore, down to 1900, at least, and actually for a few years after that time, the German Empire continued to be what it

had been during the later period of Bismarck, the dominant power on the continent of Europe. And, indeed, it did more than hold its place; for ambition increasing with the marvellous expansion of its power, it became year by year stronger and more magnificent to friends and admirers, more threatening and terrible to the others. It was this increase in power and ambition that brought about the large diplomatic changes that now shortly came to pass.

Hitherto the weaker Dual Alliance had confronted the stronger Triple Alliance, with Britain on the outskirts of Europe, aloof from Continental affairs, and usually more friendly toward Germany than either Russia or France. In 1904 England and France settled their differences and made an arrangement, the *Entente Cordiale*, which was not an alliance but in the end proved to be just as effective as one, and three years later, when England and Russia settled their differences also, in the Anglo-Russian Accord, Dual Alliance and *Entente Cordiale* coalesced in a vaster combination, the Triple Entente. Thereafter Europe was practically divided into two great combinations; and the Triple Entente was so strong that Germany's old position of easy superiority was gone. The hegemony of the German Empire, established when Bismarck kept her enemies divided, had passed. During this later time the German leaders tried to recover the old position and dictate their will to the others. Four times did they attempt this, and each time a crisis resulted which shook the European structure and seemed to lead straight to war. On two of these occasions, the Morocco Crisis of 1905 and the Affair of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908-9, Germany won signal triumph, and seemed to be master once more. Twice, in the Morocco Crisis of 1911 and the crisis that arose concerning the Balkans in 1912, discomfiture came. Each time, in the end, war was avoided. But the tension gradually became

Europe
divided:
rival com-
binations,
1904-1914

The great
crises

so great that increasingly people believed another such difference would make it difficult to avoid war again. The fifth crisis came in 1914, after the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. Then the dread catastrophe followed.

Great
Britain and
France

The origin of the *Entente Cordiale* may be traced to one great cause: fear of Germany in England and in France. The nations to the north and south of the English Channel had been rivals or enemies for ages, and so different were the character and ideals of the two that rarely had they been able to regard each other with much sympathy and understanding. In the last part of the nineteenth century it might well have seemed hopeless ever to attempt to bring them together, and Bismarck had not found any effort needed to keep them apart. As late as 1898 England and France had been very near to war. But France had once been under the German's heel and had never forgotten; for thirty years she had lived right beside a neighbor who had often been arrogant and sometimes threatening; Germany was growing in population and power so much more rapidly than France as to make Frenchmen see that in another war they could have little chance, and a new school of French leaders believed that some day such a conflict could not be avoided. Accordingly, after 1898, with the passing of Hanotaux, who disliked Britain and preferred German friendship, a new group came into power, among whom Théophile Delcasse shortly became most important. It was their belief that France had best seek the friendship of England.

The
Entente
Cordiale,
1904

The old school was passing in Great Britain also. Queen Victoria's German husband had died long before, she herself died in 1901, and a year later the Marquis of Salisbury. The German naval laws of 1898 and 1900 were making the new generation of Englishmen have an apprehension of Germany that those before never had. It began to be said that Britain could no longer, such were the changed conditions recently developed, afford to maintain

her "splendid isolation"; that she must have her own friends to stand with if there were need. Foremost among them was the new king, Edward VII, who was fond, moreover, of France. So, in 1904 France and England signed an agreement by which they amicably adjusted all their differences everywhere, France acquiescing in the British occupation of Egypt, against which she had often protested, and Britain promising to support France in her plan to get possession of Morocco: "The two governments agree to afford each other their diplomatic support." It was afterward seen, on the publication of the secret articles in 1911, that the two powers, while not making an alliance, had given each other assurances of assistance, should it be needed. In 1914 Sir Edward Grey laid before the House of Commons correspondence which had passed between Britain and France two years before with respect to coöperation of their navies. In 1904 an alliance was not, perhaps, desired, and would probably not have been tolerated by many people in either of the countries. Moreover, it was said then that Germany was resolved that such an alliance should not take place, and was willing to go to war to prevent it.

When the terms of the *Entente* were made known Germany seemed at first to make little objection. "There is no need . . . to take umbrage," said a German newspaper in which semi-official announcements were made. But the kaiser soon spoke of the great days of the German past, and of need for courage in trials that might be approaching. A little later Germany intervened with terrible brusqueness. March 31, 1905, the kaiser suddenly landed at Tangier, opposite Gibraltar, in Morocco, and told the sultan that he would uphold his sovereign power. To France this was as direct a challenge as could be made, for, following the conclusion of the *Entente*, Frenchmen were making ready to end the anarchy which had long existed

"Splendid
isolation"
abandoned

The Kaiser
at Tangier

in Morocco, and round out their north African empire by taking Morocco for themselves. After the kaiser's sudden assertion it was evident that France must, at Germany's behest, give up the enterprise or risk almost certain war.

France not
able to resist

The moment was well chosen for Germany's move. France herself was weak and in no condition to fight a great war. It was by no means certain yet how far Britain would support her, or, in view of political conditions in the British Isles, how far she could give support. Worst of all, no help could be expected from Russia. She was involved in a war with Japan, in which she had undergone repeated defeats, and just suffered the great disaster of Mukden. In the course of the struggle, rebellion and disorder had arisen in her realm, so that she was now distracted and weak. She had received no vital hurt, but for the moment her power and prestige were gone, and her condition was such that years of recuperation would be needed. Furthermore, we know now, what may have been suspected but was not known then, that the German emperor had been secretly intriguing with the tsar, over whose weak character his own obtained easy ascendancy. He was busily endeavoring to have Russia attach herself to Germany against England, who, he said, was the real enemy, and have her bring France into a Continental combination, which Germany should lead. A few months after this time, in July, 1905, kaiser and tsar met on board a vessel at Björkö in the Baltic, and there signed a secret treaty directed against England. This engagement was rejected by the Russian ministers and so not accepted by the Russian Government, but such negotiations temporarily weakened the Dual Alliance.

Secret
Treaty of
Björkö, 1905

The first
Morocco
Crisis,
1905

It was a terrible moment for France; but she was not prepared to fight, and so had to yield to a great humiliation. There was in Paris at this time a German, Count Haenckel von Donnersmarck, whose business was not known, but who was understood to be the unofficial repre-

sentative of the kaiser. To a French newspaper he gave out an interview the meaning of which was not to be mistaken: M. Delcassé's policy was dangerous to Germany and was leading to war; in such a war France might win, but if she did not the peace would be dictated in Paris; he meant his advice kindly: "Give up the minister." And this was done, for as late as 1905 Germany could still command and France obey. Delcassé was forced to resign, and France was not only compelled to yield with respect to her Moroccan policy, but was virtually forced to appear before a European conference, which was called to sit upon the matter at Algeciras, in Spain, over the bay from Gibraltar.

Warning to
France

Actually German diplomacy had gone too far, and at the Conference held in 1906, to which the United States sent representatives, much less was gained than had been the case six months before. The French had diligently strengthened their military resources, and the English, who had perhaps been more willing to go to war than the French in 1905, continued resolute, while Russia was now at peace. The French presented their case much more skilfully than the Germans, who had relied too greatly on mere display of force, and France gained a large part of what she wanted; for to France and Spain jointly was given the task of preserving order in Morocco. The results of the affair were none the less a large triumph for Germany. She had not, indeed, succeeded in breaking up the *Entente Cordiale*, which she much desired to accomplish; and it was seen now that the agreement was stronger than ever; nor had she imposed upon France as great a humiliation as at first had seemed likely. But she had forbidden France to take Morocco, and France had yielded, and at her behest a French minister of foreign affairs had been driven from office. Apparently the position of Germany in Europe was as high as in the days when France stood almost alone.


The Con-
ference of
Algeciras,
1906


Great
Britain and
Russia

If fear of Germany and trend of diplomatic events had drawn France and Great Britain together in an understanding which grew closer all the time, the same forces tended to draw together Russia and Great Britain, and, in effect, form a combination of Great Britain, Russia, and France. This was made easier because of the Russo-Japanese War. For a long while British statesmen had believed that as France was the nearest and most immediate danger, so, farther away, the great danger came from Russia. Russia had long been steadily expanding her dominion in Asia, slowly, but in a manner that seemed not to be resisted. Many Englishmen believed that this progress would one day bring the Russians down to India, to the Persian Gulf, and even to the Mediterranean, and that it might threaten the British Empire with destruction. It was for this reason that England had joined with France to protect Turkey in the Crimean War, and later had successfully opposed Russia after the Russo-Turkish War in 1878. With respect to India the danger seemed even greater, for if the Russian Empire expanded down to the Indian frontier it was conceivable that at last the country might be invaded with a great army which Britain, thousands of miles away, could never resist. For some years before the war with Japan Russia seemed to have turned away from European interests and to be engrossed with advancing in Asia, so that Great Britain was more and more apprehensive.

The Anglo-
Russian Ac-
cord, 1907

But after 1905, when Russia defeated seemed less dangerous than before, she again turned back to Europe, and, as was soon seen, entered into rivalry with Germany rather than Great Britain. All this took place at a time when British suspicion and dread of the German Empire were steadily increasing. It took place also at a time when France, the ally of Russia, was becoming ever more closely bound to England. The result of all these factors was that in 1907 the British and the Russian govern-





23. AFRICA IN 1914

ments settled their differences in friendly and generous spirit much as France and England had done shortly before. In this arrangement Russia agreed that the controlling influence in Afghanistan and in Tibet should be held by Great Britain, who thus got a secure frontier for India, and practically Persia was divided between the two powers. After 1907 there were, over against the Triple Alliance, the secret agreement between Russia and France or the Dual Alliance, the *Entente Cordiale* of Great Britain and France, and the Anglo-Russian Accord of Great Britain and Russia. These three arrangements now came to be spoken of together as the Triple Entente, and for the next seven years men understood that Europe was dominated by the two rival combinations, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.

But while this was destined to check Germany soon, it could not do so at once, and in the very next year, in company with her principal ally, she secured another more signal triumph. This time it was in the east of Europe, and had to do with the greatest of Teutonic interests, control of the Balkans. In 1908 Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, in spite of a general European treaty, the Treaty of Berlin, and in direct defiance of Russia's wishes.

By the Treaty made under the auspices of the Congress of Berlin the two Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been put under the control of Austria-Hungary, though sovereignty continued to be vested in Turkey. Actual connection with Turkey ceased, however, and the government of the Dual Monarchy set to work to bring order to the districts and make them thoroughly subservient to its rule. The people were largely debarred from professional and governmental positions and treated as inferior to Hungarians or Germans, but considerable material prosperity was brought about, and in many respects the condition of the South Slavs in these provinces was better than the condition of those who ruled themselves.

The Triple
Entente,
1907-14

The Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Crisis,
1908-9

Bosnia and
Herzego-
vina,
1878-1908

The Young
Turk Revo-
lution

in the neighboring states of Servia and Montenegro. As time went on, Austria-Hungary came to regard them as really a part of her domain, and Turkish ownership rather as a fiction. Thus things continued until 1908. In that year occurred the so-called Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman Empire, in which the older régime was overthrown by a band of zealous young leaders. They wished to make reforms, but they desired above all things to restore Turkish greatness, and believed that this could be done only by reviving a spirit of Turkish nationalism and welding all parts of the Empire together. Ignoring the Austrian possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Young Turks invited the population of the provinces to send representatives to an assembly in Constantinople. This seemed an attempt to prepare for Turkish possession of the country again if later on that could be brought about. But in the generation that had elapsed since the beginning of Austrian occupation the provinces had become more and more important in the schemes which Austria and Germany were conceiving. Possession of the provinces gave the Dual Monarchy assured control of a large part of the east shore of the Adriatic, and an imposing position in the Balkans, while possession of the country was necessary for the Teutonic scheme of controlling the way down to Turkey and the greater domain across the straits. Under no circumstances would either Germany or Austria see the loss of the provinces threatened, and so Austria acted at once. October 3, Austria-Hungary cast aside the provision of the Treaty of Berlin, without consulting the other parties to the Treaty, and announced that Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed.

Austria-
Hungary
annexes
Bosnia and
Herzego-
vina

A dangerous crisis ensued. Turkey, most directly aggrieved, strongly protested, but could do nothing, and after a while accepted pecuniary compensation and acquiesced. Great Britain and France, who had signed the Treaty of Berlin, were affronted, and they protested. To

Russia, also a signatory, and much more greatly interested because of her position and ambition in the Balkans, the affront was far greater and she insisted that the matter be laid before a European congress. Most furious of all was Servia, the neighboring independent South Slavic state. She had long hoped that when the day came of the breaking up of European Turkey, the Bosnians and their kinsmen would be united in a greater Servian kingdom, like that which had flourished centuries before, in the days before the coming of the Turk. And she had hoped that possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina would help her toward the outlet to the sea without which she could never be great. If the provinces now were finally incorporated into Austria-Hungary, the dream of future Servian greatness would never be realized. Accordingly, while Russia was prepared to oppose the action as strongly as she could, Servia was resolved to fight to the death, and could with difficulty be restrained from attacking her powerful neighbor.

Russia and
Servia in the
crisis

Austria refused to discuss her action any further. She was willing that a European congress should be called, but the taking of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be regarded as a *sacred accomplished*. Russia resisted firmly, and was supported by her two partners in the Triple Entente. Servia, believing that she would be helped by Russia, made ready for war. With grave and anxious months the winter of 1908-9 passed slowly. Then suddenly the matter was ended when Germany decisively intervened. She was apparently in the delicate position of having to offend one of her friends. She had enormous interests in Turkey, and her greatest hope for the future lay in making the Turks friends and dependents. Not less important was the alliance with the Dual Monarchy, whose position she would at all costs maintain. But her very able ambassador in Constantinople, Von Bieberstein, who was already busy in winning the allegiance of the Young Turks,

Germany
compels
Russia to
yield, 1909

"Shining
Armor"

Imposing
position of
the German
Empire,
1909-11

persuaded them that it was best to accept the inevitable, and so Turkey and Austria came to agreement. Meanwhile, Germany gave full support to Austria against Russia and the *Entente*. German troops were massed in formidable array along the Russian frontier, so that afterward the kaiser could say that he had stood forth beside his ally "in shining armor." A messenger was sent to the tsar, presumably to ask whether Austria's action was satisfactory. Russia was in no condition to fight, for she had recovered little as yet from the disasters of the war with Japan, and it was doubtful whether England, perhaps France, would be willing to fight because of the Balkans where they had no direct interest. So Russia yielded suddenly and completely. At the end of March the Russian Government declared that it recognized the annexation as a *fait accompli*. A few days later Servia, with bitterest humiliation, signed a document declaring that she renounced her attitude of protest against the annexation, and would "live in future on good, neighborly terms" with Austria-Hungary.

Thus in 1909 Russia had been humiliated and rebuffed as France had been in 1905. In the east as in the west of Europe, when Germany spoke with hand on the sword, German word was law. The old, splendid successes of Bismarck were being revived and exceeded. In spite of the formation of the Triple Entente the colossal power of Germany was not shaken, and she stood as dominant and terrifying as ever before. She had given command to France, and Great Britain had not been able to save France from yielding. She had spoken to Russia in behalf of her ally, and Russia had yielded completely. Austria was now the principal power interested in the Balkans as Germany was in Turkey; and Servia, the little *protégé* of Russia, had been abandoned helpless, and forced to promise a friendship which she loathed. What was the Triple Entente beside the Triple Alliance? And as if to

crown the success she had gained, Germany now came to another separate understanding with the tsar. In November, 1910, the Russian ruler was the guest of the kaiser at Potsdam, and there an agreement was made by which Russia's position in Persia was acknowledged, and Russia withdrew opposition to the Bagdad Railway which Germany wished to complete. So, not only was the *Entente* shaken when Germany spoke, but one of its members seemed to be drawing away.

This crisis had been brought to an end without disaster, but like the others it left an evil train behind it, ominous of woes still to come. The cynical violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Austria-Hungary was fraught with consequences of evil. All through the nineteenth century, with the progress toward better things, there had been effort to have the sanctity of treaties held more reverently. "Contracting powers can rid themselves of their treaty engagements only by an understanding with their co-signatories," said the Declaration of London in 1871, to which Austria-Hungary had been a party. But among Germans there had been growing up of late the doctrine that treaties need not be kept if they were in opposition to the good of the State, and in the more terrible days of 1914 this doctrine was to be reaffirmed when the treaty concerning the neutralization of Belgium was violated as a mere 'scrap of paper.' The result of Austria's action in 1908 was to undermine public confidence in treaties and international engagements, and to make the more cautious men believe that such engagements were good only while maintained by force.

This was the last great diplomatic triumph that Germany was destined to win. The success of 1908-9 was speedily followed by two setbacks which so far disturbed her position of supremacy in Europe that she was willing at last to make one more effort to get back her hegemony or else impose her will by force. And, as will be seen, it

The Pots-dam Accord,
1910

International en-gagements
weakened

The chang-ing current
of affairs

was such an attempt that led straight to the cataclysm of the Great War.

Increasing strength of the Triple Entente

The *Entente Cordiale* had been followed by humiliation for France, and the formation of the Triple Entente had not been able to save Russia from surrender a year later on; but actually the opponents of Germany and the Triple Alliance were coming more closely together and feeling that they could count on one another more certainly for support. Especially was this the case with England and France. They were strengthening their forces, and they were, apparently, strengthening year by year their determination not always to yield at Germany's behest. In France there was going on steadily both a revival of courage and assurance and a great rebirth of national feeling, which made people less disposed than before to crouch before the Germany which had conquered them once. In Great Britain there was each year more vivid apprehension of possible danger from the greatness of the German Empire, resolution to be on perpetual guard, and determination under no circumstances ever again to let France alone confront German aggression or suffer her to be crushed. The policy of Russia was more obscure, and depended, apparently, more on the personal character of the ruler, who was known to be partly under the influence of the kaiser. Yet, it was evident that Russia's principal ambitions were now in the Balkans, and that she was thus brought again into direct rivalry with the Teutonic powers. It was certain that she was rapidly recovering the naval and military strength that had been lost at Mukden and Tsushima. It was very evident also that the policy of Italy was now in conflict with that of Austria-Hungary, at the same time that Italy had renewed good relations with France, so that Italian support could no longer be counted on for Germany and Austria in any great war. All these factors had to do with the changes that now took place.

France gains in assurance and strength

Russia regaining her strength

The second
Morocco
crisis, 1911

The third of the great disputes between the opposing combinations came in 1911, and again it had to do with Morocco. After the Conference of Algeciras, France went steadily on with the work which the powers had committed to her. She also tried to come to an understanding with Germany, and apparently for a while succeeded in so doing. Thus encouraged she proceeded to take control of Morocco as far as she could. She had been permitted to occupy certain towns and maintain order, and under pretext of policing the distracted country she pushed an armed force farther and farther into Morocco. To Englishmen and Frenchmen it seemed, doubtless, that France was going quietly about what she had been so brusquely and even brutally forbidden to do. On the other hand, it must have seemed to Germans that France was furtively accomplishing that which they had tried to prevent in 1905, and what the European Congress of the following year had refused to permit. It looked as if Morocco was about to become a French possession, whatever appearances were maintained, and Germany resolved that this should not happen without her consent and without a share of the country for herself.

Accordingly, without preliminary warning, July 1, 1911, it was announced that German commercial interests in Morocco were being threatened, and that hence a German warship had been sent to the harbor of Agadir, on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, to protect them. But it was at once apparent that German interests were insignificant in the district, and that there was no unusual disorder. It was clearly realized that Germany had intervened this time as before, and at once there resulted a crisis which brought the nations to the brink of war.

Agadir

The moment was well chosen, as was the moment for the Austrian ultimatum to Servia three years later. France was torn by socialist and industrial agitation. There had just been a great strike on the railroads, broken only

Britain and
France
embarrassed

Strike of
the railway
workers in
France

when the government had mobilized the trainmen as soldiers to run the trains, and the anger at this was so great that the discontented were practising acts of *sabotage*, wrecking and destroying wherever they could. Ministry was following ministry in quick and bewildering succession, and the government seemed weak and unstable. In Great Britain also there was widespread industrial discontent, and there had just been disorders in Liverpool and London greater than people could remember. Moreover, the country was in the very midst of the great constitutional struggle over the power of veto of the House of Lords, and the people were divided by a contest more bitter than anything since the passage of the Reform Law in 1867. Russia had recently entered into the Potsdam Agreement with Germany, and Russia was in any event little interested in Morocco, which concerned her directly not at all.

The dip-
lomatic
struggle

The question now resolved itself into another great contest between the Entente and the Alliance, or more particularly between Germany and England and France. Between the French and the German governments began a series of "conversations," while France sought to learn how far Britain would give her support. The French Government, which had itself effectually set aside the Algeciras Agreement, was yet able to maintain that Germany's action distinctly infringed the Agreement; while Germany, it would seem, with more bluntness, declared that France had made the Agreement of no force, and that in the new order of things which had arisen Germany must have a part of Morocco, or else, as she hinted, some compensation elsewhere.

Feeling in
France and
in Great
Britain

In France the German demands made a profound impression on a people always sensitive, and then in the midst of a revival of patriotic and national feeling. Germany's action seemed harsh and unprovoked. Few people wanted war, and most Frenchmen dreaded it; but while

there was from the first a spirit of conciliation and no outburst of popular wrath, there was also an unexpected firmness and a decision not to bow down again. In the midst of the negotiations France went steadily on arming and preparing for the worst. In Britain political dissensions were hushed and put aside for the moment, as all parties stood close together. There was great popular sympathy for France and determination to support her. It was clearly realized that Germany, already dangerous to Great Britain on the seas, would be far more so if she got possession of part of Morocco, at the northwest corner of Africa, within easy striking distance of the Strait of Gibraltar, and lying right on the flank of the sea route to South Africa, constituting thus a menace both to Britain's short- and long-water route to the East. For France the presence of Germany there would be no less a trouble and danger. It would always be possible for her to make easy attack on the French Empire in northern Africa, and always possible for her to stir up disaffection among the natives of Algeria and Tunisia.

Accordingly the two powers stood resolute and undaunted. All the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean, and it was known that Britain's great fleet was ready in the Channel and in the North Sea. In the negotiations that were being carried on between Berlin and Paris, France, brought to bay, refused to let Germany have any share of Morocco. But if Germany would agree to give her a free hand there, she would from her other possessions grant compensation to Germany elsewhere.

The German Government was soon in a difficult position, much, indeed, like that in which it was during the last days of July, 1914. Germany had intervened with bold determination twice before. Each time her weaker opponents had yielded, and there had been no trouble because they had yielded. But now she had spoken

Spirit of de-
termination
in France

France re-
fuses to
yield

Difficulties
of Ger-
many's
position

The German Empire not ready for war

commandingly again, and this time her word was not being obeyed. It presently became apparent that to enforce what she demanded war might be necessary, and it was also apparent that most of the German people were not sufficiently interested in Morocco to give enthusiastic support. The socialists were bitterly opposed to such a war; most of the people did not feel that a vital interest of the nation was at stake; and it could not be pretended, as it was three years later, that Germany was being attacked by envious foes who were trying to effect her destruction. None the less, an important and influential part of the population, all those who had been striving for the creation of a greater German Empire and for the expansion of German sea power, insisted that a part of Morocco must be obtained, or, at least, certain coaling stations. But France, supported by Great Britain, firmly refused to consider yielding to Germany any part of the country; if, however, the Imperial Government acknowledged her absolute political supremacy in Morocco, so that it would not in the future be called in question, then she would cede to Germany about a third of her Congo territory. From this offer she would not swerve.

The German Empire yields

Therefore, in the anxious weeks of August and September, 1911, it seemed that any day war might break out. The French people dreaded the prospect of such a war, for they realized, as they did so clearly in 1914, that this time defeat meant the definitive loss of their position as a Great Power. But, encouraged by England, they stood watchful and firm. They were in a position far different from that of the earlier years when the Kaiser is reported to have said: "I hold France in the hollow of my hand." The best judges believed that the French were superior to the Germans in airplanes and field artillery, and there could be no doubt that the sea power of the *Entente* was overwhelmingly superior to the German. Brought to the time of decision the German Government

hesitated at last. It is said that the best advisers were consulted about whether the present opportunity was favorable for a war, and the answers were against it. Especially did the financiers oppose a conflict. The French had been conducting what they called a "financial mobilization." The vast and expanding industry of Germany had been built up partly on borrowed capital, much of it supplied by the French. If the money foundation of this structure were shaken, the whole edifice might topple down in a great industrial panic. The French were silently calling in their loans, and a colossal panic seemed imminent with widespread economic ruin. Accordingly, the French proposals were accepted; there was no war; and the crisis ended.

By the end of September the danger was passed, and early in November an agreement was signed. Substantially France established a protectorate over Morocco, guaranteeing to all nations equality of trade; and she ceded to Germany part of her Congo territory. The arrangement was not completely satisfactory, since Frenchmen believed that Germany had been bribed to permit what she had no right to interfere in, and Germans were bitterly disappointed that they had obtained no part of Morocco. Germany had, it is true, been so confident of her strength that she had defied both England and France, and she had made good her contention that no important matter could be settled unless she was consulted; but she was no longer able to carry her point, and if she had hoped to drive England and France apart and break up the *Entente Cordiale*, it was apparent now that the understanding was closer than ever and virtually a strong alliance.

One of the principal results of this contest was increasing German bitterness toward England. Great Britain had supported France stoutly, and in Germany there had been widespread indignation at what was termed the un-

The Mo-
rocco ques-
tion settled

German bit-
terness
toward Eng-
land

warranted interference of England. "We know now the enemy who loses no chance to bar our way." This bitterness resulted largely from comprehension that British support had made it possible for France to give Germany the greatest diplomatic set-back that Germans had known since before the Franco-German War. On all sides was expressed the determination to see that, next time, the Fatherland would be so prepared that there would be no receding; and it was probable that if another crisis found Germany ready she would not again endure to be checked.

The Balkan
crisis,
1912-13

But the next crisis did not arise through Germany's seeking, though it soon involved Austria's interests and her own. It came from the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, and had to do with Teutonic influence and plans in southeastern Europe. After the overwhelming defeat of Turkey early in the First Balkan War representatives of the Great Powers assembled in London to discuss the startling new problems just raised. It was not long before dangerous tension developed. Servia, by reason of her success, had not only conquered territory which she greatly desired, but she had now the chance of extending down through Albania and getting an outlet on the Adriatic Sea. To this Austria-Hungary was altogether opposed. Not only was Servia more hostile and dangerous to her than any other Balkan state, so that she was entirely unwilling for Servia to become greater and more independent, but a strong Servia resting on the sea would really block her hoped-for extension toward the Ægean. Therefore she declared, in effect, that Servia must not reach to the sea and that she must not occupy Durazzo. Servia insisted upon getting the city, and in November Austria began to mobilize her troops. Then Germany declared that she would support her allies if they were attacked. Russia began to mobilize troops behind the screen of her Polish fortresses, and France announced that she would stand by her ally if she were

Austria-
Hungary
opposes
Servia

needed. Italy, while opposed to Servia appearing on the Adriatic, was as much opposed to further extension of Austrian power down the eastern coast of that sea. In Great Britain public opinion, so far as it was interested, was in favor of letting the small Balkan States keep the conquests they had won from the Turk, even though at the beginning the Great Powers had announced that these states would not be allowed to make conquests.

Servia yielded and withdrew her troops, and in the treaty of peace that followed an independent Albania was constituted, as Austria wished. The Montenegrins, however, continued to besiege Scutari, in northern Albania, and after a long investment, captured the fortress. Before the fall of the city the powers had notified Montenegro that Scutari was to belong to Albania, and then they blockaded the one little harbor which Montenegro possessed. When Scutari fell, Austria-Hungary demanded that it be given up at once, and went forward with the mobilization of troops. Again Russia made ready to support her Slavic kinsmen as when the Servians had been threatened some months before over Durazzo. Once more the crisis was passed when Montenegro yielded to the pressure of the powers and abandoned the city which she had just taken at such great cost.

The result of the Second Balkan War, even more than that of the First, produced a profound alteration in the balance of power and politics in Europe. Early in 1912, after long struggle between the Teutonic powers and Russia for predominating influence in the Balkans, the result then was that Servia, small and unimportant, along with Montenegro, of little consequence, were friendly to Russia and to some extent dependent on her, while Greece, also unimportant, was bound by many ties to France. On the other hand, Rumania, the strongest and most progressive of the Balkan states, was allied by secret agreement with the Central Powers, and thus attached to the Triple Alli-

Servia and
Montenegro
yield to
Austria-
Hungary

The new
situation in
the Balkans,
1913

Diminished power of the Triple Alliance

ance; Bulgaria, strong and successful, was very friendly to the Dual Monarchy, and Turkey, still believed to be more powerful than any of her neighbors, was bound by close ties to the German Empire. But after the end of the Second Balkan War not only was the strength of Turkey as a European power so weakened that she counted for little more than possessor of the incomparable site of Constantinople and territories in Asia, but Servia, the bitter enemy of Austria, had come out of both wars with increased power and territory and greatly increased prestige, and Rumania, former friend of the Central Powers, was no longer so closely bound to them, and had, indeed, acted contrary to their wishes against their friend.

Austria desires to recover her influence in the Balkans, 1913

Altogether, the position of Germany and Austria-Hungary was less good with respect to the Balkans than before. It seemed to both of them, apparently, that their position was endangered and impaired. Austria greatly desired to settle at once her account with Servia, and reduce her permanently to a position in which she could never again be a source of apprehension. It was learned afterward that in August, 1913, Austria-Hungary wished to proceed against Servia at once, and tried to get her partners in the Triple Alliance to join her. But the Italian Government, describing it as a "most perilous adventure," refused to give sanction, and the matter was dropped until the next year. What action Germany then took is not certain, though most probably she also dissuaded her ally. During the conference of the powers in London, she had acted along with Great Britain in trying to settle peacefully the matters at issue.

German preparations not complete

Had she joined Great Britain in the next year as cordially, it is probable that the Great War would have been avoided. But whereas in 1914 she was ready for the great decision, it is known now that in 1913 she did not consider her preparations complete. The changes in the Balkans seemed to diminish her military superiority, and in

1913 many Germans declared that the country could be safe from the growing menace of Russia and Pan-Slavism only if great sacrifices were made and the army largely increased. Accordingly, huge and extraordinary sums of money were voted for greater armaments, and the army was increased to 870,000 men. Immediately thereupon the French, feeling the greater danger from Germany, increased their army also. They could not with their stationary population simply expand their standing army as the Germans were doing, but by keeping the troops with the colors for three years instead of for two they made a substantial increase. It was recognized that this was literally the last effort of France in the race.

So many dangerous periods had now been safely passed that pacifists and well-meaning people began to believe that a great war never would come. But it had almost come in 1911, and more nearly in 1913. Both times the great struggle was avoided, it would now seem, because Germany was not yet ready. In another year she would be prepared. Then another crisis would come, again about Servia and the Balkans, and that time the utmost efforts of those who wished peace would not be sufficient to keep it.


Alleged
menace
of Pan-
Slavism

The lull pre-
ceding the
storm

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EMPIRE IN 1914

CHAPTER XVI

* THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR

Gelegentlich der Übergabe der vorstehenden Note wollen Euer Hochwohlgeboren mündlich hinzufügen, dass Sie beauftragt seien —falls Ihnen nicht inzwischen eine vorbehaltlose zustimmende Antwort der königlichen Regierung zugekommen sein sollte—nach Ablauf der in der Note vorgesehenen, vom Tage und von der Stunde Ihrer Mitteilung an zu rechnenden 48 stündigen Frist, mit dem Personale der k. u. k. Gesandschaft Belgrad zu verlassen.

Instruction of COUNT BERICHTOLD to Baron von Giesl, about presenting the Austrian Note at Belgrade, July 22, 1914.

SUCH had been the development of the politics of Europe. Ominous and terrible things loomed up ever more striking, and there were not wanting those who each year predicted a great war inevitable in the future.
Yet, this seemed such a travesty upon civilization and the progress of mankind that many a zealous and earnest person contended in these later years that no great war could again take place, that war never paid, and that the dreadful losses certain to come would deter the principal nations from fighting. It was believed that arbitration would be used more and more in the future, that the Hague Tribunal, which had been erected in 1899, at the suggestion of the tsar, and to which shortly after the United States had brought the first case, would be able peaceably to settle disputes. Furthermore, it was often said that the whole tendency of polities recently had been to make governments more and more democratic and bring them more thoroughly under the control of the representatives of the people; that the commonalty in all countries were really bound together by ties recognized ever more clearly; that each year they better understood how wars

Possibility
of a great
war

Democracy
and peace

Alleged
class inter-
est and wars

were made by the upper classes in their own selfish class interests, that they were fought by the common people upon whom fell all the suffering and loss, but who got none of the benefits of victory; and that, therefore, the mass of the people, now that they had power in governing themselves, would not permit any more wars or give them support. Finally, it was believed by many that commerce and finance now bound together the nations so closely that powerful economic forces were making war impossible. There was much truth in all of these contentions, and perhaps had mankind been more fortunate and wiser, no great war need have come. But as one looks back now and considers things as they were, not as men hoped they were, it is evident that there were certain great causes tending almost irresistibly to the awful disaster which came.

Immediate
causes

The immediate causes of the Great War of 1914 were the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the note that Austria-Hungary addressed to Serbia thereupon. But great and larger causes had long been potently working.

General and
underlying
causes

The great nations of Europe were by 1914 divided into two great hostile combinations, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, armed to the teeth and constantly watching each other. Militarism had developed until in Europe there was the vastest accumulation of arms, munitions, and war supplies which had ever been got together, the largest number of soldiers that had ever been trained for war, the greatest amount of military science and skill, and not a little desire to use in war what had been prepared for war. Certain consequences of the mere geographical shape, arrangement, and division of Europe made some nations hostile to others. The trend of events seemed to favor some nations of Europe more than the others, which caused military statesmen to believe that if their nations did not make war now they could have little chance in the future. Differences in birth-rate

and growth of population made disparity, arrogance, and fear. The relations between Germany and England, and the rivalry between Teutons and Slavs, especially with respect to the Balkans, had for some years threatened a conflict. Above all, the character, the ambitions, the ideals, the purposes of the German people made war seem desirable to them, a good thing not to be shunned. Most of these causes affected and influenced all of the European powers, and for that reason in the early years of the struggle it seemed to many people in the United States that here was merely another contest brought about by rivalries and unwholesome ambitions, with one side no better than the other. Presently, however, it was seen that German designs had influenced and directed all the other factors; and in the end the opinion prevailed that blame should be placed upon the German people and their leaders.

The growth of the great opposing combinations has already been traced. By 1914 the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, and Italy still composed the Triple Alliance. For some time Italy had been attached to it principally through fear of what might happen if she left it, and her attitude in any great conflict was a matter of conjecture; but Rumania had long been secretly allied with Austria-Hungary, and more recently Turkey had been so closely attached to Germany's interest that it seemed very probable that any loss through Italy would be made good by her. On the other side were Great Britain, Russia, and France, held together more loosely, and held together principally through dread of the mighty and increasing greatness of the German Empire, with Russia sometimes drawn away for the moment by the influence of the kaiser upon the tsar. Whatever might be true of Italy and to a less extent of Russia, the two Teutonic powers on the one side, and Great Britain and France on the other, constantly drew closer together, and constantly watched their opponents with increasing suspicion and alarm. In both

Great rivalries and differences

Triple Entente against Triple Alliance

groups, and especially in England and France, many people bore their opponents no hostility and hoped that war never would come; but on both sides were those who constantly watched for the favorable moment to better their position, and constantly worked to oppose their opponents. Several dangerous situations had arisen, and always the two combinations seemed to drift into deeper enmity and graver danger of war.

Militarism

These great combinations had resulted not only from political developments, but partly from the growth and preparation of military power. In the nineteenth century there had been in Europe such a development of armies and military preparations as had never been seen before. In former times there had been great military states, Assyria, Sparta, Rome, overawing all their neighbors; but now almost every man in most of the great states of Europe had been trained as a soldier and was ready for the summons to come.

Development of the Prussian army

The wars of the eighteenth century were carried on in Europe by professional soldiers, paid and supported by the governments, who kept them as standing armies in permanent military establishments. Such armies were small as compared with the population of the countries that maintained them. Louis XIV terrified all Europe when he assembled 400,000 soldiers at a time when the population of France was 10,000,000. But during the nineteenth century these small armies of professional hired soldiers were given over. In 1813 a law passed in Prussia provided that a certain number of the young men of the nation should be trained as soldiers for a short period, after which like numbers should be trained in succession for the same short period, so that after a while a large number of all the young men should have been trained as soldiers, and in time of need could be called out for active service. This system was extended and perfected in Prussia until after a time a large portion of all Prussia's men had had military

CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 425

training. It was because of this that Prussia so easily won her great triumphs over Austria and France. She had by far the largest number of well-trained soldiers of any state in the world. Enormous advantage came from this, because a large army could not be created quickly. War was becoming so elaborate and complicated that it was nearly hopeless for men without military training or organization to stand against an army well prepared.

So great and so obvious was the advantage of Prussia, that in time all the neighbors of the German Empire adopted this system: France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia. The extent to which the system of "universal" military service was adopted by each one depended upon the size of the population and the financial ability of the nation to support gigantic military forces. Russia did not find it necessary to take all of her men, nor did the German Empire, but France, with much smaller population, and living directly by Germany, enrolled all her men physically fit, and was by 1914 the classic example of the system. There all the young men, not deformed or too weak, when they arrived at the age established by law, went to the training camps for three years, and after their period of training entered the reserve. In 1914 the number of soldiers in the "standing army" of Germany was 870,000, while 4,000,000 more trained soldiers could, if necessary, be called; in France 670,000 were in the camps, and it was thought that 3,000,000 could follow. By this time the soldiers of the Continental armies numbered millions, with millions more in reserve. There had never been anything like it before, and it was believed that another war would either be decided immediately in favor of that nation which could suddenly bring greatest forces to bear, or else all the contestants would soon be exhausted as a result of the stupendous cost.

Nor was this all. With these vast military establishments went the preparation of war-supplies in incredible

Growth of
armies in
Europe

Great
standing
armies

Military equipment, preparations, and spirit

quantities. Never before in the history of the world had there been so enormous an accumulation of rifles, cannon, machine guns, explosives, and death-dealing instruments of all kinds. The best brains and the greatest ingenuity in some of these countries went into the devising of more and more dreadful instruments of destruction. There was feverish activity and the most reckless expenditure to keep up in the race. Powerful weapons soon became obsolete and were replaced with others more terrible. To lag in the race might some time mean destruction by a more active rival. Preparations for the future were constantly made. Elaborate arrangements were prepared for sudden attack, and complete plans of campaign. Spies were sent out in time of peace, to collect information or disarrange plans. Railway systems were constructed for quickly moving troops, and "strategic railways" appeared, as along the Belgian frontier of Germany, where there were few passengers and little freight to be moved. And still more terrible, but as a natural consequence, powerful men who gave their careers to military service thought about military effectiveness so much and tried so hard to perfect their armies, that they came to think of war as a good thing, and to hope that there might some day be a chance to use the weapons so well prepared. In all of these things Germany took the lead and kept far ahead. When statesmen of other countries tried to bring about reduction of armament, and arrange plans for settling national disputes by peaceable means, Germany always opposed or refused.

The Hague
Peace Conferences

Some efforts were made to abate this activity, and there were not a few who dreamed of bringing war to an end. In 1898 Tsar Nicholas II invited the nations to consider the project of disarming. As he truly declared, increasing armaments and the expenses entailed threatened to destroy European civilization. In the next year what was known as the First Peace Conference assembled at

CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 427

The Hague. The German representative declared that in his country the army was no burden; and it was not possible to agree upon any scheme of reduction; but a permanent court of arbitration known as the Hague Tribunal, was established, to deal, at the request of powers concerned, with differences which they had been unable to settle by diplomatic negotiation. In 1907 a second Peace Conference met at The Hague. There was a larger attendance, and stronger efforts were now made to substitute peaceable arbitration for war, and so make possible the reduction of armaments. Again there was no success, and it was afterward stated that from Germany came the most effective opposition. A body of conventions was drawn up to regulate the conduct of war and forbid certain harsh methods and divers dreaded devices, like poisonous gases. These conventions were adopted, but again Germany made no actual change in the stern and terrible regulations contained in her *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege* (usages in war), which had been issued five years before. The Hague Conferences accomplished little, but they are the principal monument to the Russian ruler who afterward perished so miserably as a result of war. And they were afterward seen to have been preliminary steps toward the forming of a league of nations to abolish all war.

Because of mere geographical situation and the arrangement of outlets and frontiers some of the nations of Europe were at a disadvantage as compared with the others. They earnestly desired to get things that they lacked, which could only be got by taking them away from rivals. Some countries were closed in from the sea by others, who could, if they should so wish, deny them outlet and strangle their economic life. Some nations had vast expanse of territory in which to increase their population and make themselves greater in the future. Others had restricted area and far less chance for any growth.

Fruitless
efforts to
abolish war

Geo-
graphical
factors

Russia,
Austria-
Hungary

Russia had immense territory, wanting good outlet. To the north she had ports in the Arctic region, which were far out of the way and most of them closed by ice during much of the year. Far to the east she had a good outlet at Vladivostok, which was likewise closed during winter, and also at the mercy of Japan. In the west she had ports on the Baltic Sea, but they were not only used with difficulty during some months in the winter, but the German Empire could stop all Baltic trade if ever she wished. In the south there were excellent ports on the Black Sea, and to this sea came most of Russia's commerce, since most of the great Russian rivers emptied there; but the only exit from the Black Sea was through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, narrow straits controlled absolutely by the Turks at Constantinople. It had been the age-long aspiration of Russians to get a good warm-water outlet and it had long been their passionate desire to win Constantinople, from which had come their religion and civilization, and which seemed to them a holy city. But if Russia succeeded in this, then some of the greatest ambitions of Germany might come to nothing, and Austria-Hungary would be largely in Russia's power. Not only did Austria-Hungary desire to expand south through the Balkans, but her great river, the Danube, emptied into the Black Sea, and much of her commerce went out past Constantinople. That is to say, if Russia succeeded in her ambition, then Austria-Hungary could be largely closed in and at Russia's mercy, while if Austria got what she desired, then Russia could be at her mercy in like manner.

The Adriatic, the
Baltic, the
Mediterranean

There were many circumstances similar. Austria's other outlet was into the Adriatic, at Trieste and Fiume, but the end of the Adriatic was getting entirely under Italy's control. Germany, who could close in Russia on the Baltic, found her great trade routes in the North Sea and through the English Channel at the mercy of

Great Britain who could shut them off if she wished. And all the nations with ports on the Mediterranean, the most important sea and the greatest water short-line in the world, found the Mediterranean held at both ends, at Suez and Gibraltar, by Great Britain. It was not that these outlets were closed and nations strangled or made economically dependent, but the fact that in some great struggle they could be. Statesmen thought of the future, and were filled with distrust. In time of peace all the seas controlled by Britain were used by all the nations as much as they wished, but during the Great War Britain's command of the sea at last brought Germany to her knees, just as already Russia had been destroyed partly because she had from the first been closed in by the German Empire and Turkey. Indeed, in 1911-12, during the Turco-Italian War, in which Russia had no part, Russia's grain fleet was completely stopped through the closing of the straits by Turkey.

Just as great to some seemed the disadvantage of not having room for expansion. The English-speaking peoples, the Russians, Chinese, and Japanese, perhaps some of the South American peoples, had room in which to grow and increase their numbers. Even France, whose population was stationary, had a large colonial empire. But Germany's territory was small, and she had no good colonies or thinly peopled districts in which might grow up a Germany still greater. Her population was rapidly increasing, and some looked forward to the time when there would be 200,000,000 Germans in the Empire. Then France would be at a hopeless disadvantage. But when that time came, it seemed probable that the population of Russia might be 1,000,000,000, and then what chance would Germany have against her? Nor could this disparity be avoided, for Russia had immense territories only thinly peopled, able to support many more, while beyond a certain number it did not seem possible that Germany

Possible
economic
strangula-
tion

Room for
growth of
population

could support more in the limited area which she possessed. Later on, accordingly, the destiny of the world would be in the hands of great contestants, like Russia, the British Empire, the United States, perhaps Japan, with Germany relatively a minor power like France—unless, before this evil day came, Germany struck and took from others the territory which they had and which she needed so badly.

Birth-rate
and growth
of population

Connected with this were differences in birth-rate and increase in population. In some countries the number of people was increasing more rapidly than in others, and, other things being equal, superior numbers would be sure to give greater military strength and power. It was largely because of this that France had lost the position of primacy she had once held in the affairs of Europe. At the beginning of the nineteenth century her population was 27,000,000; in 1914 it was a little less than 40,000,000. In the early part of the nineteenth century there were in the countries which afterward made up the German Empire 24,000,000 people, but when the Great War began the population was estimated at about 68,000,000. During this same period the population of Great Britain had grown from 10,500,000 to 40,000,000 though during the same time that of Ireland had declined from 8,000,000 to 4,500,000. The enemies of France, and some of her friends, said that France was decadent, that France was an old, tired nation, which, like a man or a woman late in life, was not possessed of the vigor and fullness that cause early marriages and large families and increase in numbers. Actually, however, there had long been in France what had long been the case with the upper and more prosperous classes in almost every other country: a high standard of living and civilization, and a desire to hand down the same standard to the people of the next generation. The land of France was divided among a great number of small proprietors, who could maintain themselves in comfort and high standard, and bestow the same

Birth-rate
and
standard
of living

CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 431

standard upon their children, provided their property did not have to be divided among many children. Accordingly, the birth-rate was low. On the other hand, in Italy where the standard of living was low, the population increased so rapidly that large numbers of emigrants had to abandon a country that could not support them; and in Russia, despite an appalling infant mortality, population increased more rapidly still. In Germany, where the standard was high, it also increased rapidly, so that a large part of the population could only be supported by making goods to be exchanged with other nations for food. It was Germany's dearest desire to have more good territory in which to expand and increase her numbers; while the rapid increase, which she had, constantly made her more powerful, and more able to be arrogant and threatening to her neighbors.

Birth-rate
and
expansion

There were particular things which seemed to bode ill for the future, such as the feeling in France that gross injustice had been done by Germany in taking Alsace-Lorraine, though the desire of the French people for a war of revenge had largely passed away, and by 1914 it was very probable that France would never go to war solely to win the "lost provinces" back. Italy wished much for the lands in which Italians lived, which had not been given to her at the time when her unity was achieved; but it was not probable that she would go to war to obtain them or be able to get them if she did. Far more important were the rivalry between Teuton and Slav in eastern Europe, and the relations between Germany and England in the west.

Intern-
ational
relations

The relations between Germany and England in earlier times had generally been good. But a great change came at the end of the century, when Germany, having built up the greatest military power in the world, seemed to desire naval supremacy also. In 1898 and in 1900 were passed two of the most important naval measures ever

Germany
and Great
Britain

German
naval
expansion

Apprehen-
sion in
Britain

Ineffectual
efforts to
reach an
understand-
ing

sanctioned in any country. Huge appropriations were passed to be spent methodically according to plan over a number of years, at the end of which it was hoped that the German Empire would have a war fleet so powerful that in a contest the mightiest power would stake its very existence on the outcome. At once English leaders were alarmed. The British Government entered into the *Entente Cordiale* with France (1904) and settled all difficulties with Russia (1907). The people themselves were presently aroused at the prospect of great danger. More and more in the years that followed was the attention of people in Great Britain given to the growth and ambitions of Germany. Additional warships were built, and then, when for a while it seemed that Germany might still get ahead, huge appropriations were made and naval construction carried on with feverish haste. Many people believed that there was no danger; but many more thought that the British Empire was threatened by the greatest danger that had ever confronted it. There were not wanting some who feared that the Germans might strike without any declaration of war, and, evading the British fleet some misty night, suddenly throw into England a force which would destroy Great Britain completely, without any hope of redemption. It was necessary, then, to be perpetually on guard, to maintain overwhelming sea power, and perhaps raise a great army for defence.

Some attempts were made to end this rivalry and suspicion. The British Government tried to come to an understanding with Germany about limiting the building of battleships, but though a temporary arrangement was arrived at, no real agreement could be reached, since Germany was not willing to give up her effort to rival Great Britain on the seas. The British people desired to avoid a conflict, and the British Government made a sincere effort to remove such differences as existed between the two nations. In doing this, large and generous con-

cessions were made, especially with respect to the Bagdad Railway scheme; but it cannot be known what good results might have come, since the agreement was reached only a little before the Great War broke out. Meanwhile, such had been the revolution in affairs, that Great Britain, who had for nearly a century kept outside Continental affairs, now considered herself unable to stand without friends in Europe, her statesmen were constantly watching Germany's every move, and it had become the cornerstone of her foreign policy that in no circumstances must she ever allow France, her best friend, to be crushed by the German armies.

An under-standing almost reached

Less acute and less evident, perhaps, was another and vaster rivalry, between the Teutonic peoples, especially the Germans, in central Europe, and the Slavic peoples, especially Russia, in the east, a contest which principally concerned Constantinople and the Balkans. For ages this contest had lasted. Once the Slavs had pushed the Teutons almost to the Elbe and the Rhine. Then the tide turned. The history of the Middle Ages in central Europe is to a considerable extent the story of the reconquest of lands by the Germans from the Slavs. In this way was eastern Prussia built up, and it is thought that the Slavic continues to be the largest element in the Prussian people. In this way also was the power of Austria extended, and there were more Slavs in Austria than there were Germans and more Slavs in Hungary than Magyars. Poland had once been the great champion of the Slavs, but she had disappeared, and her place of leadership had been taken by the Empire of Russia. The rivalry now was concerned largely with the mastery of the Balkan Peninsula.

Teuton and Slav

In the days when the Eastern Roman Empire was decaying the Balkan Peninsula had been occupied largely by South Slavic peoples. In course of time they were overwhelmed and submerged by the Turks. In the nine-

The South Slavs and the Balkans

Russia,
leader of
the Slavs

teenth century they and the Greeks gained their freedom once more. To this freedom they had all been helped by Russia, to whom they looked as their protector and the great leader of their race. Russia desired to protect them or perhaps some day incorporate them in a great Pan-Russian domain, and she held these feelings not only because she was ambitious but because she felt the ties of religion and race: they were all of them Slavic in blood and they held the Greek Catholic faith. Also Russia greatly desired to have Constantinople and an outlet on the Mediterranean. This would never be possible, perhaps, unless she controlled the Balkans.

Germany,
the Balkans,
Asiatic
Turkey

These ambitions of Russia conflicted directly with what had come to be the first ambition of the Germanic peoples, and their best chance of founding a greater empire. There was no territory in Europe into which the Germans could expand without taking it away from some neighbor as the result of a war; and of colonies, England and France had taken almost all of the best that were to be had. There did seem to be some possibility of expansion in South America and in the Far East, but for the present the Monroe Doctrine debarred Germany from taking Latin American countries, and after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), European acquisition in China came to an end, since this was now opposed by Japan. It might be that some day Germany could take away the colonial dominion of France, or even the far-flung possessions of the British Empire; but if these things came they must be the result of a victorious war, won by greater Germany in the future. One inviting field remained, and that was in the domain of Turkey, mostly in Asia Minor, which was thinly peopled and backward now under the rule of the Turk, but which had once been a seat of civilization, populous, important, and wealthy. Under German rule it might come to be so again.

Asia Minor

Accordingly, the German Government had cultivated

good relations with the Turks, and had recently become so influential in their government that Turkey was becoming an appendage of the German alliance. But in order that the German Empire might have control of the Turkish dominions it seemed necessary that the Dual Monarchy and Germany together should control the Balkan Peninsula which lay in between. This suited very well the schemes of Austria Hungary who desired to extend to the south. Gradually the plan took shape. The two principal members of the Triple Alliance were to dominate the Balkans and thence get control of the Turkish Empire and so build up across "Middle Europe" an empire which would extend from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. To hold it together, to carry on a great trade with profit, to defend it in time of war, a railroad must bind all the parts. Already most of such a railroad existed. From the ports of the North Sea and the Baltic lines ran to Berlin, then to Vienna and Budapest, thence to Belgrade, and on to Constantinople. The Germans wished to extend this line of communication by building the "Bagdad Railway," which, starting on the shore of the Bosphorus opposite Constantinople, would run across Asia Minor and across ancient Mesopotamia to the city of Bagdad, so famed in the *Arabian Nights*, and thence on to the Persian Gulf, while a branch would run southward along the Mediterranean past Egypt to the Arabian cities of Mohammed.

Realization of this scheme of Middle Europe would make it impossible to fulfil the greater ambitions of the Slavs, and it was therefore strongly opposed by Russia. The field in which these conflicting ambitions most clashed was the Balkan Peninsula, the mastery of which was indispensable to success for either side. Hence the Balkans became the principal danger-spot of Europe. Twice did a great war almost break out because of disputes over this district. In 1908 Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and

Mittel-
Europa and
the Bagdad
Railway


Rivalry
in the
Balkans

The Balkan crises

Herzegovina. Russia strongly objected, but Germany stood beside her ally, and Russia yielded, suffering thus a diplomatic defeat. In 1912-13 another crisis developed when the small Balkan nations overthrew Turkey, took from her almost all of her territory in Europe, and then fought among themselves in dividing it up. On this occasion the Germans, and especially the Austrians, suffered loss, since the power of Turkey seemed to be destroyed, and Servia, Austria's bitterest foe, extended her territory and became more ambitious. It seemed now that Russia and the Triple Entente had the greatest influence in the Balkans. The subject Slavic peoples in the Dual Monarchy became restless, and hoped that some day they could be independent or else join the Servian kingdom. Worst of all, if a hostile Servia remained independent, there could scarcely be a Middle Europe with through railroad communication from Hamburg to Bagdad, since it was almost necessary that this railroad should run across Servia up the valley of the Morava River. This was indeed the cause which led directly to the war. The Teutonic powers were determined that an independent Servia should not stand in their way. On the other hand, it was nearly certain that if Russia allowed Servia to be crushed, then her great hopes must come to an end. Hence there were endless plots and constant watching to see that neither side gained any advantage.

The Germans


The last and the greatest of the causes of the war was Germany herself. The character, the ambitions, the ideals of her rulers and her people made a great war probable whatever other causes existed. The Germans, from rapid and mighty success, had become selfish, cynical, hard, steeped in materialism, and filled with belief that they were superior and high above others. No people had developed so greatly in so short a time as the Germans since the founding of their empire. Just before the war they were surpassed in manufacturing only by the United



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25. SUPPC'11

-  Central Europe and its Annex, in the Near East
(Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey)
-  Territory occupied by Central Powers
-  Germany's Main Route to the East
(Berlin-Bagdad, Berlin-Hodeida, Berlin-Cairo-Cape)
-  Additional Routes
(Berlin-Trieste, Berlin-Saloniki-Athens, Berlin-Constantza-Constantinople)
-  Portions under construction



PP. 11 - GERMAN PLAN

States, in commerce only by Great Britain, they were the strongest military power in the world, they were building one of the greatest navies, their population and national wealth were increasing in amazing manner. They had succeeded because of high intelligence, industry, and their excellent organization. But they had also succeeded by force and by fraud and by might. And as the years went on, their character and outlook underwent a notable change.

Other peoples have believed themselves to be the greatest and the best in the world—the Greeks and the Romans once, the British, the French, the Russians, the Japanese, and the people of the United States. But in modern times there has been no such extreme belief as that which was cherished by the Germans. “The Teutons are the aristocracy of humanity,” said a well-known writer. “The Teutonic race is called to encircle the earth with its rule, to exploit the treasures of nature and of human labor, and to make the passive races servient elements in its cultural development.” He declared that the great work of the world had been done by men of Teutonic race, that Leonardo da Vinci, Galileo, and Voltaire were actually of Teutonic strain, and that Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar were of the Teutonic type. “Whoever has the characteristics of the Teutonic race is superior.” Such teachings were spread broadcast through the German Empire in popular form, and after a while generally believed in.

Above all did the German people believe that they were superior in war to all others. They had humbled all with whom they had fought. There were still other and greater foes, but the reckoning would come with them also. An accounting would come with Russia, and many Germans looked eagerly forward to “the day,” when the British Empire was to be laid low by the valor of their arms. Long-continued militarism had accustomed the

Belief in
racial super-
iority

Glorification
of war

German success in previous wars

Germans to ideas of war; great success in their recent wars, confident belief in their superiority and future success caused many to believe that war was a good thing in itself. "Perpetual peace is a dream," wrote Field-Marshal von Moltke in 1880, "war is part of the eternal order instituted by God." Others declared that war was a part of the struggle for survival of the fittest, which, they said, was everywhere and always going on in the evolution of things. Through war it was that the superior German people would triumph over other, inferior nations. And as a result of the victories to come Germany would take away from the vanquished their possessions, which it was more fitting that she should have. It would be better for the world if Germans possessed France and parts of Russia and wide domains everywhere, since then the greatest and the best of peoples would have chance for development larger and freer.

Arrogance and boundless ambition

As Germany became greater and stronger each year, as belief in the glorious destiny of the Germans was preached and taught in the schools and everywhere circulated in cheap and popular writings, as Germans believed more in the goodness of war and in their invincible army and navy, their ambition and arrogance became boundless. Not only military men but many others dreamed fondly of the mighty victories to come, and books were published containing maps of the world with the best parts under German rule. All this was well expressed in the writings of General von Bernhardi, especially in his book, *Deutschland und der Nächste Krieg (Germany and the Next War)*, published in 1911. He maintained that war was a thing excellent in itself. Through great wars would Germany's future be assured. First "France must be so completely crushed that never again can she come across our path"; then would come the reckoning with England. The next war would be for *Weltmacht oder Untergang*, world-power or downfall. And so in the end it was.

Along with this materialism, this ambition, this belief in the goodness of war, and the great plans which were cherished, went gradually a change in character, which affected many persons with a terrible perversion, for a while not understood by outsiders. Old maxims, often preached before and often abandoned as people improved, were revived now and strengthened. Since war was so good, force was the deciding factor, and might made right. Since the Germans were superior, and their aims for the good of the world, whatever they did to secure their ends was right, the end justified the means. Since the Germans were superior, a particular code existed for them: they were not bound by ordinary moral laws. The old teachings of Christ, that mercy and mildness should be shown, and that men should do by others as they would have others do unto them, were openly scoffed at by teachers who proclaimed that Germans were *supermen*, who should, by force or fraud or any means, obtain mastery over inferior people. Cruelty, terror, hardness of heart might always be employed by Germans in a coolly scientific and deliberate way to ensure the success which was theirs by right. Nor need promises be kept or treaties observed, if such observance hindered success.

These teachings were widely proclaimed and often repeated, but they attracted little attention outside of Germany. For the most part they were so different from what humane people allowed themselves to think of or tried to believe that it seemed then incredible that Germans could deliberately entertain them. But in Germany they were received with earnest attention, and made greater impression as time went on. They were probably the greatest reason, after all, why the other factors that tended toward a European conflict actually developed into war. They were also the principal reason why, after the Great War began, the greater part of the world turned from Germany with such horror and loathing.

Old doc-trines
terrible
again

Effects of
these doc-trines

Drifting
toward a
great war

So in the years after 1870, and especially after 1900, many factors in Europe tended to bring on a struggle of nations. Several times a great war nearly came to pass, but each time it was averted. By 1913, however, conditions had become such that it would be almost impossible to avoid a great conflict if another occasion arose. We know now, what was hidden then, that the Teutonic powers were at last fully determined to secure certain things, especially in the Balkans. If they could, they would get them without war. They were ready to fight for them if they must fight.

Sarajevo
and the
Austrian
note, 1914

The immediate cause of the war developed from a single episode. June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian and Hungarian thrones, and his wife were assassinated in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The assassins were Bosnians, but the affair at once took on an ominous aspect when it was known that Austria-Hungary considered the crime to have been plotted in Servia with the knowledge of the government at Belgrade. It was rightly suspected that opportunity would now be seized to reduce Servia to the dependence which Germany and Austria desired. The worst suspicions were confirmed when, about a month later, July 24, a note was addressed to the Servian Government, declaring that it had acted in hostile way toward its neighbor, that it was a source of danger, and that evidently the infamous murder of the archduke had resulted largely therefrom. Accordingly, ten demands were presented which must be acceded to in full within forty-eight hours. One of these demands was that Servia should remove officials "whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating"; while another was that Austro-Hungarian representatives be permitted to take part in court proceedings in Servia and in measures undertaken there with respect to those engaged in activities against the Dual Monarchy.

The ten
demands

At once it was the opinion of those who read the note that it had been so drafted as not to be acceptable. Sir Edward Grey, British secretary for foreign affairs, and one of the ablest and best diplomats in Europe, declared that he had never seen so formidable a document addressed to an independent state. If Servia yielded what was now asked she would forego her sovereignty and independence, and become in effect a dependency of the power to whom she yielded. If this took place, then Austria, and with her the German Empire, would secure in the Balkans the supremacy for which they had so long striven, especially the vital advantage of controlling Servia and a part of the route of the railway to Constantinople. No state can retain its sovereignty and allow representatives of a foreign power to take part in the business of its law courts, and if any power promised unconditionally to dismiss such officials as were afterward to be named, not only would it submit to a demand subversive of its independence but it would be possible for the foreign power to cause it to remodel its government in such manner as to render it entirely submissive.

Servia at once appealed to Russia for support. Servians could count on the sympathy of Russia, and it was probable that Russia would not stand aside and see Servia crushed and Germany and Austria obtain immediate preponderance in the Balkans. Austria unaided would probably be no match for Russia, but she would certainly be supported by the German Empire. It was now as proper and fundamental a policy for Germany to refuse to allow Austria-Hungary to be destroyed as it was for the British Empire to be determined to give France support. Accordingly, men believed that such a note would never have been dispatched from Vienna without the knowledge and approval of Berlin. The German authorities announced that they approved the contents of the note, but declared that they had not known those contents be-

The inde-
pendence of
Servia at
stake

Danger of
a general
conflict

The German Government promises Austria-Hungary support in advance

forehand. Strictly this may have been true. But it is now certain that Count Berchtold, Austrian minister of foreign affairs, who had determined upon a bold stroke, had obtained from Germany general promise of support for whatever policy Austria undertook. July 5 the German Government secretly declared: "Austria must judge what is to be done to clear up her relation to Servia; whatever Austria's decision may turn out to be, Austria can count with certainty upon it, that Germany will stand behind her as an ally and friend." But bad as it would be if Russia came to the help of Servia, and Germany to the support of Austria-Hungary, the mischief would not stop there. France was bound to support Russia by the terms of the military convention, and it was her primary interest not to abandon Russia, unless Russia was making wicked and wanton aggression. And if France were drawn in, it was most probable that before long England would come to her support. Then a great European war would have begun, and it was impossible to tell how far it might afterward extend. Accordingly, those statesmen who desired to avert such catastrophe now bent all their efforts to quenching the fire that had been started.

Austria makes war on Servia

In the terrible Twelve Days, July 24 to August 4, many efforts were made to settle the affair and keep peace. The British and French ministers in Belgrade urged Servia to return a satisfactory reply. The Servian Government humbled itself to the dust and accepted most of the demands, not completely yielding to those which threatened its independence, though offering to refer the decision of them to the Hague Tribunal. Austria refused to consider the reply, and declared war on Servia, July 28. At once an invasion began. And now Russia appeared upon the scene. The day before, the tsar had declared: "Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Servia." The tsar's council had already decided to mobilize part

CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 443

of the Russian army against Austria, if necessary. Meanwhile, strong representations were made.

Every hour the menace of war grew more dreadful. The other Great Powers now bent themselves to keeping the peace between Austria and Russia. Great Britain, France, and Italy tried to do it in one way; Germany tried it in another. In the first group England took the lead. Sir Edward Grey proposed that a conference of the four powers be held to mediate between Russia and Austria-Hungary and work for a satisfactory solution; but with such a scheme Germany would have nothing to do, saying that she could not take part in bringing her ally before a European tribunal. Germany had a plan very different. She attempted to terrify Russia by threats, and so prevent her supporting Servia's cause. The dispute, she said, was an affair merely between Austria and Servia; no outside party should intervene; any such intercession "would precipitate inconceivable consequences." In Russia and in Germany military leaders now secretly urged on preparations for war, so as to take the other at a disadvantage, the measures of each one driving the other still further. The German emperor promised to use his influence to bring about a satisfactory understanding between Austria and Russia, but the German ambassador in St. Petersburg was instructed to say that Russian military measures would be answered by mobilizing the German army, and "mobilization means war." July 29, the German emperor telegraphed to the tsar that it was perfectly possible for Russia to "remain a spectator" in the Austro-Servian war. Next day he said the tsar must decide: "You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace." Germany probably wished that a war be avoided, and preferred peace, so long as she and her ally got what they asked for; otherwise they were quite willing to fight. On the contrary, Great Britain and France, and, to some extent, Russia, earnestly wished to avoid war, and were

Austria,
Germany,
Russia

Kaiser
and tsar

trying hard to bring about a compromise and satisfactory arrangement. Austria would make no compromise whatever, and Germany was bound by the secret promise to support her.

The Great
War begins:
Germany
declares war
on Russia

Meanwhile, Austrian armies continued their march into Servia. The protests of Russia effected nothing. Then on the night of July 29, almost at the same moment, Russian and Austrian armies were mobilized against each other. Face to face with the dread conflict Austria seemed to hesitate. Then Germany stepped forward, and settled the affair herself. Her diplomats were thrust aside by the Great General Staff, which now got control. Russia, more and more threatened by Germany, was mobilizing all her forces. July 31 the German Government demanded that Russia stop all mobilization within twelve hours, and France was asked what she would do if a Russo-German war were begun. Russia returned no answer. August 1 the German Empire declared war upon Russia.

Germany
declares war
on France

Neither England nor France had much direct interest in Balkan affairs, and both of them greatly wished peace. But the hour of fate was at hand for France. The German ambassador in Paris was bidden to insist on a reply to the German inquiry, and it is now known that he was also instructed, in case France promised to leave Russia to her fate, to demand that the French hand over to the German authorities certain strong fortresses in pledge. But the reply was that "France would do that which her interests dictated." Two days later, August 3, Germany declared war upon France, falsely affirming that France had attacked her first. Actually the French, in their great desire to avoid war, had drawn their forces back some seven miles from their frontier. But also in this moment of destiny the French people stood up in unconquerable spirit before the greatest danger that had ever approached them.

Thus the Continent was engulfed in war. Great Britain

was close to the brink. More than any other power had England striven for peace. Every resource had been tried. It was not improbable that France and Russia would be crushed, and British statesmen realized, what many of their people did not clearly see yet, that if France were crushed, then Britain's best friend would be gone, and Britain would be left, perhaps, to face alone a mightier Germany in the future. It would be better to support France now. Yet the British people and parliament wished to stay out of the war, and France could get no assurance that England would give her assistance. Almost certainly England would have come to the help of France before the conflict was over, but it might well be that her help would have come too late. August 2 a promise was given that the British fleet would protect French shipping and the north coast of France, and afterward this would undoubtedly have been regarded by Germany as an unfriendly act, whenever it suited her to do so. But meanwhile Germany was striving to keep Britain out of the war, and Sir Edward Grey had already declared that if Germany and Austria would make "any reasonable proposal" for keeping the peace, and it became clear that France and Russia were not trying to keep it, then Great Britain "would have nothing more to do with the consequences."

An event now occurred which caused Great Britain to enter the struggle at once. Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium. The plans of the German General Staff called for the immediate crushing of France and then afterward attacking Russia alone. If this was to succeed, there must be no delay. But the frontier between Germany and France was not long, and it was so strongly fortified that it seemed probable much time would be lost in getting through. Between Germany and France also lay the neutralized countries of Switzerland, Luxemburg, and Belgium. Both Luxemburg and Belgium afford

Germany
and Great
Britain

Violation
the neu-
trality of
Belgium

The easy
road into
France

easy and admirable entrance into the most vital part of France. It was true, the inviolability of the territory of these small states was guaranteed by treaties which had long been regarded as sacred and as part of the public law of Europe, and the German Empire was engaged to uphold them. Nevertheless, Germany at once began pouring an enormous force through Luxemburg and demanded that the Belgian Government allow free passage. One of the finest things in history was the splendid way in which Belgium, suddenly asked to forfeit her neutralization and threatened with terrible fate if she refused, bravely called upon the German Government to keep its promise, and then tried to resist the German armies, which struck her at once. Immediately Belgium appealed to the Great Powers; Russia, France, and Great Britain promised such help as they could give.

"A scrap of
paper"

The position of Belgium is such that if she were in the hands of a strong power hostile to Great Britain, then the very existence of Britain would be threatened. It had therefore long been a cardinal principle of British statesmanship that the neutrality and independence of Belgium must be maintained. Now, August 4, the British ambassador in Berlin was instructed to present an ultimatum demanding that Germany withdraw her forces from Belgium at once. The chancellor of the Empire, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, refused, saying bitterly that England was going to war for Belgian neutrality, "just for a scrap of paper." Thus did the highest official of Germany speak of the treaty obligations of his government. Before the *Reichstag* he admitted that Germany had done wrong—"necessity knows no law." "From this admission," said a German writer afterward, "neither God nor the devil will ever set us free." At midnight of August 4, when the time of the ultimatum had expired, Great Britain entered the war.

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CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 449

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CHAPTER XVII

THE GREAT WAR

Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt.
Eneid, i. 462.

Ja der Krieg verschlingt die Besten.
SCHILLER, "Das Siegesfest" (1803).

. . . the poppies blow
Between the crosses, row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly,
Scarce heard amid the guns below.

We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.

Lt.-Col. JOHN McCRAE, "In Flanders Fields" (1915).

The Great
War

THE Great War, as it has been called, perhaps for want of a better name, began August 1, 1914, with the declaration of war by the German Empire against Russia. This was followed two days later by the German declaration against France. Next day came the declaration of Great Britain against Germany. The conflict had been made nearly inevitable by the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia, and against Austria also now the Powers of the *Entente* soon issued declarations. August 23, Japan declared war upon Germany in fulfilment, as she said, of the terms of her alliance with Britain. By the end of the summer all Europe with the exception of Spain, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Italy, and some of the nations of the Balkans, the outlying and

less important parts, was involved in the most destructive conflict in the history of the world. Relatively more terrible in the end, were the death struggle between Rome and Carthage, the ravages of the Huns and of the Mongols, the Hundred Years War in France, the Thirty Years War in Germany, and even the Napoleonic wars; but these struggles were on a smaller scale or else produced their fearful results because they continued through a great many years. The war which began in 1914 lasted little more than four years, but in that short time it brought a great part of the civilized world to the brink of destruction, and because of the enormous numbers engaged and the fearful instruments of destruction employed, more men were killed or maimed, it is said, than in all the wars preceding, since the beginning of the Christian era.

The most destructive of conflicts

It was evident to all at the beginning of the struggle that the Germans and their allies had great advantage from wonderful preparation and from striking suddenly at their chosen time, but it was widely believed that if only France and Russia could endure the assault for a short period, until they could assemble all their force, and especially until Britain, unprepared for the war, could bring her resources to bear, that the Allies of the *Entente*, because they had the greater resources in wealth and population, had the better chance to win—that time was on their side. This was not entirely true. It is certain that the Germans expected a short war, for they had much reason to anticipate an easy, overwhelming triumph. But when their first rush had been checked, there were periods in the years that followed when their advantages and resources were so superior that time seemed entirely with them.

The opposing forces

The Teutonic powers, especially Germany, possessed certain advantages, which were understood elsewhere more clearly as the conflict progressed. The Germans had the largest number of well-drilled, thoroughly trained,

The German army

intelligent, and devoted soldiers possessed by any power in the world. France had as brave and as skilful soldiers, but not so great a population and not so large an army potentially or immediately available. Russia had great numbers of men, but scant facilities for training and equipping them as soldiers. Germany could put into the field in a short time 4,000,000 soldiers, without superiors in the world. Military tradition and years of training were needed to make such fighting men as hers, and having them thus ready for a sudden stroke, it was extremely probable that her army could conquer any combination, while her enemies were trying to create forces to fight her.

The German officers

If it required two or three years to make well-trained soldiers, it took much longer to produce capable officers. Without skilled officers to lead the men no great war can be won, and without a large force of reserve officers no conflict can long be carried on with any success. One reason for the failure of the Russian armies after the first year was that then most of the trained officers with whom Russia began the war were dead or in German prison camps. In 1914 Germany, of all the powers, had the largest number of trained officers, and by far the largest number of officers in reserve.

German commanders

Much more difficult than the getting of capable officers or well-trained soldiers was the building up of general military organization, creating a general staff, and finding commanders who could lead large numbers of men. All the Great Powers had attempted to do this, and some of them like Russia, and especially France, had achieved much success. But in Germany the prevalence of military atmosphere and the long-continued military tradition and devotion to the science of war had given the largest number of higher commanders possessed by any nation. In the end it was seen that no German general displayed that sort of genius which entitled him to be remembered among the first military captains of the world, none like

the great Frenchman, Foch; but no other power had so many leaders of corps and divisions and armies who had all the advantages given by patient study of military things. In this, the result of generations of work, Germany had something which none of her enemies could create in a short time when the need came.

When the conflict began Germany had the largest amount of military equipment in the world, and the greatest facilities for immediately adding to her stock. Men and leaders are indispensable for winning wars, but the bravest soldiers only give themselves up to slaughter if, without proper weapons, they fight against enemies well equipped. Millions of Russians were to fall because the Russian armies were often half armed. Modern armaments are very different from those of earlier times. In the Middle Ages weapons were comparatively simple, easier to make, and less expensive. Many a man had his sword or bow then, and armies could be quickly raised because men could quickly get weapons and assemble together. But the scientific and industrial development of modern times, especially the latter part of the nineteenth century, introduced many strange, complicated, and costly devices, which were not generally in the possession of the men of the commonwealth, could not be quickly made, and were only to be got by skilled workmen laboring for a long time. Rifles, shells, cannon, explosives often required a year or two years to make. When the United States entered the war later on, the first year was largely spent in preliminary preparations and getting the delicate tools, and it was two years before Great Britain was able to have in France a large army provided with rifles and cannon. Indeed, the great service of France was to be that in the west she would hold Germany back while England, and later America, prepared themselves to fight. In the east Russia, not similarly defended, was almost completely destroyed in the first two years. It is clear

Material
for war

War
material
difficult
to obtain

Immense
superiority
of the nation
possessing
war
materials

now that a nation provided with the enormous and terrible death-dealing devices of the latest age can probably conquer all of its enemies unprepared before they have time to equip themselves with the implements needed for defense. That is what made the Great War such a critical period in the history of civilization: had Germany triumphed, she might have conquered all her rivals and then never allowed them to arm themselves, and so maintained her domination for ages. At all events, it seems that Germany had prepared for the contest so thoroughly that when she took the field she had more of the material of war than existed then in all the rest of the world. Where the Russians had one rifle for each three soldiers, she had three rifles for each soldier of hers. In heavy cannon she was beyond all others, and she had accumulated shells, barbed wire, and military apparatus in quantities incredible and undreamed of.

Railroads
in war

Germany had the best system of military railroads in the world. Strategy is essentially the moving of armies. Napoleon and other great commanders won their principal victories by swiftly putting superior forces where they could take the enemy at a disadvantage—in the flank, or across his communications in the rear, or putting two or three men where the enemy had one. Formerly this had been done by the marching of infantry, as quickly as possible over the best roads. But in the latter part of the nineteenth century, by which time the best land communication was over railroads, it was evident that railways would be of immense importance in the moving of armies, and this was indeed seen to be the case in the American Civil War (1861–5). Nowhere was this lesson taken to heart so well as in Germany, where more and more the railroads were laid out with respect to military considerations. By 1914 there was a magnificent system, controlled by the government and, when necessary, completely subject to the military authorities, radiating

out from Berlin to all the important fortresses and points near the frontiers, while just within the boundaries, something like the rim of a wheel, ran connecting lines along which bodies of men might be swiftly moved back and forth. Russia and France had their military railroad systems also, but not so well-developed as the German. It was by means of this system that Germany hurled at Belgium the mighty army which so nearly crushed France at the beginning of the war. Because of it her armies in East Prussia were repeatedly able to disconcert larger bodies of Russians moving more slowly. And, because of the advantages which her railroads gave her, Germany was soon able to take from France and Russia the best of their railroads available for campaigns against her, thus paralyzing them almost completely.

The German
railway
system

Germany had at the beginning of the war the most extensive system of spying and secret propaganda in the world—though all the great nations employed these devices, and some had them highly developed. In Belgium the work of the armies had been prepared in advance. Artillery distances had been very accurately measured, and concrete foundations for great cannons had been put under tennis courts or factory buildings. In France, socialists were encouraged to prevent or confuse mobilization. In Egypt, Morocco, India, and Ireland malcontents had long been urged and were now encouraged to rise against England or France. In Russia, it is said, huge bribes were offered to commanders who would sell their fortresses, and it was afterward learned that most of the plans of the Russian armies were sold by traitors to German spies, who also paid bribes to keep munitions from being dispatched to the Russian armies.

Spies

The Central Powers had the advantage of position. They were adjacent, and could easily act together; the Allies were separated, and for a long time acted separately. The Germans had the central position and the “inner

Central
position

lines," much as France had had in the War of the Spanish Succession. The Germans could move over short lines and strike in any direction quickly; the Allies had the longer lines. Roughly speaking, the Germans could move along the radii of a circle, the Allies had to move around the outside.

The
Entente has
command of
the sea

On the other hand, the Allies had certain advantages which often seemed too little to bring them success against the victories of the German armies, but which, in the end, yielded complete triumph. Above all, they had command of the sea. The Allies were more or less widely separated. Their essential communications with one another lay over the water. If these communications were ever cut, they could certainly be beaten one after the other. That period of the war which seemed most hopeless for the Allies was when German submarines threatened to sever their lines of communications on the water. But the Allies always kept command of the sea. In this work the vital and indispensable factor was the British navy.

Superior
resources

The Allies had greater resources. At the beginning of the war it looked as if Germany and Austria-Hungary were hopelessly outmatched in population and resources of materials and money. Germany was, however, ready for a sudden stroke, and she was so successful at the start, that by the end of the first year she had taken possession of districts in Belgium, France, and Russia which were of immense importance for the carrying on of a European war, and which gave her for a time a decisive advantage. The resources she then had under her control enabled her to make twice as much steel and hence twice as much armament and munition, as all her opponents combined. In 1916 and 1917 many of the best judges thought it impossible that Germany could ever be defeated. All this was changed by the entrance of the United States into the conflict, after which presently the Allies once more had decisive superiority in resources.

However many factors may have entered into the war, the conflict presently assumed the character of a contest between two different types of civilization and mind, in which the democratic systems of France, Britain, and America, with their large allowance of personal liberty and individual initiative, were matched against the superbly organized and efficient autocracy of the German Empire. In the end it was found that the democratic peoples showed greater tenacity of purpose, higher intelligence, and far greater power of adaptability and invention. Every one of the frightful devices, such as poison gas and submarines used against merchant ships, was met, and checked, and in the end excelled by new devices more effective still.

Such were German methods and German ideals that it seemed to the Allies that a German victory would bring the destruction of the democratic and humanitarian systems toward which men had so long been striving. The Allies seemed almost hopelessly defeated after two years of the war, but always the cause for which they were struggling nerved them to hold fast and fight on longer. Backward Russia was the only one of the Great Powers on the Allied side to drop out. It seemed to the Allies that the world would scarcely be a fit place to live in if what the Germans had done was sealed with success. And always, too, they were supported by the evident sympathy of most of the neutral peoples, and by the fact that, one after the other, neutrals were joining to support their cause. The Germans had no such moral support as this. They believed their cause a good one, but in a different way. They were strong in courage and confidence, in the midst of success, but when the war began to go against them decisively, they did not persist as France had done, almost against all hope, but collapsed completely before the fighting even reached their frontiers.

The German plan of campaign had been arranged long

Initiative
and
inventive-
ness

Tenacity
and moral
courage

The German plan of campaign

before 1914. The armies of the Empire could be mobilized more quickly than those of any other power, so that Germany could always strike before any of her foes. This advantage, joined with the advantage of interior position, enabled her to strike at her enemies as she chose, and attempt to destroy them separately. She had planned to crush first the enemy most immediately dangerous, and afterward turn upon those who could not move so quickly, and destroy them also. The first attack, then, must be upon France, who had an army not so large as the German, but exceedingly good, and who could, perhaps, mobilize almost as rapidly as she. Therefore, the Germans designed to make an immediate and terrible thrust, hoping that France would be crushed in less than two months, after which would come the turn of the Russians, slow moving but mighty, who would in any event be held by the Austrians while France was meeting her fate.

Entrance into France

But for the success of this plan the indispensable condition, it was thought, was that France should be overwhelmed without any delay; and it would not be easy to do this, since the frontier between France and Germany was short, and strongly fortified on both sides—on the French side there was a line of fortresses from Verdun down to Belfort, just as across the frontier on the German side they stretched from Strassburg down to Neubreisach. Here the French were prepared to resist, and probably their positions could be forced only after delay and enormous losses. Accordingly, for some years it had seemed possible that when Germany next attacked France her armies would march through the valley of the Meuse, the best of all entrances into France from Germany, even though this line of march lay across the territory of Belgium, whose neutralization had been guaranteed by the German Empire along with the other Great Powers. If Germany abided by her word, then France would not be

attacked by way of Belgium; but if the Germans considered only their military advantage, then France might be attacked either from Alsace-Lorraine or through the Meuse Valley. Unfortunately, she could not know whether the Germans would keep their engagement. In any event, however, France could concentrate at the beginning for defence only about half as many troops as Germany could use in the thrust against her, and in accordance with well-known principles of strategy, it was wisest for her to keep most of them concentrated in one large body. So the French determined to ignore the possibility of an attack through Belgium, concentrate against Alsace-Lorraine, and following the best principles of military science, take the offensive, if they could. This they did, in the earliest days of the war, attacking through the Lost Provinces, and gaining some slight success. But they were soon repulsed in Alsace and badly defeated in Lorraine, this being due partly to mismanagement and very largely to German superiority in machine guns and heavy artillery.

The Germans were merely holding their lines with comparatively small forces in the south. It was soon evident that their great effort was to be through Belgium, straight at the heart of France. August 4, immediately after their demand had been rejected, they poured into Belgium. Their line of march through the Meuse Valley was barred by the strong fortresses of Liége and Namur, with Antwerp, supposedly impregnable, threatening their flank from the north. Against the avalanche of German soldiers the brave little Belgian army could do nothing but fight retarding actions, but it was hoped that the fortresses would hold until assistance came from England and France. The Germans were, indeed, checked for a moment at Liége, but immediately they revealed to the world one of the great surprises of the war. Against Liége they quickly brought incredibly large cannon, which

Easy entrance into France from Belgium

Invasion of Belgium by the Germans

they moved easily, on great broad wheels, up to positions prepared by secret agents in advance; and, having ready at hand the exact distances, dropped 10- and 12-inch shells of incredible power upon the forts, reducing the fortress in a few days. Then, bringing up their monstrous 42-centimeter guns, which fired 16-inch shells, they captured Namur. All the western world was appalled at the news that this fortress had fallen in one day, and that the way into France was open.

The British
and the
French de-
feated in
Belgium

Through Belgium, by forced marches, came such an army as the world had never seen before—gray-clad soldiers in unending stream, equipped to the last detail; and accompanied by the most fearful engines of destruction. The Belgian army was flung aside upon Antwerp, which was masked, and which the Germans took two months later, when they had leisure to bring up their heavy cannon. Brussels surrendered without resistance, and when the campaign was over it was found that all of Belgium, except for one little section on the Channel, adjoining France, had been conquered at a stroke. The British and the French did try to come to the rescue, but they could not send strong forces at once, and those which they sent came too late. The French were heavily defeated at Charleroi and the British at Mons, narrowly escaping destruction as they retreated precipitately, back into France.

France at
the brink of
destruction

For France the situation rapidly became almost hopeless. Her army, smaller than the German, was far away, in the wrong place. Shifting a large number of soldiers is one of the most complicated and difficult tasks in the world; and it was very doubtful whether the French commanders could do it, with the Germans rushing down now upon Paris. In the course of three weeks, almost by a miracle, they accomplished the maneuver, but by the end of September, when this had been done, the French armies had undergone a succession of disastrous defeats

and everywhere had had to retreat before the foe. The French Government moved from Paris to Bordeaux, and it was evident that one of the great crises in Europe's history was at hand. The Germans believed that they would soon have the French army cut off and surrounded, and would soon capture Paris. It almost seemed that they would crush France in six weeks, even as they had boasted.

The French people did not despair. They rose now to a height of grandeur which surprised their enemies and their friends, something that had before happened not seldom in the history of France. The frontier fortresses held from Belfort northward, above all the immensely important pivot position at Verdun. Between Verdun and the huge entrenched camp at Paris the retreating French armies were forced back until their line bulged far down in the center and threatened to burst asunder, while the Germans under Von Kluck threatened to outflank the French line near Paris. September 5 the matter at last came to issue. German horsemen had just ridden into the outskirts of Paris, but Von Kluck, confronting the fortress of Paris and a French army not yet destroyed, had turned aside from the capital, and thus left his own flank exposed. Joffre, commander of the French, unable to stand at first, had retreated steadily to positions which he considered favorable for a battle. He had reached them now, just when the French could go back no farther. "The hour has come," he said, in a famous order, "to hold at all costs and allow oneself to be slain rather than give way. . . . Everything depends on the result of tomorrow."

September 6 began the series of mortal combats extending for a great distance, and fought between 1,500,000 Germans with 4,000 cannons besides their heavy guns, and 1,000,000 Frenchmen with a small but excellent British force. From the river that flows through this

Retreat of
the French
army

The Battle
of the Marne

The French
against the
Germans:
wager of
battle

part of the country the conflict is known as the Battle of the Marne. The Germans were superior in numbers and equipment and flushed with a mighty triumph. The French were numerically inferior and disheartened by disaster. But the Germans were now wearied from their rapid advance and far from their base, while the French were close to their own, in favorable positions. For four days the great battle raged. The Germans fought bravely and well, but the French soldiers, with backs to the wall, with everything now and in the future at stake, rose to prodigies of valor. Everywhere the struggle was desperate and prolonged. Generally the French line held at all points, and the battle was decided by two great German reverses. Near Paris their line was defeated after a terrible combat, they were nearly outflanked, and saved themselves only by precipitate retreat, at times almost like a rout, and their backward movement gradually compelled other German armies near by to give ground and go back with them. Meanwhile, in the center the Germans nearly broke through, and threatened to cut the French line, but General Foch, four times attacking them in turn, and four times defeated, declared that "the situation is excellent," attacked them again, completely defeated the Prussian Guard, and broke through the German line. By September 10, the decision had come; and by the middle of the month the Germans had retreated from a large part of the conquests they had made, Paris was safe, and the French army was saved.

Immense
importance
of the battle

The Battle of the Marne was the most decisive incident in the Great War. It was the most decisive struggle in the history of Europe since the Battle of Blenheim (1704). Had the Germans won, the French army would almost certainly have been destroyed, or at best driven south of the Loire, leaving Paris and all north and east France, including the principal railways and industrial regions, in the enemy's hands, completely cutting off

what remained of France from good connection with England, and exposing England, unprepared, to much more dangerous menace than she afterward had to meet. Most probably the Germans could then have held their lines in the west with few troops, turned on Russia and soon destroyed her, as they did anyhow somewhat later, then come back to the west, completed the destruction of France, and undertaken the conquest of England. If England and the British fleet had passed under their sway, no other nation could have resisted their aggression; and the "world power," which Bernhardi had spoken of, might conceivably have been theirs for a great while to come. So great was the military strength of the Germans in 1914 that they could defeat all other powers if those powers were not given time to prepare. The British Empire and the United States could defeat the Germans later on, but not without some years to raise their armies and equip them. They had the necessary time only because meanwhile the French held the lines in the west, and this would have been impossible except for triumph on the Marne.

Such was the Battle of the Marne, in larger perspective. Actually, at the time, it seemed to the Germans that they had been merely repulsed, not badly defeated, and that later on they would return and then not fail. Moreover, in the campaign they had enormous success. After their defeat they went back from the vicinity of Paris, and evacuated a considerable portion of France; but they halted along the Aisne River, and there entrenching, defied every attack of the Allies. They had conquered and they held behind their lines the richest industrial district of France and the principal source of France's supply of coal and iron-ore. No longer, except for outside assistance, could the French make sufficient munitions. When, in the following year, in the east, the Germans had taken from the Russians Poland and the districts near by, very similar was the case of Russians, and by the autumn of

The Germans prevented from quickly winning the war

Great success of the Germans

1915 the Germans seemed to have definitely won the war on the continent of Europe. Russia was not able to recover; but France, supplied from abroad with materials for war, continued the struggle. This was possible only because of the work of the British navy.

Struggle for
the Channel
Ports:
Dunkirk,
Calais,
Boulogne

The French and the British lacked the heavy artillery and the shells with which to drive the Germans back from the Aisne, but they wisely extended their own lines northward just in time to keep the Germans from occupying, as they might easily have done, the Channel ports, especially Calais and Dunkirk, the gateway to England. All too late the Germans realized the supreme importance of these places, and launched a series of mass attacks upon the British and the French in an effort to break through at all costs. At Ypres, where the British held against terrible odds, and along the Yser River, where the British, Belgians, and French were almost annihilated but held out until the country was flooded and warships with long-range guns joined in the defence, the Germans were held back from their goal. The result of this action was almost as important as the victory of the Marne.


So, for a while, in the west the great movements came to an end. The Germans had won mighty triumphs, but they had failed to win the war quickly. Both sides now settled down in long, fortified lines, which reached from Switzerland to the North Sea, which left to the French a small part of German Alsace, but left within the German lines northeastern France and almost all of Belgium. These lines were constantly made stronger on both sides, until at last it seemed impossible that they could ever be broken.

The line in
the east

Meanwhile, great things had been happening in the east. While Germany hurled herself upon France, she left her eastern borders nearly unprotected, believing that the Russians could not immediately do much damage, and relying on the Austrians, meantime, to meet them. But the Russians surprised their enemies by the speed with



26. THE WESTERN FRONT IN THE GREAT WAR



27. THE EASTERN FRONT IN THE GREAT WAR

which they commenced their campaign. The Austrians did, indeed, begin an offensive into Russian Poland, but they were at once met by the advancing Russian armies, and thrown back in disastrous defeat. After a series of great battles the Russians overran nearly all of Galicia, the exposed part of Austria-Hungary, drove on the Austrian armies in precipitate rout, and captured all but one of the Galician fortresses. Austria had utterly failed to check the Russians, and in a short time was calling for assistance from the Germans.

While the Austrians were being driven back from Poland another Russian army invaded Germany itself. In a short time part of East Prussia had been crossed. At once a strong force was sent across Germany, and this army under Von Hindenburg caught the Russians in the region of the Mazurian marshes and lakes, and there at the battle of Tannenberg a force of 250,000 Russians was scattered or destroyed. Some escaped, many thousands were captured, and subsequently paraded in triumph through Berlin, but a host of them had been killed by the great shells or smothered in the marshes. It was as complete a triumph as the victory of Hannibal over the Romans at Cannæ, but such were the proportions of the Great War that Tannenberg was merely an episode in the struggle. East Prussia was cleared of the foe; but it is believed that the absence from the west front of the German soldiers who did this had some connection with the victory of the French at the Marne.

In 1915 the Germans, holding the initiative as before, changed their general plan. They had intended to overwhelm France and then destroy Russia at their leisure. In this they had failed. They now determined to hold France and Britain, standing on the defensive in their entrenchments in the west, and turn their principal effort to destroying the Russians completely. During the winter of 1914-15 there was terrible and dreary fighting in the

The Russians defeated in East Prussia

Struggle in the east, 1914-15


Campaigns
in Poland
and Galicia

east as the Germans came to the aid of their demoralized Austrian allies. On the wintry plains of Poland, and farther north along the Russian border, great battles were fought, until presently the two sides settled down in lines of entrenchments longer but less strong than those in the west. In March, the Russians took the great fortress of Przemysl, the last stronghold in Galicia, together with a huge Austrian army. All through the winter they had been fighting in the heights of the Carpathian Mountains for possession of the passes; now they had all but the most important one of them, and threatened to pour in a torrent down into Hungary. They were also near to the great fortress of Cracow, the fall of which might open the way into the German Empire.


The
Dunajec

But as spring began the Germans and Austrians were ready for a decisive blow. About the center of the long, irregular line, not far from Cracow, an immense concentration of men and cannons was made. May 2, after a fearful bombardment, the like of which had never before been seen, which annihilated the Russians and completely obliterated their lines for a space of some miles, the Teutonic armies, launching a great attack, broke completely through the Russian position. The only hope was rapid retreat until the parts disunited could join. This the Russians attempted, and on the whole their backward movement was well carried out; it never turned into rout, nor was their main force ever surrounded and captured. But the danger was very terrible. When the break through occurred at the Dunajec River, the Russian forces in Galicia and in the Carpathians were in imminent danger of being cut off; and while they were being pressed by Teutonic armies under Von Mackensen, farther north they were being attacked by the German armies of Von Hindenburg.

So began a great and disastrous retreat. The Russians fled from the Carpathian Mountains; they quickly aban-



28. THE OCEANS OF THE WORLD—MERCATOR
OF COMMUNICATIONS



MERCATOR SECTION: SHOWING THE PRINCIPAL SEA LINES
DURING THE GREAT WAR

doned nearly all of Galicia together with the great fortresses which they had captured after so much effort; and at the same time they were retreating back through Poland, fighting bitter rear-guard actions, but never really able to halt the pursuit. The outlying Polish fortresses were taken; then Warsaw, the capital; then the second-line fortresses; presently Brest-Litovsk, the center of the Russian system of defence; and even cities and strong points beyond. When at last the retreat came to an end it was found that the Germans had, indeed, fallen short of entire success, for they had not completely destroyed the Russian armies, nor had they put Russia utterly out of the war. But it was afterward seen that Russia was virtually eliminated in this campaign. A vast number of her soldiers had been killed or disabled, and an equally great number taken prisoners by the Germans. Most of the trained officers with whom Russia had begun the war were now captive or dead. Most of the war material was worn out or lost, and Russia was neither an industrial nation capable of making arms and ammunition on a great scale, nor was she so situated that she could, like France, easily procure great supplies from outside. Moreover, her railroads, best adapted for military purpose, were now in the enemy's hands. Russia did continue to fight valiantly for a time, and she accomplished some great things in the following year; but as we see it now, she was definitely defeated in the campaign that began on the Dunajec.

Thus, in the course of little more than a year, for Brest-Litovsk fell in August and Vilna in September, 1915, Germany had greatly, though not completely, succeeded in the west, and far more greatly succeeded in the east. In the autumn she turned her attention to the south, and soon accomplished the task for which she had begun the war: getting control of the Balkans. The hour of Serbia had come. Thus far the Serbs had been able to defend

Retreat of
the Rus-
sians

The Central
Powers get
control of
the Balkans

Servia
conquered

themselves. Twice had the Austrians, occupied as they were in their contest with Russia, sent expeditions over the Danube; twice had they been driven back in shameful defeat and disaster. But now a third invasion was undertaken by the Germans, at a time when Russia could give no more help, and, worse still, as the little country was struck from the side by Bulgaria, who now entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. The exhausted Serbs were ground to pieces by the Teutons from the north and the vengeful Bulgarians from the east; their country was completely subjugated; and only a part of the Servian army, and a few of the people escaped over the mountains, in a horrible retreat. They were taken to islands off the coast by Allied warships.

Gallipoli

Meanwhile, the Allies had suffered a great defeat. In November, 1914, Turkey had entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria. This more than balanced the decision of Italy not to assist the Central Powers, for it almost completely cut off Russia from her western partners, making it very difficult for them to obtain her wheat, which they badly needed, and just as hard for her to obtain from them the war supplies without which she could not long play an important part. Accordingly, it was of the greatest importance that communications be opened up again by forcing the Dardanelles and afterward taking Constantinople. Moreover, this would not only assist Russia, but it would be a momentous success in itself, and bring to an end, perhaps, the German dream of mastery in the Balkans and Asiatic Turkey. Therefore, in February, 1915, British and French warships attempted to force the strait of the Dardanelles. After severe losses they desisted, though it is said that victory was within reach if they had attacked again the next day. A great expedition was now sent out to take the positions which guarded the entrance, and in April a landing was effected on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Allied fleet
at the
Dardanelles

In all the war there was no more glorious and disastrous enterprise than this attempt to scale the barren, rocky mountains which guarded the strait. Even drinking water had to be brought from a long distance, and numbers went insane from thirst. Many a heroic attempt was made, and the fighting went on all through the time

Successful defense by the Turks



29. GALLIPOLI

when the Russians were being defeated far to the north. One day Allied soldiers won to the top and saw the blue waters of Marmora in the distance; but they were soon driven back. The Turks fought with stubborn courage until the Germans, having put Russia out of the way and destroyed Servia, were coming to relieve them. Then Gallipoli was evacuated, and the attempt ended in com-

The Allies fail

plete failure. The troops thus withdrawn were taken to the Greek city of Salonica, the most important position on the *Ægean*, to which they had been invited by the Greek Government, though the invitation was withdrawn by the Greek king. There they constituted a potential threat against Bulgaria and Turkey, though for a long time they had to remain inactive, and accomplished virtually nothing.

Position of
the Teu-
tonic powers

On land now the Germans seemed to have won the contest completely. They had obtained what they began the war for, and they had conquered much besides. If they could only hold what they had seized, they would come out of the struggle incomparably the greatest power in the world. Accordingly, they chose this moment to let it be known that they would listen to proposals for peace. But however great the disasters that had come to the Allies thus far, the consequences of such a peace as Germany would be willing to make seemed too terrible, and the German suggestions were not even considered. Besides, it still seemed to many that the future lay with the Allies; that they had been taken unprepared, and that soon they would be able to fight on equal terms, and get the victory shortly thereafter.

The Allies
keep control
of the sea

One great success they had obtained: Germany's shipping had been swept from the seas. All her commerce had vanished; and her warships stayed close to the fortifications of Helgoland and the Kiel Canal. German submarines did some execution against British warships at first, but this soon came to an end. German cruisers made daring raids, but only for a while. At first much damage was done to Allied shipping by German raiders, but one by one they were hunted down, and this also came to an end. In November, 1914, in the Far East, the German naval base of Tsingtao (Kiao-chau) had been taken by the Japanese. A German fleet did destroy an inferior British fleet off the coast of Chile, but shortly after it was

completely destroyed by a superior British force off the Falkland Islands. Meanwhile, the British and the French fleets had entire control of the oceans, over which their commerce flowed in unceasing stream.

There was but one great battle on the sea. May 31, 1916, the German High Seas Fleet cruising off the coast of Denmark was overtaken by a part of the British Grand Fleet. The powerful but lightly armored British battle cruisers engaged the enemy, hoping to hold him until the remainder of the British fleet arrived. The Germans fought with great skill and superior speed and equipment, and inflicted losses. As the rest of the British ships arrived the German fleet withdrew, and in the failing light of the evening, behind a screen of submarines and destroyers, it made good its escape. It had done more damage than it suffered, and the German Government proclaimed a great victory won. After a few days, however, it was seen that the action was essentially a British victory, for Britain's hold on the seas continued unshaken. The German battleships had withdrawn to their haven, and the spirit of the crews declined. They did not again come forth to fight for control of the waters. When they next came out it was in ignominious surrender.

The French fleet and later the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean, and in the latter part of the war the powerful American fleet, contributed materially in maintaining the Allied mastery of the seas. But this command of the waters was kept primarily by the warships of the British Empire. Since there was only one great naval battle during these years, there was little of the spectacular about the Grand Fleet's service, and the importance of what it did may easily be overlooked. Silently, and with not much said about what was being done, in the fair weather of summer and in the storms and sleet and cold of the North Sea winters, unfaltering and with vigilance unceasing, the prolonged watch was kept. Always there

The Battle
of Jutland,
1916

The British
Grand Fleet

All-important work of the British Navy

was danger from the mines which Germans strewed in the sea; always the submarines were lurking to send in their deadly torpedoes. There was the blockade to maintain, by which Germany was slowly weakened and reduced; there was the all-important line of communication across to France to be kept open; there were the sea-routes to be kept safe between the parts of the widely scattered Empire and with the other countries from which came indispensable supplies; the German warships were to be watched lest they raid the coasts of England, or lest some of them dash out into the open sea to prey upon Allied commerce; and above all the High Seas Fleet of the German Empire was to be waited for and met if ever it dared to come forth. And on this faithful watch and ward the whole Allied cause depended. If ever the Grand Fleet were destroyed or beaten, in a short time the British Empire would be starved into complete surrender, and then triumphant Germany could dictate to the rest of the world such conditions as pleased her. Now that the Great War is over, the work of the British seamen stands out in its true proportions and grandeur.

Slow progress of the Allies on land

It had been supposed that sea power would finally be decisive, and so it proved in the end. But for some time it seemed that Germany had won such mighty victories on land that she could win the war in spite of the naval superiority of the Allies. It was evident that the Central Powers could not be starved into submission by the blockade, but must be beaten also on land. At first it was hoped that this could be done when the powers of the *Entente* were more fully prepared. Britain was arming and would presently be ready, and in May, 1915, Italy, partly through real sympathy with the Western Powers and horror at German methods, and partly through desire of getting from Austria-Hungary *Italia Irredenta* and stronger position on the Adriatic, declared war on the Dual Monarchy. But Italy was at once halted by the

terrible obstacle of the Alps and made scarcely any progress, and it required more than a year for Britain to put a great army in France. So, in 1915, while Russia was being defeated and Servia destroyed, the Allies accomplished almost nothing in the west. The British made some little progress at Neuve Chapelle, but immediately the Germans, using for the first time their horrible poison gas, attacked near by at Ypres, and nearly broke through to the ports of the Channel. That they failed to do this was because the Canadians, who had thrown themselves heart and soul into the struggle along with Great Britain, closed up the gap and held the line. In September, the French attacking in the Champagne after tremendous artillery preparation, tried to break the German lines as the Germans had broken the Russian, but after some success in the beginning they were brought to a halt with nothing of importance accomplished. In all respects 1915 was a year of Allied failure and German success.

Slow as it seemed, Britain was really assembling a great army in northern France, well drilled and fully equipped. Some time in 1916 she would be ready for her first great effort. Again, so well was she organized and prepared, Germany was ready to take the initiative and deal the first stroke. Having disposed of Russia she resolved to make a second thrust at France, and possibly destroy her before England could throw in her might. Therefore, near to the key fortress of Verdun, very secretly an enormous concentration of artillery was made, and suddenly, toward the end of February, 1916, a terrible bombardment was begun from thousands of cannon. This was followed by an attack which at once carried all the environs of the fortress on the side assaulted. So quickly was this accomplished that it seemed for a moment that the Germans would take Verdun just as they had taken Antwerp and Warsaw. Indeed the railroad communications with the fortress were now largely cut, and there

The Italians
halted by
the Alps

Verdun,
1916

The French
in mortal
danger

was no small danger that a French army with all its stores and cannon might be trapped there. It is said that the French military authorities had resolved to abandon the position, but for sentimental reasons it was finally decided to hold on. Supplies were brought in by a wonderful system of motor transport, hastily arranged, and the new German methods of attack were countered by new methods of defence. The Germans came on with the utmost bravery, but were met with an unconquerable courage. "They shall not pass!" was the cry; and so it was. Other strong positions were taken, but the German progress now was very slow. Month after month, through the spring and into the summer, the fighting went on. There were savage struggles in underground passages, and scenes of slaughter too horrible to describe. Every little hill in the neighborhood was fought over and soaked with blood. More than half a million Germans were killed and wounded, and the number of Frenchmen was perhaps not much less. In July, the Germans were forced to slacken their efforts because of danger threatening elsewhere. Later on, after superb artillery preparation, the French retook in two days all the important positions for which the Germans had struggled so long. The attack on Verdun resulted in a great German failure.

The Battle
of the
Somme,
1916

The Germans had been forced to desist because at last the British were about ready, to the north. July 1, the British and the French, making the kind of artillery preparation that now preceded all great attacks, began an offensive to break through the German lines. For days the bombardment continued, and the distant thunder of the cannons could be heard over the Channel, in England. The attack was in the region of the River Somme, and was directed at the towns of Bapaume and Péronne, and the more important centers of St. Quentin, Cambrai, and Laon behind them. If these places were taken, most probably the Germans would have to retreat out of France.

The German positions were immensely strong. There were many little trenches and strong little forts for machine gunners, protected in front by tangles of thick barbed wire. Behind them were deep underground places of refuge, extending down several stories, in which armies could be sheltered while the great shells were falling. Unless these defences were largely obliterated beforehand, the attacking infantry would be mown down by machine guns as they came forward. When the infantry did advance, the French at once reached the outskirts of Péronne, but the British, more strongly opposed, made almost no progress. Thereafter, all through the summer, the armies were locked in a death struggle, the Allies slowly advancing a little, but suffering fearful losses, and the Germans losing almost as many. The autumn rains and the deep mud put an end to the offensive, and it seemed that the Allies had gained almost nothing. They had taken no important town, and the German lines were nowhere broken. But actually the Germans did make a considerable retreat in the following spring, and they now knew that England and France were not ready to abandon the contest because of discouragement at German victories, but that a terrible struggle must continue, wearing down the strength of both sides, until one or the other gave up through exhaustion.

Strength of
the German
position

During the course of this summer the hopes of the Allies ran high for a time. In May, the Austrians began an attack upon the Italians from the Trentino, but after some success were forced to desist; and later the Italians captured Gorizia, and made great progress through the mountain barrier and on the way to Trieste. The Austrians had drawn back because in June the Russians under General Brusilov, making their last great effort, completely shattered the Austrian lines in the east, took a huge number of captives, and pressed on so far that only strong German assistance, at a time when it was diffi-

Germany
at bay, 1916

The last great Russian offensive

cult for Germany to detach any troops, saved the Austrians from destruction. The Russians were finally halted, but the position of the Central Powers now seemed so dangerous that in the last days of August Rumania joined the Allies. The position of Germany, however, was still enormously strong. The Somme offensive was soon to come to an end, and the Russians had not only exhausted their strength, but were now a prey to traitors and revolutionists, and were soon to drop out of the war. Accordingly, Rumania, attacked from the side of Bulgaria and from the north by a powerful German army, was mostly overrun, and crushed almost as completely as Servia had been the year before. So, for the Allies, the campaign of 1916 ended as darkly as that of the previous year.

A contest of exhaustion

The war had for some time resolved itself into a deadlock between Germany, flushed with success and gorged with conquests, and the Allies hoping to defeat her and wrest from her what she had taken. It was evidently to be a contest of resources, a contest in which time and attrition would make the weaker succumb. The best judges now thought that Germany could never be defeated by England and France, without further aid, and that at best the fighting must end in a draw. But the Germans had undertaken to win thoroughly and quickly by means of another device. With it, they came near to success, but in the end it brought their own ruin.

The German submarines

They undertook to cut the communications of the Allies and starve England out by sinking all Allied ships by means of submarines. The communications of the Germans were on land. If ever they were cut, as they were about to be when hostilities ceased, Germany would be defeated. The most vital communications of the Allies were by sea. France depended on Great Britain, and the British people could not continue the struggle, nay, they could only feed themselves a few weeks, when they were no longer able

to bring over the seas their food and their raw materials. Had the Germans ever been able to defeat the British fleet, they would have quickly won, and won completely; but this they were never able to do. The British Grand Fleet kept undisputed command of the surface of the seas. Early in 1915, however, the Germans began using their submarines not only to sink warships, which was legitimate, but to destroy unarmed vessels as well; and in May of that year the giant liner *Lusitania* was sunk and great numbers of passengers, including many Americans, drowned. The Germans maintained that since the British were trying by the blockade to starve them, especially their women and children, and so trying to force them to submit, it was very proper for them to retaliate, and try to blockade England with their submarines, starve her into submission, and so end a hideous conflict.

This contention was accepted by few outside of Germany, since in accordance with past usage it was perfectly proper for Britain, in command of the seas, to blockade Germany, as it would have been for Germany to cut off England if her warships had got command of the seas. On the other hand, it had gradually come to be one of the fundamental maxims of procedure at sea that no ship should be sunk without saving the crew, in case they were willing to surrender; and it was soon seen that usually submarines sank ships without warning, and that they could not, because of their small size, save the crews if they would. Germans declared that the submarine was a new weapon, and that new rules were applicable to it; but all over the world public sentiment ran strongly against the use of a weapon which could not from its nature be used in accordance with primary principles of humanity and mercy.

None the less, the Germans used this device increasingly, hampered somewhat by the protests of neutrals and somewhat more by various devices which the Allied navies

The British
dependent
upon sea-
borne traffi

Sinking of
merchant
ships

Unrestricted
submarine
warfare,
1917

employed. But they paid little attention to the one and largely avoided the other, and presently the menace became very grave. Great Britain went into the conflict with enormous shipping tonnage, but month after month vessels carrying supplies were sunk by submarines until not only the great loss of money and materials was felt severely, but presently it was necessary to restrict imports, since the war greatly increased the demands upon her merchant marine at the same time that the under-sea boats were sinking so many ships. Germany still hesitated to put forth her full effort in this manner, but by the end of 1916, when the strain of the contest had begun to tell terribly on both sides, it was evident that if the sinking of Allied vessels continued at the rate then prevailing, Great Britain must after some time be forced out of the war, and that if the rate of destruction could be largely increased, the end might come quickly. The principal obstacle was that the people and government of the United States were strongly opposed, and might conceivably be brought into the war against Germany. After much hesitation the choice was made, and January 31, 1917, the Imperial Government announced that it would begin unrestricted submarine warfare. The German people believed that Britain would be starved within a few months.

A year of
disaster,
1917

This year, 1917, was a year of disaster and despair for the Allies. At no time did the cause of the Allies and of the democratic civilization of the West seem so dark. When the weather permitted, the British and the French began another offensive, to try again to break through the German lines. The Allies were hampered by the German retreat which had left an area of terrible desolation over which an attack could not well be made; but in April the British took the immensely strong position of Vimy, and in June, with a huge explosive charge, they blew up the supposedly impregnable position of Messines Ridge.

Farther north they desperately strove to break down into the plain of Flanders and compel the evacuation of the seaports of Belgium, whence the submarines constantly issued. Several times they seemed to have good chance of success; but they fought with a fatal ill-fortune, and when the season came to an end they had endured fearful losses, some 800,000 men, and taken from the Germans nothing that compelled an important retreat. During the summer the French made another effort to shatter the German lines. Near Laon they broke through the *Chemin des Dames* positions, and gained a brilliant local victory, but because of terrible losses, gave up the effort before anything decisive was accomplished. Later events were to show that this was the last great offensive effort the French could make by themselves. They had long borne the brunt of the fighting, and their losses had been so appalling that they were now almost at the point of despair. That they did not falter and accept a German peace, which some tried to persuade them to accept, was due to the efforts of their great man, Clemenceau, and most of all to their own unconquerable spirit.

If there was in this year doleful lack of success in the west, there was absolute downfall in the east. Russia now dropped out of the war. The Russians had fought almost as long as they could. A great agricultural state, with comparatively few railroads and scanty industrial development, its people, however brave, were not able unaided to carry on for a long time a great modern war. The Russian soldiers fought with a courage that should be for a long time remembered. At first they won important victories, and, it may be, saved the Allied cause; but presently their trained officers were mostly gone and they had no reserve, while, worst of all, most of their equipment was lost or worn out, and they could no longer get enough of the machine guns and wire and cannon and shells, without which no campaign can now be waged. Their

The British fail

The French exhausted

The collapse of Russia

Heroic
efforts of
the Russian
soldiers


government was inefficient and corrupt, and constantly military plans were betrayed to the German spies. And yet, the Russians fought on beyond expectation. Again and again the simple peasants laid down their lives in hopeless attacks. Without artillery preparation they went forth against the enemy lines, torn by heavy shells from a distance, shattered by the light artillery as they came nearer, riddled by machine-gun fire nearer at hand, and played upon with liquid fire as they attacked the entrenchments. Meanwhile, the entire industrial and economic life of the country was disorganized. It was as though an entire nation, long suffering some grievous malady, had suffered to the extreme of endurance, and was approaching near to dissolution. The end came now. The government, an autocracy, efficient formerly in holding down its people, was overthrown. This revolution began in March. For a while it was hoped that under a new liberal government Russia might become strong again, and once more take an important part in the war. But actually the people would endure nothing further, and they fell a prey to visionaries and radicals, who, if they were not traitors, wished to establish in the distracted country new systems such as had never before existed except in the minds of theorists and writers. Under the *Bolsheviki* Russia withdrew from the war. In the following year, March, 1918, they signed the terrible Peace of Brest-Litovsk, by which Russia was dismembered and cut off from the sea, and reduced to impotence. They now applied themselves to the establishment of the extremest socialism, seeming to care little for the fact that Russia had lost by the treaty what her leaders had striven for ages to gain. At last the Germans were completely free in the east. Now they could devote all their strength to one more crushing blow in the west.

The Treaty
of Brest-
Litovsk,
1918

In October, 1917, there was an indication of what they could do when Italy was struck and almost destroyed at

a blow. The Italians had had much success in spite of difficulties incredible and elsewhere scarce understood. Most of Italy's territory adjoining Austria-Hungary ended at the very foothills of the Alps. Immediately beyond, held by the enemy and strongly fortified in advance, rose tier on tier of giant mountains, until the ramparts at last

The Austro-
Italian
frontier



30. AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONTIER

were high above the snow and the clouds. To the south, at the head of the Adriatic Sea, was the Carso Plateau, littered with rocks, honeycombed with caves, treeless, without water, blazing under the sun. Through all these defences the Italians with undaunted courage had slowly battered their way. They had mastered the Carso, and now were near to Trieste. They had captured Monte

The Italians
batter their
way through

The Italians
defeated:
Caporetto,
1917

Santo, and might soon strike through to open country at Laibach, and then march on toward Vienna. But the Austrians, reinforced by Germans, now massed against them, and, corrupting some of the discontented soldiers and thus making a weak point in the line, suddenly attacked with overwhelming numbers and with the fearful "mustard gas." They burst completely through, utterly defeating the Italians. The result of this battle of Caporetto was that a large part of the Italian army was captured and half of its artillery, with all the territory that it had gained in weary months of fighting. The Teutonic armies did not stop until they were nearly in sight of Venice; but then the Italians rallied with the courage of despair, and, by a magnificent effort, finally saved their country by standing along the little River Piave. None the less, Italy was now thoroughly discouraged, and almost persuaded to abandon the struggle.

Destruction
of shipping

But more awful than any of these things was the havoc wrought by the submarines. As soon as unrestricted warfare was begun the losses were terrible. In February, 1917, 800,000 tons of shipping was destroyed, and the Mediterranean and the waters about the British Isles became a veritable graveyard of ships. If destruction at this rate could be continued, then there was no doubt that the cause of the Allies was doomed, and that the end was not very far off.

The United
States joins
the Allies

Against all this was to be set one great factor, which, in the end, was to counterbalance all the others: the United States had entered the conflict against Germany and her partners. When the Great War broke out there were probably not many Americans who believed that their country would ever be drawn into it. Many of the people understood little about the causes or issues of the struggle, and nearly all of them dreaded foreign complications and hated the thought of a war. But in less than three years the opinion of the great majority had changed profoundly,

and by the beginning of 1917 they willingly followed their leader into the contest. There were several reasons for this. From the beginning people were struck with horror at the methods that the Germans employed. In Servia, in Poland, in Belgium, and in France, they began immediately to do harsh and terrible things. Civilians, including even women and children, were shot down; hostages were seized, ruinous fines were imposed for small offences. There was plundering and there was wild excess on the part of German soldiers. Evidently much of it was being done with the idea of organizing terror and striking into the hearts of the people such unreasoning fear that they would not dare in the smallest degree to interfere with the conquest of their country, and would perhaps flee away in wild disorder, clogging the roads and impeding the movements of their own armies. Many of the deeds perpetrated were so contrary to principles of humanity and to the spirit of western civilization, that at first the reports concerning them were not believed; but soon evidence accumulated in such manner that many of them could not be doubted. For an alleged offence, never proved and probably not committed, the great and ancient town of Louvain was fired and a large part of it burned to the ground. The German ambassador in Constantinople declared that if necessary the entire French nation would be held as hostage and starved to death in order to make England abandon the war. In Belgium the Germans methodically seized all the resources of the country, callously leaving the people to starve; and before long the Belgians would most probably have died of hunger had they not been fed by the charity of the British, the French, and the people of the United States. "In the Name of God the Father," ran the appeals for these people, while the disgraceful spectacle continued of a captive nation being fed not by the conquerors but by other nations. To Poland, outside relief could not come, and it

Sentiment
affected by
German
procedure

Treatment
of Belgium

was not long before the appalling conditions there had caused the death of the old people and many of the children. This was commenced not when the Germans themselves were starving, but almost at the beginning of the war.

Frightful-
ness

The Cathedral of Rheims, one of the supreme examples of Gothic architecture and religious art, something that had been loved and admired for centuries, which could not be replaced, was not far from the line of battle. Because, as they said, it was used by the French as an observation post, the Germans deliberately ruined it with shells from their cannon. From the very beginning the great German airships, the Zeppelins, sailed aloft over the cities of England and France, dropping high explosives with fearful effect. Some military advantage was thereby procured, but the nature of air raids was such that the bombs were more apt to drop upon civilians than upon fortifications. In the same way German warships dashed out when they could and bombarded undefended coast towns, declaring that they were fortresses, but actually for the purpose of striking terror into the people. The aversion with which all this was regarded was enhanced by dreadful stories told of the way in which prisoners in Germany were starved and abused; while the spectacle, constantly more frequent, of men, and even women and children, being drowned at sea, with no hope of rescue, and, indeed, the desire that they should be sunk "without a trace," constantly increased sympathy for the Allies and horror and dislike of the Germans. Finally, nothing did more to prejudice neutral opinion from the start than the manner in which the rights of Belgium were treated as "a scrap of paper" and that unhappy little country trampled in the dust.

Danger to
American
ideals

These were the things which gradually swayed the feelings of the mass of the people in the United States and elsewhere. But with the leaders there were considerations still more important. It was felt instinctively, and it was

realized more and more clearly, that the people of France and England stood for much the same things that Americans did, and that the Germans represented a different system. Evidently there was now going on in Europe a death struggle between the two. If the ideals of democracy, individualism, and personal liberty went down to destruction across the Atlantic, they would afterward most probably be in grave danger in the United States. Then, in the opinion of many, the American people would later on have to fight against German encroachment even as the people of France and England were fighting now. By the beginning of 1917 it began to seem that Allied victory was not to be hoped for. Therefore, every consideration of prudence seemed to urge that Americans join in the conflict and fight along with their friends, rather than later on fight alone against a mightier, triumphant German Empire. These feelings became constantly stronger, and at last many people felt that it was not only shameful but very dangerous for the United States to remain neutral so long. It will always be matter of opinion whether the American Government might not better have declared war sooner than it did; but perhaps the President was right in waiting for public sentiment to support him. Early in 1917 he himself took the lead, and when the German ambassador delivered his note announcing unrestricted submarine warfare President Wilson advised that relations with Germany be severed, and that assistance be given to the Allies with all of America's resources. April 6, 1917, the United States declared war. It was one of the most momentous events in the history of the American people. Their intervention was destined to determine the issue of the struggle.

America alone could supply the vast resources needed to defeat the Central Powers. The Germans had not only the advantage of position and the shorter lines, but greater resources in iron and coal, and hence in munitions

Dangerous
for America
to remain out
of the war

The
United
States
prepares

Immense
resources
of the
United
States

of war. But with the accession of the United States the Allies again became definitely superior in these basic resources, and if only there were still enough time and if only they did not lose heart and give up the struggle, victory would almost certainly be theirs. At first, however, it seemed that there might not be time for the United States to assemble her resources and bring them to bear in Europe, and that she had, indeed, entered the struggle too late. It had taken England two years to bring her great strength to bear; it would probably take the Americans as long. They did begin with an energy and immensity of effort that left no doubt that they had resolved to give themselves entirely to the task; but throughout 1917, while the Allies were meeting with such disaster in Europe, the work of the United States was almost entirely preparation. Great armies were raised by compulsory service; the making of rifles, cannon, shells, and the building of ships were begun on an unheard-of scale, but nothing would be ready for some time. Meanwhile, the Germans hoped to win the war by means of their submarines, or else by one more great stroke in the west.

The sub-
marines
checked

By the beginning of 1918 the Germans had definitely failed in one respect. No single device was ever found for disposing of the submarines, but gradually they were subdued. The protection of warships had long since been effected by putting around them a screen of fast-moving destroyers. As soon as the United States entered the lists her navy joined in the work. The naval superiority of the Allies was for the first time beyond all question, and the addition of the American destroyers made it possible to protect "convoys" of merchant ships also. The rate of destruction was now much diminished. Moreover, a new and terrible device was employed with considerable effect, the depth bomb, which exploded beneath the water with fearful effect. Furthermore, a vast "barrage" of mines was laid in the North Sea, hindering the exit of the

German submarines, and in 1918 the British, in daring raids, succeeded in partly blocking the Belgian harbors out of which the submarines came. Finally, the Allied submarines lay in wait for those of the enemy, and, assisted by airplanes, destroyed a large number of them. Altogether, the German under-water craft became much less dangerous and effective, and while they continued to be a serious menace until the end of the war, yet by the beginning of 1918 the Germans could no longer hope to win by them solely.

Thus the Allies would have time, and time was now on their side. There might still be a long and costly war if the Germans stood on the defensive and fought with the protection of their fortified lines; though if the attack was resolutely pushed their ultimate defeat was certain. On the other hand, they still had one chance to win: if they could strike on the west front before American aid arrived, it might be that they would do what they had failed to do in the beginning, and that victory would still be theirs. This chance they resolved to take, and all through the winter of 1917-18 there was a constant movement of troops and guns from the east to the west. Russia was completely broken, and only such forces were left there as were needed to guard the conquests and get such scanty supplies as that ruined country could furnish. In truth the war had reached the stage where all the contestants were nearly exhausted. Italy was recovering from the defeat of Caporetto, but she was profoundly discouraged. France, who had so long borne the brunt of the struggle, had lost a great part of all her young men, and Frenchmen, though unwilling to yield, were beginning to despair of ever defeating the foe. Britain also was nearly sunk beneath the burdens she bore, and the fearful fighting of 1917 had greatly depleted her armies in France. On the other side Austria was at her last gasp and able to do little more. Germany, with all her strength organized

Exhaustion
near

The
strength of
the combat-
ants nearly
gone

for war, might fight on for some time, perhaps, and might even conquer by a sudden blow; but if she struck the blow and failed, then, as after events were to show, her power would crash down at once into ruin.

The German offensive, 1918

As Napoleon had once done, Germany's leaders resolved to stake all upon one stroke. In the spring of 1918 she took the offensive and struck out with a blow that was like unloosing the forces of hell. March 21, the Germans attacked from St. Quentin, at a point where the British had recently taken over the lines from the French. The British were not yet familiar with their ground, and a heavy mist enabled the enemy to surprise them. Shells from the great guns fell far behind the front lines, while light cannon and countless machine guns were brought up by the attackers. The British were beaten as never before during the war, and for the first time on the western front fortified lines were broken completely. The German plan had been to separate the French from the British, and drive the British back upon the Channel where they could have been destroyed; but to the north, about Arras, the British lines held so that this was by no means accomplished. None the less, the Germans had broken clear through, and when at last their advance was arrested, they had gone more than thirty miles, up to the outskirts of the all-important railroad center, Amiens. Scarcely had the fighting died down when another fearful blow was struck farther north. The lines were raked with shells and every position drenched with gases. In Armentières the streets ran with the liquid of the mustard gas. An overwhelming force was thrown against the British again, and they were driven back so far that Sir Douglas Haig, their commander, told them they were fighting with "backs to the wall." But they fought as the British usually do fight, and, with some aid from the French, held on and barred the way to the Channel. This was in April. In May came the third phase of the German

The Battle of Picardy

The British with "backs to the wall"

offensive, this time against the French lines. In one great rush they went through the position of *Chemin des Dames*, and piercing far through the lines, rushed on until once more they came to the Marne. It was evident that the crisis of the war had come. If the Germans could, from the positions they had taken, strike out again with the same success, they might next time get as far as Paris. Under stress of the fearful peril all the Allied armies were at last put under one command, under the great French general Foch, and cries went out to the United States to hasten her succor.

The Americans had made giant strides in their vast preparations, but the best judges abroad did not expect them to be ready yet. Now, however, the need was so pressing that they were asked to send across troops only partly trained. This was done. The British furnished most of the shipping, from their own diminished stock, and, protected by warships from the submarines, there now began across the ocean a movement of men such as had never been seen before in the world. Early in July there were a million American soldiers in France, and they were now coming at the rate of more than a quarter of a million each month. And more than that, as they were tried, at first in very small operations, they bore themselves so well as to give much hope for the future. Evidently there was not much more time for the Germans to get the decision before the weight of America was felt. Twice again did the Germans strike, with less success than before. Then July 14 their last offensive was undertaken. Between Rheims and Château-Thierry the attack was delivered and an effort made to cross the Marne and open the road to Paris. But the German plans had become known, and the French, giving ground a little, smothered the abandoned positions in a whirlwind of fire, and after terrible losses the Germans were brought completely to a stand.

Four days later, July 18, Marshal Foch began a great

America
answers the
call

Last effort
of the Ger-
mans:
Second Bat-
tle of the
Marne

Beginning
of the Allied
offensive

Allied offensive. The assistance from the United States had enabled him to establish a reserve and again assemble an "army of maneuver." The Germans had driven three salients into his line, and in these salients they had the inner position and the short lines, but between the two greater salients, in the region from Montdidier to Soissons, the Allies had the same advantage. Accordingly it was from this part of the line that the Allied offensive began. A sudden attack by French troops and some Americans nearly captured Soissons, and threatened with gravest peril the German forces under the Crown Prince. After many days of desperate fighting these forces were extricated, but with heavy losses and after abandoning what they had taken in the successful stroke that had brought them down to the Marne. Meanwhile, August 8, the British struck out at Montdidier, at the side of the salient to the north, and, capturing many prisoners and many important places, retook what they had lost in the disaster of March. During the same time the Germans abandoned without fighting the blood-soaked positions captured at such terrible cost when they tried to break through to the Channel. By the end of August, therefore, the great danger was past, and the Germans had definitively lost the offensive.

Great as-
sault on the
German
lines

The question now was whether it would be better to wait until the following year, or press hard upon the defeated Germans and try to end the war shortly. Great as was the assistance of America, it would not be until 1919 that she could exert her full force. Then she could have millions of soldiers fully equipped, a vast number of airplanes, and an incredible supply of artillery. German spies carried news of the colossal preparations to their country, and it was reported that a far more deadly gas than any used hitherto was being made in quantities larger than gases were made in all the other warring countries combined. Next year all this could be used.

But Marshal Foch, understanding the situation more clearly, resolved to continue the attack, and the fighting went on without any cessation.

September 13, in their first large operation, the Americans wiped out the St. Mihiel salient which the Germans had driven to the south of Verdun in the early weeks of the war. Later on now it would be possible to attack the great German fortress of Metz. A fortnight later a large American army began fighting to clear the Argonne Forest, which was the great buttress of the German lines in the south, and which protected one of their all-important lines of railroad communication. In the center the French did not press the attack upon the impregnable positions about Laon, but in the north the British with some Americans and some Belgians tried to smash through the Hindenburg Line in one place and in another break down into Flanders. It was the Germans who were now with their backs to the wall.

The failing German fortunes were accompanied by collapse everywhere else. The Allied army which in October, 1915, had landed at Salonica had never accomplished anything, largely because it could not be strongly reinforced and because the submarines constantly harassed its communication line. But now, in September, 1918, it suddenly fell upon the Bulgars, and broke through their positions. In a few days the Serbs were back once more in their country, and the Allies were threatening the Bulgarian plain. By the end of the month Bulgaria had signed an armistice agreement equivalent to complete surrender. Turkey, long since exhausted, and just defeated in Asia by the British, was now in a hopeless position, and her surrender soon followed. This brought to an end the German dream of domination in the Balkans and of founding a great "Middle Europe." In October, the Austrians, urged on by the Germans, but with almost no power left, attacked the Italians, failed completely,

The Americans and the British go forward

Germany's allies surrender

The Italians destroy Austria's power

and then, struck by the Italian armies, suffered the greatest disaster of the war. The entire Austrian forces surrendered or fled as disorganized rabble, abandoning their stores and cannon. In a few days the Italians were through the mountains at last, at Trieste, in the Trentino, and on the march for Vienna. November 4, Austria-Hungary surrendered. The Germans now fought alone.

The Germans completely defeated

While these disasters were ruining the German cause, they were fighting the last of their fight. Steadily through the tangled thickets, the rocks, and the mazes of barbed wire of the Argonne, the new American army was fighting against the inferior German force; and though their losses were very heavy, they advanced steadily, capturing positions deemed impregnable hitherto, and presently getting the main railway line, the vital line of German communications in the south, under the fire of their long-range guns. If this line were cut, a large part of the German army might be forced to surrender. To the north the British and their comrades, with as splendid dash as was ever seen during the war, broke at last all through the Hindenburg Line, with its wide trenches, its deep underground fortifications, its labyrinths of barbed wire, and its thousands of machine-gun emplacements. Here the courage of the British soldier was aided by the "tanks" or small moving fortresses, which the British had first used in the Somme offensive of 1916, and which at last solved the problem of smashing the systems of entrenchments. Moreover, they now broke through in Belgium and occupied the coast with its submarine bases. Then, turning south, they began to threaten the other great artery of German rail communications, the trunk line from Paris to Berlin, which goes through the valley of the Meuse, by Namur and Liége. If this should be cut, and if the Americans cut the other line in the south, then the Germans might be forced to surrender on the field or else save themselves only by a flight like that of the Austrian armies.

The British break the Hindenburg Line

The German armies in danger of destruction

The German soldiers, so wonderful in the days of success, began to waver now, and disaffection and despair increased among the German people. They had been slowly starved by the blockade, and, after staking all they had, they had lost. Widespread discontent was abetted by bolshevist propaganda from the east, ever insidiously crossing the frontier. The men of the navy, ordered to dash out for a last effort, mutinied. The end was at hand. The authorities asked for an armistice, but President Wilson, answering for the Allies, replied in effect that the Germans could not be trusted, and that the only conditions to be granted would be such that if the Germans should later on wish to resume the war they would not be able to do so. When the conditions were announced, they were terrible enough: not only must the Germans at once evacuate France, Belgium, and their other conquests, but they must abandon Alsace-Lorraine and withdraw behind the Rhine, leaving the bridgehead fortresses to the Allies, and giving up their richest industrial district. They must surrender their fleet and their submarines, disband their army, and give up most of their military equipment. It was evident at once that the acceptance of such terms would mean the end of the war. Revolution and disturbances now arose in various parts of the *Reich*. November 9, the German emperor abdicated and fled to Holland. Two days later, November 11, German emissaries signed the armistice terms. The most terrible of all wars had ended.

The German Empire surrenders

Conditions of the armistice granted

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE SETTLEMENT OF 1920

The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty.

Address of PRESIDENT WILSON to the Congress of the United States, April 2, 1917.

The idea that action should be taken after this war to secure an enduring peace in the future. . . .

VISCOUNT BRYCE, *Essays and Addresses in War Time* (1918), p. 176.

We know that the power of the German arms is broken. We know the extent of the hatred which we encounter here. . . . But we deny that Germany and its people were alone guilty.

COUNT BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU to the Plenipotentiaries at Versailles, May 7, 1919.

Not since Rome punished Carthage for Punic faith has such a treaty been written.

New York Tribune, May 8, 1919.

The settle-
ment after
the war

WHEN the Germans, with weariness and despair at home and their armies crumbling under the blows of the Allies at the front, surrendered by accepting the armistice, it was evident that an old era in the history of the western world had come to an end, and that the leaders of the nations must assemble and settle the affairs of the age which had been and prepare for the new order that was coming. Several times had this happened before in the history of Europe. In 1648, at the end of the dreadful Thirty Years War, a general settlement was made, of which the arrangement lasted for a long time thereafter. In 1713 and 1714 the powers which had fought out the War of the Spanish Succession arranged the division of

the Spanish inheritance and checked the encroachment of the monarchs of France. More important still, in 1814 and 1815 the powers that had overthrown Napoleon assembled at Vienna to undo his work and the results of the French Revolution, reestablish legitimate princes, and divide Europe as seemed to them best. And so now in 1919 the greatest of all the peace conferences was opened in Paris.

Never had a peace congress assembled in the midst of such general interest, or in the midst of such great and unreasoning expectations. In 1648 and 1712 the great mass of the people had no voice in government and little interest in what governments did. So it was in 1814, though then many people believed that a new and better era was at hand. But in 1919 the people of those states which had brought the Great War to victorious conclusion had considerable control of their governments; most of the populations could read and write, and had followed the events of the struggle with enormous interest. Moreover, whatever the original aims of the contestants may have been, as the war progressed and became a contest of endurance and exhaustion, so that it was necessary to have the fullest support of the body of the people, such appeals were uttered and such promises made, that presently to the people in Great Britain, Italy, France, and the United States the struggle seemed more and more a contest between militarism and autocracy on the one hand, and democracy and peaceful civilization on the other. Men were asked to throw themselves into the fighting now so that the world might be made "safe for democracy," and so that war with all its horrors might be brought to an end. Everywhere the masses of the people, the simple minded, the liberal, the idealists, yearned for these things and believed that they would shortly come to pass, and that a new and a better world was about to be brought into being.

Public interest and expectations


Unbounded popular hopes


The Presi-
dent of the
United
States

At the head of these people in all of the Allied countries, and to some extent even among the enemy, was President Wilson of the United States, the greatest idealist of his time. There was difference of opinion about the wisdom of his course before America entered the war, whether he should not have led the United States to take part in it long before she finally entered; and also about the propriety of some things which he afterward did; but there could be no doubt about the loftiness and purity of his motives, or that he had the good of mankind at heart. His speeches and his communications seemed to great numbers of people in the Allied countries, and perhaps even in Germany and Austria, to express the yearnings of their hearts for better things. So it came about that at the end of the war he had for a short while unparalleled influence among multitudes of people who trusted with pathetic confidence that he would in some way bring about the great reforms he had spoken of so finely, and which they believed would at once make the world far better than it ever had been in the past. Many of the people who spoke so confidently of the immense improvements now suddenly to be made had thought little about the difficulty of achieving them, and knew not that some of these things were old problems which had baffled mankind for ages.

"Fourteen
Points"

In January, 1918, just before the last crisis of the struggle, President Wilson, in an address to Congress, had outlined the "Fourteen Conditions" of what he regarded as proper peace. Here, in addition to saying that Russia should be evacuated, Belgium, France, Rumania, Servia, and Montenegro evacuated and restored, that Alsace-Lorraine should be returned to France, that the Italian frontier should be rectified, that a free Poland should be established, and that the subject peoples of Turkey and of Austria-Hungary should be given opportunity for autonomous development, he declared that there must be an





31. AFRICA IN 1920

impartial adjustment of colonial claims with consideration of the populations involved. He then entered upon wide and more difficult questions in saying that there must be "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at," and no more private international understandings; "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas"; removal of economic barriers; guarantees for the reduction of armaments; and "a general association of nations" under specific covenants for the purpose of maintaining peace. Some of these provisions were at once criticized as vague or liable to evident objection, or impossible of fulfillment, but they were immediately accepted by multitudes who believed them to be practicable and necessary for the good of the world.

For an
enduring
peace

Some of the matters here proclaimed did present enormous difficulty. To make treaties openly, or to bring diplomacy within the control of the representatives of the people, had been much desired by reformers for a long time and many efforts had been made to obtain it; but these efforts had failed for reasons well understood by some people. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the English House of Commons had made repeated efforts to take control of foreign affairs, and when the first American government was instituted such control was given to Congress; but in both countries it was presently obvious to those who studied the matter that, conditions being what they were, secrecy was necessary for the proper conduct of foreign relations, which was impossible if they were communicated to a large legislative assembly; and that such business could only be transacted effectively if left to the management of a small number of experienced and expert men.

Control of
foreign
affairs

More immediately troublesome was the question of the "freedom of the seas." This was a cry which had been raised by the Germans during the war, and from them taken up by pacifists and idealists everywhere, who believed

"Freedom
of the Seas"

Militarism
and
navalism

that there ought not to be any militarism or force either on sea or on land. Actually, however, the application of such a doctrine would principally affect Great Britain and the British Empire, whose principal strength and sole reliance was naval power. Britain had won her wars and become great through power on the sea, and her strength there was so great that she had long been mistress of the seas. But it was generally admitted that she had not abused this power, and in time of peace had not for a great while interfered with other nations upon the waters. In time of war she had not seldom exerted her sea-power with decisive effect; but it was owing to this very agency that the Allies had been able to resist Germany with any success, and British sea-power had been the cornerstone of their alliance. It was certain that the British people would regard any attempt to deprive them of it as a thrust at their very existence.

A league of
nations

With respect to what was being called a league of nations, a long line of men, from Henry IV of France and William Penn to Tsar Alexander I and Tsar Nicholas II, had hoped for such a thing; and many a plan had been suggested for it; but so far the perplexity of the problem had baffled all who attempted to solve it.

The Con-
gress of
Paris, 1919

The Congress of Paris, which assembled January 18, 1919, began its work amidst unparalleled popular interest and in the midst of popular expectations that no assembly could have fulfilled. By the time its first session opened idealists, pacifists, humanitarians, and a vast number of others who were enthusiastic but ill-informed, had come to believe that such a peace treaty was about to be made and such a settlement of the affairs of the world, that all the damage done by the war would be amended, yet little or nothing taken from Austria-Hungary and the German Empire; that the Allies would be made content, yet the Central Powers in no wise offended; that reparation should be made, yet no indemnities taken; that self-determination

of peoples would be recognized, yet Germany and Austria not be shorn of their possessions; and they believed now that open diplomacy would be established, democracy and the welfare of the masses, that there would be freedom of the seas, no more war, and a league of nations with good feeling and the brotherhood of men. He who seemed to represent the possibility of all of these aspirations was President Wilson. As he visited London, Paris, and Rome he was received with an acclaim such as no American in Europe ever had had. In the estimate of the people he was the foremost leader and citizen in the world. On the other hand, a smaller number, though not a few, with better knowledge of affairs and of what had been done in the past, predicted that some of the proposals current were irreconcilable and others impossible of fulfilment, that the procedure of the Congress must of necessity be much like what had taken place at Vienna and Berlin, that the principal business would be to settle the questions which the Great War had brought forth, and that with respect to the grander and more general schemes the utmost possible was for the best men to try earnestly and in good faith to solve some part of the difficulties which had remained insoluble so long.

From the countries which had participated in the war against the Central Powers came delegates to the Conference at Paris. There was to be made a treaty which, when ready, would be submitted to Germany at Versailles, and others that would be offered to her recent allies. Neither Germany nor her allies were to take part in the discussion nor the framing of the treaties, which were to be submitted merely for acceptance or rejection. From January to May the delegates and their advisers deliberated on the matters before them.

Some of the more important matters were quickly decided. The great decisions were not arrived at openly or with the knowledge of the entire Conference. The very

Generous idealism

Personnel

Procedure

The council
of four

temperament of President Wilson was such that he easily acceded to what was doubtless the only workable scheme: important affairs were first decided by the representatives of the five greatest powers, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States; after which they were made known to the other members of the Congress. Actually the principal work was always in the hands of four men, Mr. George, M. Clemenceau, Signor Orlando, prime ministers respectively of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, and President Wilson. The question of the freedom of the seas was soon dropped, and wisely, as competent critics had hoped and predicted beforehand. With respect to the reduction of armaments little was done; the defeated powers were to be compelled to diminish theirs and it was hoped that others would be able later to do likewise. None the less, there remained numerous difficult questions to be settled, which were all the more perplexing because this time, unlike what had taken place at Vienna and Berlin, the framers of the treaty would make an honest effort to face the difficulties and settle them, not evade them by some specious or convenient solution.

Questions
to be dealt
with: the
conquered
powers

First among the matters to be dealt with was the question of the treatment of the conquered powers. Some, who professed to be the prophets of a new era, declared that a peace of vengeance would only lead to new wars, and that mild treatment, or, as they called it, just treatment, which would not offend Germany and her friends but leave them content, was the only way to spare succeeding generations from the horrors that had blasted the present. Some of these people in the Allied countries, like Lenin and Trotzky in Russia, proclaimed that there must be no annexations and no indemnities. A larger number said that Germany and Austria must repair the devastation they had wrought in the invaded countries, but that was all. There were not a few who asserted that the people of the Teutonic countries were little, if any,

more to be blamed than the others, since it was the greed of imperialists and capitalists, and the rashness of diplomats working in secret, which had brought on the war, and these baneful influences had been strong in all the countries concerned. On the other hand were a great many who had come to fear and to hate the Germans more than any people for generations had been hated. They declared that Germany and her allies must be stripped to the uttermost to pay for the infinite woe they had caused. It was vain, they said, to try to conciliate such people by mild treatment; an enduring peace could be obtained, if at all, only by so reducing her power that Germany could not make unprovoked attacks in the future. Some of these advocates proposed that to France should be given German territory down to the Rhine, and that Germany should be compelled to pay the entire cost of the war. This last was obviously impossible. The war had cost the Allies more than \$120,000,000,000, perhaps \$200,000,000,000, including all indirect losses; but the total wealth remaining to the German Empire was perhaps not more than \$50,000,000,000

Leniency
and severity
urged

The question of the German colonies attracted less attention. Some declared that they ought under no circumstances to be taken away, since the Germans needed colonial possessions; they had never had their fair share, and this was one of the causes of the war. On the other hand, it was vehemently asserted that the Germans had most cruelly misused the native populations, and were unworthy to be entrusted with ruling them any longer.

The German
colonies

The question of Alsace-Lorraine was not really before the Conference, since the French had already occupied the provinces, and were not willing to discuss the matter further. They said they were merely taking back what had once been wrested from them. But the whole question was very complicated, and had already been a great deal discussed. There could be no doubt that while a

Alsace-
Lorraine

A
debatable
land

portion of the people in Lorraine were French, most of the rest were Germans. The districts had long been attached to the Holy Roman Empire of the Germans, from which they were taken mostly by force by the French, under Louis XIV and Louis XV. On the other hand, this territory had originally been part of a middle kingdom between Germany and France, which had presently fallen to pieces. There was also no doubt that, after their incorporation into the kingdom of France, the people of the provinces became strongly attached to the French Government, took prominent part in the French Revolution, and thoroughly shared in the development of French nationality then, so that in 1871 they were most unwilling to be taken by Germany from France. The question was further complicated because of the great strategic importance of the country, in the hands of either Germany or France, and because in Lorraine lay the most valuable iron-ore deposits in Europe.

The Italian
frontier

The question of the Italian frontier seemed relatively simple, though, in the end, it proved difficult to arrange. It was generally conceded that *Italia Irredenta* should be taken from the broken Dual Monarchy, but the extent of the lands to be taken proved difficult to settle. There was no doubt about the Trentino, nor about Trieste, though that port was Austria's sole outlet to the sea; but all down the Dalmatian coast, on the eastern side of the Adriatic, were old Italian towns and a fringe of Italian population, while the great mass of the people, in the country behind, were South Slavs. The islands and the seaport districts were, indeed, largely unredeemed Italian land, but if they were all given to Italy then an outlying fringe of Italians would shut off from the sea a far greater number of Jugo-Slavs. Actually, because of the broad untracked Dinaric Alps, just back from the coast, the South Slavic people would be effectually shut off from the sea if they did not obtain Fiume, inhabited mainly by Italians.

Italians and
Jugo-Slavs

THE SETTLEMENT OF 1920 507

The question of the Czechs and the Slovaks had not until recently been much discussed, but became prominent just before peace was made. Bohemia and Moravia, which had been independent kingdoms in the Middle Ages, then joined under one ruler, were united with Austria in 1526, the same year that part of Hungary also was joined

The Czechs



32. CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

with Austria. The people were mostly West Slavs, and a body of their near kinsmen, the Slovaks, lived just to the east in Hungary. The Slovaks had remained a backward people, but the Czechs and Moravians had an old culture of which they were proud; and during the nineteenth century they had revived a strong national feeling. They had not desired independence so much as autonomy,

The Slovaks

but in 1867 they had seen the Dual Monarchy established in which only the Germans and the Magyars were to rule. Accordingly, discontent had increased, and during the Great War their troops deserted the Austrian armies whenever they could. A body of Czecho-Slovak troops, which had surrendered to the Russians, had just taken a conspicuous part in resisting the *Bolsheviki*.

Poland

The question of Poland had been much discussed, and it had evoked a great deal of interest. The tragic fate of the Polish people had for some generations aroused deepest sympathy among the statesmen of western Europe and among liberals all over the world. To reestablish Poland had long seemed a most desirable act of international justice, but the difficulties in the way were so insuperable that a new Polish state was outside the calculations of practical statesmen. By the strangest of coincidences, all three of the powers that had once divided Poland were ruined by the war. At the very beginning of the struggle the Russian Government, allied with the Western Powers, had promised the Poles autonomy, under the tsar. Then the country had been conquered by the Teutons; Russia had been ruined and the tsar was dead. Now, at last, the Teutonic powers themselves were prostrate. There was little difference of opinion about the reconstitution of Poland, but much difficulty in determining what the boundaries should be. In former times Poland had greatly extended her borders so that Polish population was widely scattered and mixed in with other peoples. Therefore it was not possible to fix boundaries that would include all the Poles and not many Germans, Lithuanians, and others, or such boundaries as would include only Poles without leaving a great many of them outside the new state. Moreover, Poland had formerly extended to the Baltic. If now she were given her outlet to the sea at Danzig, then Prussia would be divided into two parts.

The greater
Poland of
old



83. THE BALKANS IN 1920

The Jugo-Slavs

The question of the South Slavs presented no fundamental difficulty. It was generally agreed that the Jugo-Slavs formerly oppressed in the southern districts of Austria and Hungary, the people of the provinces of Carniola, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, should be given their freedom, and there



34. JUGO-SLAVIA

Projected union of them all

was already a movement on foot to have them all unite with their kinsmen of Montenegro and Servia in a large Jugo-Slavic state. It would undoubtedly be difficult to hold in one union these people, of the same race indeed, but differing much in culture and religion. The immediate difficulty, however, was to reconcile conflicting ambitions of Italians and South Slavs on the Adriatic

coast, and assure the new federation an outlet to the sea.

The question of Constantinople and the Turkish Empire presented such enormous difficulties that for the most part it was postponed as long as could be. Many thought it well to take from the Turks all their possessions except Anatolia in Asia Minor, their real home, and then free the subjects whom they had so misruled or distribute the territories among Britain, France, Italy, and Greece. But Constantinople, as always, was so mighty a prize that there was no agreement as to who should have it, and some thought the best solution was to let the Turks still remain.

Constantinople and Turkey

Since the proceedings of the inner council of the Congress of Paris were largely secret, the greatest matters being settled, as at Vienna, in private meetings between the great men, the motives and procedure that prevailed will long be partly the subject of conjecture. It is believed that at opposite extremes were President Wilson and Premier Clemenceau. The American statesman stood for the high ideals and the liberal ideas which the long struggle had quickened in the hearts of the best people, but he seems to have been without great knowledge of European statecraft and conditions, and often hampered by insufficient information. He stood first for justice. He believed that an enduring peace could best be obtained by liberal terms. He desired, above all, that the present opportunity for establishing a league of nations should not be allowed to pass, so that governments might thereafter settle their differences by reason and justice, and not by war. The aged French premier was wise with the wisdom of long experience and service. Apparently he had none too great faith in a league of nations, but was willing to assist in establishing one, provided that he was able to assure the safety of France for the future. Twice in his life had France been invaded by the Germans and terribly ravaged, and now he was resolved upon measures so stern

Business of the Congress

Clemenceau

that it would not be likely to happen again. In between these two were the Italian premier, with no very striking policy aside from Italy's interests, it would seem, and Mr. Lloyd George, one of the great liberal leaders of the world, who had been very near to the horror and tragedy of the conflict, and who now used his matchless skill in reconciling the divergent views of Clemenceau and Wilson.

The Treaty
of Versailles

May 7, the Treaty having been drawn up was presented to the German representatives at Versailles. Their leader made a dramatic declaration for his country, not without eloquence and pathos, acknowledging Germany's defeat, but declaring that not the German people alone but the old system of European imperialism was responsible for the coming of the war. June 28 the Treaty was signed. In a document as long as an ordinary book the affairs of Germany, Europe, and the world were settled, it was thought, for the time.

The
Covenant

At the beginning of the Treaty of Versailles, and a part of it, was the Covenant, or agreement, of a League of Nations designed "to promote international coöperation, and to achieve international peace and security, . . . through open, just, and honorable international relations." At first the members of the League were to be the powers now signing the treaty, while the remaining South American states and the neutral countries of Europe were invited to join. The seat of the League was to be Geneva. It was to act through an assembly in which each member was to have one vote, and a council, consisting of members representing the greater powers. The particular business of the Council was to be the planning a reduction of armaments "to the lowest point consistent with safety," and especially the taking of measures for preventing war. If there arose any dispute which threatened war it must be submitted to arbitration or inquiry by the Council, nor in any case should there be resort to war until three months

after decision, which must be rendered within a reasonable time. If a member of the League resorted to war in defiance of these provisions, he was to be regarded as committing an act of war against all the members of the League, who should sever relations with him and take measures to enforce the agreement. It was further provided that members should abrogate all treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the League, and that all other treaties and engagements should be published. Article 10 provided that, "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." This was afterward the object of much criticism as a provision to keep things as they were, and make impossible necessary revolution and change, much as had been said of the Holy Alliance a century before; but it was difficult to see how such a provision could be dispensed with, and it was hoped that proper changes would be brought about, when necessary, by voluntary action of the League or its members. Another article of vast possibilities for good, but complicated with great difficulties also, proclaimed that the members should secure fair and humane labor conditions everywhere, control traffic in women and children, in opium and other drugs, in arms and ammunition, and give just treatment to native populations. That this Covenant contained defects was not to be doubted, and many objections were easily raised against it. But it was evident that numerous objections might always be made with respect to any great constructive effort involving changes, as had been the case with the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, the great reforms of the French Revolution, the passing of the British electoral reform laws,

Article 10

Article 23

and the emancipation of the serfs in Russia. Whatever its defects, many people believed that here was at least an honest attempt to make the world better, a scheme that would be altered and improved as the result of experience and in the course of time, if people tried their best to make it succeed, instead of merely raising objections to it.

The Treaty
with Ger-
many

This Covenant of the League of Nations was the first part of the Treaty with Germany. By other provisions Alsace-Lorraine was restored to France, a small district to Belgium, and to Poland a small portion of Silesia and the greater part of Posen and West Prussia. Germany was to renounce her agreements with Belgium and Luxemburg; she was to yield to France the coal mines of the Saar Basin, on the French frontier, in compensation for the wanton and terrible destruction of the French coal mines about Lens, this district to be administered by the League of Nations for fifteen years, the people of the district to determine after that time whether it should continue under the League, or be returned to Germany, or united with France. Germany lost thus more than 35,000 square miles, a sixth of her former area, and about 7,000,000 of her population. Whereas in 1914 she had an area of 207,000 square miles and a population of 68,000,000, by the Treaty of Versailles she was reduced to about 170,000 square miles and about 60,000,000 of people. Furthermore, East Prussia was now left separated from the remainder of Germany by a "corridor" of Polish territory extending to the Baltic Sea, while Danzig was made a free city under the guarantee of the League of Nations. These losses, perhaps, were not in themselves so severe as was the taking of so much of Germany's resources in coal and iron-ore and other materials, which lay in the territories ceded. In the districts surrendered to Poland and to France were a considerable part of the resources upon which Germany's industrial greatness had been founded and also her military strength. It was

Germany's
losses

possible thus that preëminence in Europe had passed indefinitely from her.

Germany was required to abrogate the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which she had forced on Russia; she was to recognize the independence of Austria, of Czecho-Slovakia, and of Poland, the new states now being established; leave the fate of the Danish country once taken from Denmark to be decided by the people themselves, and destroy the fortifications of the fortress of Helgoland. Outside of Europe she was to renounce all her possessions: her colonies, her rights in China, Siam, Liberia, and Morocco; cede her rights in Shantung to Japan, and recognize the British protectorate over Egypt. She was to abolish conscription, and limit her army to 100,000 men, her navy to a few small ships, with no submarines, her warships being surrendered to the Allies, and she was to have no airplanes for purposes of war. She was also forbidden to keep any fortresses within a zone of territory extending from her frontier to fifty kilometers, east of the Rhine.

The Treaty declared that the war had been forced upon the Allies by German aggression. To repair the damage and losses caused to them Germany was to pay an indemnity of which the amount was to be fixed later on, in accordance with Germany's ability to pay; but \$5,000,000,000 was to be paid by May 1, 1921, twice that amount in the five years following, and \$10,000,000,000 still later. Subsequently attempt was made to fix the total at \$30,000,000,000, and on another occasion at \$55,000,000,000. Germany was to replace ton for ton the merchant ships destroyed in the war, and she was to undertake the restoration of the areas devastated by her armies of invasion. The Kiel Canal and certain rivers of Germany were to be opened to free navigation.

This Treaty, which according to some was the most terrible doom ever imposed upon any nation since the

Destruction
of German
military
power

The indem-
nity


Character
of the
Treaty

time when Rome conquered Carthage, was viewed with dismay by others as not sufficiently binding Germany as to make impossible another aggression, and by no means commensurate with the evil and suffering she had caused. There was no doubt that the provisions of the settlement reduced Germany to poverty and weakness. It took from the generation of Germans who accepted it the very hope of prosperity and greatness such as they had known before 1914. But there was also no doubt that the people of England, Italy, and France, despite all indemnities that Germany could pay, would for generations remain crushed under burdens of taxation such as they had never known before, made necessary by expenditures caused by the war. Severe as the terms were they were far less terrible than the Germans had, in their moments of triumph, boastfully proclaimed that they would impose. The indemnity required was not plunder, but merely compensation for the ruin that Germans had wrought; and the reparation thus made would be very incomplete. The terms of disarmament imposed made the beginning, it was to be hoped, of general reduction of armaments, which the people of the democratic countries had long much desired. The populations surrendered were largely Polish or Danish and partly French, and the territories now to be given up had all previously been taken away from Poland or Denmark or France. The results of the war being what they were, and the evil conditions which had come from the war being so great as they were, the peace was probably as good a one as in the circumstances was to be made. All in all, it had not been formulated in a spirit of hatred or revenge, nor with desire to destroy the German people.

Treaty of St.
Germain
with Austria,
1919

With the allies of Germany separate treaties were made. As a result of the war Austria-Hungary had fallen to pieces. From the ruins had arisen Czecho-Slovakia, and the state of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, whose in-





THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1920

dependence the Allies had acknowledged. Accordingly, the Dual Monarchy had ceased to exist. With Austria and with Hungary arrangements were made which stipulated that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk should be renounced and also rights in Egypt, Morocco, Siam, and China; the navy should be surrendered, and an indemnity paid. No state suffered more fearful fate than Austria-Hungary. Austria, once the leading state in Europe, and long the principal member of the Dual Monarchy, which in 1914 had a population of 51,000,000 and an area of 260,000 square miles, was now reduced to the petty inland state of German Austria, with 40,000 square miles and a population of 9,000,000. The splendid old capital, Vienna, left with too little territory to support its greatness, soon became a sad, shunned, famine-stricken place, while the Austrian people, because of the destruction and ravages of the war, and because their former economic connections had been severed, were soon in such terrible straits that they had no recourse but to beseech the charity of the world. By a later treaty Hungary likewise was bereft of much of her territory and all of the non-Magyar populations so long held in subjection. She also was left a minor inland state, of 35,000 square miles, containing 8,000,000 people; and she was soon overrun and plundered by Rumanian armies, which now took terrible vengeance for the awful miseries put upon their people two years before. With Bulgaria a treaty was made which imposed upon her an indemnity, and took from her the territories she had seized from Servia, Rumania, and Greece, during the war, while the disposition of the territory giving her access to the Ægean was to be decided by plebiscite of the local population. Bulgaria was left, therefore, the least important of the Balkan States, in the midst of rivals who had grown great by the war. By the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), agreed upon after much difficulty and delay, Turkey was stripped of most of her possessions.

The Dual
Monarchy
already in
fragments

Hungary

Bulgaria

Turkey

Nominally Constantinople was left to the sultan, but the straits were internationalized, the European territory of the Porte was given mostly to Greece, and the Ottoman dominions in Asia were largely divided among Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece.

Ratification
of the Treaty
of Versailles,
1919-20

The more important part of the work done in Paris was the treaty with Germany embodying the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was signed at Versailles, June 28. A few days later it was ratified by the German Republic. At the end of July it was ratified by Great Britain and by Poland, in the following month by Belgium, and in October by the British dominions, by Italy, and by France, and at the end of December by Japan. Meanwhile, the surrendered German fleet, which had been interned at Scapa Flow, in the Orkney Islands, north of Scotland, having been sunk by the German crews, the Supreme Council issued a protocol containing provisions for making good the loss by surrender of additional German shipping. Considerable negotiation and some delay followed, but January 10, 1920, the protocol having been accepted by the German Government, ratifications were exchanged at Versailles and the Treaty put into effect. On this day, then, formally, the Great War came to an end.

The United
States fails
to ratify

In the ratification the United States took no part. She had exerted enormous, if not decisive, power in the later stages of the war, and during the negotiations in Paris her president had taken a prominent part. It was due particularly to his efforts that a League of Nations had been formed and the Covenant embodied in the Treaty. But he had been unable to secure its ratification by his country. The Constitution of the United States provided that the assent of two thirds of the Senate was necessary for the acceptance of any treaty, and this it had been impossible to obtain. All sorts of objections were raised. The extreme idealists and reformers believed that a harsh and evil treaty had been made, and that this was sanc-

tioned by the Covenant. There was a large number of Americans who were still unwilling to have their country enter into close relations with other powers, and wished to continue the old isolation. It was probable that most of the people of the United States earnestly desired that some sort of league be made for the purpose of preventing wars in the future. But a considerable number of senators refused to accept the Covenant without amendments which the president was unwilling to have made, so the Covenant was not accepted and the treaty with Germany not sanctioned.

The war and the settlement in Paris made immense changes in European relations and altered the map of the world more than it had ever been changed at one time before. In Europe itself France became again, what she had once been for so long, the first of the Continental powers. A great number of her best men had been killed and her resources so drained that she was now left thoroughly exhausted, but she had acquired such resources and such position that if she recovered at all she would most probably have a splendid future before her, and her colonial empire remained intact. Italy had at last got the "unredeemed lands," the head of the Adriatic at Trieste and also the outlet of the Adriatic by establishing a protectorate over Albania. For the time, at least, this sea was entirely under Italy's domination. Across on the other side was the new Jugo-Slavic state. The age-long enemy, Austria, had been removed from all rivalry in the future. Belgium, slightly enlarged, and enormously enhanced in prestige, at once began to recover from the disasters which had fallen upon her.

In central Europe the changes were greater. The German Empire had fallen with the final disasters to its armies in eastern France, just as fifty years before the Second French Empire had been overthrown when the news of Sedan came to Paris. Just before the Germans

Traditional
American
aloofness

The new
era: France

Italy

Belgium

The end of
the German
Empire,
1918

Flight of
the Kaiser

surrendered there were outbreaks in many places; the kaiser and some of the lesser rulers fled from the country, socialist republics were hastily set up, and in Berlin and especially in Munich there were communist disorders much like those of Paris in 1871. For a moment it seemed that Germany was about to split into pieces and sink into the chaos of ruin and disorder into which Russia had just gone before her. But, temporarily at least, the strong and solid qualities of the German people reasserted themselves; the disorders were suppressed; the separatist movements checked; and in place of the German Empire there presently appeared a federation of republics much like the United States of America, except that constitution and organization were socialized, less, indeed, than in Russia, but more thoroughly than anywhere else in the world. In the midst of national disorganization and disaster, liable for an indemnity of vast and indefinite amount, this government maintained itself with increasing difficulty. It probably had the support of most of the German people for the time, but in any event, such were the general conditions existing, it would probably be harder to uphold this new government than it had been to perpetuate that over which Thiers had presided in France. This German government, under President Ebert, was constantly threatened on the one side by reactionaries and *Junkers*, who hoped to see the older forms soon restored, and on the other by radicals and "Spartacists," as the extreme communists were called, who wanted a complete revolution more like the one in Russia. It would be some years before the outcome could be accurately foretold.

Position of
the German
Republic

The German state was vastly reduced in power and reputation; its old industrial prosperity was gone, its commerce had vanished, its colonies were completely lost. Most of its European territory it still retained, but its immensely important districts on the upper Rhine and in Posen were gone, and with them great stores of iron-ore

and coal. If the parts of the Republic remained together through the lean and hard years to come, there was hope that Germany later on might recover and grow great once more, and, next to France, be the greatest Continental power, or in the end even recover her primacy once more. All this lay hid in the future.

For the old Dual Monarchy there was no hope of a better day. In what had been the realm of Austria-Hungary the servants of other days had become masters, and set up for themselves. In the north was Czecho-Slovakia, with its capital at Prague, apparently with a great industrial future before it. To the east a new Poland had appeared, which might later be one of the strong European states if only it could live now through the period of death-like weakness in which war and famine had left it. To the south, on the western side, was the new state of the once-despised South Slavs, with Italy holding the Adriatic; while to the south on the eastern side was the greater Rumania, which statesmen had so often dreamed of, doubled in size by having taken Transylvania from the Magyars. In the midst of these newcomers were Hungary, poor and surrounded, without access to the sea, and with uncertain future, and Austria, poorer and weaker, and similarly cut off, having, perhaps, as her greatest hope, future incorporation with Germany. The old Dual Monarchy, whatever its faults, had held these peoples together. Now economic ties were severed and barriers erected, so that hunger and misery were added to the desolation of the war. Here the principal task of statesmen would be to bring the various districts into economic association once more.

The greatest changes of all had taken place in eastern Europe. Not only had Russia broken to pieces, but the lands, first ravaged by war, had in the end gone down in a revolution so fundamental and sweeping that its outcome for the present could not be predicted. It was to be

Austria and
Hungary

Changes in
eastern
Europe:
Russia

Revolution
in Russia

hoped that the excesses and terror of the time of change would prove to be the things least striking in the end, and that finally it would be seen that the principal result of the Russian Revolution was the breaking of an obsolete and oppressive autocracy and a great betterment of the condition of the Russian people. But however that might be in the end, Russia had, for the time, ceased to be one of the Great Powers of the world. All the outlying parts had dropped off. Finland, the Baltic Provinces, Poland, Bessarabia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and a great part of Siberia. It might be that all of these countries would later on be brought together in a strong federation, though it was more probable that the Russian Empire of the days before the Great War was not to appear again; but after the evil days of dissolution and weakness the Russians would almost certainly take their place among the principal nations once more.

The Slavs

None the less, the standing of the Slavic peoples in Europe had been for the time improved. If on the one hand the Russian Empire had broken to pieces, yet the fragments had set up autonomous governments, and on the other hand the Slavs of central Europe, so long held down by German masters, had got their freedom. Whether Poland, lying between bolshevist Russia and a vengeful Germany, could maintain herself, even with the assistance of France, remained to be seen. The fate of Czecho-Slovakia also lay hidden in the future. The new state of the South Slavs would certainly encounter most difficult problems in holding together such elements as the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes. Yet Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and also Rumania were now established as considerable states, and the prospects of the West and the South Slavs were brighter than they had been for five hundred years.

Africa and
Asia

Africa had fallen practically into the hands of Britain and France. In Asia all the northern part still belonged

to Russia, but the far more important southern part, all of it from Arabia to Malaysia, was now under the control of Great Britain. In the east almost all the important strategic positions and approaches to China, from Sakhalin down to Formosa, had come into the hands of Japan.

The results of the large forces at work in the modern world and also now the results of the Great War had been the formation of vast empires, much as huge industrial combinations had appeared in the business world. For a chance to be one of the greater empires Germany had struck in 1914, and her defeat in 1918 had for the present definitely taken from her the possibility of obtaining it. Russia, if she recovered, might be one of the greatest, as might Japan if she continued her remarkable expansion and success, and succeeded in her aggressions on the mainland. But the two powers now indubitably holding first place were the British Empire and the United States. In her large population, intelligent and prosperous, in her infinite wealth, her immense resources, the United States held unrivalled position. But more imposing, though intrinsically less strong, was the position of the British Empire, which controlled most of Africa, and a great part of Asia. Its colonies, its naval stations, its strategic positions were everywhere. Britain was mistress of the seas, and held the approaches to the best routes, the entrance to the Mediterranean, all the environs of Suez, and virtually now the control of Constantinople. Together the British Empire and the United States held assured control of the seas, and had in their keeping so great a part of all the world's wealth and resources, so large a part of all of the earth's coal and iron, tin and copper and gold, so much of its meat and wheat and corn, that for the present to a great extent the destiny of the world lay in their keeping. Fortunate it might seem that such unparalleled greatness and wealth had come to the peoples which, notwithstanding

The domi-nant powers

Greatness
of the
British
Empire

ing many errors, had most cherished democracy, humanity, and free development. The best of the English-speaking peoples might well be humble in contemplation of the mighty prospect ahead.

Solidarity
of the Eng-
lish-speak-
ing peoples

For the British Empire and the United States one of the greatest tasks of the future was maintenance of friendship and cordial relations with each other. Neither of them, probably, could be overthrown except by the other. Together their safety was assured, and also their future position. Their people spoke the same tongue and dealt much with each other; hence there would often be rivalry, some ill-feeling, minor conflict, and many disputes. But the people of the United Kingdom, of the United States, and of the commonwealths of the British Empire had a common inheritance of speech, law, governmental system, character, general outlook. And for some time an increasing number of the English-speaking people had come to believe that war between the British Empire and the United States was inconceivable and outside calculation.

Crushing
debt

But however bright the future of the most fortunate might seem, the outlook of most of the European nations, and even their present, was dark indeed. Seldom had there been so much desolation and waste, so much misery and woe. The total cost of the war, variously estimated, had been, perhaps, at least \$200,000,000,000, and perhaps \$300,000,000,000, of which nearly two thirds had been incurred by the Allies. Such vast expenditures in four years' time could in no wise be met out of income, and the funds had been raised only in small part through taxation. Great Britain and afterward the United States had procured through taxes the largest sums ever so obtained in the history of the world; but France, and Italy, Austria-Hungary, and especially the German Empire had issued repeated loans, hoping to make the defeated enemy pay sufficient indemnity to cover them later on. Had the conflict been short, it is possible that the victor might have

been able to do this; but when the long struggle was over it was evident that the ruined Central Powers had not remaining sufficient substance to make good the damage they had wrought and then reimburse to the victors the expenditure entailed by the war. Hence the present generation found itself burdened with a terrible, crushing mortgage which might be repudiated, which might be paid off after many years of economy and toil, which might remain as a veritable millstone about the necks of weaker peoples indefinitely on in the future. In 1914 the national debt of France was about \$6,000,000,000; after the war it was about \$33,000,000,000, or more than half of her national wealth. The debt of Great Britain had risen from more than \$3,000,000,000 to about \$40,000,000,000. The financial position of Germany and of Austria was so utterly desperate that their future salvation could be hoped for rather than understood and explained. Hard work, meager living, crushing taxes alone could get rid of these debts. The destruction caused by the war had brought more economic confusion and more widespread distress than the world had ever known before. Everywhere prices were high and supplies and materials scarce. Accordingly, the despair and unrest, which unhappily had always prevailed among those least fortunate and stable, were immensely increased. There were many demands for complete and immediate reform. Everywhere appeared those who proposed revolutionary schemes. Hence radicals looked forward to speedy dissolution of the existing social and economic organization; many others feared that dangerous changes were at hand; and the conservatives became more conservative until a great tide of reaction set in.

More terrible than the waste and the heritage of debt was the loss of life and happiness and health that the war had entailed. The number of men killed was estimated at 9,000,000, and the total casualties of the struggle.

Financial
confusion
and ruin

Grave
problems
resultant

Heritage
of woe

Loss of life

at 33,000,000. Horrible were the losses of Germany and Russia, and the very flower of the young manhood of France was gone. For a generation it would be a question whether France or Servia or Poland could ever recover, and during all this time from the highlands of Scotland to the great plain of Russia travellers would see mutilated or weakened men dragging out the course of their lives. Millions of children were orphans, millions of women widows. To other millions of women in England and Germany and France it would seem that a curse was upon the earth in the time that they lived, for many could never expect to marry or hope to become mothers of children.

The old system and the hope for things better

The direct cause of this War of Desolation had been the actions of military leaders who guided Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the German Empire. Much condemnation and wrath had fallen upon the German people; and, as matters were, this was well. But in larger sense, the war came from the system of things that existed in Europe. And as the passions of war time subsided it was evident that in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, as in Russia and France and Great Britain, a host of plain and simple men had been torn from their homes to be devoured in the death-jaws of battle. From all these countries, and especially from Great Britain, Germany, and France, a goodly company of gentlemen, who held in their lives and their keeping the best of the present of Europe and the best of her hopes for the future, had gone forth and given themselves. Now they lay in the silence of unnumbered graves. War had taken the best. To an ancient master of tragic tale it might have seemed that the air was alive with innumerable spirits of slaughtered men, hovering over the trenches and fortress towns, writhing ghostly hands in an agony of woe and uttering mute imprecations upon the evil thing that had touched them. This system had developed not from the wickedness of

The tragedy of the present

particular men, but during a long time, from numerous and complex causes. It was to be the principal task now of all the best people to displace it gradually with something that was better.

The task of
the future

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CHAPTER XIX

SOCIALISM, SYNDICALISM, AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

. . . in the most advanced countries the following will be pretty generally applicable: 1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes. . . . 3. Abolition of all right of inheritance. . . . 6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State . . . 8. Equal liability of all to labour. . . .

KARL MARX and FRIEDRICH ENGELS, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848).

Je suis un partisan convaincu de l'égalité économique et sociale . . . je pense que l'égalité doit s'établir dans le monde par l'organisation spontanée du travail et de la propriété collective des associations productrices librement organisées et fédéralisées dans les communes, et par la fédération tout aussi spontanée des communes, mais non par l'action suprême et tutélaire de l'État.

MIKHAIL BAKUNIN, *Préambule pour la Seconde Livraison de L'Empire Knouto-Germanique* (1871).

We are about to ask how it is possible to conceive the transformation of the men of to-day into the free producers of to-morrow working in manufactories where there are no masters. . . . violence enlightened by the idea of the general strike

GEORGES SOREL, *Reflections on Violence* (trans. 1914.)

Russia is declared to be a Republic of Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. All the power in the centre and in the provinces belongs to these Soviets.

. . . private ownership of land is abolished, and the whole land fund is declared common national property and transferred to the laborers without compensation. Inheritance, whether by law or by will, is abolished.

Decrees of the Soviet Government of Russia, 1917.

AFTER the middle of the nineteenth century the progress of socialism in Europe was increasingly rapid. It was spread abroad by the powerful writings of Karl Marx,

Progress
of socialism
in Europe

by the teachings of his associate Engels, and by the labors of disciples, notable among whom was the brilliant Ferdinand Lassalle in Germany. In 1871 it received a setback in the overthrow of the *Commune* of Paris, which Marx had hoped would succeed. Moreover, the socialists, in the presence of their own vast doctrines, began to split up into different creeds, and by the beginning of the twentieth century it was often difficult for outsiders and even for adherents to determine just what socialism meant. None the less, meanwhile it continued to go forward, especially in Germany and in France.

Other social
doctrines:
anarchism

In the course of this time other social doctrines had been preached, of which the more important made much progress. Some of them developed alongside of socialism or even in opposition to it; others were the outgrowth or extension of socialism itself. About the time when Marx began doing his work a Frenchman, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, revived and extended the teachings of predecessors in France, that government interfered with the liberties and thwarted the happiness of most of the people, and that property was got by plundering the mass of the people. His most famous work, *Qu'est-ce que la Propriété?* (What is Property?), published in 1840, declared that property was theft. He believed that man's happiness could best be obtained under anarchism, absence of government and governmental interference. Like many others who have taught extreme and subversive doctrines, Proudhon was a theorist, kindly and humane; but his doctrines were taken up by bolder and more violent persons, who undertook to accomplish great reforms by getting rid of existing governments, and who strove to destroy governments by murdering their principal officials. Under Mikhail Bakunin, a Russian, and his followers, anarchism spread horror and dread throughout Europe. In the course of a single generation a tsar of Russia, an empress of Austria, a king of Italy, a president

Mikhail
Bakunin

of France, a premier of Spain, and even a president of the United States, fell victims to anarchist assassins.

Marx was almost from the first bitterly opposed to the teachings of Proudhon; and socialism and anarchism have continued to be widely separate, embodying very different theories of organization. The anarchists would destroy all authority above, so as to establish complete and extreme individual freedom. The ideal of the socialists was that the State, reorganized, should control all collectively or for the common welfare of all the people. Upon the great body of men anarchism never had more effect than to excite wondering curiosity or terror; and it never did much to affect socialist theories or methods.

But socialism was affected by a radical movement from within. In the course of the half century that passed after the time when Louis Blanc and Karl Marx began teaching, socialism gained in greatness and importance, and many of the more moderate reforms advocated by its adherents were slowly obtained. Great and obvious evils remained, however, some of which were not remedied because it was not known how to amend them. During this period many of the more moderate and practical socialists abandoned their extremer theories and took part in the politics of the states where they lived, hoping thus to better conditions by sustained and constructive effort. But it was obvious that after two generations many of the things foretold by socialist leaders had not come to pass, and slight prospect was seen of bringing them about as things for the most part were then going. Accordingly, as is ever the case, the bolder, the rasher, the more fiery and impatient, proclaimed that existing methods never could effect fundamental betterment, and that the important changes which socialists desired must be obtained by very different devices.

In France, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, appeared leaders who proclaimed that the great goal of

Anarchism
and social-
ism

Discontent
with the
progress
of socialism

Syndicalism


"Direct action" by trade unions

socialism was to be reached not through slow, patient work and persuasion but through violence and force; not through efforts in legislatures, which were the creations of the middle classes, who always controlled them, but through direct action of the workers themselves. As parliaments had been devised by the middle class, so had the working people created an institution peculiarly their own, the trade union, which they really controlled, and which was their particular means of bringing desired changes to pass. The new movement was soon known as *syndicalism*, from *syndicat* (trade union). It spread rapidly into other countries, and across the ocean into Canada and the United States, where its adherents styled themselves Industrial Workers of the World (I. W. W.).


Objects of syndicalism

Syndicalists proposed to render the workingmen's unions more powerful by making them larger and more comprehensive. They would organize into one big union all the workers employed in a single industry, and then make powerful alliance of the large groups. In time of need workers who resisted their employers could be supported by their brethren in gigantic strikes, or even general strikes, which would paralyze the transportation and industrial life of the nation. It was in France that these ideas were most strikingly carried out, though they were tried also in Russia and England. In the years 1906-9 several efforts, only partly successful, were made by French workers to paralyze opposition by means of great strikes, and in 1910 an effort was made to stop all railway traffic. But the railway strike failed when the government mobilized the strikers for military service on the railways, thus putting them in effect under martial law; and on other occasions not all the workingmen joined, and many citizen volunteers took the place of the strikers. Syndicalist workmen were taught that there must be no real peace even in the time when no strikes were going on, but that capitalism must be damaged and diminished by

Unceasing industrial warfare



36. EUROPE



36. EUROPE IN 1920

secret, continual destruction; that laborers must do less work than they were paid for, and that they must injure the product and hurt the machinery whenever they could. Since on one occasion, it is said, certain French workmen beginning a strike had thrown their wooden shoes into the machinery to ruin it, this destruction was known as *sabotage*.

The extreme views and often the violence of the syndicalists not only awakened great apprehension wherever they made themselves known, but aroused suspicion among some of the socialists themselves. Syndicalism really proposed to bring about some of the most important reforms which socialists had originally taught; but syndicalist methods and the results they strove for were very different from what many of the socialists now supported. In the early years of the twentieth century the syndicalist leaders in Liverpool, in Dublin, in Paris, in Barcelona, and elsewhere, hoped to bring about the suppression of capitalism and the taking over by workmen of property and the means of production, so that the railways, factories, and mines should be owned and managed by the laborers for their own profit and advantage. Some of them hoped for a new organization of the State, which should be but a group of industries or unions of workers, controlled completely by the laborers within them. All this, if necessary, should be done by revolution and force.

In Germany socialism had been carried forward by Ferdinand Lassalle, disciple of Marx and son of a wealthy Jewish merchant. Lacking the profound mind and intellectual reach of his master, he nevertheless possessed such brilliancy and charm that he made friends of officials like Bismarck and attracted a large following among the workmen of his country. In 1863 he founded the General Workingmen's Association. Before much came of it he was killed in a duel, but in 1869 the Social Democratic Party was founded by Wilhelm Liebknecht and August

Socialism
and syndi-
calism

Socialism in
the German
Empire

Bebel. Socialists were regarded with suspicion and dislike by the government of the new German Empire, stern laws were passed against them, and presently some of the things they demanded were done by the State itself with the hope of lessening their influence and weakening their power. Nevertheless, their numbers grew rapidly until at last they had the largest following of any party in the country, though many who were not socialists, but merely liberals and moderates, voted with them. Shortly after the Social Democratic Party was founded it received more than 100,000 votes; in 1912 it had more than 4,000,000. The party was ably led by Bebel, who displayed great skill in the *Reichstag*, and became one of the striking orators of his age. For a long time it could do no more than be a party of opposition and protest; but after the fall of the German Empire at the end of the Great War a German republic was established, partly upon a socialist plan. In Austria-Hungary also socialism made some progress; but not till the beginning of the twentieth century did a socialist political party attain any importance there. This was partly because Austria and Hungary, with respect to industrial development, lagged behind their neighbors to the north and the west, and partly because in no other great state was the population less homogeneous, more divided by race and religion.

In Austria-Hungary

In France

In France also socialism had made rapid growth, though with more violent upheavals, which were followed by reaction and repression, so that development was retarded for a while. A socialist movement in 1848 had led to a fierce uprising in Paris, which was quelled after terrible fighting. The capture of Paris by the Germans in 1871 was almost immediately followed by the establishment there of a *commune*, which, had it been maintained, would have been a socialist community only loosely connected with the rest of France. But against it the conservative people and the peasants of the rural districts rose,

and Paris was again captured after a siege more terrible than that endured at the hands of the Germans. There was much destruction of property and life, followed by great and merciless vengeance. For a time the socialists were completely crushed, and socialism was entirely discredited in the eyes of most of the people of France. But after a while communists who had been sent into exile were allowed to return, and gradually socialism gained strength again. For some time French socialists were divided into parties, especially under Jules Guesde, who in Germany had studied the Social Democratic organization, and who was a follower of Marx, and under Jean Jaurès, the greatest and most accomplished orator of his time, who advocated gradually socializing the means of production. In 1904 the different factions were united, and ten years later the French Socialist Party received 1,500,000 votes. In France socialism was supplemented and extended by the syndicalist doctrines, which spread outward to neighboring countries, especially to Spain, to Italy, to Great Britain, and to Ireland. In Belgium, Italy, and in Spain socialist and syndicalist doctrines had considerable effect and got much attention.

In Great Britain, where the Industrial Revolution had begun and attained greatest growth, where Robert Owen and his associates had taught some of the first of the socialist doctrines, and where Marx had spent the best of the years of his life, socialism developed more slowly than in Germany or France. This was due very largely to the temperament of the British people, long accustomed to slow change and improvement, and always distrustful of the usefulness of theories and general ideas. For more than a generation in the British Isles socialism made scarcely any progress. In 1880 William Morris, the poet, and H. M. Hyndman, followers of the teachings of Marx, organized the Social Democratic Federation, which drew no large following, however. Three years later the Fabian

Overthrow
of the Com-
mune, 1872

In Great
Britain

The Fabian Society

Society was founded by a group of intellectual leaders, including the well-known writers on economic history, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the Anglo-Irish dramatist, G. B. Shaw, and the prolific minor novelist, H. G. Wells. They proposed to follow the "Fabian" policy of gradually getting political parties to accept and carry through social reforms. Presently socialism began to affect the labor organizations, and in 1893 a trade-union leader organized the Independent Labor Party, whose members hoped that socialism might be brought to prevail in their country. By 1914 British socialists, increasingly numerous and active, were advocating as a matter of course the abolition of capitalism and wages, the taking over by the State of the great industries, like mining and transportation, and the control of the lesser ones by the workers themselves. During the time of the Great War, confronted with the immense danger that threatened the destruction of Great Britain and the British Empire, these doctrines, though much talked of and written about, were by most of the workingmen of Britain thrust away into the background. But after the victory, when the enemy was powerless, in the midst of the want and discontent which followed the destructive conflict, socialism and syndicalism seemed to take possession of a greater part of the population than ever before. Accordingly, some observers declared that the Labor Party would in the future get control of the government and attempt to reform the State by the application of socialistic ideas. And there were not wanting those who affirmed that what was called bolshevism had much more chance of being established in Great Britain, where the majority of the inhabitants were an industrial proletariat, than in a country like Russia, where almost all the people were peasants, uneducated and not progressive. It was very probable, however, that here as elsewhere, what seemed like powerful tendency toward sweeping social changes was to a considerable

Growth of
British
socialism
after 1918

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 537

extent merely the unrest and the ferment following inevitably in the wake of the war.

In Russia, likewise, socialist doctrines had been taught, but for a long time they had seemed to be of slight importance there, since in Russia there was little industrialism. Even after the Russian industrial revolution had done its work, the overwhelming body of the people continued to be agricultural workers, isolated, uneducated, conservative, and moved only by desire to obtain a larger share of the agricultural lands. Nevertheless, it was in Russia that the most complete and thorough-going experiment in socialism was tried. During the misery and confusion which overwhelmed that country in the latter part of the Great War, the old system completely collapsed. In 1917, after a revolution had overthrown the old government, certain socialists, whose leaders were Lenin and Trotzky, forming a group called the *Bolsheviks*, seized power and maintained themselves. They then decreed some of the sweeping changes which Marx had long before hoped would come to pass. Private property and inheritance were abolished; land, capital, transportation were nationalized; and it was decreed that all people should work. By this time all over the world radical leaders were loudly proclaiming that socialism was the hope of the future, and that bolshevism was destined shortly to overthrow what they called the outworn systems. For the moment it appeared to many that the Russian Revolution was the most striking event since 1793, and that bolshevism held untold possibilities for good or for evil in the future. But it is probable that this revolution in Russia was less the result of the advance and the power of socialism than of the destruction, the uncertainty, and the general unrest, which proceeded from the War of the Nations.

Perhaps no great struggle ever produced such mighty results in so short a time as the war which began in 1914. The conflict lasted little more than four years, but in that

In Russia

Application
of the doc-
trines of
Marx in
Russia

Unrest of
the period
of the war

Destruction resulting from the Great War

time the most powerful state in Europe, the German Empire, was overthrown, Austria-Hungary was broken to pieces beyond all hope of redemption, and the Russian Empire not only broke into pieces, but was the scene of a revolution more striking than any since that which long before had transformed France and Europe. The consequences and changes of the cataclysm are not to be estimated yet. But nowhere else in Europe was the old order so completely altered as in Russia.

Russia and the Great War

At the beginning of the Great War the Russian armies had much success, utterly defeating the Austrians; but their own losses were heavy, especially against the Germans; and after a while, as their military material was exhausted, they were forced to carry on the struggle with prodigal and hideous sacrifice of their men. In 1915 the Teutonic allies defeated them completely, drove them from the territory which they had occupied, and conquering Poland and part of the Baltic Provinces, drove deep into Russia itself. From this disaster the Russians never recovered. It was now seen that a great agricultural state, not well organized, could sustain no long conflict with an industrial state well organized for war and well equipped. Russian war supplies were exhausted; the transportation system was breaking down; vast numbers of men had been killed or wounded; the country was filled with miserable refugees from provinces taken by the foe. It is true that a great national enthusiasm had been aroused at the beginning of the conflict. Russians desired to help their kinsmen in Servia, and there was an outburst against all things German, the old name of the capital, St. Petersburg, being changed to Petrograd, the Slavic equivalent. But many of the officials and reactionaries had no desire to continue the war, and plotted to make peace with Germany as soon as they could. They feared that a continuance of the disastrous conflict would destroy their old privileges and position, and not a few of them

Reactionaries plan to withdraw from the war

were of German sympathy or extraction. But the liberals in the *Duma* steadily supported the war, believing that only with its triumphant conclusion could they obtain the changes which they hoped for; and the local *zemstvos* did excellent work in relieving distress and providing material of war. In 1916 the Russians made a last great effort, with much success, but at enormous cost; and after this they could do no more. By the end of the year the nation was almost completely exhausted; the inefficient government had nearly broken down, and thought only of making peace in time to save itself; and the people had suffered almost to the limit of endurance.

The end came with a suddenness that surprised the world. The poorer people in Petrograd were starving, and hunger now drove them to revolution, as once it had driven the rabble of Paris. Early in March, 1917, bread riots began, which increased until the whole city was filled with fighting and confusion, during which the troops deserted the government and went over to the mobs. The opposition in the *Duma* was plotting to overthrow the government at this very time; and the *Duma* was now suspended. The tsar acted with much weakness and indecision and the capital was lost. The other great cities of the Empire joined the revolution, and a part of the *Duma* now instituted a provisional government of the country. The abdication of the tsar was demanded. March 15 Nicholas II, "Emperor of all the Russias," laid down his power, and the dynasty of the Romanovs came to an end.

As after events were to show this was one of the momentous events in the history of Europe. For ages autocracy had maintained itself in eastern Europe. For a thousand years at Constantinople the Byzantine emperors had ruled absolutely, heads of Church and State, and from their empire some civilization had gone up through the Balkans, and also into south Russia. Of this civilization the Russians had been principal heirs, and their government and

Beginning
of the Rus-
sian Revo-
lution,
1917

Fall of the
tsardom

their religion had in the course of centuries been spread over half of Europe. Under the Russian tsars lived a fourth part of all the white people in the world. While most of the other white people in Europe and the Americas had developed self-government and gone forward in material civilization, the Slavs had lagged far behind. Now, after supporting the old system for a long time or else passively enduring its evils, they suddenly overthrew it, and, as was evidenced very soon, they overthrew it completely. Everywhere was the Russian Revolution of 1917 hailed as a great advancement for democracy, and rash expectations were cherished of the benefits immediately to follow.

First stage:
attempted
moderate
reforms

The provisional government attempted to effect liberal reform, set up a constitutional government after the model of the states of western Europe, restore order, and continue a vigorous prosecution of the war. This government was in the hands of the Constitutional Democrats led by Prince Lvov, and by Miliukov, assisted by Kerensky, a moderate socialist leader. An assembly was to be called to draw up a new constitution. Meanwhile, a general amnesty was proclaimed for political offenders, and freedom of speech was announced, and universal suffrage, for both men and women.

Extreme
Russian
socialists:
the *Bol-
sheviki*

But the liberal leaders were by no means able to control the revolution now started. The socialists and radicals in both city and country joined forces, and soon proved to be the most powerful and aggressive body in the country. They began to be known as the *Bolsheviks*. Twelve years before, at the time of the earlier revolution, the Social Democratic Party of the industrial workers had split into two parts, a moderate minority, the *Mensheviks* (Russian *menshe*, less) and the majority of radicals, led by Nicolai Lenin, the *Bolsheviks* (Russian *bolshe*, more). Now in 1917 the more radical peasants of the Social Revolutionary Party combined with the radical socialists of the cities,

desiring a far more complete revolution than they thought had yet been attained, and caring less for mere political change than thorough social alteration. To bring this about they wished to end the war at once. Their leaders taught that the Great War had been brought about by capitalists and imperialists of all the countries alike, all of whom had as their chief interest the exploitation of the masses. Everywhere the proletariat and the mass of the people must compel the making of peace, after which the people must overthrow the upper class and the selfish *bourgeoisie* and capitalists, then usher in the great reforms of the socialists, which would bring real freedom to the masses of the world.

Such were the *Bolsheviki*. Their teachings were not new, but to many of the hungry, disheartened, suffering people of Russia, most of whom had no political experience whatever, these doctrines came as a great new message or else made no difference whatever. All over the world the dislocation caused by the war had produced a stirring and unrest, and a willingness of men to hearken to strange, revolutionary doctrines. The teachings of the *Bolsheviki* began to spread over the country, everywhere undermining the existing order. The Germans soon understood how greatly Russia would be weakened by this. So they helped some of the Russian extremists to return to their country, and assisted them as much as they could. The Russian soldiers holding the east front against the Germans were told that they need not obey their officers, and all discipline was soon at an end. They were likewise told that the land was being divided up among the people, and they, deserting to get their share, the Russian armies melted away. The socialists demanded a "democratic" peace with "no annexations and no indemnities." German soldiers fraternized with the Russians, declaring that they also desired this, and military operations in the east came nearly to an end.

Social and
economic
alteration
desired

The Ger-
mans and
the *Bol-*
sheviki

"No annexa-
tions and no
indemnities"

Second stage: the *Bolsheviks* get control

Lenine and Trotzky

The *Bolsheviks* accept the Peace of Brest-Litovsk

Meanwhile, a provisional government of liberals was trying to rule the country and continue the war. In many places, however, the radicals took affairs into their own hands, the people choosing *soviets*, or councils of delegates of the soldiers, sailors, and workingmen. The most powerful and important was the *soviet* at Petrograd, which regarded itself as representing, in effect, the radicals of the country. In every way possible it opposed the Provisional Government, and was determined to get control of the government itself. It was not long before Miliukov and Prince Lvov lost power and Kerensky became the head of affairs; but he, who had formerly seemed a radical, was soon left far behind in the violent progress of the revolution. He strove valiantly to restore the armies, but the Germans completely routed the Russians and in September they captured Riga. Lenine, the bolshevik leader, was now in the country, as was Trotzky who had also taken part in the Revolution of 1905. Boldly and with great energy and skill they urged the workmen to overthrow the old system completely. More and more did disorder and anarchy increase as the old system went down in ruin, as Kerensky and other moderates lost hold, and as the *Bolsheviks* took their place. In November the garrison of Petrograd went over to them and Kerensky fled from the city. He strove to recover his power but was defeated, and fled from the country. Meanwhile, the *Bolsheviks* gained Moscow, Kiev, and other places, fighting fiercely, and putting down their enemies with iron hand.

The Russian Revolution now entered upon another phase. The *Bolsheviks* abandoned the Allies, and began negotiations for a separate peace. The Germans, who had no more to gain by pretended friendship, threw off the mask, and at Brest-Litovsk, in March, 1918, compelled the Russian leaders to agree to a terrible peace, which undid the work of Russian expansion and development for the

past two hundred years, and broke the Russian Empire into fragments. Finland, Poland, the Baltic Provinces, the Ukraine, were to be abandoned along with other territory, and Russia, paying a large indemnity, was to be left cut off almost entirely from the sea, in economic subservience to the German Empire. Germany now was completely victorious in the east. Lenine and Trotzky regarded all this without great concern. They had no desire for unwilling peoples to be held subject by Russia, and they believed that bolshevism among the German masses would soon overthrow German autocracy also. They turned with greater interest to domestic problems, which always they had most at heart.

The Russian Empire in fragments

They attempted to set up a political organization different from what existed in other countries. Lenine wished Russia to be a republic in which political power would be vested in *soviets* or councils of workmen, soldiers, or peasants. The state was to be socialized, taking over banks, railways, industrial enterprises, and land, to nationalize them and make them the property of all of the people. A series of decrees was issued to effect these designs, and to abolish inheritance and private ownership of property. Actually, while many changes were made, some of them in theory at least having much merit, a great part of the programme soon broke down. The peasants had already seized most of the land and divided it, and were little disposed to see it taken away and made the property of the nation. The new order in Russia was regarded with much suspicion elsewhere. The bolshevists announced their intention of overthrowing capitalism and the *bourgeoisie* in all countries; hence the Allies were hostile. Disorders broke out and numerous counter-revolutionary movements, in the course of which there was great cruelty and slaughter, and much destruction of property. Apparently Russia sank lower and lower in economic demoralization and confusion, but Lenine and Trotzky, who had

The bolshevist system in Russia

Disorder and de-struction

dispensed now with most of the *soviets*, ruthlessly crushed all resistance. Great numbers of the upper classes and more intelligent people were slaughtered, and some time in 1918 the tsar was murdered miserably in Ekaterinburg far away.

Counter-revolutionary movements

In the autumn of 1918 Germany and Austria, exhausted by the length of the struggle, weakened by the influence of bolshevism in the east, and overwhelmed by their foes in the west, abandoned the contest and surrendered. But the end of the Great War brought no peace for Russia. By most of the people in the rest of the world the bolshevists were regarded with fear and suspicion, and Russia was not permitted to have communication with other countries. In the next two years several great counter-revolutionary movements were organized. In Siberia Admiral Kolchak, in south Russia General Denikine, along the Baltic General Yudenitch, all prepared to march upon the center of the country and overthrow bolshevist rule. At one time they all seemed near to considerable success, but by the end of 1919 Lenin and Trotzky were completely triumphant. Somewhat later the Poles, who believed that their new state was gravely threatened by bolshevist activities, suddenly invaded Russia and drove on until their armies captured Kiev. But the Russian people, whatever their attitude toward bolshevism and a socialist government might be, were filled with strong national feeling against their old enemies the Poles. They rallied to the support of Lenin's government, drove the invader out of Russia, pressed on across Polish territory and were stopped only at the gates of Warsaw. There they were held and defeated. While the tide of war was flowing and ebbing across this wasted country, and while Poland and Russia were both being reduced to the last stages of exhaustion, the relics of Denikine's forces, assisted by the British and the French, took refuge in the Crimea, and, under the leadership of General Wrangel, rapidly gained new strength.

War with Poland

During such time as the Poles and the bolshevist armies were engaged in fighting each other, Wrangel's forces moved north from their stronghold and for a moment seemed to have some chance of success. But no sooner had the Poles and the Russians made peace than the *soviet* forces were marched to the south, the narrow neck of the Crimean Peninsula was forced, and before the end of 1920 the counter-revolutionary movement had been everywhere utterly crushed.

All opposi-
tion crushed

Much obscurity continued to surround these events. It would seem that the efforts of Kolchak and Denikine, which were supported by the Allied governments, were in Russia regarded to some extent as outside aggression; and that the Russian people, with national spirit aroused, rallied to support the government in power, even though many of them had as little love for Lenin and his system in 1919 as some Frenchmen in 1793 had for Robespierre and a French republic. It is probable, moreover, that some of the strongest supporters of the counter-revolutionary leaders were members of the upper classes and dispossessed landowners, who hoped that the overthrow of bolshevism would make possible a return of the privileges and possessions they had lost. Accordingly, a great number of Russian peasants, who had no desire for socialism and no understanding of it, rallied under the *Bolsheviks* to defeat reaction. In 1920, therefore, it seemed that bolshevism had established itself firmly, for the time being, in Russia.

No event for a hundred years had aroused such strong feeling as this Russian Revolution, and such diverse opinions arose concerning it and such conflicting information that it was almost impossible to find out the truth. It would seem that the *Bolsheviks* were only a small minority, perhaps not more than 600,000 in a population of 180,000,000. They succeeded because they acted with the most vigor and determination in a time of

Causes of
the success
of the *Bol-
sheviki*

The Russian people desire agrarian reform

Prospect of the future

distress and confusion. They were supported partly by Russian national spirit and partly by those who dreaded reaction. Furthermore, they maintained themselves by means of a reign of terror, and also because they held the chief cities and such railway facilities as remained. But it seemed probable that their extreme socialistic programme was a failure, and that they were doomed to fall. Most of the Russian peasants had no knowledge of socialism and no desire for it, and in most of the country bolshevism never took root. Nevertheless, it was certain that the old Russia had gone, even as the old France was gone by 1795. Perhaps later on, after exceeding misery and exhaustion, the Russians, without autocracy and with the lands in possession of the people, would go forward in the construction of a new and better state, more nearly on the model of the great democracies elsewhere.

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THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 547

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APPENDIX

EUROPEAN RULERS SINCE 1870

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

FRANCIS JOSEPH, 1848-1916 CHARLES I, 1916-18

BELGIUM

LEOPOLD II, 1865-1909 ALBERT I, 1909-

BULGARIA

Principality until 1909, kingdom afterward.

ALEXANDER, 1879-86 BORIS I, 1918-
FERDINAND I, 1887-1918

DENMARK

CHRISTIAN IX, 1863-1906 CHRISTIAN X, 1912-
FREDERICK VIII, 1906-12

FRANCE

Government of National Defence, 1870-1

Presidents of the French Republic

ADOLPHE THIERS, 1871-3	ÉMILE LOUBET, 1899-1906
MARSHAL MACMAHON, 1873-9	ARMAND FALLIÈRES, 1906-13
JULES GRÉVY, 1879-87	RAYMOND POINCARÉ, 1913-20
SADI CARNOT, 1887-94	PAUL DESCHANEL, 1920
CASIMIR-PÉRIER, 1894-5	ALEXANDRE MILLERAND, 1920-
FÉLIX FAURE, 1895-9	

THE GERMAN EMPIRE

WILLIAM I, 1871–88
FREDERICK III, 1888

WILLIAM II, 1888–1918

Chancellors

- Prince Bismarck, 1871–90
- Count von Caprivi, 1890–4
- Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, 1894–1900
- Count von Bülow, 1900–8
- Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, 1908–17
- Georg Michaelis, 1917
- Count von Hertling, 1917–18
- Prince Max of Baden, 1918

*The German Republic, 1918–*THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
IRELANDVICTORIA, 1837–1901
EDWARD VII, 1901–10

GEORGE V, 1910–

Prime Ministers

- William Ewart Gladstone, 1868–74
- Benjamin Disraeli (Earl of Beaconsfield, 1876), 1874–80
- W. E. Gladstone (II), 1880–5
- Robert Cecil (Marquis of Salisbury), 1885–6
- W. E. Gladstone (III), 1886
- Marquis of Salisbury (II), 1886–92
- W. E. Gladstone (IV), 1892–4
- Archibald P. Primrose (Earl of Rosebery), 1894–5
- Marquis of Salisbury (III), 1895–1902
- Arthur James Balfour, 1902–5
- Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 1905–8
- Herbert Henry Asquith, 1908–16
- David Lloyd George, 1916–

GREECE

GEORGE I, 1863–1913
CONSTANTINE I, 1913–17ALEXANDER I, 1917–1920
CONSTANTINE I (restored) 1921–

APPENDIX

553

ITALY

VICTOR EMMANUEL II, 1849-78 VICTOR EMMANUEL III, 1900-
HUMBERT, 1878-1900

MONTENEGRO

Principality until 1910; kingdom until 1918; then incorporated into Jugo-Slavia

NICHOLAS I, 1860-1918

THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

WILLIAM III, 1849-90 WILHELMINA, 1890-

NORWAY

Ruled by the kings of Sweden, 1814-1905

HAAKON VII, 1905-

THE POPES

PIUS IX, 1846-78
LEO XIII, 1878-1903

PIUS X, 1903-14
BENEDICT XV, 1914-

PORTUGAL

LUIZ I, 1861-89
CARLOS, 1889-1908

MANOEL II, 1908-10
Republic. 1910-

PRUSSIA

WILLIAM I, 1861-88
FREDERICK III, 1888

WILLIAM II, 1888-1918

RUMANIA

Principality until 1881, kingdom afterward.

CHARLES I, 1866–1914

FERDINAND I, 1914-

RUSSIA.

ALEXANDER II, 1855-81
ALEXANDER III, 1881-94

NICHOLAS II, 1894-1917

ALEXANDER III, 1881-94

Provisional government, 1917
Sessions 1918

APPENDIX

SERVIA

Principality until 1882; kingdom afterward; in 1918 the ruler became king of the "Unitary Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" (Jugo-Slavia).

MILAN, 1868-89	PETER I, 1903-
ALEXANDER, 1889-1903	

SPAIN

AMADEO OF SAVOY, 1870-3	ALPHONSO XIII, 1875-85
<i>Spanish Republic, 1873-5</i>	ALPHONSO XIII, 1886-

SWEDEN

CHARLES XV, 1859-72	GUSTAVUS V, 1907-
OSCAR II, 1872-1907	

TURKEY

ABDUL-AZIZ, 1861-76	MOHAMMED V, 1909-18
MURAD V, 1876	MOHAMMED VI, 1918-
ABDUL-HAMID, 1876-1909	

INDEX

- Abdul Hamid, 193, 324.
Abgeordnetenhaus, 311.
 Abyssinia, 349, 371, 389.
 Accident Insurance Laws, 163.
 Act of Union, concerning Scotland and England, 258; concerning Ireland and Great Britain, 258.
 Adowa, 389.
 Adrianople, captured by the Turks, 316; by the Russians, 323; by the Bulgars, 327, 328; reoccupied by the Turks, 331; ceded to Greece, 336.
 Adriatic Sea, 13, 180, 305, 315, 350, 428.
 Ægean Sea, 305; islands of, 320.
 Affair of 1875, 233, 234.
 Afghanistan, 378, 405.
 Africa, in 1920, 522.
 Agadir, 411.
 Age of Reason, 29.
 Agrarian Reform, in Ireland, 260; in Rumania, 338, 339.
 Agricultural Laborers, in Great Britain, 252.
 Agriculture, in the German Empire, 152, 153; in Italy, 347; in Spain, 352.
 Aisne, Battle of the, 463.
 Alabama Claims, 101.
 Albania, 13, 319, 323, 325, 328, 334, 416, 417, 519.
 Alexander I, Tsar of Russia, 111, 502.
 Alexander II, Tsar of Russia, 25, 112; accession of, 269, 270; emancipation of the serfs by, 270; reforms under, 273; becomes conservative, 274; assassination of, 280, 281.
 Alexander III, Tsar of Russia, reign of, 281–90; policy of, 281; reaction under, 282, 283; policy of Russification under, 283, 284, 287–9.
 Alexander, Prince of Battenberg, 340.
 Alexander Couza, 337, 338.
 Alfonso XII, King of Spain, 350.
 Alfonso XIII, King of Spain, 350, 351.
 Algeciras, Conference of, 403.
 Algeciras Agreement, 403, 412.
 Algeria, 181, 382, 383, 394.
 Ali, Pasha of Janina, 319.
 Allies, The, advantages of in the Great War, 456, 457; superior resources of, 456; tenacity and moral courage of, 457; command of the sea kept by, 472–4; great offensive of, 492–4; triumph of, 495.
Almanach de Gotha, 301.
 Alsace, 136.
 Alsace-Lorraine, under German rule, 169, 170; taking of, 190; a *Reichsland*, 310; desire for the recovery of, 431; question of, 505, 506; ceded to France, 514.
 Amadeo of Savoy, 350.
 Americans, arrive in France, 491; take the St. Mihiel salient, 493; clear the Argonne, 493, 494.
 Amiens, 14, 490.
 Anarchism, 279, 280, 530, 531.
 Anatolia, 116, 195.
Ancien Régime, 7–9, 17–20.
 Anglo-French Agreement of 1899, 384.
 Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, 387.
 Anglo-German Agreement of 1914, 207.
 Anglo-Russian Accord, 404, 405, 432.
 Anglo-Saxon Conquest of Britain, 256.
 Anglo-Saxon Tongue, 336.
 Angola, 387, 390.
 Annam, 383.
 Anne, Queen of England, 254.
L'Année Terrible, 211.
Annual Register, 94.
 Antwerp, 358, 460, 475.
 Apprentices, 46.
 Arabi Pashà, 375.
Arabian Nights, 435.
 Argand, 44.
 Argonne Forest, 493, 494.
 Aristocracy, 54–6.
 Aristotle, 336.
 Arkwright, Richard, 46.
 Armentières, 490.
 Armies, in earlier times, 123, 124; in the nineteenth century, 124–7; growth of in Europe, 425.
 Armistice (1918), 495.

- "Army of Maneuver," 492.
 Army System, reformed in France, 215.
 Arras, 490.
 Article 10, 513.
 Article 23, 513.
 Artificial Lighting, 9.
 Asia, in 1920, 522, 523.
 Asiatic Russia, 285.
 Asiatic Turkey, 434, 435.
 Asquith, H. H., 249, 261.
Association Culturelle, 229.
 Association of the Congo, 370.
 Association of Worship, 229.
 Astronomy, 69.
Ateliers Nationaux, 77, 78.
 Athenians, 34.
 Atlantic Ocean, passage across, 10.
 Atlantis, 371.
 Augsburg, 15.
Ausgleich, 27, 33, 108; terms of, 109; difficulties attending renewals of, 306, 307.
 Australia, 380.
 Austria, abolition of serfdom in, 25; Revolution of 1848 in, 27, 106; constitution proclaimed in, 27; suffrage in, 32, 33; position of in the first half of the nineteenth century, 106; in earlier times, 108; peoples of, 108; defeated by France and by Prussia, 109; rules part of Italy, 113, 114; takes part in the war about Schleswig-Holstein, 128, 129; army of in the Austro-Prussian War, 130; beginning of, 103, 433; decline of, 211; in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 304; becomes part of the Dual Monarchy, 304; industrial development in, 306, 307; provinces of, 310; peoples of, 311; fate of, 517, 521.
 Austria-Hungary, establishment of, 108, 304, 305; rivalry of with Russia, 175, 176, 178; makes an agreement with the German Empire and Russia, 175; alliance of with the German Empire, 179, 313; helps to form the Triple Alliance, 170-185; relations of with the German Empire, 197, 108; diversity of races in, 284; relations of with Russia, 293, 313; policy of, 304, 305; history of, 305-15; parts of, 310-12; character of, 312; foreign policy of, 312-15; relations of with Servia, 315; protects Turkey from Russian aggression, 318; acquires Bosnia and Herzegovina, 324, 333, 405-8, 436; in the Balkan Crisis of 1912-13, 416, 417; desires to attack Servia in 1913, 418; outlets of, 428; ultimatum of to Servia, 440; makes war on Servia, 442, 444; surrenders to the Allies, 494; dissolution of, 516; socialism in, 534.
 Austrian Empire, 105.
 Austrian Note to Servia, 400, 440, 441.
 Austrians, defeated in Poland, 467; lose Przemysl, 468; help to defeat the Russians at the Dunajec, 468; help to conquer Servia, 469, 470; invade Italy, 477; defeat the Italians at Caporetto, 484; overwhelmed by the Italians, 493, 494.
 Austro-Italian Frontier, 483.
 Austro-Prussian War, 107, 114, 130, 131, 308.
 Azov, Sea of, 317.
 Babeuf, 75.
 Bacon, Roger, 40.
 Baden, government in, 165.
 Bagdad Railway, 195, 196, 207, 313, 435, 436.
 Bakunin, Mikhail, 279, 280; on equality, 529; career of, 530.
 Balance of Power, 95.
 Balkan Crisis of 1912-13, 416, 417.
 Balkan League, 326.
 Balkan States, relations of with Austria-Hungary, 314, 315; growth of, 324; intrigues of in Macedonia, 325, 326; unite against Turkey, 326; development of, 331-41.
 Balkan Wars, 313, 315, 327-31, 416, 417.
 Balkans, slight progress of industrialism in, 54; changes in, 206; ambitions of Austria-Hungary in, 312; the German Empire and Austria-Hungary strive for predominance in, 313; conquered by the Turks, 316; Turkish rule in, 316, 317; rivalry of the Great Powers in, 318, 435, 436; the danger spot of Europe, 325; political situation in, in 1912-13, 417, 418; the German Empire desires to control, 434, 435.
 Ball, John, 74.
 "Baltic Barons," 286.
 Baltic Provinces, 286, 288, 522, 543.
 Baltic Sea, 13; under Swedish control, 363; Russia and Germany on, 428.
 Baluchistan, 378.

- Bapaume, 476.
Barcelona, 533
Bathing, 48.
Bavaria, government in, 165.
Bazaine, 136.
Beaconsfield, Earl of, 240.
Bebel, August, 533, 534.
Belfort, 188, 458, 461.
Belgians, resist the German invaders, 459, 460; help to break the Hindenburg Line, 493, 494.
Belgium, suffrage in, 32; Industrial Revolution in, 54, 58; neutralization of, 118, 359; separation from Holland, 118; in 1870, 119; joined with Holland, 355, 358, 359, 374; becomes independent, 356, 359; earlier history of, 358; conditions in, 359, 360; obtains the Congo country, 392; violation of the neutrality of, 446; invasion of by the Germans, 459, 460; German methods in, 485; war relief for, 485; in 1920, 519.
Benedict XIV, Pope, 346.
Berchtold, Count, 421, 442.
Berlin, voting in, 147; growth of, 158
Berlin Conference, 376, 391.
Bernhardi, General von, 438.
Bessarabia, 337, 338, 522.
Bethmann-Hollweg, von, 446.
Bhutan, 379.
Bible, 70, 72, 88.
Bieberstein, von, 407, 408.
Birth Rate, in France, 231; decline of, 231; in Italy, 348, 431; in European countries, 430, 431.
Biscay, Bay of, 12.
Bismarck, Count Otto von, 32; speech of, 94; enters the Prussian ministry, 126; plans to obtain Schleswig and Holstein, 128, 129; diplomacy of before the Austro-Prussian War, 129; opposes Napoleon III, 132; diplomacy of before the Franco-German War, 132-4; in the Franco-German War, 138; fiscal policy of, 155; contest of with the Roman Catholics, 159, 160; with the socialists, 161, 162; institutes state socialism in the German Empire, 162, 163; on the position of the German Empire, 173; tasks of, 173, 174; diplomacy of, 175-87; at the Congress of Berlin, 178; great success of the foreign policy of, 184, 185; passes from power, 188; great achievements of, 188, 189; methods of, 189; failure of, 190; on another war with France, 234, 235; the passing of, 295; reveals intrigues of Napoleon III concerning Belgium, 359; encourages French colonial enterprise, 363; friend of Lassalle, 533.
Björkö, Secret Treaty of, 402.
"Black Hundreds," 300.
Black Sea, 11, 12, 14, 498.
Blanc, Louis, 77, 78, 79.
Blanqui, Adolphe, 40, 46.
Bloc, 219.
"Blood and Iron," 189.
"Board Schools," 248.
Boer War, 201, 377.
Boers, 376.
Bohemia, 306, 310, 507.
Bolsheviki, 22; hatred of for the bourgeoisie, 56; in the Great War, 482, 537; origin of, 540; ideas of, 540, 541; assisted by the Germans, 541; accept the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 542, 543; system of in Russia, 543, 544; regarded with suspicion in other countries, 544; at war with Poland, 544; defeat counter-revolutionary attempts, 544, 545; strength of, 545, 546.
Bolshevist Propaganda in Germany, 495.
Bordeaux, 461.
Borneo, 391.
Bosnia, acquired by Austria-Hungary, 178, 313, 315, 323, 324; annexed by Austria-Hungary, 324, 333, 405-8, 435; lost by Austria and Hungary, 510.
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 310.
Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis, 405-8.
Bosphorus, 12.
Boulanger, General, 224, 225.
Boulanger Affair, 235.
Bourbons, restoration of in France, 24; rule of in France, 104; family of, 917; rule of in Italy, 346; in Spain, 350.
Bourgeoisie, in the old Régime, 8; become an industrial aristocracy in the nineteenth century, 10; in France, 20, 105; in the French Revolution, 22; rise of, 55; predominance of after the Industrial Revolution, 55, 56; triumph of in France in 1848, 78; Marx and Engels on, 81; in Russia, 110; suppress the *Commune* in Paris, 214; overthrow of desired by the *Bolsheviks*, 541, 543.

- Boxer Outbreak, 294.
 Boyen, 125.
 Brazil, slavery in, 25, 271; independence of, 353; held by the Dutch, 390.
 Branch of Contract, in Russia, 282.
 Brest-Litovsk, 469.
 Briey Basin, 153.
 British, defeated in Belgium, 460; help to defeat the Germans at the Marne, 461; help to defend the Channel Ports, 464; failure of at the Dardanelles, 470-72; keep control of the sea, 472-4; defeat the German fleet off Jutland, 473; in the Battle of the Somme, 476, 477; capture Vimy and Messines, 480; fail to break the German lines, 481; great defeat of in Picardy, 490; break the Hindenburg Line, 493, 494.
 British East Africa, 376.
 British Empire, formation of, 95; government of, 97, 98, 380-82; extent of, 371; growth of, 371-9; civil war in, 373; character of, 379, 380; greatness of, 379, 380; weakness of, 380; peoples of, 380; in 1920, 523.
 British Grand Fleet, 473, 474, 479.
 British Labor Committee, 251.
 British North America, 374.
 British People, sympathy of for France, 174; attitude of toward the German people, 174, 175.
 British South Africa Company, 370, 377.
 Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count von, 498.
 Brusilov, General, 477.
 Brussels, 460.
 Bryce, Viscount, 498.
 Budapest, 305.
 Buddhists, in the British Empire, 380.
 Buffon, 70.
 Building, 42.
 Bukowina, 310, 314.
 Bulgaria, relations of with Russia, 315; with the Teutonic Powers, 315; conquered by the Turks, 316; rebellion in against the Turks, 321; Turkish atrocities in, 323; freed from the Turks, 323, 324; complete independence of, 324; in the Balkan Wars, 327-31, 330; history of, 339, 341; joins the Teutonic Powers in the Great War, 470; surrenders to the Allies, 493; losses of, 517.
 "Bulgarian Atrocities," 339.
 Bulgarian Exarchate, 341.
 Bulgars, early history of, 339; origin of, 341; join the Teutonic Powers in the Great War, 470; help to conquer Servia, 470.
 Bülow, von, 143, 183.
Bundesrat, 145, 146.
 Bureaucracy in Russia, 300.
 Burma, 394.
 Butt, Isaac, 261.
 Byron, Lord, 13, 320.
 Cabet, Étienne, 79.
 Cabinet Government, 97, 144.
 Cables, Submarine, 11.
 "Cadets," 300.
 Calais, 464.
 Calvin, 89.
 Calvinists, 18, 28.
 Cambodia, 383.
 Cambrai, 476.
 Cambridge, 247.
 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 249.
 Canada, 380.
 Canada Government Act of 1840, 97.
 Canning, Stratford, 117.
 Canossa, 160.
 Canterbury Cathedral, 14.
 Cantons, Swiss, 360, 361.
 Cape Colony, 374, 376.
 Cape of Good Hope, 375.
 Capitalism, in the older industrial system, 47; in the Industrial Revolution, 49; abolition of desired by socialists, 81; syndicalist war against, 532.
 Caporetto, Battle of, 484.
 "Capping the Line," 297.
Carbonari, 114, 320.
 Carinthia, 310.
 Carlyle, Thomas, 193.
 Carniola, 310, 510.
 Carpathian Mountains, 12, 13, 15, 16; struggle for the passes of, 468.
 Carso Plateau, 483.
 Cartilage, 370, 451.
 Cartwright, Edmund, 46.
 Cartwright, John, 30.
 Caspian Sea, 11, 12.
 Castelar, Emilio, 311, 350.
 Catalonia, 35.
 Catherine II, Tsaritsa of Russia, 318.
 Catholic Emancipation, 258.
 Catholic Party in the German Empire, 160.
 Caucasus, 286, 287, 321, 522.
 Cavour, Count Camillo di, 114.
 Celebes, 391.

- Celtic Language, 37.
 Celtic People, 256, 257.
 Center Party, 160.
 Central Europe, in the first half of the nineteenth century, 105-7.
 Central Position of the Teutonic Powers in the Great War, 455, 456.
 Cervantes, 382.
 Ceylon, 357, 374.
 Chamber of Deputies, 312.
 Champagne, battle in, 475.
 Champlain, Samuel de, 384.
 Channel Ports, 464, 475, 490, 492.
 Charleroi, 460.
 Charles, Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 337.
 Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, 345.
 Charter, of France, 26, 31.
 Chartism, 78.
 Chartists, 76, 78.
 Château-Thierry, 491.
Chemin des Dames, 481, 491.
 Child Labor, 50, 51.
 Children in the Industrial Revolution, 50, 51.
 China, decay of, 293; territory of seized by other Powers, 293, 294; in ancient times, 370; German rights in, 515; Austrian rights in, 517.
 Chinese, in the British Empire, 380.
 Chinese-Japanese War, 293.
 Christ, teachings of, 439.
 Christianity, suppressed in France, 22; effects of upon the position of women, 62; communism in, 73, 74.
 Christians, treatment of in the Turkish Empire, 317.
 Church, lands of confiscated in France during the French Revolution, 21; measures against in France, 22; communism in, 73, 74; in the Middle Ages, 84, 226; during the Reformation, 226; in Lutheran countries, 226; in England, 226; in Catholic countries, 226.
 Church and State, in the German Empire, 158; in the Middle Ages, 226; in modern times, 226; in France, 226, 227; separation of in France, 227-30; in Italy, 345, 346; in Spain, 351; in Portugal, 354.
 Church of England, 90, 98.
 Church of Ireland, 99, 260.
 Cinema, 10.
 Cities, increase of size and power of after the Industrial Revolution, 60, 61; consequences of, 61, 62.
 Citizen Armies, in France, 138, 139.
 Civil Equality, 28.
 Civil War, American, 101.
 Classes, Struggle of, 81.
 Cleanliness, 43.
 Clemenceau, 481, 504, 511, 512.
 Clericalism, in France, 227.
 Coal, 41, 45, 153.
 Coalition, First, against France, 35.
 Cochin China, 383.
Code Napoléon, 23.
 Colonial Empire, of Great Britain, 97, 98, 371-82, 523; of Spain, 115; of France, 236, 237, 382-5; of Germany, 385-9.
 Colonial Populations, treatment of, 393, 394.
 Colonies, of Great Britain, 371-82; of France, 382-5; of the German Empire, 385-9; of Italy, 389, 390; of Spain, 390; of Portugal, 390; of Holland, 390, 391; of Belgium, 391, 392.
 Command of the Sea, in the Great War, 456, 472-4.
 Commercial Development, in the German Empire, 155.
 Communal Ownership of Land, in Russia, 272.
 Commune of Paris, 80, 83, 105, 211, 212-14, 279, 530, 534, 535.
 Communes, in the Middle Ages, 213; in modern France, 213.
 Communism, in earlier times, 73, 74; in the French Revolution, 74, 75; belief in advanced by the Industrial Revolution, 75, 76; in England, 76; in France, 76-8; development of by Marx and Engels, 79-81; doctrines of, 81-4.
 Communist League, 79.
Communist Manifesto, 56, 60, 79, 80, 81, 82, 529.
 Compulsory Military Service, in France, 124, 215, 233; in Prussia, 125-7; in Austria-Hungary, 307.
 Concordat of 1801, 23, 86, 226, 227, 229.
 Conference of London, 418.
 Congo Free State, 391, 392.
 Congress of Berlin, 178, 181, 265, 313, 319, 323, 324, 332, 333, 335, 339, 374.
 Congress of Paris (1856), 265, 336.
 Congress of Paris (1919), public interest in, 499; assembling of, 502, 503; procedure at, 503, 504; questions to be discussed at, 504-11; business of, 511, 512.
 Congress of Vienna, 24, 86, 102, 113, 360.

- Conservatives, 248.
 Constantinople, 12, 14; captured by the Turks, 116, 316; desired by Russia, 202; controlling position of, 428; question of, 511; left to the Turks, 518.
 Constitution of 1791 (France), 20, 30.
 Constitution of the Year I (France), 362.
 Constitution of the Year III (France), 22, 31.
 Constitution of the Year VIII (France), 23, 31.
 Constitution of 1812 (Spain), 26, 27.
 Constitution of 1814 (Norway), 33, 364.
 Constitution of 1831 (Belgium), 32, 359.
 Constitution of 1848 (Switzerland), 33, 362.
 Constitution of 1848 (Holland), 357.
 Constitution of 1849 (Denmark), 366.
 Constitution of 1850 (Prussia), 27.
 Constitution of 1863 (Sweden), 365.
 Constitution of 1875 (France), 217.
 Constitution of the United States, 30.
 "Constitutional Democrats," 300.
 Constitutional Progress in Europe, 25-7.
 Constitutions and Government, 220.
 Control of the Sea, in the Great War, 472-4.
 Convention of Gastein, 120.
 "Conversations" between Germany and France, 412.
 Copernicus, 68.
 Corn Laws, 57, 98, 152.
 Corrupt Practices Act, 241.
Cortes, in Spain, 351; in Portugal, 353.
 Cossacks, 270.
 Council of State, in Russia, 299; in Switzerland, 361.
 Council of Trent, 90.
 Council of the Vatican, 90.
 Counter-Reformation, 158.
 Counter-revolutionary Movements in Russia, 544, 545.
 Courland, 286.
 Covenant of the League of Nations, 512-13.
 Craeow, 468.
 Creation, 69, 70, 72.
 Crete, 335.
 Crimen, 545.
 Crimean War, 103, 111, 118, 318, 404.
 Crinoline, 7.
 Crises in Recent European history, 399, 400.
 Crispi, Francesco, 344.
 Croatia, 510.
 Croatia-Slavonia, 310, 313.
 Crompton, Samuel, 46.
 Crown Prince, of the German Empire, 492.
 Cuba, 390.
 Cyprus, 374.
 Cyrenaica, 390.
 Czecho-Slovak Troops, 508.
 Czecho-Slovakia, 515, 516, 521, 522.
 Czechs, 310, 311, 507, 508.
 Dahomey, 384.
 Dalmatia, 310, 313, 349, 510.
 Danes, 256.
 Danish War, 127-9.
 Danish West Indies, 366.
Dannerirkc, 128.
 Dante, 16, 68.
 Danton, 22.
 Danube River, 14, 428.
 Danubian Principalities, 321, 336, 337.
 Danzig, 48, 508, 514.
 Dardanelles, 12; attack upon, 470-2.
 Darwin, Charles, 71, 80, 81, 87.
De Natura Rerum, 70.
De Orbium Cælestium Revolutionibus, 68.
 Declaration of Independence, 30.
 Declaration of London, 409.
 Declaration of the Rights of Man (French), 17, 28.
 Degeneracy, 51.
 Delcassé, Théophile, 400, 403.
 "Delegations," 305.
 Democracy, in Europe, 9; ideas of in the French Revolution, 21; among the Greeks, 28; little idea of in the eighteenth century, 28; in ancient times, 28; in the :eighteenth century, 28; at the end of the eighteenth century, 29, 30; during the French Revolution, 30; advanced by the Industrial Revolution, 60, 61; slow progress of in the German Empire, 164-6; making the world safe for, 498, 499.
 "Democratic Control" of Industry, 251.
 Denikine, General, 544, 545.
 Denmark, suffrage in, 33; troubles of concerning Schleswig and Holstein, 127-9; in earlier times, 362, 363; in the nineteenth century, 365, 366.
Descent of Man, 71.
Deutsches Reich, 144.
Deutschland und der Nächste Krieg, 433.

- Diderot, 20, 228.
 Diplomatic Revolution of 1904-7, 201, 202.
 "Direct Action," 251.
Directory, 75.
Discourse Concerning Inequality among Men, 74.
 Dissenters, 31, 98.
Divina Commedia, 68.
 Divine Right, 9, 26, 147, 148, 151.
 Dobrudja, 337.
 Döllinger, 159.
 Domestic System of Manufacturing, 46, 47, 48.
 Donnersmarck, Count von, 402, 403.
Drang nach Osten, 194.
Dreadnaught, 203.
Dreikaiserbund, 175.
 Dreyfus Affair, 225, 226.
 "Dropping the Pilot," 188.
 Dual Alliance (France and Russia), 197; terms of, 210; formation of, 235, 236, 291; relations of Great Britain to, 266; position of, 398; weakened, 402.
 Dual Alliance (German Empire and Austria-Hungary), 179; treaties of, 182.
 Dual Control, of Egypt, 375.
 Dual Monarchy, founded, 108, 304, 305; career of, 305-15; parts of, 310-12; character of, 312; foreign policy of, 312-15; end of, 521.
 "Dualism," in Austria-Hungary, 305.
 Dublin, rebellion in, 263, 264; industrial disorders in, 533.
 Dulcigno, 332.
Duma, First Imperial, 299, 300; Second, 301; Third, 301, 539.
Dumas (Councils), 273, 282.
 Dunajec River, 468.
 Dunkirk, 464.
 Durazzo, 327, 333, 416, 417.
 Dutch, rise of, 354, 355.
 Dutch Colonial Administration, 357.
 Dutch Colonies, 390, 391.
 Dutch East India Company, 370.
 Dutch Guiana, 391.
 Earth, Age of, 71.
 East India Company, 372, 374.
 East Prussia, 145.
 Eastern Roman Empire, 316.
 Eastern Rumelia, 340.
 Ebert, President of the German Republic, 520.
 Ecclesiastics, Appointment of, 227.
 Education, spread of in the nineteenth century, 36; advanced by the Industrial Revolution, 60, 61; reform of in France, 221, 222; clerical influence upon in France, 227; partly controlled by religious orders, 228; partly controlled by the Church in Great Britain, 247; improvement of in Great Britain, 247, 248; lack of in Russia, 288; in Austria-Hungary, 306.
 Education Act of 1870, 247, 248.
 Edward VII, King of Great Britain and Ireland, 202, 401.
 Egypt, 370, 374; acquired by the British, 374, 375; condition of the people in, 394.
Einkreisung, 166, 205.
 Electoral Law, in Russia, 301.
 Electoral Reform, in the United Kingdom, 31, 32, 240, 241.
 Electoral Reform Law of 1832, 96; of 1867, 96, 101, 240; of 1884, 241; of 1918, 246.
 Electricity, 41.
 Elizabeth, Empress of Austria, 308.
 Emancipation of the Serfs in Russia, 270, 271, 272; results of, 272, 273.
 Emigration, from Ireland, 259; from Italy, 348.
 Empire of Austria, 310; *sec Austria*.
 Ems Dispatch, 188, 189.
 Engels, Friedrich, 79, 80.
 England, geographical position of, 13; nationality in, 34; increase of population in, 56; agriculture in, 57; changes caused by the Industrial Revolution in, 58; position of women in, 63; in earlier times, 94; united with Scotland, 95; foreign policy of, 95; the Church in, 226; conquered by the Danes, 369.
 English, The, build up a great empire, 371-9.
 English Channel, 13, 428.
 English Soldiers, in the Middle Ages, 95.
 English-speaking Peoples, civil wars among, 100; relations between, 100, 101; solidarity of, 524; duty of, 524.
An Englishman's Home, 203, 204.
 Entente, between Russia and France, 235.
Entente Cordiale, formation of, 202, 384, 399, 400, 401, 492; settlement of the Egyptian question by, 375; strengthened, 403.
 Epirus, 335.
Erin, 256.

- Estonia, 286.
États Généraux, 19.
 Eton, 247.
 Europe, importance of, 7; in the Old Régime, 7-9; conditions in in 1870, 7, 9, 10; geography of, 11-14; great plain of, 12; rivers of, 12; old buildings and remains in, 14, 15; historical associations of, 15, 16; conditions in before the French Revolution, 17-20; growth of the power of, 369-71; divided between great rival combinations, 399; great crises in, 309, 400, 401-19, 440-4; just before the Great War, 419.
 Evolution, 70-3.
 Exhaustion, of the combatants in the Great War, 489, 490.
 Fabian Society, 535, 536.
 Factory Legislation in Great Britain, 249.
 Falk Laws, 159.
 Falkland Islands, 373; battle near, 473.
 Fashoda, 237, 376, 384.
 Fashoda Dispute, 194.
Fathers and Sons, 279.
 Federal Assembly, Swiss, 361.
 Fenians, 99, 261.
 Ferdinand, Prince of Saxe-Coburg, 340.
 Feudal System, 34, 54.
 "Financial Mobilization," 415.
 Finland, acquired by Russia, 118, 285, 364; lost to Russia, 287, 522, 543; privileges withdrawn from, 298; constitution restored to, 299.
 First Balkan War, 315, 319; causes of, 326, 327; course of, 327-9; effects of, 416.
 Fiume, 428, 506.
 Flanders, 58, 481.
 Florence, 15, 345.
Flottenverein, 200, 201.
 Foch, General, afterwards Marshal, 462, 491, 493.
Folketing, 366.
 Foreign Affairs, Control of, 501.
 Forstner, Lieutenant von, 168.
 42-Centimeter Guns, 460.
 Fourier, 77, 78.
 "Fourteen Points," 500-2.
Francs-tireurs, 139.
 France, Greek and Roman remains in, 14; conditions in during the Old Régime, 10; constitutions of, 26; development of democracy in, 29, 30; franchise in, 30, 31; nationalism in, 34, 35; Industrial Revolution in, 53, 104; land in bought by the peasants, 75; growth of socialism in, 76-8, 104, 105; in 1870, 101-4, 134, 135; earlier history of, 102-4; relations of with Prussia, 103, 104; social progress in, 104, 105; national armies of in the French Revolution, 124; army of in 1870, 134, 135; in the Franco-German War, 136-9; accepts the Treaty of Frankfort, 139-41; downfall of in 1870, 210; disasters suffered by in 1870-1, 211; inherent greatness of, 211, 212; recovery of, 212; communard attempt in, 212-14; republic proclaimed in, 212, 215; republic established in, 215, 217; government of, 217-19; development of self-government in, 219, 220; reform of education in, 221, 222; higher education in, 222, 223; material progress in, 223; plottings of the Monarchists in, 224; domestic crises in, 224-6; Church and State in, 226, 227; separation of Church and State in, 227-30; national wealth in, 230; standard of living and birth rate in, 231-3; high civilization in, 233; foreign relations of, 233-7; becomes a partner in the Dual Alliance, 235; relations of with Great Britain, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 400, 401; interest in Egypt, 375; colonial empire of, 382-5; relations of with Germany, 400; assurance of strengthened, 410; does not yield to Germany in 1911, 412, 413; nearly overwhelmed by the Germans in 1914, 460, 461; German practices in, 485; in 1920, 519; syndicalism in, 532; socialism in, 534.
 Franchise, in France in 1791, 20; in the United States, 30; in France, 30, 31; in Great Britain, 30; extension of in central and southern Europe, 32, 33; in northern Europe, 33; extension of in the United Kingdom, 96; in Russia, 299, 301; in Austria, 310, 311; in Hungary, 312; in Italy, 345; in Spain, 356; in Holland, 357; in Belgium, 359, 360; in Norway, 364, 365; in Denmark, 366, 367.
 Franco-German War, causes of, 131-4;

INDEX

565

- course of, 134-9; results of, 139-41; immediate cause of, 350.
- Franco-Prussian War, *see Franco-German War.*
- Frankfort Parliament, 27, 107.
- Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 308, 314, 402, 440.
- Franz Josef, Emperor-King of Austria-Hungary, 308.
- Fraternity, 33, 34.
- Frederick III, German Emperor, 149.
- Frederick the Great, 189.
- Free Negroes, 271.
- "Freedom of the Seas," 501, 502, 504.
- Freeman, E. A., 193.
- French, The, in the Great War, await the German attack, 458, 459; defeated in Alsace and in Lorraine, 459; defeated in Belgium, 460; retreat of, 460, 461; defeat the Germans at the Marne, 461-3; drive the Germans back to the Aisne, 463; help to defend the Channel Ports, 464; failure of at the Dardanelles, 470-72; help to keep control of the seas, 473; fail in the Champagne, 475; defend Verdun, 475, 476; in the Battle of the Somme, 476, 477; fail to break the German line, 481; great defeat of at *Chemin des Dames*, 490, 491.
- French Army, increased, 419.
- French Cochin China, 383.
- French Colonial Empire, 382-5; extent of, 384, 385; character of, 385.
- French Congo, 384, 415.
- French Culture, in the eighteenth century, 19.
- French Guiana, 382.
- French Revolution, 17, 20-2; causes of, 19, 20; results of, 23-7; development of nationalism during, 35; retards the Industrial Revolution on the Continent, 53; affects the position of women only indirectly, 62, 63; affects the Church, 86; effects of in England, 96; slight effect of in Russia, 110; effects of in Spain, 115; agrarian consequences of in France, 231; women's movement in, 242.
- French Somaliland, 383.
- French Yellow Book about the Dual Alliance, 236.
- "Frightfulness," 486.
- Fulton, Robert, 42.
- "Fundamental Laws" in Russia, 300.
- Gaelic Language, 168.
- Gaelic League, 263.
- Galicia, 310, 311, 467, 468.
- Galileo, 16, 437.
- Gallipoli, 470-2.
- Garibaldi, 85, 114.
- Gas, used for illumination, 43.
- General Strike, in Russia, 298; in Belgium, 360.
- General Workingmen's Association, 533.
- Genesis*, 70.
- Geneva, 29, 308.
- Geographical Factors, a cause of the Great War, 427-30.
- Geology, 71.
- George II, King of Great Britain and of Ireland, 370.
- George III, King of Great Britain and of Ireland, 258, 370.
- George, Lloyd, 163, 249, 252, 253, 261, 264; on small nations, 344; at the Congress of Paris, 504, 512.
- German Army, in 1918, 137; increased, 419; at the beginning of the Great War, 451-4; limited, 515.
- German Colonial Empire, 385-9.
- German Colonies, question of, 505.
- German Commanders, 452, 453.
- German East Africa, 386.
- German Empire, increase of population in, 57, 59, 232; military strength of increased by the Industrial Revolution, 59; founding of, 141; the grand age of, 143-4; government of, 144-6; rulers of, 148-50; system of government in, 150-2; immense economic development in, 152-7; growth of population in, 157, 158; domestic problems in, 158-62; state socialism in, 162-4; slow progress of democracy in, 164-7; militarism in, 167, 168; treatment of subject races in, 168-71; position of after 1871, 173; alliance of with Austria-Hungary, 179; helps to make the Triple Alliance, 179-85; renews good relations with Russia, 185, 186; new generation rising in, 187; new policy takes shape in, 191, 192; relations of with Great Britain, 193, 198-207, 266, 491-3; with Turkey, 193, 194, 313; with Austria-Hungary, 197, 198, 313; maritime development of, 199; naval ambitions of, 200; naval expansion of, 200; naval program of accelerated, 203; policy of affected

- by changes in the Balkans, 206; education in, 222; higher education in, 222, 223; relations of with Russia, 292, 293; preëminence of in Europe, 398, 399; imposing position of in 1909-11, 408, 409; yields in the Morocco Crisis of 1911, 413-15; bitterness in against Great Britain, 416; opposed to disarmament, 427; promises support to Austria-Hungary, 442; negotiations of with Russia, 443; declares war on Russia, 444; on France, 444; violates the neutrality of Luxembourg and of Belgium, 445, 446; revolution in, 495; losses of by the Treaty of Versailles, 514, 515; end of, 519, 520; revolutions in, 520; socialism in, 533, 534; weakened by Bolshevism, 544.
- German High Seas Fleet, 473, 474; sinking of, 518.
- German Methods in the Great War, 485, 486.
- German Naval Laws, 431, 432.
- German Officers, 452.
- German People, expansion of east and southward, 193, 194.
- German Railway System, 454, 455.
- German Republic, 520.
- German Southwest Africa, 386.
- German System of Government, 150, 151, 165, 166; character of, 151, 152, 164, 166, 167.
- German Trade, 155, 156.
- Germanic Confederation, 106, 129, 131.
- Germans, military triumphs of, 122-41; military reputation of, 123, 134; conduct of in France in 1870-1, 139; in Russia, 286, 287; in Austria, 306, 310; rivalry of with the British in Africa, 387; disappointment of about colonial acquisitions, 386, 387; character and ambitions of, 436, 437; belief of in their racial superiority, 437; glorification of war by, 437, 438; arrogance and ambition of, 438; doctrines of, 439; advantages of in the Great War, 451-6; defeat the French in Alsace and in Lorraine, 459; invade Belgium, 459; advance into France, 460, 461; defeated at the Marne, 461-3; great success of, 463, 464; fail to take the Channel Ports, 464; defeat the Russians at Tannenberg, 467; defeat the Russians at the Dunajec, 468; invade Russia, 468, 469; conquer Serbia, 469, 470; defeated at Jutland, 473; fail at Ypres, 475; at Verdun, 475, 476; in the Battle of the Somme, 476, 477; check the Russians, 477, 478; submarine warfare of, 478-80; retreat of, 480; hold their lines, 481; help to defeat the Italians at Caporetto, 484; grand offensive of, 490, 491; fail to destroy the Allies, 491; overwhelmed by the Allies, 493, 494; surrender, 495; assist the *Bolsheviks*, 541.
- Germany, end of serfdom in, 25; unification of, 36; Industrial Revolution in, 54; in 1920, 520, 521.
- Gibraltar, 12, 373.
- Giovine Italia*, 114.
- Girondists, 74.
- Gladstone, W. E., 247, 261, 323, 369.
- Glasgow, 252.
- Gneisenau, 125.
- "God-fearing" Men, 29.
- Godwin, Mary, 242.
- Goidels, 256.
- Gold Coast, 372.
- Gorizia, 477.
- Gortchakov, 179.
- Government, in the eighteenth century, 8; in the nineteenth century, 9; in Europe before the French Revolution, 18.
- Government of National Defence (France), proclamation of, 210.
- "Governments," 273.
- Grand Army, 235.
- Gravelotte—St. Privat, 136.
- Great Britain, government in in the eighteenth century, 18, 19; constitution of, 25, 26; franchise in, 30; Industrial Revolution begins in, 44-6; course of in, 46-53; growth of socialism in, 76; formation of, 95; relations of with the United States, 100; attitude of toward the German Empire, 174; relations of with the Triple Alliance, 183; with the German Empire, 193, 198-207, 431-3; enters the *Entente Cordiale* with France, 202; makes agreement with Russia, 202; seeks a good understanding with the German Empire, 205-7, 432, 433; growth of population in, 232; attitude of in the Affair of 1875, 234; relations of with France, 236, 237, 400, 401; electoral reform in, 240, 241; women's suf-

- frage movement in, 241-6; position of women in, 242; reform of education in, 247, 248; social and economic reforms in, 248, 249; trade unions in, 249, 250; Labor Party in, 250, 251; power of Labor in, 251; distribution of wealth in, 252; ownership of land in, 252, 253; constitutional reform in, 253-6; relations of with Ireland, 256-65; foreign relations of, 265, 266; relations of with Russia, 293, 404; helps to preserve the Turkish Empire, 318; makes treaties about the neutrality of Belgium, 359; purchases controlling interest in the Suez Canal, 375; obtains sphere of influence in Persia, 379; rivalry of with Germany in Africa, 387; fear of the German Empire in, 410, 432; supports France in 1911, 413; dominant position of, 428, 429; naval construction in, 432; policy of concerning France, 433; desires to prevent the Great War, 443; wishes to stay out, 445; promises assistance to France, 445; declares war on the German Empire, 446; socialism in, 535-7; chance for Bolshevism being established in, 536.
- Great Famine, in Ireland, 99, 259.
- Great General Staff, German, 444, 445.
- Great Powers, note of concerning the *status quo* in European Turkey, 327; propose mediation in the First Balkan War, 328; seize spheres of influence in China, 378; in the Balkan Crisis of 1912-13, 416, 417.
- Great Russians, 284, 289.
- Great War, industrial power in, 59, 60; women of Great Britain in, 246; possibility of, 421, 422; general causes of 440-4; immediate causes of, 440-4; beginning of, 444-6; declarations of hostilities in, 450; destructiveness of, 451; opposing forces in, 451-7; German plan in, 457, 458; early French failures in, 459; Germans invade Belgium, 459, 460; Germans invade France, 461; Battle of the Marne, 461-3; struggle for the Channel Ports, 464; successes of the Russians, 467; Russians defeated in East Prussia, 467; fighting in the east, 467, 468; Russians defeated at the Dunajec, 468; their disastrous retreat, 468, 469; Serbia conquered, 469, 470; Gallipoli, 470-2; Allies keep control of the sea, 472-4; Battle of Jutland, 473; fighting on the west front, 474, 475; Verdun, 475, 476; Battle of the Somme, 476, 477; fighting on the Austro-Italian front, 477; Russian offensive, 477, 478; conquest of Rumania, 478; work of the German submarines, 478-80; failures of the Allies in 1917, 480, 481; Russia withdraws from the War, 482; Caporetto, 482, 484; havoc wrought by the submarines, 484; the United States joins the Allies, 484-8; the submarines checked, 488; general exhaustion, 489; great German offensive, 490, 491; Allied offensive, 492-4; Bulgaria surrenders, 493; Turkey surrenders, 493; Austria-Hungary collapses, 493, 494; Germany surrenders, 495; settlement following, 498-527; cost of to the Allies, 505; terrible consequences of, 524-7; cost of, 525; loss of life in, 525, 526; effects of in Russia, 538, 539.
- Great Western*, 42.
- Greece, renewed study of the Greek classics in, 36; becomes independent, 117; condition of in 1870, 118; in the Balkan Wars, 327-31, 335; history of, 334-6; in the Great War, 335, 336; after the War, 336; conditions in, 336; ancient, 370.
- Greek, study of, 36, 320.
- Greek Catholic Church, 84, 85, 284; in Servia, 334; in Greece, 336; in Rumania, 339; in Bulgaria, 341; among the South Slavs, 434.
- Greek Independence, War for, 313, 319, 320, 321.
- Greenland, 363, 366.
- Grey, Sir Edward, 207, 401, 441.
- Griffith, Arthur, 263.
- Grillparzer, Franz, 304.
- Guadeloupe, 382.
- Guesde, Jules, 535.
- Guilds, regulations of, 45; disappearance of in England, 46.
- Gustavus Adolphus, 363.
- Habeas Corpus*, 19.
- The Hague, peace conferences at, 426, 427.
- Hague Tribunal, 421, 442.

- Haig, Sir Douglas, 490.
 Haldane, Lord, 206, 207.
 Hamburg-America Steamship Company, 155.
 Hanotaux, 400.
 Hapsburg, House of, 304, 308.
 Hardenberg, 125.
 Hargreaves, James, 45.
 Garrison, Frederic, 122.
 Heating of Houses, 9, 41.
 Hébert, 87.
 Heine, 193.
 Helgoland, 374, 376, 472, 515.
 Helvetic Republic, 360.
 Henry IV, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 160.
 Henry IV, King of France, 502.
 Herzegovina, acquired by Austria-Hungary, 178, 313, 315, 323, 324; rebellion in, 321; annexed by Austria-Hungary, 324, 333, 405-8, 435, 436; lost by Austria and Hungary, 510.
Hetaireia Philike, 320.
 "High Court of Parliament," 254.
 Higher Criticism, 88.
 Hindenburg, von, 467, 468.
 Hindenburg Line, 493, 494.
Histoire Naturelle, 70.
 Holland, suffrage in, 32; in 1870, 118; decline of, 211; earlier history of, 354, 355; in the nineteenth century, 355-7; relations of with Great Britain, 356; with the German Empire, 356, 357; during the Great War, 357; colonial possessions of, 357, 390, 391; government of, 357.
 Holstein, 118, 127-9, 131, 366.
 Holy Roman Empire, 105, 113, 227.
 Holy Synod of Russia, 281, 288.
 Home Rule, 256.
 Home Rule Bill (1886), 261; (1893), 261; (1912), 261, 263.
 Honduras, 372.
 Hong Kong, 377.
 Horsley, Bishop, 28.
 Hours of Labor, regulated for women and children, 53; in the United Kingdom, 98.
 House of Commons, 96, 254, 255.
 House of Lords, 253-5, 261, 412.
 Hudson Bay, 373.
 Humanitarianism, 63.
 Hundred Years War, 123, 211, 451.
 Hungary, abolition of serfdom in, 25; Revolution of 1848 in, 27, 106; constitution proclaimed in, 27; suffrage in, 32, 33; peoples in, 108; becomes a part of the Dual Monarchy, 305; agricultural development in, 306, 307; parts of, 310; government of, 311, 312; conquered by the Turks, 316; abandoned by the Turks, 317; fate of, 517, 521.
 "Hunger Strike," 245.
 Huns, 16, 451.
 Hutton, James, 70.
 Huxley, T. H., 67, 72, 87.
 Hyndman, H. M., 535.
 Iceland, 363, 366.
Ikons, 85.
 Illiteracy, 11; in France, 222; in Germany, 222; in Russia, 283.
 Immaculate Conception, 89.
 Imperialism, 392, 393, 394.
 "In Flanders Fields," 450.
 Indemnity, paid by France to Germany, 141, 211, 214; to be paid by Germany, question of, 504, 505, 515.
 Independent Ireland, struggle for, 261, 265.
 Independent Labor Party, 250, 536.
 India, 374, 378, 381, 394.
 Indian Mutiny, 374.
 Industrial Disorders, in France, 411, 412; in Great Britain, 412.
 Industrial Growth, in the German Empire, 153, 154.
 Industrial Revolution, contributes to the development of nationalism, 36; earlier stages of, 44, 45; in Great Britain, 45-53; spreads eastward across Europe, 53, 54; effects of, 54-65; causes growth of communistic ideas, 75; in France, 104; in the German Empire, 154; effect of upon the position of women, 64, 242; in Russia, 291, 292; in Austria-Hungary, 306.
 Industrial Workers of the World, 532.
 Industrialism, in Belgium, 359.
 Industry, regulation of by the State, 49; unregulated, 50.
 Infallibility of the Popes, 90.
 Initiative, 362.
 Intellectual Changes in Modern Times, 67-91.
 International Association of the Congo, 391.
 International Engagements, weakening of, 409.
 International Working Men's Association, 80.

- Internationale, 80.
 Ionian Islands, 335.
 Ireland, condition of the people in, 18; nationalism in, 37; united with Great Britain, 95, 258; conditions in, 98, 99, 258, 259; relations of with Great Britain, 256-65; early history of, 256, 257; conquest of, 257; famine in, 259; improvement of conditions in, 259, 260; movement for Home Rule in, 261, 263; geographical relation of to Great Britain, 264; ravaged by the Danes, 362.
 Irish in the service of France, 124.
 Irish Convention, 264.
 Irish Language, study of, 263.
 Irish Literary Revival, 263.
 Irish Question, 256-65.
 Irish Republic, 264.
 Iron, 45, 153.
 Isabella II, Queen of Spain, 350.
 Istria, 310.
Italia Irredenta, 349, 474, 506.
 Italian Colonies, 389, 390.
 Italian Frontier, 506.
 Italian Provinces, lost by Austria, 308.
 Italian Somaliland, 389.
 Italians, in Austria-Hungary, 310; join the Allies in the Great War, 474; progress of, 477; defeated at Caporetto, 484; overwhelm the Austrians, 493, 494.
 Italy, disappearance of serfdom in, 25; suffrage in, 32; unification of, 36, 114, 344, 345; Industrial Revolution in, 54; in earlier times, 112, 113; in the first half of the nineteenth century, 113, 114; makes an alliance with Prussia, 129; becomes a member of the Triple Alliance, 179-82; relations of with France, 180, 181, 197; ambitions of in Tunisia, 181; weak frontier of, 181; less attached to the Triple Alliance, 182, 184; makes a "reinsurance treaty" with France, 184; relation of with other members of the Triple Alliance, 197; seizes Tripoli, 324, 325; government of, 345; Church and State in, 345, 346; domestic history of, 346-8; nationalism in, 348, 349; foreign relations of, 349, 350; relations of with Austria-Hungary, 349; enters the Great War, 350, 474; refuses to join in attack on Servia in 1913, 418; in 1920, 519.
 Jacobins, 23, 74.
 Jamaica, 372.
 Janina, 319, 327, 328.
 Janissaries, 316, 317.
 Japan, progress of, 293; fears Russia, 294; at war with Russia, 294-7; triumph of, 297, 298; increase of population in, 348; commanding position of in the Far East, 428; in 1920, 523.
 Jaurès, Jean, 535.
 Java, 391.
 Jena, 124.
 Jesuits, 159.
 Jesus, 73, 74.
 Jewish Pale, 288.
 Jews, in Russia, 286, 288.
 Joffre, 461.
 Judicial System in Russia, reformed, 273.
 Jugo-Slavs, in Austria-Hungary, 306; aims of conflict with Italy's desires, 506; question of, 510, 511; in 1920, 519, 522; *see South Slavs*.
 Junkers, 145, 146, 152, 520.
 Jury, Trial by, introduced into Russia, 273.
 Justices of the Peace, 273.
 Jutland, Battle of, 473.
 Kaiser, of the German Empire, 145, 148.
 Kamerun, 386.
 Kapital, Das, 80.
 Kara George, 322, 333.
 Karageorgevich, House of, 333.
 Kay, John, 45.
 Kepler, 69.
 Kerensky, 540, 542.
 Kiao-chau, 294, 472.
 Kiel Canal, 366, 472, 515.
 Kiev, 541, 544.
 Kingdom of Hungary, 310; *see Hungary*.
 Kingdom of Italy, 32, 112, 114, 245; *see Italy*.
 Kipling, Rudyard, 369.
 Kirk-Kilisse, 328.
 Kitchener, General, 376.
 Kluck, General von, 461.
 Kolchak, Admiral, 544, 545.
 Königgrätz, Battle of, 130.
 Korea, 294, 297.
 Kuwait, 195.
Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, 427.
 Kulturkampf, 159, 170.
 Kumanovo, 327.

- Labor Disputes in Great Britain, 251.
 Labor in Great Britain during the Great War, 251.
 Labor Laws in the United Kingdom, 98.
 Labor Party in Great Britain, 250, 251.
Laissez-faire, doctrine of, 49, 50; partly abandoned, 52, 53; abandoned in the German Empire, 155.
 Lamps, 44.
 Land, in France, divided among small proprietors, 21, 231; in Russia, 231; ownership of in Great Britain, 252, 253; ownership of in Ireland, 257, 260; in Italy, 347; in Norway, 364; in Russia in 1920, 516.
 Land Captains, 282.
 Land Laws, affecting Ireland, 260, 334.
 Land Purchase Acts (Ireland), 334.
 Landlords, English, in Ireland, 257.
Landsturm, 125.
Landtag of Prussia, 126.
Landwehr, 125.
 Language of Command, in the army of Austria-Hungary, 307.
 Laon, 476, 481, 493.
 Laplace, 71.
 Lapps, 285.
 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 530, 533.
 Law of Associations, 228.
 Law of Papal Guarantees, 315.
 "League of Nations," 502, 512-14.
 Legitimists in France, 217.
 Leisure, 64, 65.
 Lenine, Nicolai, 504, 537, 542, 543, 544, 545.
 Lens, 514.
 Leopold II, King of the Belgians, 391, 392.
 Leopold, Prince, of Hohenzollern, 133.
 Lepanto, 116, 316.
 Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 374, 375.
 Levellers, 74.
 Liao-tung Peninsula, 294, 296, 297.
 Liao-yang, 296.
Liber Chiesa in Stato Libero, 345.
 Liberal Party, advocates Home Rule for Ireland, 261.
 Liberals in Great Britain, 248.
 Liberia, 371, 515.
Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, 27.
 Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 533.
 Liège, 459, 460.
 "Light Year," 69.
 Lighting, Artificial, 41, 43, 44.
 Liliencron, song of, 122.
 Limitation of Armaments, opposed by the German Empire, 206.
 Liquid Fire, 482.
 Lithuania, 276, 285.
 Little Russians, in Austria-Hungary, 310, 311.
 Liverpool, 13, 412, 533.
 Livingstone, 391.
 Livonia, 286.
 Local Government, reformed in Russia, 112, 273; in France, 215, 221; in England, 220, 221.
 Lombardy, 114.
 London Protocol, 128.
 Lorraine, 136.
 "Lost Provinces," 431.
 Louis XIV, King of France, 95, 124, 211, 354, 424, 506.
 Louis XV, King of France, 506.
 Louis XVI, King of France, 20, 23, 290.
 Louis Napoleon, 26.
 Louvain, 485.
 Lowe, Robert, 247.
 Lower Austria, 310.
 Lucretius, 70.
 Lüderitz, 386.
 Little-Burgas, 328.
Lusitania, 479.
 Luther, 80, 90.
 Lutheran Church, 90, 226, 363.
 Luxemburg, 118, 132, 416.
 Lvov, Prince, 540, 542.
 Lyell, Sir Charles, 71, 87.
 Macaulay, on the suffrage, 31.
 Macedonia, 325, 326, 340.
 Machinery, Labor-saving, 44.
 Machines, 45-8.
 Mackensen, von, 468.
 MacMahon, 136, 217.
 McCrae, Lieut.-Col. John, 450.
 Madagascar, 236, 384.
 Magyars, 37, 108, 109, 116, 306, 310.
 Malays in the British Empire, 380.
 Malta, 374.
 Manchuria, 294, 297, 298.
 Manhood Suffrage, in France, 21, 30, 31; obstacles to, 30, 31; in Spain, 32; in Austria, 32; in the United States, 33; in Norway, 365.
Manifeste des Égaux, 75.
Manifesto of the Communist Party, 56, 60, 79, 80, 82, 529.
 Manoel II, King of Portugal, 353.
 Manorial Obligations, abolished in France, 21, 23; abolished in Russia, 112; in Rumania, 338.

- Manorial Rights, in France, 19.
Manufacturing before the Industrial Revolution, 9.
Marat, 22.
March Laws, 33.
Marchand, Major, 384.
Maréchal, Sylvain, 75.
Maria Christina, Queen Mother, rules Spain, 350.
Marne, Battle of the, 134, 461-3; Second Battle of the, 491.
Marseillaise, 169.
Martinique, 382.
Marx, Karl, 10; on the *bourgeoisie*, 56; on Capital and Labor, 67; career of, 79-81; doctrines of, 81-4; influence of, 529, 530; opposed to anarchism, 531; in England, 535.
Matches, Friction, 44.
Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, 308.
Mazurian Lakes, 467.
Mazzini, 114.
Mechanical Invention, in the nineteenth century, 10.
Mediterranean Sea, 12, 14; agreement concerning, 183, 267; trade-route through, 196; Turkish power in, 316; controlled by the British, 375, 429; havoc wrought by submarines in, 484.
Mehemet Ali, 320, 321.
Mensherikî, 540.
Mercenaries, 123, 124; Swiss, 360.
Merchant Ships, sunk by submarines, 479.
Mesopotamia, 435.
Messines Ridge, 480.
Metternich, Prince, 24, 25, 106, 320, 335.
Metz, 136, 137, 138, 493.
Mexico, 308, 383.
Middle Europe, 435, 436.
Militarism, in Prussia, 167, 168; growth of in Europe, 190; in Europe, 424-6; in antiquity, 424; in the German Empire, 438.
Military Convention between Russia and France, 235.
Military Law of Boyen (1813), 125, 424.
Military Power Altered by the Industrial Revolution, 59, 60.
Military Strategy, 127.
Miliukov, Professor, 300, 540, 542.
Mill, J. S., 63, 231, 243.
Milton, John, 17, 68, 240.
"Ministries" in Austria-Hungary, 305.
Ministry, in the United Kingdom, 97; in Prussia, 97; in France, 97, 104.
Mir, 272, 301.
Mischoz, 332.
Mitrailleur, 134.
Mitteleuropa, 195, 196.
Mobilization, 444.
Mohammedans in the British Empire, 380.
Moldavia, *see Danubian Principalities*.
Moltke, Helmuth von, 126, 127, 128, 130, 133, 195, 136; on peace and war, 438.
Monarchy, relics of cherished in Great Britain, 224; restoration of desired in France, 224.
Monasteries, suppression of in Poland, 276.
Mongols, 316.
Monroe Doctrine, 434.
Mons, 460.
Montalembert, 17.
Montdidier, 492.
Montenegro, declares war on Turkey, 327; in the Balkan Wars, 327-31; history of, 332; conditions in, 332; in the Balkan Crisis of 1912-13, 417; expected to join a South Slavic federation, 510.
Monte Santo, 483-4.
Montesquieu, 20, 74, 117.
Moravia, 310, 507.
More, Sir Thomas, 74.
Morocco, acquired by France, 384, 415; penetration of by the French, 411; German rights in, 515; rights of Austria in, 517.
Morocco Crisis of 1905, 402, 403.
Morocco Crisis of 1911, 411-16.
Morris, William, 535.
Moscow, 15, 235, 292, 542.
Mountains of Europe, 13.
Mozambique, 390.
Mukden, Battle of, 296, 402.
Municipal Government in the German Empire, 151, 152.
Namur, 458, 459.
Napoleon, 14, 21; rise of, 22; work of, 23; hostility to, 24; wars of, 24, 35, 36, 95, 213; French Revolution saved by, 24; on aristocracy, 55; relations of with the Church, 85-7, 227; power of, 102; rearranges central Europe, 105; invasion of Russia by, 235.
Napoleon III, Emperor of France,

INDEX

- 26, 94; foreign policy of, 103, 104; waning popularity of the government of, 131; diplomacy of before the Franco-German War, 131-3; in the war, 136, 137; maintains the temporal power of the Pope, 180, 181, 345; leader in the Crimean War, 235; assists the Rumanians to unite the Danubian Principalities, 337; assists the Italians, 344; intrigues concerning Belgium, 359. Napoleonic Empire, 102.
- Natal, 376.
- Nation, original meaning of the word, 34.
- National Armies, 124, 125.
- National Assembly, in France (1789), 20; of Russia, 299.
- National Convention (France, 1792), 21.
- National Council (Swiss), 361.
- National Debt of France, 223, 525.
- National Debts, 524, 525.
- National Guard in Paris, 212.
- National Insurance Act, 249.
- "National Notables," 31.
- National Wealth, of the principal European countries, 156, 157; of France, 230.
- National Workshops, 77, 78.
- Nationalism, in the eighteenth century, 8; in the nineteenth century, 9; in France during the French Revolution, 22; development of, 34-7; disintegrating effects of, 37; in Central Europe, 106; among the Poles of the German Empire, 170; strength of in Russia, 289; in the German Empire, 289; in Italy, 348; in Holland, 356.
- Nationality, 34-7.
- "Natural Laws," 50.
- "Naval Holiday," 206.
- Naval Laws (German), 200, 201, 400.
- Naval Panic of 1909, 203, 204.
- Naval Power, reliance of Great Britain on, 199, 200; development of in the German Empire, 200, 201.
- Navarino, 321.
- Near East, 324.
- Nebular Hypothesis, 71.
- Needle Gun, 130.
- Negroes in the British Empire, 380.
- Nekrasov, 269.
- Nepal, 379.
- Neptune*, 69.
- Netherlands, in earlier times, 354, 355; revolt of, 354, 358.
- Netherlands, Austrian, 355, 358; Dutch, 355; Spanish, 355.
- Neubreisach, 458.
- Neutrality of Belgium and of Luxembourg violated by the German Empire, 446.
- Neutralization of Belgium, 359; of Switzerland, 360; of Norway, 365.
- Neuve Chapelle, 475.
- New Brunswick, 373.
- New England, 29.
- New Guinea, 391.
- New Lanark, 76.
- New South Wales, 373.
- New Zealand, 380.
- Newcomen, Thomas, 42.
- Newfoundland, 372.
- Newspapers, in the eighteenth century, 9; in the nineteenth century, 11.
- Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia, 24, 111.
- Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, 269; character and policy of, 290-1; reign of, 290-302; urges disarmament, 426; works for world peace, 502; abdication of, 539; murder of, 544.
- Nihilists, 279, 283.
- "No Annexations and No Indemnities," 504, 541.
- Nobles, in the eighteenth century, 8; in the nineteenth century, 9; emancipation of serfs by in Russia, 270.
- Non Expedit*, 346.
- Non Licet*, 346.
- Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 398.
- Normandy, 363.
- Normans, 15, 256.
- North German Confederation, 27, 32, 96, 107, 131, 134-6.
- North German Lloyd Steamship Company, 155.
- North Sea, 13, 354, 428.
- Norway, 118, 362, 363, 364, 365.
- Nova Scotia, 373.
- Novi-Bazar, Sanjak of, 334.
- Obrenovich, Milosh, 332.
- Obrenovich Family, 333.
- October Manifesto*, 299, 300.
- "Octobrists," 300.
- Officers, in war, 452.
- Oil, used for lighting, 44.
- Old Age Insurance Laws, 163.
- Old Age Pension Act, 249.
- Old Catholics, 159.
- Old Colonial System, 393.

- Old Régime, 41.
 Ollivier, Émile, 165.
 Omdurman, 376.
 Ontario, 373.
 "Open Covenants," 501.
 Opium Traffic, 377, 378.
 "Opium War," 377.
 Orange Free State, 376.
 "Organic Laws," 217.
Organisation du Travail, 77.
Origin of Species, 71.
 Orlando, 504.
 Orleans, House of, 217.
 Orleans Monarchy, 382.
 Orthodox Church, 84, 85, 284, 285, 288, 289.
 Osman Pasha, 323.
 Ottoman Empire, in earlier times, 116, 117; in the first half of the nineteenth century, 117, 118; decay of, 314; decline of, 316, 317; government of, 317.
 Owen, Robert, 76, 78, 79, 535.
 Oxford, 247.
- Pæstum, 15.
 Pan-Germanism, 289.
 Pan-Slavism, 289, 419.
 Panama, 10, 375.
 Pankhurst, Emmeline, 245.
 Papacy, 227.
 Papal Infallibility, 67, 90, 159.
 Papal States, 85.
Paradise Lost, 68.
 Paris, siege of, 138; surrender of, 139; in 1871, 212, 213; socialist commune in, 212-14; industrial disorders in, 533.
 Parliament of Great Britain, 19, 32, 256.
 Parliament, Independent, in Ireland, 258.
 Parliament Act of 1911, 253, 255, 261.
 Parliamentary Representation in Great Britain, 241.
 Parnell, C. S., 261.
 Partitions of Poland, 276.
 Patriotism, 393.
 Peace Conferences, 426, 427.
 Peace of Paris, 373.
 Peasant Proprietors in France, 23.
 Peasants, in France, condition of bettered, 22; purchase land in France, 75, 231; in Russia, condition of, 111, 272, 273, 291; become landowners in Russia, 231; condition of in Ireland, 258, 259; acquire ownership of land in Ireland, 260; condition of in Poland, 278; ownership of land by in Serbia, 334.
 People, Lower Class of, condition of in the Old Régime, 8, 17.
 Péronne, 476, 477.
 Persia, 370, 378, 379, 405.
 Petrograd, 538, 539.
 Philip II, King of Spain, 358.
 Philippine Islands, 390.
 Piedmont, suffrage in, 32; leader of the Italian people, 114.
 Piraeus, 335.
 Pitt, William, the Younger, 258.
 Pius VII, Pope, 226.
 Pius IX, Pope, 89, 345, 346.
 Plagues, 43.
 Plato, 73.
 Plehve, von, 283, 290, 298.
 Plevna, 323.
 Pobiedonostsev, 269, 281, 282, 290, 299.
 Poison Gases, 427.
 Poland, partitions of, 110; rebellion of 1863 in, 274; desire for independence in, 276; complete subjection of, 276; conditions in, 278; former greatness of, 285; strategical position of in Russia, 287; attempted Russification of, 288; tributary to the Turks, 316; leading Slavic state, 433; battles in, 468, 469; German methods in, 485; question of, 508; in 1920, 521, 522; lost to Russia, 543; at war with the *Bolsheviks*, 544.
 Poles, in the German Empire, 170, 171; of Russia, 286; disturbances among, 298; concessions to, 299; in Austria-Hungary, 310, 311.
 "Polish Corridor," 514.
 Polish Language, 170.
 Polish Nationalism, 170.
 Polish Rebellion of 1863, 179.
 Popes, 85, 180, 181.
 Population, increase of in Europe, 56; in Great Britain, 56, 57, 430; in the German Empire, 57, 58, 157, 158, 430; decline of in Ireland, 99, 430; growth of in the principal European countries, 157; increase of in Italy, 348; in Japan, 348; room for growth of, 429, 430; growth of in France, 430.
 Port Arthur, 294, 296, 297.
 Portugal, palaces of, 14; history of in the nineteenth century, 352-4; controls the sea-routes to the east, 372; colonies of, 390.
 Portuguese Colonies, alleged secret agreement about, 353, 387, 388.

- Portuguese East Africa, 387, 390.
 Portuguese Republic, 353, 354.
 Posen, 170, 284, 287, 514.
 Potsdam Accord, 409, 412.
 Poverty in Great Britain, 252.
 Prince Edward Island, 373.
Principles of Geology, 71.
 Printing-press, Power, 11.
 "Prisoners of the Vatican," 346.
 Production, increased, 11.
 Profit-sharing, 76.
 Proletariat, 81, 82.
 Protective Tariffs, in the German Empire, 154, 155; in Austria-Hungary, 307.
 Protestant Churches, 90; in the nineteenth century, 91.
 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph, 279, 280, 530, 531.
 Prussia, education in, 11; reforms in, 25; abolition of serfdom in, 25; Revolution of 1848 in, 27, 106; constitution granted in, 27; nationalism in, 36; leader of the German states, 107; military triumphs of, 122-41; foundation of the greatness of, 124; development of the army of, 124-6; at war with Denmark, 127-9; with Austria, 129-31; with France, 131-41; makes alliance with Italy, 129; army of in the Austro-Prussian War, 131; army of in the Franco-German War, 135, 136; government in, 167; friendship of with Russia, 178, 179; beginning of, 193, 433; development of the army of, 424, 425.
 Prussian Army, development of, 424, 425.
 Prussian Guard, 462.
 "Public Schools," 247.
Punch, 188.
 Puritan Revolution, 242.
 Pyrenees Mountains, 12, 13.
 Quakers, 242.
Quanta Cura, 89.
 Quebec, 373.
Qu'est-ce que la Propriété?, 530.
 Racial Differences in European Countries, 284.
 Racial Superiority, belief in, 437.
 Racial Unity, desire for, 283, 284.
 Radicalism, in France, 104, 105; in Russia, 278, 279.
 Railroads, 11, 41, 291, 454.
 Reason, Worship of in France, 22, 86.
 "Red Sunday," 299.
 Redistribution Act of 1885, 241.
 Redmond, John, 261.
 Referendum, 362.
Reflections of Pobiedonostsev, 281.
 Reformation, 62, 158.
Reichsland, 145, 169.
Reichsrath, 310, 311.
Reichstag, 145.
 Reign of Terror, 22, 24, 86.
 "Reinsurance Treaty," 186, 192.
 Religion, troubled by the doctrine of evolution, 72, 73; in France, 227, 228, 230.
 Religious Belief, in the eighteenth century, 8; conflict of with scientific thought, 10.
 Religious Liberty in the Turkish Empire, 317.
 Religious Orders in France, 228.
Report of the British Labor Committee, 251.
 Representation of Industries and Groups, 246, 247.
 Representative Government, origin and development of, 29.
 Republic, established in France, 21; becomes militant, 24; in England, 28; second, established in France, 103, 219, 220; third, 212; in Spain, 350; in Portugal, 353, 354.
Republic of Plato, 73.
 "Revenge for Sadowa," 132.
 Reventlow, Count Ernst zu, 240.
 Revolution of 1830, 24.
 Revolution of 1848, 25, 77, 106, 109, 301.
 Revolution of 1905 in Russia, 298-300.
 Revolution of 1917 in Russia, 231; beginning of, 539; first stage of, 540; second stage of, 542-6; results of, 546.
 Revolutionary War, 100.
 Rheims, 15, 486, 491.
 Rhodes, Cecil, 377.
Rigsdag, 366.
Risorgimento, 114.
Rivet Law, 215.
 Robespierre, 22, 74, 545.
 Roman Catholic Church, in the nineteenth century, 85-90; in the German Empire, 159, 170; in France, 226-30; in Poland, 286; in Italy, 345, 346.
 Roman Catholics, religious disabilities removed from, 31, 98; in Ireland, 99; in the German Empire, 159, 160.

- Roman Empire, 34, 62, 232, 370, 371.
 Romanovs, Dynasty of, end of, 539.
 Rome, 114, 115, 344, 345, 370.
 Roon, von, 126.
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 297.
 Rousseau, 8, 20, 28, 29, 49, 74, 80.
 Rudolph, Archduke, of Austria, 308.
 Rigby, 247.
 Rumania, wins autonomy, 117; conditions in in 1870, 118; attached to the Triple Alliance, 184, 314; enters the Second Balkan War, 331, 337; history of, 336-8; domestic affairs of, 338, 339; enters the Great War, 478; conquered, 478; in 1920, 521.
 Rumanians, union of assisted by Napoleon III, 103; in Hungary, 306; in Austria-Hungary, 310, 314. Rumelia, 319.
 Rural Life, predominance of before the Industrial Revolution, 60.
 Russia, little affected by the French Revolution, 25; nationalism in, 36; Industrial Revolution in, 54, 291, 292; religion of, 84, 85; earlier history of, 109, 110; in the nineteenth century, 110, 111; government of, 111, 112; reforms in, 112; rivalry of with Austria-Hungary, 175, 176, 178; friendship of with Prussia, 179; new agreement of with the Central Powers, 185, 186; secret treaty of with the German Empire, 186; attitude of in the Affair of 1875, 234; makes the Dual Alliance with France, 235; relations of with Great Britain, 265, 404; under Alexander II, 269-281; abolition of serfdom in, 270-4; reform of the judicial system in, 273; reform of local government in, 273, 274; discontent in, 274; crushes the Polish rebellion, 276; increase of discontent in, 278; nihilism in, 279; anarchists in, 279, 280; activities of radicals in, 280, 281; under Alexander III, 281-90; reaction in, 282, 283; policy of Russification in, 283, 284, 287, 288, 289; peoples in, 284-7; unification of peoples in desired, 287; extreme nationalism in, 289; corruption and inefficiency of the government in, 289, 290; under Nicholas II, 290-302; foreign relations of, 292-4; at war with Japan, 294-8; accepts the Treaty of Portsmouth, 297, 298; discontent in, 298; revolution in, 298-300; reaction in, 299-301; before the Great War, 302; foreign policy of, 302; relations of with Austria-Hungary, 313; thwarted at the Congress of Berlin, 313; southern part of conquered by the Turks, 316; expansion of at the expense of the Turks, 318; assists the Greeks to win independence, 321; makes war on Turkey, 323; obtains a sphere of influence in Persia, 379; in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis, 406-8; recovers strength, 410; in the Balkan Crisis of 1912-13, 416, 417; outlets of, 428; leader of the Slavs, 433; negotiations of with Germany, 443; collapse of in the Great War, 481, 482; losses of, 521, 522; socialism in, 537-46; effects of the Great War in, 538, 539; under the *Bolsheviks*, 542-6; accepts the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, 542, 543. Russian Empire, end of, 521, 522. Russian Revolution of 1905, 298-300; failure of, 301. Russian Revolution of 1917, 231, 482, 522; cause of, 539-46; results of, 546. Russians, defeat the Austrians, 407; overrun Galicia, 467; defeated at Tannenberg, 467; capture Przemysl, 468; strive to win the Carpathian passes, 468; defeated disastrously at the Dunajec, 468; retreat of, 468, 469; last offensive of, 477; withdraw from the War, 481, 482; endurance of, 482. Russification of Poland, attempted, 278; policy of, 283, 284, 287-90. Russo-Japanese War, lessons of, 202, 203; course of, 294-8; consequences of in Europe, 402, 404; in Asia, 434. Russo-Turkish War, 178, 265, 313, 323, 339, 404. Ruthenians, in Austria-Hungary, 310, 311. Saar Basin, 514. Sabotage, 412, 533. Sagasta, 351. Sahara, 383, 384. St. Mihiel, 493. St. Petersburg, 292, 299. St. Quentin, 476, 490. Saint-Simon, 10, 76, 77. Sakhalin, 297. Salisbury, Lord, 193, 400.

- Salonica, 198, 312; captured by the Greeks, 327, 335; occupied by the Allies, 336, 472, 493.
- Salzburg, 15, 310.
- Samoan Islands, 386.
- Sarajevo, 308, 315, 440.
- Sardinia, Kingdom of, 114, 344.
- Scandinavian Countries, in 1870, 118; earlier history of, 362, 363; in the nineteenth century, 363-6.
- Scharnhorst, 125.
- Schiller, 450.
- Schleswig, 118, 127-9, 131, 284, 306.
- Schleswig-Holstein, question of, 127, 128; war about, 128, 129.
- Schnæbelé Affair, 234, 235.
- Science, conflict of with religion, 87, 88, 91.
- Scientific Progress, 10, 87, 88.
- Scotland, 58, 95.
- "Scrap of Paper," 189, 409, 446.
- Scutari, 327, 328, 329, 417.
- Second Balkan War, 315, 329, 331.
- Second Empire (French), 96, 103, 383.
- Second Hague Conference, 206, 427.
- Secret German Report, alleged, on German expansion, 398.
- Sedan, 137.
- Self-government, progress of in Europe, 20-4, 25-33; advanced by the Industrial Revolution, 60, 61; development of in France, 219, 220; in the British Empire, 381.
- Senate of the United States, 256, 518.
- Serbs, in Austria-Hungary, 310; help to defeat the Bulgars, 493.
- "Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," State of, 516, 521, 522.
- Serfdom, 8, 17, 18, 19; abolished in France, 20, 23, 271; disappearance of in the various countries of Europe, 25; abolition of in Russia, 112, 270, 271; disappearance of in England, 271; results of the abolition of in Russia, 272, 273; end of in Europe, 271; end of in Rumania, 338.
- Sergei, Grand Duke, 298.
- Servia, relations of with Austria-Hungary, 315; with Russia, 315; beginning of the struggle for the independence of, 319; in the Balkan Wars, 327-31, 333, 334; history of, 332, 333; foreign relations of, 333, 334; in the Great War, 334; after the War, 334, 510; conditions in, 334; in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis, 407, 408; strives for an out- let on the Adriatic, 416; appeals to Russia for support, 441; accused of complicity in the crime of Sarajevo, 440; largely yields to the Austrian demands, 442; conquered by the Teutonic Powers, 469, 470; German methods in, 485.
- Seven Years War, 373, 382.
- Shantung, 515.
- Shaw, G. B., 536.
- Shelley, 304.
- "Shining Armor," 408.
- Siam, 515, 517.
- Siberia, 280, 293, 298.
- Sickness Insurance Law, 163.
- Sinn Fein*, 37, 263, 264, 265.
- Skupshtina, 334.
- Slavery, in the United States, 25, 271; in Brazil, 25, 271.
- Slavonia, 510.
- Slavs, in Austria-Hungary, 306; in Greece in the Middle Ages, 336; rivalry of with the Teutons, 433-6; position of in 1920, 522.
- Slivnitsa, 333, 340.
- Slovaks, 311, 507.
- Slovenes, 310.
- Smith, Adam, 49.
- Sobranje, 341.
- Social Democratic Federation, 535.
- Social Democratic Party (German Empire), 166.
- Social Democratic Party (Russia), 292, 533, 534, 540.
- "Social Workshops," 77.
- Socialism, 10; origin of, 73; development of, 73-81; doctrines of, 81-4; effects of upon the Church, 87; condemned by the Roman Catholic Church, 89; in France, 104, 105; growth of in the German Empire, 161, 162; repression of, 162; in Great Britain, 251; in Russia, 292; spread of, 529, 530; discontent with the progress of, 531; spread of in the German Empire, 533, 534; in Austria-Hungary, 534; in France, 534, 535; in Great Britain, 535-7; in Russia, 537-46.
- Socialist, origin of the term, 76.
- Socialist Party in the German Empire, 163.
- Socialist Revolutionary Party, 292.
- Soissons, 492.
- Somme, Battle of the, 476, 477.
- Sonderbund, 119, 361.
- Sorel, Georges, 529.
- South Africa, 357, 380.

- South Slavs, 310, 314, 433, 434.
Soviet Government, decrees of, 529.
Soviets, 542, 543.
Spain, disappearance of serfdom in, 25; constitution proclaimed in, 26, 27; suffrage in, 32; nationalism in, 34-6; Industrial Revolution in, 54; rules part of Italy, 113; in earlier times, 115; in 1870, 116; throne of vacant, 133; relations of with the Triple Alliance, 183; decline of, 211; history of since 1870, 350, 351; government of, 351; conditions in, 352; colonial empire of lost, 372, 390.
Spanish Republic, 350.
"Spartacists," 520.
Spencer, Herbert, 72.
"Spheres of Influence" in China, 378.
Spicheran, 136.
Spies, 136, 426, 455.
Spinning "Jenny," 45.
"Spinning-Mule," 46.
"Splendid Isolation," 96, 175, 401.
Stadtholder, 355.
Stambulov, 340.
Standard of Living, 230, 231.
Standing Armies, 425.
Stanley, 391.
"State of Nature," 20, 30.
State Socialism, 162, 163, 167, 249.
States General, 254, 357.
Statuto Fondamentale del Regno, 345.
Steam, 41.
Steam Engine, 9, 41, 42.
Steamboat, 41, 42.
Steamship, 10.
Stein, vom, 125.
Stephenson, George, 42.
Stolypin, 301.
Storthing, 364, 365.
Straits Settlements, 373.
Strassburg, 138, 458.
Strategic Railways, 426.
Strikes, 532.
Stromboli, 15.
Styria, 310.
Subject Races, 168-171.
Submarines, 10, 478-80, 484, 488, 489.
Sudan, 376.
Suez Canal, 10, 11, 374, 375.
Suffrage, in Europe in the eighteenth century, 8; universal, 17; in France in 1791, 20; in the United States, 30; in France, 30, 31; in Great Britain, 30; extension of in central and southern Europe, 32, 33; extension of in the United Kingdom, 96; in Russia, 299, 301; in Austria, 310, 311; in Hungary, 312; in Italy, 345; in Spain, 351; in Holland, 357; in Belgium, 359, 360; in Norway, 364, 365; in Denmark, 366, 367.
Suffrageétes, 245, 246.
Sumatra, 391.
Sweden, suffrage in, 33; decline of, 211; in earlier times, 363; in the nineteenth century, 364, 365; government of, 364.
Swedes in Russia, 363.
Swedish Culture in Finland, 285.
Swiss, obtain their freedom from Austria, 360.
Swiss Cantons, government in, 18.
Swiss Confederation, 360.
Switzerland, suffrage in, 33; neutralization of, 118; education in, 248; earlier history of, 360; in the nineteenth century, 360, 361; government of, 361, 362; conditions in, 362.
Syllabus of Errors, 89.
Syndicalism, 531-3.
Syndical, 532.
Table of Magnates, 312.
Taff Vale Case, 249, 250.
Take Your Choice, 30.
Talleyrand, 102.
"Tanks," 494.
Tannenberg, Battle of, 467.
Taxation in Italy, 347.
Tchataldja Lines, 328.
Telegraph, 11, 41.
Telephone, 41.
Terrorists, 281.
Teutonic Race, alleged superiority of, 437.
Teutons, rivalry of with the Slavs, 433-6.
Textile Industry, 45, 46.
"They Shall Not Pass," 476.
Thiers, L. A., 214, 520.
Third Estate, 20.
Third Republic (French), 212, 215, 217, 224, 227, 228.
Thirteen Colonies, independence of, 257, 373.
Thirty Years War, 123, 153, 158, 363, 451, 498.
Three-class System of Voting, 146, 273.
Tibet, 378, 379, 405.
Tirpitz, Admiral von, 200.
Togo, Admiral, 297.
Togoland, 386.
Tonkin, 383.
Toynbee, Arnold, 40.
Trade Unions, 53, 98, 249, 250, 532.

INDEX

- Trades Disputes Act, 250.
 Trafalgar, 201.
 Tram Cars, 10.
 Trans-Siberian Railway, 293, 294.
 Transportation, revolution in, 42.
 Transvaal, 376.
 Transylvania, 310, 314, 317, 337, 338, 521.
 Travel, 9, 10.
 Treaty of Adrianople, 319, 321, 332, 336.
 Treaty of Berlin, 178, 323, 324, 337, 339, 340, 405, 406.
 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 482, 515, 517, 542, 543.
 Treaty of Bucharest, 331, 334, 337, 341.
 Treaty of Carlowitz, 317.
 Treaty of Frankfort, 139–41, 153.
 Treaty of London, 319, 328, 335.
 Treaty of Portsmouth, 297, 298.
 Treaty of Prague, 131, 175.
 Treaty of St. Germain, 338, 516, 517.
 Treaty of San Stefano, 319, 323, 332, 339.
 Treaty of Sèvres, 517, 518.
 Treaty of Utrecht, 176, 254, 358, 373.
 Treaty of Versailles, 512–16, 518, 519.
 Treaty of Vienna, 128, 129.
 "Treaty Ports," 377.
 Treitschke, 122, 143.
 Trentino, 310, 349, 477.
 Trevithick, Richard, 42.
Tribune, New York, 498.
 Trieste, 310, 428, 477, 506.
 Trinidad, 374.
 Triple Alliance, preamble to, 173; formation of, 179–82; weakening of, 182; treaties of, 182, 183; relations of with Great Britain, 183, 267; Rumania an appendage of, 184, 314, 315; power of, 184, 185; stronger than the Dual Alliance, 236; Italy helps to make, 349; position of, 398; power of relatively diminished, 417, 418; opposed to the Triple Entente, 423.
 Triple Alliance of Workers in Great Britain, 251.
 Triple Entente, 205, 266; formation of, 399, 404, 405; increasing strength of, 410; opposed to the Triple Alliance, 423.
 Tripoli, 324, 325; seized by Italy, 349, 389, 390.
 Trotzky, 301, 504, 537, 542, 543, 544.
- Tsardom, fall of the, 539, 540.
 Tsingtao, 472.
 Tsushima, Battle of, 203, 297.
 Tunisia, 181, 383, 384, 389.
 Turco-Italian War, 429.
 Turgeniev, 279.
 Turkestan, 265.
 Turkey, relations of with the German Empire, 193, 194; former greatness of, 315; enters the Great War, 470; surrenders to the Allies, 493; losses of, 517.
 Turkish Empire, rivalry for the possessions of, 318; preserved by the rivalries of the Great Powers, 318, 319; dismemberment of, 319–31; further decline and losses of, 324–31; before the Great War, 331; African possessions of lost, 390; loses Bosnia and Herzegovina, 405–8.
 Turks, earlier greatness of, 315; character of, 325; incapacity of in government, 325.
 "Two-Power Standard," British naval policy, 199.
- Uganda, 376.
 Ukraine, 284, 287, 522, 543.
 Ulster, 99, 257, 263.
 Unification, of Germany, 106, 107; of Italy, 114, 115.
 Unionists, of Ulster, 264.
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, suffrage in, 31, 32; in 1870, 94; formation of, 95, 258; national debt of, 96, 525; government of, 96, 97; extension of the franchise in, 240, 241, 246.
 United Netherlands, 355.
 United Provinces, 360.
 United States, slavery in, 25, 271; constitution of, 25; franchise in, 30, 33; relations of with Great Britain, 100; recognizes the Third (French) Republic, 215; assimilation of immigrants in, 288; Italians in, 348; participates in the Algeciras Conference, 403; joins the Allies in the Great War, 484–8; refuses to accept the Treaty of Versailles, 518, 519; in 1920, 523.
 Universal Military Service, 124, 125, 126, 233, 424, 425.
 Universe, 68, 69.
 Universities, 222, 223.
 University Tests Act, 248, 249.
 Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, 479, 480.

- Upper Austria, 310.
 Urban Life, 60, 61, 62.
 Usher, Archbishop, 70.
 Utopia, 74.
- Vatican, 345.
 Vatican Council, 89, 90, 159.
 Venetia, 131, 349.
 Venice, 15, 484.
 Venizelos, 326, 335.
 Verdun, 458, 461, 475, 476.
 Veto, king of England's power of falls into disuse, 255.
 "Veto Power" of the House of Lords, 254.
 Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, 149, 192, 400.
 Vienna, 15, 116, 117, 305, 316, 317, 517.
 Village Community in Russia, 272, 989.
 Villeins, 271.
 Vimy, 480.
 Virgil, 450.
 Virginia, 372.
 Virginia Company of London, 370.
 Vladivostok, 293, 294, 296, 428.
 Volga River, 12, 13, 286.
 Voltaire, 20, 228, 437.
Voyage en Icarie, 79.
- Wallace, A. R., 71.
 Wallachia, 316; *see Danubian Principalities*.
 War, end of desired, 33, 34; glorification of in the German Empire, 437, 438.
 War Material, accumulation of, 425, 426, 453, 454.
 War of Liberation, 36, 125.
 War of the Nations, 315.
 War of the Spanish Succession, 115, 372, 373, 498.
 Warsaw, 469, 475, 544.
 Washing, 43.
 Water, supply of, 42, 43.
 Waterloo, Battle of, 23, 96.
 Watt, James, 42.
 Wealth, distribution of in Great Britain, 252.
 Weavers, 48.
 Weaving, 45, 46.
 Webb, Beatrice, 536; Sidney, 536.
 Wei-hai-wei, 378.
 Weitling, Wilhelm, 79.
 Wells, H. G., 536.
Weltmacht oder Untergang, 438.
- West Indies, 372, 373.
 West Prussia, 170, 514.
 West Slavs, 310.
 White Russians, 285.
 Whitechapel, 252.
 "Wild Women," 245.
 Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands, 357.
 William I, German Emperor, 148, 149.
 William II, German Emperor, character of, 149, 150; statements of, 167, 173; takes control of the government, 191; new policy of with Russia, 191, 192; declaration of concerning policy, 192; visits of to Turkey, 193, 194; on German sea power, 201; foreign policy of, 235; on European conditions in 1904, 401; goes to Tangier, 401; in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis, 408; on the position of France, 414; flight of, 520.
 William I, King of the Netherlands, 355, 356.
 William II, King of the Netherlands, 357.
 Wilson, Woodrow, 487, 495, 498; character and ideals of, 500; "Fourteen Points" of, 500-1; at the Congress of Paris, 504, 511, 512; fails to secure ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by the United States, 518, 519.
 Witte, Count Sergei, 291, 299.
 Woman's Age, 64.
 Women, condition of improving, 9; position of in earlier times, 62; betterment of in the nineteenth century, 63, 64; affected by the Industrial Revolution, 64; position of in Great Britain, 242, 248; movement to obtain suffrage for, 241-6.
 Women's Movement, in English-speaking countries, 241, 242; in Great Britain, 241-6.
 Women's Suffrage Movement, progress of in Great Britain, 243-6; in Norway, 365; in Denmark, 367.
 Workers, Industrial, condition of, 10; condition of depressed by the Industrial Revolution, 48-52; condition of improved, 52, 53.
 Workingmen's Compensation Act, 249.
 "World Dominion or Downfall," 191.

INDEX

- Wörth, 136.
Wrangel, General, 544, 545.
Young, Arthur, 231.
Young Ireland, 37, 261.
Young Italy, 114.
Young Turk Revolution, 406.
Young Turks, 326, 406.
Ypres, 15, 464, 475.
Ypsilanti, Prince, 320.
Yser River, 464.
Yudenitch, General, 544.
Zabern Affair, 147, 168.
Zanzibar, 376.
Zemstvos, 273, 282.
Zeppelins, 486.
Zollverein, 107, 152.

